The New Europe

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Thank you for the warm welcome. I am very pleased to be here and to speak about foreign affairs in a time of change. As Adam said to Eve as they left the Garden of Eden, “We are living in a time of transition,” so are we too living in a time of transition.

The framework that has shaped world affairs since World War II is creaking and cracking like an iceberg. It is about to disintegrate. That framework for world affairs was shaped largely by the United States and the Soviet Union in the years following World War II. Then, those powers were much stronger than others. They were polar opposites in a bipolar world. A divided Europe was organized around these two powers. Now this framework is changing.

New powers are challenging the near monopoly of influence and status in the world. Japan is just one of these powers; the European community is another. Newly industrialized countries, such as those in the Pacific Rim, are also challenging the United States and the Soviet Union. The rise of these new powers has led to a decline of the influence of both the United States and the Soviet Union in parts of the world where they have previously been deeply engaged.

Today, fundamental changes in the framework within which international affairs have taken place are well advanced. One of the most dramatic examples of this change is the emergence of the European Community. The European Community has existed for decades, but it is still growing in both breadth and depth while becoming progressively more important. Austria, for example, has applied for membership and it is generally expected that it will be accepted. Turkey and Morocco also applied, but neither was accepted.
Meanwhile, the European Community serves as a magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe. East Germany passes its products into the European Community by way of the Federal Republic, and the influence of the European Community passes back into East Germany by way of the Federal Republic. A former Austrian Foreign Minister told me recently that Austria had been approached by representatives of Czechoslovakia and Hungary asking, if after its admission to the European Community, Austria would be willing to serve as a funnel for their products as the Federal Republic does for East Germany. The former Austrian Foreign Minister said he told his Czech and Hungarian interlocutors, "Let us wait and see. That is a bit premature." But it is not premature to say that the influence of the European Community is already very important. The countries who comprise it are strong, rich, and have growing influence. Also, most of the best friends of the United States are members of that particular club.

The European Community is still taking shape. It is not known yet whether it will become a single nation with a single currency, full-scale economic integration, one parliament, and one set of laws as some people think it might, or whether it will remain a union of sovereign states that unite for some specific purposes (e.g. trading goods and bargaining for access to other markets while maintaining their own identity and sovereignty in their own countries). The latter is Mrs. Thatcher’s vision, but she is not the only European leader who is very interested in maintaining her country’s distinctive personality. The United States and the Soviet Union can do little to influence the process one way or the other; both must wait and see how it comes out. How it evolves will be important for the members of the European Community and us all.

More dramatic changes are underway in the other half of Europe where innovations are announced almost daily. Actual change and promises of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will have a cumulative impact on the way those countries are and will be governed. The pace of change is rapid.

In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia people are speaking their own languages, singing their own songs, and flying their own flags. They are having meetings, talking about autonomy. Some are talking about independence. They are publicly discussing the fact that their countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union on the basis of the Hitler-Stalin Pact at the beginning of World War II. They are talking about the fact that they were incorporated by force and maintained by force.

In Warsaw just last week, the government offered the Roman Catholic Church unprecedented powers and freedoms in exchange for full diplomatic recognition. The Catholic Church did not accept the offer because of the strings attached. They want to examine those strings very closely. But the idea that the Roman Catholic Church should be offered
the opportunity to publish youth magazines, presumably free of censor-
ship, and sponsor youth organizations dedicated to the education of
young Catholics, is new and shocking in this society. Meanwhile, Hun-
gary made overtures to the Pope, proposing that he visit Hungary.

A Soviet literary journal published an article which explored the
Soviet military role in the World War II Katyn Forest Massacres — the
massacres in which the Polish officer corps was murdered “in cold
blood” in the forest at Katyn after the Soviet Union had conquered Po-
land. Soviet responsibility for these murders has been clear to objective
scholars, but has always been denied. But two weeks ago, a Soviet jour-
nal openly discussed the role of the Soviet military in this dastardly mas-
sacre. It was also announced in the Soviet press last week that the
writings of Leon Trotsky, of all people, were going to be published next
year as a part of the centenary celebration of Trotsky’s birth. This is part
of the ongoing effort — as the article put it — to give the Soviet people a
more full and accurate picture of their past. This is what Mikhail
Gorbachev calls, “filling in the blank pages of history.” It is something
very new.

