Abstract
The alleged purpose of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare by proscribing actions and arrangements that reduce output and increase prices. Conservation seeks to improve human welfare by maximizing the long-term productive use of natural resources, a goal that often requires limiting consumption to sustainable levels. While conservation measures might increase prices in the short run, they enhance consumer welfare by increasing long-term production and ensuring the availability of valued resources over time. That is true whether the restrictions are imposed by a private conservation cartel or a government agency. Insofar as antitrust law fails to take this into account, it bars the creation and evolution of ecologically valuable and socially beneficial arrangements among resource users.
Keywords
antitrust, competition policy, environment, environment protection, marine commons, commons, collusion, property rights, tragedy of the commons, antitrust law
Publication Date
2006
Document Type
Article
Place of Original Publication
Regulation
Publication Information
2004-2005 (Winter) Regulation 38 (2004)
Repository Citation
Adler, Jonathan H., "Conservation Cartels: How Competition Policy Conflicts with Environmental Protection" (2006). Faculty Publications. 199.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/199
