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Reply Essay: Civil Justice Delay and Empirical Data: A Response to Professor Heise

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One decade ago, Congress undertook an ambitious, controversial effort to reduce expense and delay in the federal civil justice system. The Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990 instituted unprecedented nationwide experimentation by requiring that all ninety-four federal district courts scrutinize their civil and criminal dockets and then promulgate and apply numerous procedures which district judges believed would save cost and time in civil litigation. Congress also prescribed rigorous assessment of the six principles, guidelines, and techniques of litigation management and expense and delay reduction that federal districts in fact adopted and enforced. Lawmakers provided for an expert, independent evaluator that was to collect, analyze, and synthesize systematically relevant empirical data on certain aspects of the testing. Moreover, legislators requested that the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking arm for the federal courts, study additional features of experimentation, which principally implicated differentiated case management ("DCM") and various forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). Congress asked that the Judicial Conference submit a report and recommenda-

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1 Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Angeline Garbett for processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine.

tions to lawmakers and the president on both dimensions of the testing which the federal districts had conducted.\(^3\)

Congress mandated implementation of this national experiment, which it intended to conserve fiscal and temporal resources, even though minimal empirical data demonstrated that the federal district courts actually experienced serious delay when resolving civil disputes. A thorough study released during 1990, for example, found considerably less delay in terms of time to disposition than many federal courts observers had contended, thereby seeming to confirm the proposition that resolution times in the federal districts had remained comparatively constant over the preceding twenty years.\(^4\) Insofar as delay did exist, the periods needed for concluding civil lawsuits appeared to vary significantly across the districts.\(^5\) Delay is a relative concept.\(^6\) For instance, it seems inappropriate to characterize as delay the time that resource-poor litigants consume in developing the factual information those parties need to prove their cases.\(^7\) Precisely how slow is too slow remains unclear. Furthermore, Congress prescribed effectuation of this expansive, costly experiment with measures for decreasing expense and delay in civil litigation, even though similar efforts in numerous states and in a significant number of federal districts suggested that the courts had exhausted practically all of the advantages that they could derive from procedural reforms.\(^8\)

\(^3\) See Civil Justice Reform Act § 104 (calling for a report on the results of the demonstration program that experiments with DCM and ADR systems). The Judicial Conference assessed the measures that five demonstration districts applied. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (authorizing the Judicial Conference as the policymaking arm for the federal courts).

\(^4\) See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990). See also TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. FACE, RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 25 (1990) (contending that no evidence substantiated the assertion that time to disposition had increased).

\(^5\) See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 99, 101 (observing that, while variations exist among the districts, no study has described why some do well in moving cases and others do poorly). See also Lauren Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 122 (1991) (same).

\(^6\) See, e.g., Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 849-51 (1994) (discussing problems created by a lack of common understanding of delay); Robel, supra note 5, at 117-23 (observing the need to rethink the definition of the delay problem).

\(^7\) See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1423 (1992) (arguing that “individuals who lack resources and information need greater, rather than less, discovery”). See also Robel, supra note 5, at 121 n.37 (noting that public interest litigants cited delay most frequently when asked their greatest criticism of the litigation process).

It should not have been surprising, therefore, that the comprehensive evaluation, which the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation performed at the instruction of Congress, ascertained that the judicial case management mechanisms prescribed and implemented by districts pursuant to CJRA may have saved some time but only minimally reduced cost in civil cases. Moreover, the Judicial Conference rejected extension of the six statutorily-enumerated principles, guidelines, and techniques of litigation management and expense and delay reduction beyond the ten pilot federal district courts that experimented with these approaches. The Judicial Conference correspondingly suggested an alternative program to conserve economic and temporal resources.

During 1996, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to explore whether those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that govern discovery required amendment. The Discovery Subcommittee astutely commissioned studies by the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, which had recently concluded a thoroughgoing assessment of the principles, guidelines, and techniques for decreasing cost and delay applied by pilot districts under CJRA, and by the Federal Judicial Center, the principal research arm of the federal courts, which had primary responsibility for preparing the analyses of the measures enforced by the CJRA demonstration districts. The new evaluations, which expanded on the empirical data that RAND and the Federal Judicial Center had assembled, assessed and synthesized in the CJRA effort, found that discovery functioned comparatively well as a general matter and created the greatest difficulty in a

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9 See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 18, 41 (1997) (finding that the pilot program had little impact on litigation cost savings and time to disposition). See also infra note 24 and accompanying text.

