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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS. By Sayre A. Swartztrauber. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1972. Pp. xii, 316. $12.50.

Exploitation of the sea, as a source of food and mineral wealth, is assuming an ever-increasing importance in the commercial and political relations of nations. Against a backdrop of greater need and incentive for exploiting the resources of the oceans, however, there has been no development of a stable concensus of international legal opinion to govern the interaction of sovereign governments, as well as private interests, each pursuing its own perceived goals for developing and harvesting its sea resources. To this must also be added the conflicting approaches taken to those non-economic functions which nations ascribe to the sea: conservation ("genuine," as opposed to mere attempts to monopolize resources for one's own nationals), and providing a buffer zone viewed as essential for both national security and the enforcement of revenue and criminal laws.

Contemporary conferences attempting to resolve these differences by delineating the international law of the sea, regulating the exploitation of the resources of the seas, the continental shelves, and the seabed, coupled with the declarations and acts of various nations proclaiming 200-mile limits, exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf, "freedom of the seas," and pollution control jurisdiction, graphically illustrate the centuries-old conflict between the concepts of *mare liberum* and *mare clausum*.

The *Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas* represents an ambitious undertaking: the tracing of the development, preeminence, and decline of a rule of international law limiting the jurisdiction of a littoral state to 3 miles from shore. Its usefulness extends beyond consideration of the 3-mile rule, however, because Captain Swarztrauber approaches his history of that rule through an analysis of the underlying concept of national sovereignty over the seas, or maritime territoriality.

Explaining at the outset that the doctrines of *mare clausum* and *mare liberum*, while seemingly conceptually opposed, are merely different methods by which states exercise control over the oceans[1] (the latter being crude while the former is more subtle) the author traces the influence that each concept has had on the practices

[1] SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 1.

of nations from the Roman view that state jurisdiction stopped at the high-water mark,[2] to the ostensible attempts of 15th century Spain and Portugal to divide the world in half (including outright ownership of the high seas),[3] to the Pax Brittanica's staunch upholding of the 3-mile limit and freedom of the seas,[4] and finally to contemporary claims of sovereignty over vast reaches of hitherto high seas.[5]

The author generally follows a chronological pattern in his treatment of the 3-mile limit. He begins by considering ancient and medieval practices then moves on to deal with three predecessors of the 3-mile rule: the famed "cannon-shot" rule, line-of-sight doctrine, and the marine league. Captain Swarztrauber next traces the ascendancy of the 3-mile limit from the 18th through the 19th and into the early part of the 20th century. He is also careful, however, to document major departures from the rule, dissents to it, and competing views and practices. This is followed by a consideration of the effect of World War II on the rule, after which the author examines the post-war controversy over the extent of territorial seas, the role of the United Nations in that controversy, and the demise of the 3-mile rule.

Throughout his book, Captain Swarztrauber describes and contrasts theory, the works of publicists, and so forth, with the actual practice of states as manifested in their decrees, statutes, treaties, and court decisions. He points out that the 3-mile limit became an accepted rule of international law mainly because its chief backer, Great Britain, was a great power with the will and strength to impose it upon lesser nations by neither recognizing nor submitting to other nations' attempts to enlarge their jurisdiction beyond 3 miles and also by scrupulously adhering to the rule itself.

The author shows that when Great Britain's successor, the United States, equivocated with respect to the rule, the long dormant claims to greater expanses of sea were revived and the current regime of conflicting claims was begun.

Captain Swarztrauber concludes his description of the present anarchy with what he terms, "a formula for reform." He maintains that to turn back the tide of extensive unilateral claims to exclusivity would require a whole-hearted joint effort on the part

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[2] *Id.* at 10.

[3] *Id.* at 13.

[4] *Id.* at 64.

[5] *Id.* at 164.

of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two contemporary naval powers which, acting in conjunction with one another, might bring a measure of order to the current scene in much the same way that Great Britain did a century ago. He then adds that stability requires a single multi-purpose limit, pointing to the relative stability which was maintained under the 3-mile rule until states started claiming special purpose jurisdiction beyond that limit. He proposes that the 12-mile limit presents the most politically feasible successor to the 3-mile limit, given, of course, great power cooperation in its sponsorship and advocacy.

