It is one thing to create an international institution devoted to enforcing international justice; it is quite another to make international justice work. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, whose orders were implemented by the Allied occupation forces, the ICC will have no constabulary. In the absence of a direct enforcement mechanism, the ICC will have to rely on state cooperation and indirect means of inducing compliance with its arrest orders and requests for judicial cooperation.

The range of enforcement measures potentially available to the ICC include: (1) condemnation of non-cooperation by the Assembly of State Parties or the U.N. Security Council; (2) offers of individual cash rewards for assistance in locating and apprehending indicted war criminals; (3) use of luring by deception to obtain custody over indicted war criminals; (4) freezing the assets of indicted war criminals; (5) offers of economic incentives to governments to induce cooperation; (6) imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions on non-co-operating governments; and (7) use of military force to effectuate apprehension. Drawing upon the recent experience of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, this Article examines the potential usefulness of these enforcement measures to the ICC.


international criminal justice, Yugoslavia Tribunal

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49 DePaul Law Review 925 (2000)


COinS Michael P. Scharf Faculty Bio