In Lithuania, an archbishop who had been under house arrest for
twenty-seven years has been released and permitted to visit Rome. This
too is new and different. A Lithuanian cathedral which had been shut
for many years has been reopened, and people are now able to attend
services there. Mikhail Gorbachev gave some assurances last week to
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that he intended to free all remaining
Soviet political prisoners by next year. Now, I grant you, that there is a
problem about the definition of “political prisoner” and a question about
how many exist, but in any case, Gorbachev acknowledged that there are
some political prisoners and stated his intention to free them.

Last week we had news that Andre Sakharov would be permitted to
visit the United States. This is a man who less than three years ago was
in exile in Gorky, a closed city in the Soviet Union, and denied all con-
tact with his professional colleagues — much less foreign visitors. He
was under constant guard. This is a man who dazzled the whole world
with his courage under harsh repression. He is probably the Soviet
Union’s most brilliant nuclear physicist. I believe that one of the first
signs that Gorbachev might be serious about raising some of the repres-
sion under which the Soviet people have suffered for so long was when he
ended Sakharov’s exile, and permitted Sakharov to return to Moscow to
see his friends and visiting foreigners. I might say that not all foreigners
have been permitted to visit him — only foreigners who are not nuclear
physicists and who could not engage in professional conversation with
him were permitted to visit him.

When I was in the Soviet Union last year with a small group of
former officials — Cyrus Vance, Henry Kissinger, Pete Peterson, and
Harold Brown — we had the opportunity to meet, not only with Gorbachev, but also with Sakharov. We met with Sakharov in his apartment for an evening. We were neither nuclear physicists nor nuclear scientists, and there was no chance of any of us comprehending any technical discussions well enough to constitute any sort of potential threat. At that point, the Soviet government was still claiming that Sakharov could not go abroad and could not meet with visiting physicists because he possessed “secrets.” None of us was capable of understanding or transmitting secrets of that sort in any case, and that is how we were able to spend a very pleasant evening with him.

When we met with him, Sakharov told us that he believed Mikhail Gorbachev was serious in his desire for change in the Soviet system. He told us that he was not sure that Gorbachev could succeed and that there were many problems, but that he believed that Gorbachev intended to try to relax the heavy repression under which the Soviet people have so long lived. He told us that articles now regularly appeared in Pravda, Izvestia and other Soviet publications for which the authors would have been sent to the Gulag as recently as three years before. He said that there were still a few people in the Gulag sentenced for writing such articles as now appear. Heavy-handed repression was being lifted in some areas. Sakharov said he believed Gorbachev was not only their best chance but their only chance, and that he proposed to support him within the limits of his capacity.

Lech Walesa, another expert on repression, has had a good word to say about Gorbachev recently. Walesa said that Poland’s tragedy and Solidarity’s problem was that Brezhnev had lived too long. “Had Brezhnev died before the heyday of the Solidarity struggle,” said Walesa, “things might have turned out differently in Poland.”

Actually, I think there has been a good deal of change in Poland, as well as in the Soviet Union in the last months. I believe that in both countries we see something the Solidarity leadership has called the “hollowing out of totalitarianism”; that it is very important, that it is new, and that it derives above all from their acknowledgment that their economic system is not working and apparently cannot work the way things are currently organized. These moves which relax the iron grip of government on key aspects of Soviet society and culture give new meaning and significance to Gorbachev’s plans for reform. They suggest that Soviet leaders may be ready to abandon their characteristic efforts at total control of the society and economy, which is the distinguishing characteristic of the totalitarian state.

Totalitarian governments claim the right to control all aspects of society and to eliminate and absorb all social institutions into the state and recognize no limits to their power nor rights against the state. Individual rights and free association have no place at all in the totalitarian
state. Religion has always been a special target of totalitarian governments because the governments admit no interpretation but their own of human life, duty, conscience and destiny; they cannot tolerate competing claims on conscience and the energy of their systems. Totalitarian governments invariably act with special harshness against religious institutions, outlawing many religious sects, closing many churches and eliminating religious education.

The Soviet Constitution, for example, guarantees freedom of atheistic and nonreligious propaganda, but no freedom of religious education. It provides for freedom of religion but not for freedom of religious education. Totalitarian states, the Soviet Union specifically, have imposed heavy penalties on religious observance, including teaching Hebrew, circulation of the Bible, and participation in unauthorized religious gatherings. If one belongs to a so-called unregistered church, which includes almost all the Protestant churches, attending church services is a criminal offense.

