Hughes Properties and General Dynamics: The Supreme Court, the All Events Test, and the 1984 Tax Act

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by Erik M. Jensen

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I. Introduction

In United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.,¹ decided on June 3, 1986, the United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Ninth and Federal Circuits over the application of the “all events” test to particular future liabilities of gambling casinos. By rendering a decision in this case, the Court was apparently fulfilling its usual, and crucial, role as final arbiter of the nation’s laws. Resolving circuit conflicts is a regular component of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction, and the all events test, as applied in determining the timing of deductions of accrual-basis taxpayers, has been of great practical importance.

It is not at all clear, however, that Hughes Properties represents a valuable use of scarce Supreme Court time. As tax lawyers know only too well, the law is constantly changing. Issues that were once important can disappear with the enactment of a new statute. And, at least at first glance, Hughes Properties deals with precisely such a disappearing issue. The case involved deductions in taxable years 1973-1977, and the Tax Reform Act of 1984² made substantial revisions in the rules governing the timing of deductions.

For most deductions subject to the Tax Reform Act,³ the critical consideration in determining timing will no longer be whether the requirements of the all events test are met—the issue in Hughes Properties—but rather

²Pub. L. No. 99-369, section 91(a), 98 Stat. 494, 598 (adding I.R.C. section 461(h)).
³For accrual-basis taxpayers, the changes made by the Act are generally effective for deductions that, under prior law, would have been allowable after July 18, 1984. Tax Reform Act of 1984, section 91(g)(1), 98 Stat. at 608.

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provide something more than a rough estimate, although absolute precision is not necessary.\textsuperscript{24}  
It was conceded that the amount of the liability had been shown in Hughes Properties; the payoff indicator amounts were stipulated.\textsuperscript{25} The Commissioner argued, however, that the fact of liability would not be fixed for any particular slot machine until a winner pulled the machine handle.\textsuperscript{26} Only then would all contingencies, including the identity of the winner and the time of payment, have disappeared.

Both the Claims Court\textsuperscript{27} and the Federal Circuit\textsuperscript{28} held for Hughes, viewing the liability as fixed by Nevada law at midnight on the last day of the fiscal year. The all events test was met on the final play of the machine before year's end, "that is, the last change in the jackpot amount before the amount is recorded for accounting purposes."\textsuperscript{29} The Commissioner argued, however, that the fact of liability would not be fixed for the amount is recorded for accounting purposes.\textsuperscript{30} The Commissioner argued, however, that the fact of liability would not be fixed for the amount is recorded for accounting purposes.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{2. Unknown Payee.} A liability can be fixed even though the identity of the ultimate payee is not known: "The obligation is there, and whether it turns out that the winner is one patron or another makes no conceivable difference as to basic liability."\textsuperscript{32} Prior to Hughes Properties, the Service, in a number of cases involving worker's compensation and similar obligations, had argued that such a liability is necessarily contingent.\textsuperscript{33} In the government's view, a liability cannot be fixed until some person exists who can assert a claim against the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{3. Uncertain Time for Payment.} A liability can be fixed even though the time of the future payment is unknown. As the Court stated, "[O]nly the exact time of payment and the identity of the winner remained for the future."\textsuperscript{35} The Court noted, almost as an aside, that the government's brief "speaks of the time value of money,"\textsuperscript{36} but it rejected that as a serious issue.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{24} The Service's view has also consistently been that a bilateral contract standing alone does not fix a liability prior to performance because no obligation to make payment solidifies until that time. See LTR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (technical advice memorandum considering timing of deduction for strip miner's statutory reclamation obligation); Jensen, supra note 11, at 457-58 (describing LTR 7831003).

\textsuperscript{25} See LTR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978); Jensen, supra note 11, at 457-60.

\textsuperscript{26} 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575.

\textsuperscript{27} The Service had generally been unsuccessful in its argument. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 83-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9621 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting current deduction to cover uncontested liabilities, under worker's compensation laws, arising from injuries to employees); Washington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9192 (Cl. Ct. 1969) (permitting current deduction of accrued, but unpaid, contributions to newspaper dealer profit-sharing plan); Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (permitting current deduction for future strip mining reclamation obligation even though identity of party to perform reclamation was unknown); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 943 (1977) (permitting current deduction for future payments to trusts under supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) plans); Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 764 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9374 (3d Cir. 1971) (to same effect as Reynolds Metals).