The *Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas* provides a wealth of historical material for the reader desirous of preparing himself for a thorough understanding of the complex issues facing contemporary negotiators. In addition, it contains probably the most extensive bibliography ever compiled on the subject of territorial claims over the ocean.

As citizens of the world's most highly industrialized nation, we Americans have a vital stake in maintaining the freedom of the seas for private commercial exploitation. The fruition of current trends, either to divide up the high seas among littoral states for their exclusive use or to place the seas under a kind of quasi-world (presumably via the U.N.) sovereignty, with developers being required to pay licensing fees which would in large part accrue to the benefit of non-littoral lesser developed nations with no stake whatsoever in the risks associated with the venture, would be a detriment to the exploration incentives which must be present if the high costs of exploitation are to be surmounted and the sea's resources tapped for the benefit of all mankind. All those interested in preserving a regime of freedom with respect to the oceans would do well to study Captain Swarztrauber's book.

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LIMITS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE SEA. Edited by George T. Yates, III, and John Hardin Young. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1974. Pp. 236. $15.00.

This volume focuses upon the vexing problem of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf and seabed. It is composed of six essays dealing with three broad themes: a) jurisdiction over the continental shelf; b) jurisdiction over the seabed; and, c) the national practices of the Soviet Union and Canada.

Development of a rational test for defining national control over both continental shelf and seabed is of crucial importance today. Economic considerations such as availability of large supplies of offshore oil and deposits of crucial minerals make a just definition of national jurisdiction a necessity. The choice of an arbitrary marker such as the 200-meter isobath depth limit as opposed to a more flexible method such as exploitable reaches can change the contours of boundaries. The subject is technical in that there are numerous proposed definitions of what the continental shelf is and the extent to which the coastal states may exert control over it. The ultimate impact of the various proposals does not work very much change upon the areas which would fall under the control of the states with the greatest coastlines such as the United States or the Soviet Union. However, employment of the American proposal of 200-meter isobaths or some other formulation based on exploitability or adjacency can very much alter the territorial limits of various island states and states with less extensive coast lines than the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, or Brazil. An exploitability limit would, for example, greatly favor Iceland, while the 200-meter isobath proposal would not.

That the alternatives are still broad is fairly evident. The areas where the different systems for boundary determination come under the stress of actual testing are places such as the North Sea or the South China Sea. In the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases*, the International Court of Justice began to work out the boundaries of the North Sea States assuming that the States were under a duty to negotiate and that each State should be awarded a "just and equitable share of the divisible area." The Court rejected the notion that the States were participating in a division of commonly owned property. Rather, the Court assumed that it was defining the extent of territory already appurtenant to that State. It was thus a problem of delimitation of the boundaries of the States. The Court then held that the proper manner for

defining the boundaries of the continental shelf was not to be based on distributive principles nor was it for the unfettered appreciation of the parties.

The ultimate outcome of the case was a negotiated North Sea settlement on the basis of general principles laid down by the Court. The settlement was an attempt to allocate the territory which constituted a natural extension of its land mass.

Another area in which the issue of national jurisdiction over the seabed may arise is the South China Sea. It is bordered by Brunei, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Malayasia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Peoples Republic of China. The issue of control is serious because the shelf of the South China Sea is thought to be rich in petroleum deposits. There is, as yet, no definite method of delimiting the seabed boundaries of the South China Sea. Compared to the North Sea, for example, it is deeper, bordered by seven states and dotted with islands. Much of the problem depends on the significance of such factors as the location of various trenches and islands, and the principle chosen for boundary creation. The states bordering the South China Sea probably have sovereign rights to enjoy the mineral wealth which lies beneath the surface of the continental shelf. That is where certainty ends, because there has been no agreement between the states concerned as to common principles.