Religious belief is judged incompatible with membership of the Communist Party and membership in the Communist Party is the "open sesame" to all good things in the Soviet Union: to the good jobs, to influence and status, and to dashas on the Volga and everything else that makes life pleasant in the Soviet Union. The penalties for religious observance have been harsh. This history makes the present era extremely interesting. The Soviet government, which had so recently outlawed education in Judaism, has now announced that it will establish an institute for the study of Judaism, make available its archives on Jewish history, and make available the teaching of Hebrew. Similarly, the Polish government has formally recognized the right of the Catholic Church in Poland to publish magazines for youth organizations. In fact, the right to organize youth — that is a big departure.

These are all moves toward something which some people call pluralism. I do not believe it is pluralism yet, but these moves suggest to me that it may prove possible to transform totalitarian states peaceably from within, and that the very first steps of such a transformation may be underway.

Why is this happening? I believe that the Soviet leaders' attempt to reform the system is not inspired by some noble, sudden realization that the system is too harsh, repressive or poorly regarded abroad. Rather they have come to realize what the Communist governments of Eastern Europe and China also have concluded: that as an economic system, Communism simply does not work. Quite literally, it cannot produce the goods. The steady and continuing deterioration of the Soviet economy has become so bad that some hard facts had to be faced by a leader as intelligent, dynamic and realistic as Mikhail Gorbachev.

A second important factor which also involves some fact-facing, is
the persistence of strong nationalist feelings among the ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union and the people of Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union. Kazakhs want to be Kazakhs, Armenians want to be Armenians, Estonians want to be Estonians, and so forth; they are not satisfied with being Soviet. In 1981, we had the slogan, "Let Poland be Poland." Since then, almost everybody, including General Jaruzelski, has come to realize that nobody can prevent the Poles from being Poles. They will be Poles, and they can shut down the Gdansk shipyards, as I heard this morning they have decided to do. This persistence and intensification of ethnic identification is a principle source of change. I would like to look a little at each of the two factors.

Mikhail Gorbachev is an interesting man for a good many reasons. He is a modern man. An interesting fact about Mikhail Gorbachev is that he took the initiative to travel on a vacation outside of the Soviet Union that almost no Soviet apparatchiki ever did. Fifteen to twenty years ago, he and his wife, Raisa, drove through France and Italy on vacation with another couple of apparatchiki. He has been outside the Soviet Union on other occasions. He has been in trade missions to Western Europe, though he has been more often in Eastern Europe. Wherever he has gone, he has obviously sharpened a conception of a modern society, which is something different from what they have in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gorbachev has apparently concluded that the kind of total control over economics and culture and politics that has existed in the Soviet Union from Joseph Stalin’s time, maybe Lenin’s, to ours is incompatible with the requirements of the information age. In Soviet society everyone works for the government and is organized into an interlocking bureaucracy with decisions made at the top. I think Gorbachev has discovered that that method of organizing society and decision-making leads to stagnation, not to production and modernization.

I think he also believes that without modern technology — the technology of the information age; the computer, the microchip, instant telecommunications — it is impossible for the Soviet Union to compete either militarily or economically with the West, much less to fulfill its own leaders’ dreams representing the future. Most Eastern Europeans and observers of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who know Communists well, will tell you that all Communist leaders carry in their bosoms a real belief that they are the dream of the future. But how can you be the dream of the future if you cannot even keep up with the present?

Mr. Gorbachev has understood that the information age requires an end to the total monopoly over information and skills. Read his books; listen to his speeches. He means to end the monopoly of decision-making at the top of the system with decisions moving only downward. He pro-
poses more decentralized economic decision-making and more sharing of control over information and communication. The leadership in the Soviet Union will have to dilute its control or else renounce some of its claims to be the future.