10 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 89-90 ("Because this pilot project, as a package, did not have a great impact on reducing cost and delay, the Judicial Conference does not recommend that it be applied nationally."). See generally Carl Tobias, The Judicial Conference Report and the Conclusion of Federal Civil Justice Reform, 175 F.R.D. 351 (1998) (assessing the Judicial Conference Report and suggesting prompt resolution, preferably by Congress, of the question of whether CJRA has expired).


rather small percentage of relatively complex cases. Notwithstanding these instructive findings, the Judicial Conference substantially modified several significant features of pretrial discovery, a process which is essential to modern civil litigation. The Conference instituted important changes for all civil lawsuits in the scope of discovery and in the strictures that cover mandatory prediscovery disclosure.

These two vignettes of contemporary public policymaking in the areas of federal civil justice reform and federal civil procedure resist easy understanding and might even appear to be somewhat counterintuitive. Nevertheless, a recent law review article, authored by Professor Michael Heise, illuminates those stories and informs our understanding of the federal and state civil justice systems more broadly.

All of the propositions above mean that Professor Heise’s valuable contribution deserves a response. This essay undertakes that effort. The initial section of the paper provides a comparatively brief descriptive assessment of Justice Delayed?. The second part of this Response considers how Professor Heise enhances our appreciation of the two initiatives examined above and of civil justice reform generally. The third part offers a number of recommendations for future treatment of the federal and state civil justice processes.

I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Justice Delayed? significantly advances understanding of the federal and state civil justice systems. Professor Heise first places the issue of civil justice delay in its broader historical context and examines earlier attempts to collect empirical data on the question. The author finds that undue delay has persisted as a complication that frustrates the administration of civil justice, “despite well-intentioned reform efforts to reduce” case disposition time. The difficulty has received minimal assessment, primarily because informative data are

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13 See Kakalik et al., supra note 12, at 682 (“The empirical data show that any problems that may exist with discovery are concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence indicates that discovery costs can be very high in some cases.”); Willging et al., supra note 12, at 534-35 (same). A National Center for State Courts study of discovery in five states reached somewhat similar conclusions. See Susan Kellitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts Out of Control?, STATE CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8, 14 (finding that discovery is conducted less frequently than presumed). But see John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 506-09 (2000) (demonstrating empirically that discovery disputes occur in significantly greater numbers now than in the past).


16 See id. at 818. See generally supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
somewhat scarce and numerous intrinsic complexities attend the research issue. The problem of undue delay, or at least its perception, has prompted serious, successive attempts to expedite case resolution since the mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, initiatives that have closely evaluated the impacts of the various reforms instituted on disposition time have generally detected minimal direct, systematic effect.

Professor Heise determines that ambivalence characterizes the relationship between empirical research and the attempts of public policymakers to improve the civil justice system. He ascertains that "little comprehensive data exist that inform many civil justice reform efforts." He also describes "one recent and notable exception" to this dearth of assessments—the evaluation conducted by the RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice of the pilot program effectuated under CJRA. This analysis, according to Professor Heise, "represents the most recent large-scale empirical study of this country's civil justice system."
Professor Heise observes that the RAND assessment, which clearly concluded that the CJRA's "efficacy is mixed, at best," has already provoked considerable lively debate in the academic literature. The RAND Corporation researchers determined that, on the whole, the "pilot program, as the package was implemented, had little effect on time to disposition," although the investigators associated particular case management practices with "significantly reduced time to disposition." He ascertains that the RAND results are limited by specific considerations that implicate the research design employed and by a number of problems that accompany any effort when evaluators have not yet established common metrics. Despite any technical questions that might restrict the validity of the RAND conclusions, Professor Heise remarks that this entity's overall finding that the "CJRA program did not systematically reduce case disposition time comports with the weight of prior research."

After setting the issue of civil justice delay in context, the writer explores the need for better comprehension of the civil justice system by analyzing potential determinants of time to disposition for civil disputes that culminate in a jury trial. Professor Heise invokes empirical data that the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") and the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") recently collected, evaluated, and synthesized during a study which explored one year of outcomes in civil lawsuits that reached jury trials in forty-five of the seventy-five heaviest-populated counties in the United States. He considers geographic locale, party compo-

877, 900-05 (1993) (arguing that the research provided for by CJRA will not yield adequate information for developing new policy).


