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Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — RIGHT OF PRIVACY — ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVE INFORMATION


Legal restrictions on birth control demonstrate the discord between present state statutes and present American mores. As early as the 1940's, the majority of married couples in the nation employed some type of contraceptive techniques; yet now, more than two decades later, legislative restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives and the dissemination of information still exist.

The United States Supreme Court, in the recent decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, held, by a seven-to-two vote, that two Connecticut criminal statutes, one prohibiting the use of contraceptives, the other prohibiting anyone from counseling another in the use of birth control methods, were unconstitutional.

Appellant Griswold was the executive director of a non-commercial birth control clinic which actively distributed contraceptive information and instructions to married persons. Both appellant and co-appellant, a licensed physician who was the medical director of the clinic, were accused of violating the two Connecticut statutes.

A survey in 1960 demonstrated that 80% of married women with some high school education and 60% of those with a grammar school education have performed or plan to perform in the future various acts designed to limit conception. A breakdown by religious affiliation established that: among Protestants and Jews, 80% of women with a grammar school education and 90% of those with more education have used an appliance method (condom, diaphragm, pill, douche) of contraception; among Catholics, 67% of women with some college education, 52% with a high school education, 34% with some high school exposure, and 38% with a grammar school education have used rhythm and withdrawal to prevent conception. RAINWATER, AND THE POOR GET CHILDREN 26-27 (1960).

Gynecologists well know that most American couples use one or another form of contraception. Eastman quotes Pearl as demonstrating that 55% of the married population of the United States practices contraception; Himes' figure is higher — 60 to 75%. My experience with both clinic and private patients is that the incidence... of contraception, not including complete abstinence, is of the order of 90%. I include the practice of coitus interruptus, as well as the exercise of periodic continence.” Rock, Medical and Biological Aspects of Contraception, 1 CLINICS 1598 (1943). (Footnotes omitted.)

See text accompanying notes 32-39 infra.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).


CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-196 (1958). For a discussion of these statutes, see Comment, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275, 279 (1964).

Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.
Appellants were found guilty as accessories who assisted and counseled another person in the use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception. Following affirmation of the conviction by the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, struck down the Connecticut statutes as unconstitutional, establishing that the intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation involve a right of privacy which must be protected from unwarranted intrusion by the government. The Court held that the Constitution protects, without specific enumeration, certain essential freedoms of the individual. Labeled peripheral rights, these freedoms are derived from the penumbra or total scope of the constitutional amendments. The penumbral approach incorporates rights not explicitly included in any amendment, with the rationale that their existence is vital "in making the express guarantees [of the various amendments] fully meaningful." Without these peripheral rights the enumerated rights would be vulnerable. Guidelines for judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are not defined as the Court subjectively determines which peripheral rights are necessary to implement the express guarantees of the Constitution.

Judicial interpretation has construed the first amendment to include: the right to educate a child in a school of the parents' preference.

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10 Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court held that appellants had standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married couples with whom they dealt. Accessories, convicted under an aiding-and-abetting statute, have standing to assert that the offense which they are charged with assisting cannot constitutionally be classified as a crime. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). The case of Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), was distinguished because, there, the plaintiff sought to represent others who had their constitutional rights infringed. In the instant case, appellants, themselves, were convicted under the aiding-and-abetting statute. The court held that they have a valid "case or controversy" and standing to demonstrate that the act they were charged with assisting was not in fact a crime.

11 The Court relied on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), which recognized the existence of a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. The intimacy of a husband and wife's marital relation must be incorporated into that private realm. The physician's service to married couples (i.e., instruction and consultation in birth control) is similarly protected. The Court primarily discussed the rights of married clients, but since their conduct is not criminal, appellant physicians cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting. Further the Court stated that "the rights of husband and wife . . . are . . . adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." Id. at 481.
13 Id. at 483.
choice, whether public, private, or parochial;\textsuperscript{14} the right to the entire spectrum of available knowledge in school;\textsuperscript{15} and the freedom to associate in privacy.\textsuperscript{16} The Court reasoned that the first amendment has a penumbra where privacy is immune from governmental invasion and that all forms of "association" — social, legal, and economic — are to be equally protected.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, although the Constitution does not expressly mention the term "right of privacy," it is a fundamental right that "emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live."\textsuperscript{18}