\textsuperscript{28} See Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties. In its reply brief, the government hinted that its position in some of the earlier cases involving "group liabilities," cited in infra note 37, may have changed. However, even if those cases were rightly decided, the government argued, they were distinguishable from Hughes Properties. In Lukens Steel, for example, the taxpayer had an obligation to make payments, on behalf of its employees, to a supplemental unemployment benefit plan trust. The government had at the time argued that such a liability was contingent because, among other reasons, the identities of the ultimate payees were unknown. 52 T.C. at 786-87. While the government now suggests that the obligation to the entity, the trust, may itself have constituted a fixed liability, no such entity or other group obligee existed in Hughes Properties: "The obligee may be an individual or an entity; the obligee may be identifiable or unknown; but there must be an obligee." Reply Brief for the United States at 8-10, Hughes Properties.

\textsuperscript{29} 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{30} See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text (discussing time value of money and how 1984 Act deals with that issue).
The Court’s opinion does not make clear whether time value issues were unimportant primarily because of the particular facts of Hughes Properties. Where jackpots are paid on the average every 4½ months, the benefits of accelerated deductions would generally be small. However, the opinion can also be read to suggest that the time value of money is always an irrelevant consideration under the all events test. This latter reading is consistent with the implication of prior cases: that the time value of money, if it is an issue at all under pre-Act law, is properly taken into account under other doctrines such as “clear reflection of income.” In any event, while the boundaries of the opinion in Hughes Properties may be fuzzy on this point, the Court clearly rejected the Service’s long-time contention that a liability is necessarily contingent under the all events test if the precise time of payment is unknown.

**4. Possibility That Payment Will Not Be Made.** The fact that a taxpayer may go out of business prior to satisfaction of a liability does not necessarily make the liability contingent. Thus, although Hughes could have avoided the jackpot obligations through its own voluntary acts—surrendering its license or filing for bankruptcy, for example—the liability remained fixed as long as those possibilities were remote: “The existence of an absolute liability is necessary; absolute certainty that it will be discharged by payment is not.” If a legitimately deducted liability is not ultimately satisfied, proper tax accounting, the Court suggested, requires making a later adjustment under the tax benefit rule. This conclusion, which also ignored the time value of money, elicited a strong dissent by Justice Stevens. Stevens argued that the Court’s opinion implicitly rejected the valid distinction between (i) the nonpayment of an existing fixed (and therefore potentially deductible) obligation and (ii) the nonexistence of an obligation. The progressive jackpot guaranty, Stevens maintained, belonged in the latter category until a winning pull of the handle.

Each of these four issues had been important prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Hughes Properties thus would have been instructive had there been no 1984 Act. The next question for consideration, however, is whether the Court’s opinion is any help in analyzing similar cases that are governed by new section 461(h) of the Code.

**III. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and Hughes Properties**

**A. Background**

The 1984 Act, by adding section 461(h) to the Internal Revenue Code, significantly changed the rules governing the timing of deductions by accrual-basis taxpayers. The Congress was concerned that the all events test, as judicially construed in some cases, permitted the deductible amount to equal the amount of the deduction previously taken. For example, if a one dollar deduction is taken in 1988 for a 1991 liability, and the liability is not satisfied, the taxpayer may include the one dollar in income in 1991. Viewed from the perspective of 1986, the taxpayer thus received a one dollar deduction with an inclusion obligation having a present value of considerably less than one dollar. See infra note 51.

Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger, cited World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786 (1974), aff’d, 564 F.2d 866, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9149 (9th Cir. 1977), in which an airline’s statutory obligation to overhaul engines and airframes used for a certain number of hours was held to be contingent because certain events, such as bankruptcy or the crash or other disposition of the airplane, could prevent the obligation from ripening. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576 (citing World Airways, 62 T.C. at 804). An airline subject to the statute would have an obligation to overhaul the aircraft only if the airline was going to proceed with business as usual. Stevens suggested that a relevant consideration in determining whether a liability in fact exists is whether the claim is one that would be discharged in bankruptcy, and a jackpot guaranty clearly would not. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576. The government, however, had not advanced such a position.