24 Kakalik et al., supra note 9, at 18, 41. See also Heise, supra note 15, at 820; Tobias, supra note 8, at 593 (describing some of the case management practices adopted by specific districts).

25 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. See generally McArthur, supra note 23, at 633-34 (arguing for a more carefully constructed experimental design than that used by CJRA).

26 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. Professor Heise identifies four specific problems: (1) the pilot program's small sample size, (2) potential selection bias involving the pilot and control courts, (3) treatment effect issues, and (4) the limited aspect of the Civil Justice Reform Act program assessed. See id. at 821-22. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 239-40 (1997) (arguing that a systematic body of knowledge in this area is needed because, in the past, assertions regarding civil procedure reform have been based upon hunches or theories); Jeffrey J. Connaughton, Judicial Accountability and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997) (arguing that judicial resistance to change was a primary reason why CJRA resulted in no measurable effect on litigation delay).

27 Heise, supra note 15, at 822. See generally Priest, supra note 18, at 537 (describing how the interaction between court congestion and volume of litigation explains why litigation delay studies fail to demonstrate a systematic effect of reduced delay).

sition, and party type, as well as certain case types, results, and character to be important variables.29 Professor Heise believes that an empirically grounded understanding of the attributes of case resolution time will help facilitate public policymaking and reforms that attempt to secure more expeditious, economical, and equitable civil justice.30 Professor Heise ascertains that the evaluation performed on the country’s largest counties seriously challenges the effectiveness of recent civil justice reform endeavors, which emphasizes factors that do not affect case disposition time and which neglect additional factors that do significantly influence the civil justice system.31 For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act prescribed, almost exclusively, process-oriented principles, guidelines, and techniques, as well as a number of related mechanisms, principally involving DCM and ADR, even though many state trial courts and numerous federal district courts had previously realized virtually all of the benefits to be extracted from these measures.32 Moreover, Congress apparently ignored additional considerations, such as substantial criminal dockets and the prolonged periods required to fill judicial vacancies, which can slow civil case resolution.33

Professor Heise concludes by summarizing and elaborating upon a number of the concepts examined above. He emphasizes that alternative approaches may warrant exploration when empirical data, as well as practical experience, demonstrate a particular course of action’s inefficacy. He carefully admonishes that assessors must undertake greater empirical research before it will be possible to posit definitive determinations, especially if empirical “data rather than impressions or anecdotes are to inform public policy and reform ef-

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29 See id. at 824-27. See generally infra note 65 and accompanying text.
30 See Heise, supra note 15, at 817. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (requiring that the rules “be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1325 (1995) (examining the problem presented by a rule, such as Rule 1, that attempts to provide direction on the basis of overarching values); Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1264, 1286 n.90 (1996) (assessing the ideals of Rule 1 and suggesting that they should apply equally to appellate courts).
32 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
forts in the future." Professor Heise specifically calls for the systematic collection, examination, and synthesis of cross-sectional data, of increased data from additional federal and state jurisdictions over larger time periods, and of data on parties' settlement activity. He asserts that information such as this will appreciably enhance comprehension of the civil justice system and help reformers who attempt to improve the process by decreasing resolution time for civil cases.

II. HOW JUSTICE DELAYED? INCREASES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF RECENT REFORMS

Professor Heise's recent article contributes substantially to appreciation of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems in the United States. Justice Delayed? correspondingly increases our understanding of modern civil justice reform efforts, and in particular of the two procedural public policy initiatives instituted by Congress and the federal rule revision entities during the 1990s.

A. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

Justice Delayed? demonstrates that the explicit congressional purpose in passing the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 was to restrict expense and delay in civil lawsuits through the application of numerous procedural measures. The legislation was passed, even though it was unclear that cost or delay was sufficiently problematic to deserve remediation or that process-oriented change was the best solution. A substantial number of the six principles, guidelines, and techniques as well as additional measures that Congress prescribed (particularly DCM and ADR) had already received application in many states and quite a few districts, and much of this experimentation demonstrated the limitations inherent in those procedures' application. The previous testing in the state and federal courts indicated


and the CJRA undertaking apparently reaffirms that the state and federal judiciaries have achieved practically all of the expense and delay reduction that can be achieved with process-based reforms. Indeed, non-procedural approaches—including augmentation of the federal judiciary’s resources, alteration of court structure or court administration, such as the individual calendaring system, or change in the present American adversarial system—would more efficaciously secure additional, meaningful fiscal and temporal economies.\footnote{See Tobias, supra note 8, at 599. See generally Judicial Conference Report, supra note 8, at 67 (finding that “the cost of litigation [is] driven by factors other than judicial case management procedures’’); McArthur, supra note 23, at 633-40 (arguing for the introduction of a more structured program).}

