•  
  •  
 

Abstract

Since 2011, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly deployed investigative mechanisms—or commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, and other ad hoc investigations—to not just monitor and document egregious human rights abuses, but also to collect, preserve, and analyze evidence in order to lay the groundwork for future accountability. Importantly, these “accountability mechanisms” tend to deploy in places where the International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks jurisdiction or national courts are unwilling or unable to conduct prosecutions. They thus work to counter impunity gaps. However, since their debut, accountability mechanisms have faced immense political, financial, administrative, and institutional challenges, which have hindered their ability to advance accountability for atrocity crimes.

Since 2012, there have been multiple efforts to address these challenges, resulting in some changes, particularly at the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), which coordinates the work of most accountability mechanisms. The fate of more comprehensive solutions—such as adding a standing investigative body to the UN system that could support all accountability mechanisms—is in doubt. Why have efforts to enhance the work of accountability mechanisms proven so challenging? To answer this question, I draw on insights from interdisciplinary theories of institutionalism, as well as stakeholder interviews. I argue that because the OHCHR and its allies have institutional and extra-institutional means of resisting change (or, strong veto opportunities), it has been tough for change agents to openly break with the OHCHR to create a new standing investigative body. Consequently, change agents have had to work within the OHCHR system. In turn, these agents’ limited successes in securing reforms to the OHCHR have occurred when they have mobilized a strong pro-reform coalition that has been able to counteract resistance from within the UN to reforms. (from author)

Download

Share

COinS