The point in discussing bankruptcy is not that Hughes has creditors whose claims might be discharged in bankruptcy. The point is that no slot machine player could even assert a claim against [Hughes] in bankruptcy unless and until he had won a jackpot.

**Reply Memorandum for the United States at 3, Hughes Properties.** (Emphasis in original.)
The taxpayer could deduct the full [amount] without any discounting to reflect the time value of money.

The Internal Revenue Service has never been happy with premature accruals, but the reason for its concern was not clearly articulated in the older cases and rulings. The Commissioner did not speak in terms of the time value of money until recently. Although he provided no underlying theory for his position, the Commissioner generally fought any deduction taken prior to the time that services were performed or property was provided. In the above example, if the $100 liability is for services to be performed in five years, the Commissioner would have insisted, even without benefit of the modifications made by the 1984 Act, that the deduction also be delayed for five years. In the language of the all events test, the Commissioner would have argued that the fact of the liability is not fixed until the services are performed. If successful in such an argument, and if the $100 is in fact paid in five years, the Commissioner would have brought the cost of the liability ($100 in five years) into alignment.

In challenging premature accruals prior to the 1984 Act, the Internal Revenue Service thus in effect added a "performance" requirement to the all events test. An alternative attack was available under section 446(b) of the Code: a deduction much "earlier than performance should be denied because it would "not clearly reflect income." The Service, however, seldom made such an argument. Instead, by formalistically concentrating on the all events test, the Service burdened the language of the regulation with more than it could carry. The regulation made no reference to performance, or anything like that, and the Service’s litigation record was accordingly less than perfect. Frustrated by the courts, the Service took its grievances to Congress.

B. Economic Performance Requirement

Congress, newly sophisticated in 1984 about the time value of money, was receptive to the Commissioner’s pleas. To impose some rationality on the deduction scheme, Congress in the Tax Reform Act required that a deduction be taken no earlier than "economic performance," thereby generally codifying the Commissioner’s prior position. The all events test was retained—indeed, elevated from the regulations into the Code—but the economic performance requirement was grafted on to that test. As a result, to be entitled to deduct a future liability in the current taxable year, a taxpayer must now demonstrate not only the fact and the amount of the liability, but also that economic performance has occurred or is occurring.

New section 461(h) in general operates to defer deductions . . . .

Economic performance in general occurs as activities are performed that are necessary to satisfy the liability. What constitutes economic performance depends on the nature of the subject transaction. Economic performance attributable to an obligation to provide or pay for property or services occurs only as the property or services

51 The present value of that future obligation, using a discount rate of five percent compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today at a five percent after-tax rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary to satisfy the liability.

52 See Jensen, supra note 11, at 477. In one sense, it is unfair to the Commissioner to suggest that the time value of money was not an articulated concern: attacks on accelerated deductions of course have been motivated by the knowledge that, all other things being equal, a deduction today is worth more than a deduction next year. The point here, however, is that no full theory was developed by the Commissioner to justify his challenges to premature accruals.


54 If payment is not made in five years but the taxpayer is permitted a deduction at that time, a premature accrual will still result, although it would obviously be less beneficial than a deduction in the same amount taken five years earlier.

55 See supra note 43.

56 Mooney Aircraft is an unusual example in which the Commissioner successfully argued the clear reflection standard with respect to a premature accrual. See supra note 43; Jensen, supra note 11, at 470-72 (discussing possible reason why Service generally did not press clear reflection argument).

57 See, e.g., Denise Coal v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 935, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9769, at 74,035 (3d Cir. 1959) (strip mining reclamation obligation under Pennsylvania law held currently deductible); Harold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9107, at 45,138 (4th Cir. 1951) (strip mining reclamation obligation under West Virginia law held currently deductible); Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (strip mining reclamation obligation under Ohio law held currently deductible).