Professor Heise confirms the suggestions of other federal court observers that Congress neglected or underestimated several important factors that are responsible for, or could decrease, cost and delay in civil disputes. For instance, some individuals, namely federal district judges and certain entities participating in the CJRA endeavor, remarked that criminal prosecutions are a substantial source of expense and delay, a factor that Congress effectively ignored,\footnote{See supra note 33 and accompanying text.} while other people and institutions indicated that more expeditious confirmation of nominees for judicial vacancies on the district courts would save significant financial and temporal resources.\footnote{See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group pt. III(C)(2)(a) (1991) (“These problems will recur, however, if future judicial vacancies are not promptly filled . . . .’’); U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, Report and Recommendations of the Civil Justice Reform Advisory Group pt. II(B)(1-2) (1991) (noting that expense and delay has been caused by failure to fill promptly judicial vacancies as they arise). See generally Kim Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 St. John’s L. Rev. 757 (1993); Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 Emory L.J. 527 (1998) (offering suggestions for implementation of alternatives to alleviate the problem).}

The ideas in the two paragraphs above illustrate that there may be insufficient communications, both among individuals and entities responsible for civil justice reform in the branches of the federal government and between those people and institutions and their counterparts in state governments. If Congress, for example, had been more attentive to the perspectives of numerous federal judges or had considered more fully procedural experimentation that many states and a number of federal districts had conducted, lawmakers might have relied less substantially on process-oriented reforms, which proved rather ineffective, and perhaps prescribed other, comparatively effective measures.

Justice Delayed? also demonstrates that after public policymakers commission empirical data, they must carefully consult and thoroughly employ this information when implementing decisions about
procedural change. For instance, Congress authorized several comprehensive assessments of the CJRA experimentation, but seemingly failed to consider and capitalize on the results derived from the analyses undertaken. Even Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), the enactment’s foremost proponent and the member of Congress for whom the legislation was named,\(^40\) apparently could muster so little interest in the statute by the conclusion of its application that he sponsored a provision which continued only CJRA’s case reporting requirements.\(^41\) It even remains unclear whether the legislation that lawmakers ostensibly scheduled to expire seven years after its 1990 passage has actually reached “sunset.”\(^42\) Indeed, during 1995, Republican House members introduced a number of proposals as part of the Contract With America before the legislative branch had received any evaluations of the 1990 enactment that Congress had commissioned.\(^43\) Several provisions of the legal reforms included in the Contract would have imposed substantive and procedural changes that eclipsed certain features of CJRA.

**B. The 2000 Federal Rule Revisions**

*Justice Delayed?* similarly increases comprehension of the recent rule revision proceeding culminating in the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the 2000 amendments related to civil discovery. Professor Heise illustrates the compelling need for public policymakers to commission expert, independent evaluations that systematically gather, analyze, and synthesize dependable empirical data, as well as the need to examine closely and deploy carefully the material collected as a predicate for procedural decision-making. For example, when the empirical data requested by the Discovery Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee suggested that discovery was generally working well and presenting substantial difficulties in rather few


comparatively complicated cases, the rule revision entities should have consulted several alternative means of proceeding. The revisors might have considered more seriously the prospects of postponing amendment or rejecting change altogether. At the least, the revisors should have entertained the possibility of tailoring procedural modification to the problems created by the relatively limited number of complex lawsuits, rather than adopting alterations that applied to every case. It is also important to realize that even the assessments that evaluators performed examined the operation of the existing discovery requirements, such as the 1993 provision that imposed mandatory prediscovery disclosure, instead of experimenting with the measures that the Supreme Court eventually prescribed during 2000, to understand how they would function in practice.

C. General Ideas

Both the experiences of Congress in passing CJRA and of the federal rule revisors when promulgating the 2000 civil procedure amendments demonstrate that relevant public policymakers appropriately commissioned empirical assessments, albeit at different time periods. In fairness, Congress had the benefit of an evaluation undertaken by the Foundation For Change and of additional analyses, but it is unclear how systematically those conducting the assessments collected, evaluated, and synthesized applicable empirical data, and how substantially Congress relied on the analyses in drafting CJRA. Moreover, Congress properly commissioned empirical assessments of the experimentation that districts implemented pursuant to CJRA.