Some people believe that Mr. Gorbachev has been influenced by the Hungarian model. In Hungary, as in East Germany, closer ties existed with Western Europe and industrialization was further advanced than in the Soviet Union when they were incorporated under Soviet control at the end of World War II. In Hungary, where more people know the West better, there has been a further move toward the incorporation of elements of market economics into their economic system. In Hungary, the shops are filled with goods, and the lines are not so long because the country is a more productive. There are more goods to be distributed than in other Communist countries. Mr. Gorbachev saw this prosperity, and doubtless saw the experiments, permitting a little opposition to develop to the government. There was actually a candidate who ran for a seat in the parliament in the name of an opposition party, not much of a party I grant you, but he was elected. It was not much of a victory for an opposition, but the idea of opposition was planted and accepted in Hungary, as were the ideas of sharing information, decentralizing decision-making down to lower levels and consulting more with the people who were actually in workplaces and engaged in industrial production.

These ideas took root in Hungary and were also taking root in China. Noticing what neighboring countries were doing and what the Chinese were doing outside the People's Republic of China — in Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other countries — Deng Xiaoping made reforms which incorporated some element of "capitalism." (We call it free enterprise or a market economy; they call it capitalism.) The Chinese had made a marvelous discovery about four years ago that people worked harder when they could hope to profit from their labor. They called this discovery the "responsibility principle," and set about applying it in agriculture. The predictable happened; people worked harder and better when they had could hope to profit from their labor. The Chinese experienced the kind of progress one sees in Hungary or in the private plots of Poland.

Mr. Gorbachev has not abandoned his fundamental belief in either Marxism, Leninism or Socialism, but he has planned reforms which he calls "new thinking." The limits of this new thinking are unclear. It is most fully described in Mr. Gorbachev's book Perestroika. The book examines what the Soviets can do to mobilize their society to create a modern, economic, information-age economy and states Soviet orientations to the world. In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev says that he seeks a more efficient kind of socialism. He seeks a modern society from which laziness,
slovenliness and especially the backwardness characteristic of the Soviet Union today is overcome.

Mr. Gorbachev wants the Soviets to sober up. He shut down many of the state liquor stores, creating long lines for vodka. But his policies in the field showed him to be a man who can compromise, as well. "Moonshine" establishments developed faster than controls over state liquor stores. The state lost revenues without diminishing alcohol consumption. Some of the stores which had been shut down have been permitted to reopen.

Gorbachev is also trying to persuade the Soviet people to show up for work and work harder. He thinks there is much too much absenteeism, and he thinks the Soviets do not work as hard as they used to. (I do not know anybody anywhere who thinks people in their society work as hard as they "used to." ) He wants to mobilize the Soviet people to work as hard as the Japanese or the Koreans or, in his view, as hard as they "used to."

The new thinking is designed to create this more efficient kind of socialism and make the Soviet Union a socialist society that fulfills the revolution. In *Perestroika*, Mr. Gorbachev writes, "[I]t is a revolution, a decisive acceleration of the socio-economic and cultural development of Soviet society which involves radical changes. It is a jump forward in the development of socialism." He seeks a better socialism, a kind of socialism that does not exist anywhere. Its achievement will be the revolution the Communists have always been seeking.

In *Perestroika*, Mr. Gorbachev also writes about the new thinking applied to foreign policy, but he does not write much about it. Mr. Gorbachev is straightforward about his distaste for the United States and the American system. He sees the United States as a military/industrial complex in which it hardly matters who wins elections because the military/industrial complex rules. The same munition makers are always in charge. During my meeting with him, much to the surprise of everyone present, he attacked Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown, both of whom had served Jimmy Carter's administration loyally. Gorbachev said relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had been developing better until the military/industrial complex got the ear of Carter, Vance and Brown, who then increased the military budget, boycotted the Olympics and embargoed U.S. grain — violating contracts with the Soviet Union — and reinstated the Cold War. Gorbachev did not mention the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when he described this deterioration of relations. It did not exist. He blamed the deterioration and the arms buildup that began near the end of the Carter Administration on the "caveman" mentality of the United States in its dealings with the world. What motivates the U.S. war-like mentality is the nationalism, chauvinism and narrow-minded parochialism of Americans.
The new thinking does not necessarily bring with it friendliness towards the United States. On the other hand, it does bring significant changes in the Soviet Union. Among those changes are the “filling in the blank pages” of history and the economic reforms already mentioned. It is extremely interesting that Mr. Gorbachev perceives a relationship between modernization of the Soviet Union and some kind of truth-telling about the Soviet past. It is interesting and significant. He thinks that the United States cannot make much progress until they have corrected the “lies” planted at the foundation of the system and protected by force. So Mr. Gorbachev has been trying to rectify some of the entrenched mythology.

