Abstract
This article conducts an in-depth exploration of the dynamic competition among states to attract businesses and determine the legal framework governing corporations. It adopts an innovative market-centric viewpoint, treating corporate law as a product within the broader context of charter competition among U.S. states. While the scholarly spotlight has predominantly shone on publicly traded giants, this article daringly delves into uncharted territory, unraveling the intricate incorporation and governance decisions of privately held “unicorns”—those elusive venture capital-backed behemoths that silently shape the economic landscape.
By unraveling the decision-making processes of where these economic powerhouses incorporate, the article challenges prevailing assumptions on horizontal and vertical competitive federalism, introducing the concept of “long-term private giant” companies. This distinctive perspective provides insights into the relocation options and incorporation choices of both large private and public firms, illuminating how these entities navigate and influence the intricate landscape of organizational structure and governance choices within the corporate domain.
Keywords
Competition for corporations, State Law, Corporate Law, Unicorns, Federalism
Publication Date
2024
Document Type
Article
Publication Information
Illinois Law Review (forthcoming 2024)
Repository Citation
Alon-Beck, Anat, "Delaware Beware" (2024). Faculty Publications. 2318.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2318