Determination of rights of national sovereignty is much less complex when a state does not share a significant coastline with other states or border on some common body of water. For example, Canadian jurisdiction over much of the Arctic Sea is not open to question. The real issues and problems are the extent to which Canada wishes to exercise its jurisdiction for the purposes of both extraction of minerals and environmental self-protection. Canada's problem is to define her control in such a way as to leave room for legitimate international uses of the Arctic and, simultaneously, to protect Canadian interests in an area where precise geographical information does not exist. Thus, Canada extended its territorial limits to 12 miles. She also has taken legislative action to protect her Arctic waters from pollution as far as 100 miles offshore. Although controversial, there appear to be grounds in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter for applying the anti-pollution legislation to both Canadian and foreign vessels.

It is important to remember that there are well over 100 states with some coast line. The evolution of rational means of dividing the control of continental shelf territory can be of immense significance to them. That is especially so for those states grouped

around such masses as the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf, where the economic consequences are likely to be great. It is of less significance to the Soviet Union, Canada, and the United States. It is possible to analyze the significance of the different proposed systems of division by geographical position, that is, whether a state is land locked, shelf locked, and those which are unaffected by those classifications. Much will ultimately depend on whether the issues involved are resolved in favor of maximally large allocations to the various states or whether the largest possible bloc of territory is preserved under an international regime.

Limits to National Jurisdiction of the Sea is a collection of six essays by leading authorities. Taken as a whole, it seems to be oriented for the specialist rather than the lay reader. It is a brief work, with the result that it focuses narrowly on the evolution of doctrine and practices connected with national control of undersea resources. As it develops little of the necessary background material, it would appear that it is meant as a reference tool and summary of developments for those already working in the subject area rather than as a guide for the interested non-specialist lawyer or layman.

WILLIAM A. GERBER

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE. Edited by Robert G. Wirsing. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press (1974). Pp. 141. $5.95.

The concept of "freedom of the seas" has endured well into the Twentieth Century, and it has only been in the recent past that international attention has been focused upon the sea as a possible extension of national sovereignty rather than a mere liquid barrier between land masses. This new awareness of the potential use of ocean space has brought with it a new awareness of the inadequacy of man's institutions in dealing with international conflicts over the direction and means of the new use of ocean space. Professor Robert G. Wirsing has collected and edited papers delivered at the 1972 Institute of International Studies conference on the Future of Ocean Space which deal with these new problems in the formation and implementation of national ocean space policy.

A basic and undisputed premise is that the old rules of international relations, based on sovereignty over land masses, are inadequate in establishing policies and standards for disputes in-

volving ocean space. A major decision currently facing the United Nations is whether ocean space is to be partitioned between nations, and if so, what process is to be used in carrying out the partition. International debate over division and control of ocean space continues, leading many to question whether there even exists a proper forum for the resolution of differences.

Each nation carries to the debate its own national policy on use of ocean space, comprised of one or more special interests. Mr. H. Gary Knight, in his essay "Special Domestic Interests and United States Policy," takes a critical look at the role of the military, petroleum and natural gas industries, the fishing industry, the scientific community, the mineral mining industry, the transportation industry, and the environmentalists in the formulation of United States ocean policy. The roots of national ocean policy date from 1967 when the United Nations first addressed the issue. Between 1967 and 1970, when the United States submitted its first draft treaties to the U.N. Seabed Committee, the current U.S. policy developed and evolved. Mr. Knight's most severe criticism of U.S. policy is reserved for the procedure used to obtain input by special interests into this policy-making process. With the exception of the Department of Defense, no special interest group was allowed input during the policy formulation stage. The other groups were assigned the role of review and critique of first drafts of various position papers. By emphasizing this review role for special interests, the Department of State has reduced their significance. Even after creation of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea in 1972, meaningful access to the policy formation process was effectively denied these special interests due to the withholding of vital information as a result of security classifications. If decision-making improves with full, free and honest discussion of all responsible interests and points of view, immediate participation in the policy-making process by all special interest groups is vital.