58 Following the language of the regulations, I.R.C. section 461(h)(4) provides that "the all events test is met with respect to any item if all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy."

59 See supra note 4.

60 See supra note 3 (effective date of section 461(h)).
are provided. For liabilities arising from tort or worker’s compensation claims, economic performance occurs as required payments are made to another person. The statute also provides that economic performance with respect to a liability arising from the use of property (an obligation under a lease, for example) occurs as the property is used. In all other cases, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to issue regulations governing the determination of economic performance.

New section 461(h) in general operates to defer deductions; that, of course, is why the provision was added to the Code. Economic performance will usually be later than, or will coincide with, the time at which the unmodified all events test is met. In most cases, economic performance fixes the fact of a liability; prior to the Tax Reform Act, even the Commissioner conceded that result. The first part of the all events test is therefore generally redundant. In addition, the amount of a liability will usually be reasonably certain, if not fixed, at the time of economic performance. Hence, in most cases, the critical consideration will be the time of economic performance; the requirements for deductibility will be met no earlier than, but also no later than, that time.

C. Economic Performance and Hughes Properties

The facts of Hughes Properties, if governed by section 461(h), would easily fit within the terms of the statute. A careful analyst can discover many conceptual difficulties with the application of the economic performance requirement, but none of those difficulties would be involved in a progressive jackpot case. Economic performance under the statute would be deemed to occur at the time that the machine’s arm is pulled and the machine disgorges its promise of riches, the time that Hughes provides services or property. The fact of the liability and the amount of the liability would also then be set.

Indeed, at that time, given the Nevada statutory and regulatory scheme, no uncertainty whatsoever would remain: the obligation would be unquestionably fixed, and the identity of the payee and the time of payment would be unquestionably known.

Nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion is... helpful... in deciding casino cases under the 1984 Act.

For future progressive jackpot cases, unless a statutory exception to the economic performance requirement applies, section 461(h) provides exactly the result that the government sought, and that the Court rejected, in Hughes Properties: deferring the casino’s deduction until the jackpot is won. Only one exception to the economic performance requirement can even arguably apply to such jackpot obligations, and the application of that exception appears to have a fatal flaw, as described below. Accordingly, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion is necessary, or even helpful, in deciding casino cases under the 1984 Act. The Court in Hughes Properties answered a number of questions that have disappeared from the consideration of similar fact situations.

D. A Brief Digression

The conclusion that section 461(h) easily resolves future progressive jackpot cases assumes that no exception to the economic performance requirement applies. For “certain recurring items,” however, the Code in effect relies on the unmodified all events test to determine the timing of deductions. Since this exception, if it did apply, would leave the authority of Hughes Properties unimpaired, a brief digression is necessary to explain why the exception appears not to be available.

The progressive jackpot obligations meet three of the four requirements for application of the exception: (1) As Hughes Properties decides, the unmodified all events test is met in a year prior to the year of economic performance; (2) the obligations are recurring in nature and are consistently accounted for by the casinos; and (3) the accrual of a jackpot obligation in an earlier taxable year gives a better matching of income and expense than would accruing the liability in the year of economic

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.

The time of payment would be known unless the casino contests, and does not pay, the liability. In that case, no deduction would be permitted until the contingency disappears. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.

The issues have not disappeared, of course, from those casino cases in the litigation pipeline that are not governed by the Tax Reform Act. See supra note 5.

R.C. section 461(h)(3).

“Appears” is the appropriate word because, “in many if not most of the cases, it will be difficult to determine if the exception is available.” Bowers & Stone, supra note 66, at 356.


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performance. On the third point, too, the opinion in Hughes Properties is helpful: the Court gives surprisingly great weight to the matching principle and the determination of "true income" in concluding that a deduction prior to performance must be permitted.27

The final requirement for application of the recurring items exception is more problematic, however: economic performance must occur no later than 8½ months after the close of the taxable year in which all events test is met.28 No regulations have yet specified the workings of this (or any other) requirement of the exception, but the requirement can apply to progressive jackpots only if it is very generously interpreted.

