Abstract
Over the past several decades, the scope, reach and cost of federal regulations have increased dramatically, prompting bipartisan calls for regulatory reform. One such proposed reform is the Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS Act). This proposal aims to restore political accountability to federal regulatory policy decisions by requiring both Houses of Congress to approve any proposed "major rule." In effect, the REINS Act would limit the delegation of regulatory authority to federal agencies, and restore legislative control and accountability to Congress. This article seeks to assess the REINS Act and its likely effects on regulatory policy. It explains why constitutional objections to the proposal are unfounded and many policy objections overstate the REINS Act’s likely impact on the growth of federal regulation. The REINS Act is not likely to be the deregulatory blunderbuss feared by its opponents and longed for by some of its proponents. The REINS Act should be seen more as a measure to enhance accountability than to combat regulatory activity.
Keywords
REINS Act, federal regulation, agency oversight, administrative law, delegation, political accountability, delegated authority, Congressional Review Act, executive authority
Publication Date
2013
Document Type
Article
Place of Original Publication
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
Publication Information
16 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 1 (2013)
Repository Citation
Adler, Jonathan H., "Placing 'REINS' on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act" (2013). Faculty Publications. 508.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/508
