The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-delegation doctrine to bring Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis
Abstract
This article examines the problems of benefit-cost analysis in our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the "non-delegation" doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though the "non-delegation" doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in separation of powers doctrine, exists in court review of agency action under Chevron analysis. The article notes how Chevron and non-delegation, though from different strand of analysis can be seen as part of one separation of powers continuum.
Keywords
non-delegation, agency, benefit-cost, cost-benefit, separation, executive, legislative, environmental
Publication Date
2007
Document Type
Article
Publication Information
15 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1087 (2007)
Repository Citation
Flatt, Victor B., "The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-delegation doctrine to bring Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis" (2007). Faculty Publications. 2271.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2271