The exception for recurring items was intended to "avoid disrupting normal business and accounting practices" when the benefit of a premature accrual for an item would be slight.29 Progressive jackpots are, by their nature, not routine; the precise timing for any particular machine cannot be predicted in advance. Moreover, the time value benefit of accruing future liabilities for some of the machines in any particular year may be substantial. On the average, Hughes' progressive jackpots were paid every 4½ months, clearly within the prescribed period. But not all jackpots were so paid. One machine had not been forthcoming with its prize for 35 months.30 Nor can it be said that the payment of any particular jackpot more than 8½ months after the end of a taxable year was aberrational; it was statistically to be expected that some jackpots would be delayed to such an extent.

In sum, whether the appropriate "item" for analysis under the recurring items exception is the aggregate of the jackpot obligations for all machines or the jackpot obligations with respect to any particular machine, the 8½ month test would not be met on a recurring basis. The economic performance requirement should therefore remain applicable to progressive jackpots.

41.R.C. section 461(h)(3)(A)(iv). As an alternative to showing that better matching would result from an earlier accrual, the taxpayer may demonstrate that the item is not a "material item." For the evaluation of either alternative, the treatment of the item on financial accounting statements must be taken into account. I.R.C. section 461(h)(3)(B).

27The Court stated that one of the expenses that necessarily attends the production of income from a progressive slot machine is the commitment of a particular portion of the revenue generated to an irrevocable jackpot. Hughes' "true income" from its progressive slot machines is only that portion of the money gambled which it is entitled to keep.

54 U.S.L.W. at 4576 (emphasis added). The government had strenuously argued, with a great deal of support in recent Supreme Court opinions (see, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1989)), that matching is not a significant tax accounting concept even though it continues to be important for financial accounting purposes. See B-49 for the United States at 26-28, Hughes Properties. The Court agreed that "financial accounting does not control for tax purposes" because the purposes of the two accounting regimes are different, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575, but it nevertheless deferred to the matching principle. This resuscitation of an apparently dying concept in tax law came as a surprise to some commentators. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 53; Jensen, supra note 11, at 472-76.

28I.R.C. section 461(h)(3)(A)(iv). If a "reasonable period" after the close of the taxable year is less than 8½ months, that shorter period governs.


30See supra text accompanying note 17.

IV. Hughes Properties and Noncasino Cases

Section III of this article concluded that, if the Tax Reform Act of 1984 had applied to the facts of Hughes Properties, the result would have been straightforward, and the Supreme Court's analysis would have played no role in reaching that result. Hughes Properties quite simply has nothing to say about the future resolution of similar cases.

This is not to say, however, that the opinion necessarily has no future effect. Although the all events test, as applied to liabilities, has been stripped of much of its importance by the Tax Reform Act, it has not disappeared altogether; the test for current deductibility under section 461(h) is not solely economic performance. In those cases in which economic performance precedes the fulfillment of the all events test, the all events test retains vitality.

The all events test... has been stripped of much of its importance....

For example, consider a liability, for services already performed, that is contested by an accrual-basis taxpayer. Even though economic performance has occurred because of the performance of the services, the liability is not currently deductible because the all events test has not been met. The contest itself defeats the fact of the liability, at least in part, and the special Code provision dealing with contested liabilities will help the taxpayer only if the contested liability is first paid.31

The significance of Hughes Properties thus depends on the scope of cases in which economic performance may occur before both the fact and the amount of a liability have been set. If there are few such cases, Hughes Properties is indeed an insignificant decision. But this category of cases may not be small or inherently unimportant. Indeed, General Dynamics, although it too will be decided under pre-Act law, is an example of the continuing significance of the all events test.

V. General Dynamics

A. Facts

General Dynamics and its affiliated corporations (collectively, GD) were required under collective bargaining agreements to maintain health insurance coverage for GD employees. In 1972 GD, which had earlier funded a plan through private insurance carriers, took over the insurance function itself. GD established reserves to meet its estimated liability and retained the two insurance firms that had earlier provided coverage to evaluate and approve benefit claims. On its 1972 tax return GD deducted its liability for medical services assumed to have

31If only part of a liability is fixed in fact and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy, the regulations, as yet not amended to reflect the 1984 Act, permit the deduction of the fixed part. Treas. Reg. section 1.461-1(a)(2).