He appointed a commission to investigate the guilt of Nikolai Buckharin. Buckharin was one of the original Bolsheviks, one of Lenin’s comrades along with Leon Trotsky. He was one of those most active in bringing Communism to the Soviet Union. He helped Lenin make the revolution. Then, under Joseph Stalin, he was tried in an open show trial, found guilty and executed. Mr. Gorbachev organized a commission which reinvestigated the proceedings against Buckharin. This Soviet Communist Party commission formally announced that it was overturning the verdict of treason against Buckharin, that declarations of Buckharin’s guilt would be expunged. Moreover, the Soviet press reported the following week, that Buckharin not only had not been guilty of treason, but had played quite a constructive role in the Bolshevik Revolution. It stated also that Buckharin had some rather good ideas about agriculture and the reincorporation of some elements of capitalism into the Soviet economy—which turned out to be rather like the ideas of Mikhail Gorbachev.

At about the same time, Brezhnev came under increasing criticism. Then, two interesting events occurred during the same weekend. First, Mr. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union intended to negotiate withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan—withdrawal is now about half completed. Secondly, Brezhnev’s statue disappeared from the square in Moscow on which it stood.

The news that the Soviet Union will actually publish Trotsky’s writings is even more dramatic than the rehabilitation of Buckharin, since Trotsky has been the arch villain in Soviet demonology since Joseph Stalin’s era. Even Nikita Kruschev, during his period of great reforms, did not try to rehabilitate either Buckharin or Trotsky. Trotsky has not been formally rehabilitated, but several publications have printed his name, which means he is a person, not an unperson. Some have even referred to his contributions to the Bolshevik Revolution. One even referred to the fact that he had worked alongside Lenin, and that is about the best one could do in the Soviet Union, as Lenin is the supreme reference figure. In every office there is a picture or likeness of Lenin. To have been
a comrade, to have worked alongside or to have helped Lenin is to be already a long way toward rehabilitation.

Where is it all going? How far will it go? What is Mr. Gorbachev willing to do? What is he not willing to do? What does it mean for the United States? We should begin by respecting Mr. Gorbachev as a skillful man — not a friend, not someone whom we can trust — but a very skillful, intelligent, vigorous and dynamic man, who "plays the whole board." He operates throughout the whole world simultaneously: China, South Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, North America, Europe.

There is no reason to suppose that he is interested in democratization Western-style. He has told us again and again that when he talks about democratization, he does not mean Western-style democratization. He has told us that he means Soviet-style democratization and that that means participation in decision-making by those directly involved. It means some decentralization of decision-making, but it does not mean an opposition party, shared power or competition elections.

In Perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev states without embarrassment that he does not expect an opposition party to develop in the Soviet Union, because there is no opposition in the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note, however, that last week there were negative votes in the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet. Not many, just a few negative votes. Their existence suggests that it is legitimate to disagree with the majority in the Soviet Union. You can permit disagreement with the majority, providing the majority is big enough, and disagreement will not have much effect. There is no evidence so far that Mr. Gorbachev believes any reforms he advocates require sharing political power.

The evidence so far suggests that Mr. Gorbachev believes that it will be possible to relax some heavy-handed repression and expand participation at lower levels so that people are not afraid to think independently. Sharing information at lower levels, as well as at middle and upper levels, is a form of pluralism. Permitting people to go to church if they wish and permitting them to pursue artistic and journalistic and literary enterprises is a type of cultural pluralism.

Recently, for example, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was invited to join a literary committee in the Soviet Union. He turned down the invitation, stating he could not join a committee in the Soviet Union as long as he could not travel to the country because of his outstanding indictment for treason. But the fact that he was invited means that there is the beginning of freedom for writers to write outside of narrowly circumscribed orthodoxy. Mr. Gorbachev believes that he can loosen the controls and permit some pluralism in social and economic affairs without significant sharing of political power over the society.
In Poland, Lech Walesa has distinguished three kinds of pluralism: social pluralism, which he says is freedom to join organizations which are not controlled by the state (which you do not have to join because you are told to); economic pluralism, which permits some labor unions, like Solidarity, to operate within workplaces without government authorization or organization; and political pluralism, which permits opposition political parties to develop and function. Walesa has suggested that the government in Poland can permit economic and social pluralism now without permitting political pluralism, which he believes lies in the future. There is certainly nothing Mikhail Gorbachev has said or done to suggest that he is willing to accept political pluralism, but the sharing of power in social and economic decision making is a step forward.