The substantive impact of individual special interest groups with conflicting needs has varied considerably. The military's desire for narrow territorial seas and free access through international straits, in order to facilitate free, undetected movement of subsurface naval vessels, has been fully met by ocean space policies advocated by the United States. Petroleum industry needs for extended national jurisdiction over off-shore mineral deposits has also been advocated in U.S. policy. Unfortunately, Mr. Knight, in criticizing petroleum industry rhetoric of the "energy crisis" as a pure smoke-screen for short-term industry profit

motives, fails to consider that industry and national interests may coincide in a common objective. Internal differences within the fishing industry, with coastal fishermen advocating expanded territorial seas to protect the fisheries, and deep water fishermen advocating narrow limits to facilitate freedom of movement, may have rendered the industry virtually ineffective as a source of input into U.S. policy-making. The desire of the scientific community for maximum access to all possible ocean areas for purposes of testing and experimenting has encountered strong opposition from developing nations, and the relative unimportance of the scientific interest in terms of short-term economic impact may be the reason for a basic neglect of these interests in U.S. policy. The mineral mining industry has had a more noticeable impact on U.S. policy. This impact was not due to input at the Department of State, but rather to an intensive legislative lobbying effort which resulted in legislation to protect deep-sea mining from competing claims. This type of legislation may be nothing more than an appropriation of mineral resources by technologically advanced nations, forcing the developing nations to press claims for a 200-mile territorial sea, and hampering future efforts to resolve differences in the U.N. Other special interest groups have met with success in having their interests adopted as U.S. policy in almost direct proportion to the coincidence of their interests with those of the Department of Defense. The transportation industry, needing unlimited movement upon the seas, has been successful. The environmentalists' desire to expand coastal state jurisdiction for an international agreement to control pollution, has not been expressed in U.S. policy. The sum total of all different special interests may equal the national interest expressed in ocean policy, but it is imperative that these needs be balanced in order to create a workable national policy.

Mr. Robert L. Friedheim's essay, "A Law of the Sea Conference — Who Needs It?," is extremely prophetic in light of the less than spectacular success of the recent conferences and provides an insight into the factors that contributed to the outcome of the conferences. The mistaken reliance by nations upon a universal lawmaking conference to resolve the multiple problems of ocean use was evident in the difficulties encountered by the U.N. Seabed Committee in developing an agenda in preparation for a Law of the Sea Conference. The primary difficulties encountered were the differences in theory and implementation that arose between the "Group of 77" (a caucusing group of developing states) and the developed nations. These differences arose in all subcommittees on

issues of seabed regime, territorial seas, straits, fishing, ocean science and environmental controls. As an historical comment, Mr. Friedheim attributes this stalemate to the failure of the developed states to anticipate the demands and objections of developing nations, a failure which may be due, in part, to a misunderstanding of the nature of the U.N. as an institution.

The U.N. is a political institution which handles world problems in a political manner. The heart of the ocean problem is the allocation of ocean resources, and a political approach demands that each nation advance its individual and self-serving claims as to how allocation should take place. In this environment, the claims of the developed states of altruistic motivation have met with a skeptical reception from the developing nations. The General Assembly is controlled by the developing nations, who dominate in numbers but lack the present capacity for utilization of ocean resources; thus, any General Assembly sponsored conference is skewed in their favor. The issues that will receive serious attention in any such conference are those issues which are salient to the majority. A substantive law of the sea is salient at this time to the minority developed states because they are massive users of the ocean. A law of the sea as a substantive standard is only indirectly relevant to developing states whose primary concern is to harness ocean resources to aid in rapid economical development while preventing their use for the purpose of economic gap between themselves and the developed nations. The developing nations view a law of the sea as a zero sum game — one in which in order for one player to win, another must lose.

The nature of U.N. negotiations, in and of themselves, greatly contributes to the futility of a search for solutions in a law of the sea conference. U.N. negotiations are a unique blend of parliamentary procedure and diplomatic formality. Diplomatic influences color negotiations on any issue with the concepts of state sovereignty and sovereign equality, which raise the stakes and decrease the possibility of compromise. Another factor contributing to the inadequacy of the U.N. as a forum for resolution of ocean problems is the glaring lack of enforcement power over its solutions and conventions. A majority in the General Assembly may reach a convention, but it is almost impossible to bind a dissenting nation unless the convention rule becomes part of customary international law. Lack of enforcement power leads to reliance upon consensus decisions. The inability to arrive at a consensus on ocean problems has prevailed at recent conferences.