Zones of privacy were thus created from the various guarantees found in and implied by the Constitution: freedom of association provided by the first amendment;\textsuperscript{19} freedom from governmental invasion of the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" granted by the fourth and fifth amendments;\textsuperscript{20} assurance that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people, set forth in the ninth amendment;\textsuperscript{21} and protection of basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," established through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.\textsuperscript{22}

Marriage is within this realm of fundamental guarantees; therefore, it is an association which demands constitutional protection equal to that accorded those guarantees impliedly incorporated in the protected zone of privacy through the penumbral theory.\textsuperscript{23} The

\textsuperscript{14} Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 515 (1925).
\textsuperscript{15} Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
\textsuperscript{18} Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
\textsuperscript{19} See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
\textsuperscript{20} Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
\textsuperscript{22} U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 324-25. Mr. Justice Harlan advocated this point in his concurring opinion, based solely on the fourteenth amendment. He disagreed with the court's opinion which implied that the due process clause did not touch the Connecticut statutes unless the enactment violated some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights. This "incorporation" doctrine was employed to restrict the reach of the fourteenth amendment, and was totally unacceptable to the Justice, who interpreted the due process clause to stand on its own "bottom," independent of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1965).
\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 486-87 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Goldberg based his concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, on the ninth and fourteenth amendments, as interpreted by Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923): "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration. Without doubt, it denotes not merely free-
Connecticut statutes, by forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than by regulating their sale, were an unwarranted and unjustified legislative invasion of this privacy. The Court held that the laws thus swept too broadly into the area of protected freedom — marital rights — and, as such, could not stand.

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, adopted the reasoning of the Court's opinion, but relied on the ninth amendment which similarly recognizes that fundamental personal rights, even though not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, are protected from abridgment by a government. The language and history of this amendment establish that other "unmentioned" rights must exist and be lawfully protected if the sovereignty and dignity of the individual are to be preserved.

Although the modern birth control movement achieved full growth in England as early as 1877, prevailing laws in the United dom from bodily restraint but also the right . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . ." The concurring opinion stated that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights including marital privacy, that are fundamental even if not guaranteed by name in the Constitution.


Ibid. The Court cited NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964), as exemplifying the application of the principle that if the purpose of the government was to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation, it could not be achieved by means which swept unnecessarily broadly and invaded protected freedoms. Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion asserted that Connecticut's two statutes bore a substantial burden of justification and would prevail only if the state's interest was compelling. The statutes were enacted to prevent pre-marital and extra-marital relations, but in the process also affected those engaged in marital relations. He concluded that less drastic measures for achieving the same purpose were available and must be employed. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965).

Id. at 486 (concurring opinion). This opinion actually represents the plurality of the Court as six separate opinions were written.

The two dissenting opinions asserted that the majority and concurring opinions incorporated provisions, not previously existing, into the various amendments merely to confer upon the court power to invalidate any legislative act which was believed to be irrational, unreasonable, or offensive. Id. at 520-21. Mr. Justice Black feared that such broad "judicial control . . . would . . . jeopardize the separation of governmental powers . . . and . . . threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves. . . ." Id. at 521. The dissent further visualized the deprivation of legislative power to make laws based on their own wisdom, if the Supreme Court usurped the power of veto or ultimate determination. Id. at 513. Mr. Justice Stewart could find no general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution which rendered the Connecticut statutes invalid. Id. at 530. The dissent further stated that the essence of judicial duty is to subordinate any personal view of the wisdom of a particular law. The constitutional method of repealing a law is through the state legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 530-31.


Free distribution of contraceptive information was legalized, mainly through the efforts of T. R. Malthus, British minister and economist. See Comment, 9 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 245, 246 (1960).
States have prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptive methods since the Federal Comstock Law of 1873. This law prohibited interstate distribution of birth control devices and information, but the courts, by permitting certain exceptions to exist, have in essence negated any effective restriction. The one remaining enforceable federal requirement, as established by United States v. Nicholas, is that the instruments and information be used only by married couples.

The majority of state legislatures originally patterned their morality statutes after the rigid federal law. State courts and legislatures, with few exceptions, have incorporated provisions in statutes on contraceptives to exempt physicians and licensed pharmacists from prosecution. The justification for the statutory prohibition on the dissemination of information is derived through the rationale of the inherent police power of the state to protect the public wel-
fare, safety, and morals. Although at the present time only Massachusetts severely restricts legal means of obtaining contraceptives, twenty-nine other jurisdictions have retained stringent control of the sale or advertisement of such methods, or both.

