Formal Legal Theory and the Surrender of political Control over Monetary policy: What can Ulysses' Journey to Ithaca Teach Argentina about Appropriate Legal Form


This Note applies the legal theory of form, posited by Robert S. Summers, to an area usually thought of as being dominated by substance: monetary policy. It focuses primarily on the question of the cumulative effects of choices of (legal) form in carrying out monetary policy. It posits that the successful reduction of the perverse influence of politics in the monetary policy of Western democracies can be credited to the choice of a specific legal form. This Note's primary hypothesis is that a certain kind of legal form deserves a major portion of the credit for the success that these democracies have had in achieving the goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth.



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Cornell International Law Journal

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36 Cornell International Law Journal 151 (2003)

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COinS Juscelino F. Colares Faculty Bio