Mr. Friedheim, in anticipating the current situation, provides

the reader with some cause for optimism. The current stalemate in negotiations may, in effect, be a blessing in disguise. A stalemate has the advantage of allowing time for all parties to consider their positions. It has the further advantage of allowing a measure of time to explore the possibility of a rival or supplemental forum. An analysis of the U.N. shows that any ocean problem taken before that body becomes a universal problem, with the U.N. forced to arrive at a universal solution. The author proposes that many ocean problems are regional in nature and therefore require regional, not universal solutions. Transnational regional bargaining may provide a solution for these problems. Many of the issues which have received bloc support from the developing nations have originated at regional or idealogical conferences, and this same medium may provide solutions for these issues. Unfortunately, Mr. Friedheim fails to concede the existence of universal problems such as pollution of major oceans. Not all problems are susceptible to regional solutions in that they require universal acceptance and cooperation in order to work. The author, in stating his case as a hard choice between futile efforts in an unwieldy forum and international bargaining on a regional basis, does not address the third alternative of reevaluation of national goals and policies in light of long range world needs rather than short term national needs. Selflessness has never been an attribute characterizing negotiations between sovereign states, but an extended deadlock in the face of ever compounding ocean problems may well prove intolerable to all nations.

In his short essay, "New Approaches to Control of Ocean Resources," Mr. Lewis M. Alexander provides a concise and readable review of present jurisdictional control over ocean resources and some workable alternatives worthy of serious consideration. Mr. Alexander points out that the existence of two separate types of ocean resources, living and nonliving, dictate separate approaches to control over both the coastal water column and the seabed. Present national jurisdiction is based primarily on two sources: codified international law found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, and customary international law as it has evolved over the years. Generally, a nation exercises jurisdictional control over a territorial sea, and sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting natural resources of its continental shelf, extending out to the 200-meter isobath or beyond to where the depth of the water allows for the exploitation of the natural resources. This last exploitation limitation is technological rather than jurisdictional, and actually makes possible resource exploitation by any coastal

state that develops the technology to mine resources beyond depths of 200 meters. This license to exploit, based upon advanced technology, is the primary motivation of developing nations in establishing a new ocean regime.

The author analyzes the conflicting objectives of developed states that advocate freedom of the seas and developing states that insist upon protection of resources. He foresees a universal trend toward desired expansion of jurisdictional control over both the water column and the seabed. A third faction comprised of landlocked nations and nations with limited coastlines is also demanding a share of ocean resources, and strongly advocates the establishment of a world authority to control resource use and collect and distribute resource revenue.

As a compromise to these conflicting objectives, Dr. Arvid Pardo of Malta proposed in the 1970 U.N. Draft Ocean Space Treaty[1] a 200 mile belt of ocean space for each coastal state, with exclusive resource rights to the state within the 100-mile limit and a mandatory contribution by the coastal state to an international fund of a percentage of resources derived between 100 and 200 miles. Mr. Alexander feels that this is a simplistic approach to a complex situation. Among the other alternatives, such as limiting seabed jurisdiction to a certain depth, or to the edge of the continental shelf, he favors the United States' proposal for a limited jurisdictional sea, with an intermediate seabed zone as a trusteeship area in which the coastal state receives preferential consideration in resource exploitation. Under this proposal, an international authority would control the use of resources beyond the trusteeship area by dividing resources among all nations.

Mr. Alexander argues the absolute need for an international authority to control some portion of ocean resources and distribute income derived from their exploitation to the landlocked nations. If the oceans of the world are truly a heritage of all mankind, then a workable world solution to the resource allocation problem may only be found in an equitable allocation between all nations.