44 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.4 (3d. ed. 1995) (tailoring procedures by case types). See generally Levin, supra note 22, at 898-99 (recognizing that some types of cases need “specialized treatment”); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994) (arguing that discovery rules should be drafted to meet the unique needs of different types of cases).
46 For suggestions on how the federal rule revisors might conduct such experimentation, see Levin, supra note 36. See also Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for Federal Procedural Rulemaking, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 2 (forthcoming Spring 2001); Walker, supra note 36 (arguing that the processes guiding development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the past are no longer appropriate). See generally Tobias, supra note 14, at 85-90 (offering specific suggestions for future remedies through legislation).
47 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1410-21 (1994) (asserting that such studies were based on “soft social science methodologies,” and thus inadequate); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1601-02 (stating that many judges were concerned that there had been insufficient consultation with the judiciary in preparing the reports and assessing the efforts of the Foundation For Change). See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 416, 101st Cong. 13-14 (1990) (praising the reports, stating that “[t]he committee is indebted to the members of the task force for the comprehensive nature of their recommendations”).
However, Congress essentially ignored the results of the evaluations that the RAND Corporation and the Judicial Conference completed.\textsuperscript{48}

The federal rule revision entities also aptly undertook assessments of the procedural provisions that they contemplated altering before proposing modification.\textsuperscript{49} Perhaps those responsible for studying the rules and formulating recommendations for improvement recognized that the 1983 amendment in Rule 11 became the most controversial change over the six-decade history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure partly because the revision entities had gathered no empirical data on the provision's operation prior to altering the 1938 version.\textsuperscript{50} The rule revisors may have similarly appreciated that the substantial controversy surrounding the 1993 amendment of Rule 26 requiring mandatory prediscovery disclosure was attributable to limited understanding about how that procedure would actually work.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, although decision-makers in Congress and in the Judicial Conference rule revision committees correctly called for studies, they should then have seriously considered and used the findings of the evaluations when developing public policy in the procedure field.\textsuperscript{52}

III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The analysis above shows the important need for additional studies of the type that Professor Heise has conducted, as well as for assessments like those commissioned by Congress under CJRA and

\textsuperscript{48} See supra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{49} See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. Even those studies analyzed how the existing federal civil rules operated, not how the revisions the Court eventually prescribed would work in practice by experimenting with the proposed amendments first. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (finding that Rule 11 was controversial partly because “there is a conflict between or among circuits on practically every important question of interpretation and policy under the Rule”); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 455-59 (1993) (stating that the Advisory Committee’s note explaining the change does not make any reference to empirical research). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 1606-17 (noting that the 1983 revision to Rule 11 was sharply criticized, despite a comprehensive analysis by the Advisory Committee).

\textsuperscript{51} See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1992) (asserting that many lawyers felt the amendment would actually increase costs and delay); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820-21 (1991) (finding that many research issues regarding the revision are unresolved). See generally Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1999) (arguing that the revision was problematic because the revisors had minimal empirical data and little experience with the practical application of the procedure).

\textsuperscript{52} Developments implicating time to disposition and potential reform, which resemble those involving the federal district courts, have occurred in federal appeals courts. Professor Heise, however, minimally mentions appellate court resolution times or possible reform, and those phenomena are beyond the scope of this response, even though Justice Delayed? does enhance appreciation of the developments. For exposition of some relevant ideas related to the appellate courts, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
the Advisory Committee pursuant to its rule revision authority. Those with responsibility for reform of procedure must commission expert, independent evaluators that systematically assemble, analyze, and synthesize empirical data relevant to procedural decision-making, while policymakers should consult and apply these studies and base reforms on the assessments' results. The CJRA experimentation and the rule amendment proceeding that underlay the 2000 federal rule revisions, as well as state civil justice reform efforts and endeavors similar to the NCSC-BJS study on which Professor Heise relied, have generated a substantial quantity of informative empirical data. Decision-makers must capitalize on this material in formulating procedures for civil litigation in the twenty-first century.53

It bears reiteration that even the finest empirical data alone will not foster improvement, unless procedural policymakers consider and employ the information that evaluators have collected. Illustrative are developments in the 1990s involving CJRA, the 2000 federal rules amendments discussed above,54 and experiences implicating the federal appellate courts. With regard to the appeals courts, numerous observers holding quite diverse perspectives have found, and considerable empirical data have shown, that the tribunals have lacked resources to treat caseload increases.55 Notwithstanding information indicating that the courts have delivered less appellate justice, Congress has evinced reluctance to reduce appeals by limiting jurisdiction.56 Congress has also been reluctant to address docket growth by expanding relevant resources, such as the authorization of additional judgeships or court administrative staff.57 Lawmakers should reex-

53 They must also capitalize on a recent study that collected much valuable empirical data on the appellate system. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].

