In a recent article, Richard Friedman articulates a modified and generalized version of the doctrine of conditional relevance, which he calls "conditional probative value."1 This version comes in response to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional doctrine.2 As one of the critics to whom Professor Friedman responds, I offer this reply with two purposes in mind: (1) to clarify the relationship between Friedman's analysis and my earlier reinterpretation of the conditional relevance doctrine; and (2) to ad- dress Friedman's specific proposals with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. I conclude that Friedman's articulation helps clarify the logic of proof in certain contexts, but I take issue with his suggestions for amending the Federal Rules.


"conditional probative value"

Publication Date


Document Type


Place of Original Publication

Michigan Law Review

Publication Information

94 Michigan Law Review 419 (1995)

Included in

Evidence Commons


COinS Dale A. Nance Faculty Bio