The final essay, "A Regime For World Ocean Pollution Control," by E. W. Seabrook Hull and Albert Koers, deals with the international aspects of ocean pollution and presents a framework for creation of an international agency for pollution control. The authors provide the reader with evidence to support the hypothesis that ocean pollution results from activities almost entirely under the control of individual nations. Among the pollutants analyzed are heavy metals such as mercury and lead, chlorinated

[1] *Draft Ocean Space Treaty*, United Nations Doc. A/AC. 138/53 (1970).

hydrocarbons such as pesticides, PCB and perchlorethylene, petroleum, radionuclides, and thermal energy. The conclusion of the analysis is: 1) pollution is a product of human economic activity; 2) that pollutants are carried to the oceans by natural means such as through the atmosphere and by rivers; and, 3) pollutants are generally not transmitted by direct human activity. A pragmatic approach to pollution control dictates an appreciation of scientific, economic, and political realities. The maximum "safe level" of pollution which the atmosphere can absorb and still maintain life can not be scientifically ascertained. Pollution is correlated to economic activity, with the more highly developed states being the more significant pollutors. The developing states, realizing that the developed states were able to obtain their higher economic status through unrestricted pollution, will oppose any strict international pollution standard that would deprive them of the same economic opportunity. Since pollution is an economic activity, any political solution to the pollution problem will have to utilize economics as the key mechanism of control.

Messrs. Hull and Koers have developed the concept of an "International Environment Protection Agency," which they vest with the function of protection of international air and water. The agency would consist of a General Conference, an Executive Board, and an International Staff. The General Conference would not use the "one nation, one vote" concept, but instead would rely on weighted voting, with those nations having high populations, larger land masses, and more economic activity having proportionately more votes. The agency, through either the General Conference or Executive Board, would establish standards in the form of maximum tolerable limits of pollution on a universal basis. In those areas where pollution is regional, the agency would encourage regional standards to be adopted by the concerned states. The agency would also regulate the discharge of waste into the high seas. The publicity given to the use of the oceans by the United States as a dumping ground for containerized toxic material points to the immediate need for this type of control.

The basic principle upon which the agency would operate would be that each state is individually responsible for pollution which escapes its territorial boundaries. It would not interfere with the internal pollution of a nation which does not have an effect beyond the state's boundaries. Each nation would also be responsible for any pollution produced outside of its national territory which is the result of activities of nationals or activities subject to its jurisdiction.

The establishment of standards and a regulatory mechanism

would be a useless exercise unless the agency were given enforcement powers. Messrs. Hull and Koers recommend an enforcement power based upon a levy system. Offending states which exceed the maximum pollution standard would have a fine levied against them. The exact amount of the levy would be based upon the economic value realized from polluting, the degree to which the state exceeded the maximum levels, the length of time the excess continued, and the per capita national product of the offending states. This levy system would serve a two-fold purpose. It would remove the profit motivation from pollution, and, over time, make pollution an economic liability. It would also place higher penalties upon the developed states and consider the economic situation of developing states, making the entire plan more palitable to them. Funds collected through the levy system would be used to operate the agency and to assist in the economic development of these developing states.

Messrs. Hull and Koers present a serious and scholarly approach to what is perhaps the most pressing of all ocean problems. They point out that the mechanism for pollution control need not be placed in a new agency created especially for that purpose, but could be given to the established world body. The authors present only a sketchy framework of a new universal agency, the mechanics and workability of which is undoubtedly subject to serious debate. However, their underlying premise — the need for immediate and decisive action to control ocean pollution — is not debatable.

International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space may serve as a primer for the law of the sea novice whose interest has been piqued by the recent conferences. Messrs. Alexander, Friedheim, Hull, Knight, and Koers present the reader with an excellent array of primary source material on the difficulties of policy development, the conflicting interests, and the seeming inadequacy of existing institutions which, in the opinion of many observors, characterize the international allocation of ocean space. The scholar may be disappointed by the lack of critical analysis of the continuing dialogue between nations on ocean space, or by Mr. Knight's thinly veiled prejudices which are evidenced by his treatment of the role of conflicting interest groups in shaping national policy. However, this is neither a handbook of politics and diplomacy, nor is it an exhaustive treatment of the impact of the petroleum industry on U.S. policy. It is an excellent analysis of those basic issues which must be resolved before a new law of the sea is possible.

CHARLES W. WHITNEY

A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS. By Richard A. Falk. New York: The Free Press (1975). Pp. 506. $15.00 Hardcover $3.95 Paperback.

This book is one in a series of volumes compiled by a transnational research enterprise, the World Order Models Project (WOMP). *A Study of Future Worlds* concerns itself with examining possible world models in terms of their desirability and attainability. At this point, a brief explanation of the substantive content of the book is necessary to support the reviewer's final conclusions concerning the value of this book and the group whose basic ideas it sets forth.