32I.R.C. section 461(h) provides in effect that the all events test may be deemed met, despite a taxpayer's contest of a liability, if a transfer of property or services is made to satisfy the liability.
been performed during the year; that is, GD deducted not only its liability for those employees whose claims had been approved during the year, but also its estimated liability for claims during the year that had either not yet been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approved.

The Commissioner denied the deductions for the estimates, even though the estimates were based on the actuarial principles used by the insurance industry for determining such "incurred but not reported" (IBNR) claims. The basis for the denial was the all events test. The Commissioner contended that no deduction should be permitted until an insurance company administrator had approved a claim for payment. At any earlier time, GD could establish no liability in fact: either an employee might not file a claim or, for one reason or another, the administrator might deny the claim. Accordingly, in the government's view, any deduction permitted would be with respect to "expenses that [GD] may never incur at all."

GD prevailed at both the Claims Court and Federal Circuit levels. The last event necessary to fix liability was held to be the "occurrence of the insured event," that is, the provision of medical services. In taking a deduction, "[GD was] not predicting the happening of future events; rather, [it was] estimating the amount of fixed liability for events which had already occurred." Not everything reflected in a reserve account would necessarily be paid to claimants, but absolute certainty is not required to establish the fact of a liability. The all events test must be applied in a "reasonable and practical matter," and, so applied, the courts held, the test was met.

By validating GD's actuarial principles, the lower courts approved the use of probability theory to determine the fact of a liability. It is important to understand the narrow scope of the holding. The Claims Court and the Federal Circuit did not hold that probability theory could be used to generate a current deduction for medical services to be provided to employees in future years. Based on its experience, GD presumably could have estimated such future expenses with a fair degree of accuracy. But the permitted deduction for as-yet-unpaid expenses was limited to those arising from medical services already provided to employees. In seeking Supreme Court review, the government suggested that the Federal Circuit's opinion, if left standing, may permit taxpayers to deduct payments to self-insurance reserves generally. However, that argument grossly overstates the holding of the case. In no way does General Dynamics approve a deduction for additions to reserves to cover events that have not yet occurred, and the deductibility of such additions will, therefore, not be before the Supreme Court.

The lower courts approved the use of probability theory to determine the fact of a liability.

The Court in General Dynamics will also not consider the application of probability theory to determine the amount, as opposed to the fact, of a liability. In the courts below, the government challenged the reasonable accuracy of the estimated amounts, but it did not request Supreme Court review of that issue. The government's unwillingness to press this second point at this time is unfortunate because General Dynamics contains some interesting features. For example, a Court opinion could have provided guidance about the extent to which the Commissioner may use hindsight (that is, the actual amounts necessary to ultimately satisfy a liability) to

With respect to those claims already approved but not yet paid, there was no dispute about deductibility under the all events test. The 1984 Act, had it applied to these claims, should have added no further uncertainty. Economic performance would have occurred with the provision of the medical services, and the liability would therefore have been deductible no later than the year of claim approval. Since claim approval could occur in a taxable year earlier than the year of payment, see infra note 101, the government effectively conceded that a premature accrual could result from some approved claims. See supra note 65; infra note 102.

GD followed actuarial principles, but it did not claim it was an "insurance company" specially entitled for that reason to deduct additions to reserves. See I.R.C. section 807 (permitting deduction for additions to reserves by life insurance companies); I.R.C. section 832(b)(5) (permitting deduction for additions to reserves by casualty insurance companies).

The administrator was required to determine "whether the medical procedures were covered by the health plans, whether stipulated maximum charges had been exceeded, and whether the treatment was medically necessary." Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 2, United States v. General Dynamics (No. 85-1385). About 90 percent of the amounts for which GD's employees claimed reimbursement had historically been approved for payment. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cls. Ct. 250, 254, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9783, at 85,322 (1984).

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, 8, General Dynamics.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at B. General Dynamics.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.2, General Dynamics.

The government did not agree that the lower courts had ruled properly on the amount of liability issue, see id., and it is an issue that surely will be seen again.

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