Birth control clinics have been subjected to stringent control from their inception. As late as 1962 in Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, these clinics were impeded, although not outlawed, in the distribution of non-commercial information to married persons. The Griswold decision substantially protects from state intervention the clinical instruction of patients. Current statutory bans on dissemination of information, however, severely limit the effectiveness of the clinics in reaching the segment of Americans who are misinformed and apprehensive of modern, inexpensive birth control methods.

Perhaps the most significant element of the Griswold decision,

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37 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 20-21 (1956).


Seven states generally prohibit the sale of contraceptives, but an express exception is made for physicians and/or pharmacists: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-944 to -954 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-04 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-603, 39-801 to -810 (1947); IOWA CODE §§ 725-7, 725.9-10 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-3609, 94-3616 to -3619 (1947); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 453.010-990 (1955); WIS. STAT. § 151.15 (1961).

Five states have special prohibitions: New York, Minnesota, Nebraska, Missouri and New Jersey. See notes 34, 35 supra. For an exhaustive study of state and federal birth control legislation, see Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275-82 (1964).

39 The operation of organized, permanent institutions dedicated to the dissemination of birth control information had been universally held subject to regulation under the police power. See, e.g., People v. Dever, 236 Ill. App. 135 (1925); People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918).

40 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962). The court construed ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-213 (1956) to allow medical personnel to see patients who had requested aid, but if the clinic canvassed or solicited, its activity would be illegal.

41 See RAINWATER, AND THE POOR GET CHILDREN 169-70 (1960); TRUXAL & MERRILL, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 223 (1953).
although it concerned birth control statutes on the surface, is the
enunciation by two justices of the penumbral approach to Bill of
Rights questions. Through this approach to Constitutional inter-
pretation, unmentioned rights are incorporated into the Bill of
Rights with a subjective look toward the "spirit" of the amendments. The scope of this article precludes a discussion of the future ramifica-
tions of such an approach to the interpretation of the Constitution.

The interests that states have in controlling the indiscriminate
distribution of birth control information — to prevent pre-marital
and extra-marital relations — will still be served, although access
to information will be considerably easier. State welfare and health
officials' anxieties, fostered by unrestricted dissemination of informa-
tion, can be alleviated if precautions followed in the actual proc-
curement of the contraceptive (i.e., that proof of marriage is a prere-
quisite to obtaining the device) are enforced by the physicians, phar-
macists, and clinical personnel who distribute them, as well as by
the law.

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42 See text accompanying notes 11-27 supra.

43 For an excellent and extensive analysis of the penumbra theory and other elements
of the case, see Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 Mich. L.
Rev. 197 (1965).

44 In the same month as the Griswold decision, the Ohio Legislature amended its
statutes on contraceptives, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2905.32-.34, to permit the unconditional
sale and advertisement of birth control devices. Amended H.R. 120, 106th Gen. Assem-
bly, 1965 Regular Sess. This amendment was passed June 23, 1965, approved June 29,
1965, and went into effect September 28, 1965. The previous statutes, included in the
chapter entitled "Offenses Against Chastity," Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2905.01-.44, and
dealing equally with dissemination of drugs and information to procure abortions, in-
duce miscarriages, and prevent conception, were rephrased to delete any reference to
contraceptives. Thus, Ohio may no longer ban or even control the sale of devices or
the dissemination of related information.

Unfortunately, the Ohio Legislature may have been too liberal in removing unequiv-
cally the contraceptive ban. The amendment provides that anyone may now sell or
advertise contraceptives; previously only responsible professional people were intrusted
with dissemination. The potential danger of the new Ohio law was envisioned in San-
itary Vendors, Inc. v. Byrne, 40 N.J. 157, 190 A.2d 876 (1963), which judged con-
traceptive dispensation through vending machines illegal in New Jersey. Reasoning
that the sale of contraceptives must be regulated to guard against an illegal use in pre-
marital or extra-marital relations, the court held that promiscuous and indiscriminate
sale through vending machines in public places removes all measure of control. See,
e.g., People v. Pennock, 294 Mich. 578, 293 N.W. 739 (1940); Howell v. Bryant, 99

A more practical amendment than Ohio's would permit uninhibited, noncommercial
advertisement and would restrict the actual sale to professional agencies where only
legal demand would be supplied and pre-marital relations controlled. This statute would
best implement the growing needs of the people in light of the restraining mores of the
nation. Ohio's amendment has not provided for such regulation and must, if it is to
prove beneficial to the State's interest, incorporate restrictions against commercial ad-
vertising and indiscriminate sale.