The proposed world models center around four central values: 1) the minimization of large scale collective violence; 2) the maximization of social and economic well-being; 3) the realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice; 4) the rehabilitation and maintenance of environmental quality, including the conservation of resources. Varying states, of course, tend to emphasize different values in their preferred world model, depending on their stage of development, level of industrialization, relative economic wealth and stability and numerous other factors. Mr. Falk focuses primarily on the world order proposed by the United States members of WOMP.

Unlike many "utopia" writers, Mr. Falk does not merely describe a more desirable world order. The transition steps necessary to reach such a world-order system are also enumerated. The initial transition step described is re-education, with a focus primarily on global concerns and nonaggression. Education as to where the present state-oriented world system will ultimately lead is also necessary. Mr. Falk asserts that this educational process will be undertaken not by governments, but by marginal non-governmental groups. The process will progress to control by regional centers in areas acceptable to primarily state-oriented governments. If the results of this progression are positive or the deterioration of the present system increases rapidly (thereby making the need for such centers more apparent), greater power and authority will be transferred to these organizations. The ultimate end of the gradual transition process will be global institutions. State governments will continue in some form to handle domestic affairs, subject to global policy and review, and in cases of abuse, by the appropriate global institution. This result will be realized through altered values. The transition process does not include sudden drastic change accomplished

through violence or coercion. Such a transition would be counter-productive in view of the four basic values to be attained.

Chapter Four is devoted to the organizational structure of a central world government. Mr. Falk emphasizes that the structure is more a central guidance system than an actual world government, and the preferred model will rely more heavily on a buildup of roles of non-state actors and organizations and a shift in orientation rather than a drastic reduction in the power of state actors.

The final chapter explores the instrumental role the United States could play in the implementation and realization of the WOMP objective in its position as a world leader and one of the world's wealthiest countries.

The brief description of the WOMP model given above is a gross oversimplification of a convincing and well-researched plan. The preferred model described is one designed to accomodate the continual shifting of world priorities. Mr. Falk does not consider the United States' view of the WOMP model as being the ultimate goal. Once stability has been achieved, or at least, when the more immediate objective of avoiding ecological or man-induced catastrophe and repression has been achieved, attention can be turned more to the individual level and the shaping of a society more conducive to the fulfillment of the personal needs of its members.

When viewed objectively, doubts about the attainability of the WOMP model center basically upon two factors. The first is that the basic assumption is made that no global catastrophe will occur before the year 2000. Such a catastrophe during the transition process would almost certainly result in a world order system, developed prematurely due to necessity, that is not based on the four values recognized as necessary to a permanent, workable world-order system. Mr. Falk does not ignore or discount the possibility that this could occur. He does discuss briefly alternative plans that could be implemented, mostly based on the "one common enemy theory." The second factor is one that is virtually unavoidable, considering the nature of this book. When dealing with a future world-order system, projections based on present trends are necessarily used as indicators. Limitless variables could alter such trends, invalidating normal projections. Obviously, however, projections are not meant to be taken as absolutes. Mr. Falk emphasizes that he is not attempting to predict the future. He does not present one hard fast line of development from which there can be no deviation. It is, rather,

a flexible approach. Mr. Falk is examining what is possible and desirable, not predicting what *will* happen.

As one final comment, the reader will encounter a method of thought that will almost certainly be foreign to his present method of thinking. Concepts of nationality and the sovereign state are so deeply embedded in most world inhabitants today that a conscious effort to abandon them must be made by the reader if he wishes to assess this book realistically and with an open mind. Because the present system has existed so long and is so deeply entrenched in the minds and consciousness of people and governments alike, it is easy to dismiss as impossible any alternate system, however reasonable and viable, that has as its basis a global rather than state system.

This book deserves more than passing notice. It should not be summarily dismissed. If for no other reason, the seriousness of the present world situation should trigger interest in alternative systems to readers who assess world problems realistically. *A Study of Future Worlds* presents one such alternative.

BARBARA A. GARVER