54 See supra notes 1-14, 37-46 and accompanying text.

55 See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994); CHRISTOPHER BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 126-29 (1999) (stating that strategies employed by the appellate courts have been insufficient to treat the caseload crisis); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (finding that inevitable changes must be made in the appellate courts to deal with the increasing volume of cases). But see CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1999) (asserting that the appellate courts do not need additional judges to handle appeals).

56 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 34-37 (1990) (stating that such proposals are controversial and unlikely); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 177, 181 (1999) (arguing that changes must be made in the opinion output of courts because Congress will not limit jurisdiction). See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 77-84 (addressing the appropriate jurisdiction of the federal courts).

57 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 55, at 1-30 (evaluating the history of the courts of appeals and their state today); BANKS, supra note 55, at 126-29 (arguing that the better solution is to increase the capacity of the appellate courts). These and other federal courts observers attribute legislative reluctance partly to political considerations.
amine this important situation and prescribe measures to rectify or ameliorate the circumstances.

Several ideas already enumerated suggest the need for greater and better communications among officials with responsibility for decision-making about procedure in various entities of the state and federal governments. For instance, Congress should have more closely consulted the procedural experimentation in numerous states and federal districts before prescribing certain civil justice reform measures during 1990. The federal rule revisors in proposing, and the Supreme Court in promulgating, the 1983, 1993, and 2000 amendments should similarly have commissioned and considered additional relevant data, particularly on the operations of the procedures that the Court ultimately adopted, before effectuating change. These actions could have led to the implementation of new provisions that were more efficacious and less controversial. State officials and institutions should correspondingly examine experimentation that the federal courts and other states conduct. For example, states in the South and West, which have encountered rapid population growth and escalating caseloads, might review the efforts to treat mounting dockets with few resources instituted by the larger federal appeal courts and the large counties scrutinized in Justice Delayed.

Public policymakers at the federal and state levels as well as evaluators and scholars may also want to elaborate upon the findings, assertions and raw data which Professor Heise has offered. For instance, comparing the large counties in the state systems with federal districts in the same locale could prove productive. More specifically, Professor Heise's determination that Fairfax County, Virginia compiled the fastest civil case disposition time of the seventy-five counties at the state level correlates with Fairfax's location in one of the most expeditious federal districts, the Eastern District of Vir-
Virginia. Not surprisingly, Fairfield County, Connecticut, the county that recorded the second slowest resolution time, is situated in the District of Connecticut, one of the federal trial courts that requires the greatest period to conclude civil lawsuits. These findings seem to reinforce the local legal culture hypothesis that phenomena, such as judicial practices, lawyers' ethics, and litigant strategic behavior in a specific geographic area, can usefully explain the pace of civil cases.

CONCLUSION

Justice Delayed? contributes substantially to our understanding of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems. Professor Heise affords instructive insights on the importance of having procedural policymakers commission expert, independent evaluators to collect, analyze, and synthesize empirical data. He further denies the importance of insuring that decisionmakers closely consult and carefully apply the material assembled when reforming civil justice. The author also aptly contends that there must be considerable, additional rigorous assessment of the civil justice systems before it will be possible to reach definitive conclusions about precisely how they operate and might be improved.

63 See Heise, supra note 15, at 837 tbl.5.
65 See, e.g., Thomas Church, Jr. et al., Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts 54 (1978) (suggesting that speed and backlog may be a result of expectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of both judges and lawyers within the local culture); Mahoney et al., supra note 19, at 87-89 (examining the affects of practitioner attitudes and expectations on court delay); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 Duke L.J. 929, 944-47 (1996) (describing differences caused by "procedural localism"); Robel, supra note 1, at 1483-85 (arguing for a more cautious approach to local decision making). See also Heise, supra note 15, at 826-27, 836-37 (describing the effects of locale on variations in case disposition time). But see Herbert Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of Litigation, 27 Law & Soc’y Rev. 535 (1993) (arguing that variation among districts is a result of structural and situational differences rather than local legal culture).