What else does Mr. Gorbachev want? He obviously wants a higher degree of legitimacy — a better reputation for the Soviet Union in the rest of the world. The Polish and Hungarian governments are also seeking greater legitimacy. The issue between the Polish government and Solidarity is legitimacy. Two weeks ago, the Polish government offered to meet with Solidarity and formally recognize it as a legitimate trade union movement, provided the representatives from Solidarity would recognize the legitimacy of the Polish government or as they call it, “respect the constitutional order,” and accept the fact that the Communist Party has the right to rule. It is very simple. All they have to do is agree to respect the constitutional order. The last talks between the Polish government and Solidarity broke down because Solidarity’s delegation contained two people who are clear opponents of the idea that the Communist Party has the right to rule; namely, Jascek and Adam Michnik.

In its search for legitimacy, the Polish government has agreed to respect the rights of the Church, with regard to religious education of youth. The Church will respect the constitutional order — that is to say, accept the legitimacy of the government of the Communist Party of Poland. The issue of legitimacy is extremely important to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Jaruzelski and to various other Communist leaders today. It is part of their plan for playing a new and more important role in the world.

Mr. Gorbachev has written and has said to the Central Committee, the Congress of the Communist Party and others that he is withdrawing from Afghanistan because the continued Soviet war in Afghanistan has negative effects on Soviet policy and diplomatic affairs throughout the world. He is right. How can he persuade the countries of Western Europe and Southern Asia that the Soviet Union is not a threat if the Soviet Union is using force against a less powerful neighbor on its border? Mr. Gorbachev claims his goal is to persuade the world that the Soviet Union is not a threat, that there is no Soviet threat and that the world does not
need to be armed against the Soviet threat. In order to persuade the world that it does not need to be armed against the Soviet threat, the Soviet Union cannot use force to impose its will. It must be a government like the others of the world, with a constitutional order that one can respect.

This pursuit of legitimacy explains why Mr. Gorbachev said it is unthinkable that the Soviet Union would use force against a socialist country. In this declaration he seems to renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine under which the Soviet Union reserves the right to intervene with force if socialism is threatened within any socialist country or if such a country appears likely to break with the Socialist World System, that is, Soviet control. In fact, Mr. Gorbachev has not really renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, he has sounded as if he has renounced it. Neither he nor the Polish government has ever renounced their claim to a monopoly of power, nor agreed to the legitimacy of political opposition. If the Communist Party has the sole right to govern, then any opposition that threatens their government is illegitimate opposition.

Mr. Yakolev, Mr. Gorbachev’s “right-hand man” who has recently been put in charge of foreign affairs inside the Politburo, said in an interview with the New York Times that it was unthinkable that Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia or the Ukraine should speak of being independent or imagine they could have a currency of their own. (The Estonians have been speaking of things.) Yakolev noted that California does not have a currency of its own, as though he did not really understand that California had asked to be a member of the United States and that Estonia never had asked to be a member of the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, we are seeing new departures and less heavy-handed repression in the life of the Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian people. We are also seeing a new Soviet opening toward Western Europe which could well change U.S. relations with Western Europe and result in the dismantling of NATO. That, I think, is clearly Gorbachev’s aim.

I do not want to end this address without noting that some of the implications for Western Europe of the new, less repressive Soviet Union are already clear. Relations between the Soviet Union and our closest allies in Western Europe have already improved. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl signed some thirty accords with Mr. Gorbachev during his most recent visit. Those accords are in a wide variety of fields, from nuclear reactors to kidney machines, dental equipment to bulldozers. Accords were signed on energy and space technology, environmental protection, avoiding accidents at sea, and on farming and cultural exchange and cooperation in Middle European affairs. Meanwhile, the West German government announced a new $3 billion loan to the Soviet Union. Our best friends have provided some $7 billion in new credits to the Soviet Union in the last three months. They are forging tighter eco-
nomic links, closer economic ties, and creating new problems for controlling technology transfer.

It is a whole new world; as Adam said to Eve, a "time of transition." Thank you very much.