Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes and the Sixteenth Amendment

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Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes and the Sixteenth Amendment

by Erik M. Jensen

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The point of this essay is simple: a direct-consumption tax like the Forbes-Arney-Hall-Rabushka flat tax or the Nunn-Domenici USA tax isn't a "tax on incomes" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. As a result, such a tax would be constitutional only if it were apportioned among the states on the basis of population. And since these taxes wouldn't be apportioned — how could they be and work as they're intended to work? — they would be unconstitutional.

I've written on this subject before, and I intend to do so again — probably at mindnumbing length. This article briefly presents my current thinking on Sixteenth Amendment issues. It was supposed to serve as part of a symposium on constitutional issues in taxation — in fact, it was supposed to serve as a bull's-eye that other commentators could shoot at — but, so far, no one has wanted to open fire. Here, not-so-gentle readers, is your chance.

Choose your weapons; let the battle begin.

I begin with a few assumptions that are necessary to keep the debate limited to the Sixteenth Amendment point. I then outline my reasons for treating the phrase "taxes on incomes" as having substantive content and for doubting that a direct-consumption tax is such a tax on incomes.

Lest I be misunderstood, let me emphasize that I'm not advancing arguments about the merits of direct-consumption taxes. I'm focusing on issues of constitutional interpretation, and just as not all arguably bad policies are unconstitutional, not all arguably good policies meet constitutional requirements.

Assumptions

To focus on the meaning of "taxes on incomes," I make some assumptions that will seem peculiar to most tax buffs.

Assumption number 1: I assume that an income tax is a direct tax within the meaning of the direct-tax apportionment rule of the Constitution. I assume, that is, that the 1895 Income Tax Cases were rightly decided, and that the only reason a "tax on incomes" needn't be apportioned among the states is the Sixteenth Amendment. This isn't an unfounded assumption — I've set out the reasoning to support it elsewhere — but for present purposes it needs to be treated as a given.

I recognize that not everyone accepts this assumption, and that others, like Calvin Johnson, who might agree that an income tax is a direct tax under the original understanding, nevertheless believe that Sixteenth Amendment questions go away because the direct-tax apportionment rule was properly aban-
direct-consumption tax is direct and isn't a 'tax on incomes,' it would be unconstitutional.

For now, I put aside that issue in order to focus on the meaning of "taxes on incomes." We can't discuss every interpretational issue simultaneously; please indulge me in Assumption Number 1.

Assumption Number 2: I assume a direct-consumption tax, like the flat tax or the USA tax, which would operate on individuals very much like a traditional income tax but which would reach only the consumption component of income, is a direct tax. Although debatable, this also isn't an unfounded assumption. Such a tax is a direct tax for many of the same reasons that the tax at issue in the Income Tax Cases was direct: it's a tax imposed directly on individuals and isn't presumptively shiftable like a classic indirect tax on articles of consumption. The Sixteenth Amendment dealt with the practical consequences of the Income Tax Cases, but no judicial authority has explicitly repudiated the meaning of "direct taxes" that can be derived from those cases and from a study of the original understanding of the direct-tax clauses.

With those assumptions, the Sixteenth Amendment issue takes center stage. Direct taxes other than "taxes on incomes" must be apportioned. If an unapportioned direct-consumption tax is direct and isn't a "tax on incomes," it would be unconstitutional.

Why a Consumption Tax Isn't a Tax on Incomes Under the Sixteenth Amendment

We've all grown up assuming that the Constitution imposes no serious limitations on the congressional taxing power, and it's therefore hard to take seriously any constitutional language that seems to put limits on that power. (I venture to guess that few even know that the Sixteenth Amendment 

Direct taxes other than 'taxes on incomes' must be apportioned. If an unapportioned direct-consumption tax is direct and isn't a 'tax on incomes,' it would be unconstitutional.

For that reason, I am shocked — shocked! — to see Professor Kahn question the proposition that "Congress cannot tax as income an item that does not fall within the meaning of 'income' as that term is used in the Sixteenth Amendment." Douglas A. Kahn, "The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury," 46 Tax L. Rev. 128, 130 (1999).

"Instead, the concept is by its nature highly practical, flexible and ad hoc, and has constitutional implications:"

The Constitution allows Congress to provide for the common defense. Can a congressional funding of a missile be challenged on the basis that, in fact, the missile . . . decreases our security? Apart from standing concerns, such a challenge surely would be summarily rejected by the courts on the basis that the common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which must be left to the judgment of Congress. The

"[I]f the Constitution allows Congress to provide for the common defense, can a congressional funding of a missile be challenged on the basis that, in fact, the missile . . . decreases our security? Apart from standing concerns, such a challenge surely would be summarily rejected by the courts on the basis that the common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which must be left to the judgment of Congress. The
same should apply to the meaning of income in the [S]ixteenth [A]mendment.16 And Professor Marjorie Kornhauser seems to agree that “incomes” is an inherently malleable term. Congress must therefore provide meaning for an otherwise amorphous concept:

[The Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested power to tax all income, however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions. Such an interpretation yields a meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary. Income’s meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that meaning changes over time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated.17]

I’ve no doubt that almost all tax practitioners and tax teachers, if they think about the matter at all, would accept those propositions. (Indeed, that most don’t think about the matter is itself evidence that the propositions are accepted.) In the following discussion, I’ll explain why the conventional wisdom isn’t necessarily true, or, even if it’s true, why it doesn’t necessarily mean that a direct-consumption tax is a “tax on incomes.”

1. The nature of the constitution and ‘inherent malleability.’ To begin with, the notion that the term “taxes on incomes” is “inherently malleable” and therefore means whatever Congress says it means is inconsistent with the idea of the Constitution. Yes, as the Constitution was intended to increase national power, to make a real national government possible. But, as we all know, the Constitution is full of limitations on national power—sets of limitations on national power—sets of limitations on national power. It wouldn’t have been ratified without limitations—and we don’t usually think of Congress as having the final say on matters of constitutional interpretation.18

It would be peculiar to interpret a document that was intended, in part, to limit federal power as granting to Congress a nearly unlimited power to determine what those limits are.19

If their intention was to remove all direct taxes from the apportionment requirement, the drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment did a poor job indeed. Instead, it

16 Id. at 101.
18 Congress has a say, and congressmen should feel obligated to consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation. But we don’t usually think of Congress’s having the only say.
19 The fact that the Sixteenth Amendment was added later doesn’t change the nature of the Constitution. The Amendment had a limited purpose, to overturn the narrow holding of the Income Tax Cases; it shouldn’t be interpreted as having repealed other constitutional values. As Judge Kozinski and Professor Volokh state, The notion that every constitutional amendment is a partial repeal of every previously-enacted constitutional provision has hair-raising implications. Does the Sixteenth Amendment... authorize a tax levied only on income derived from sale of antigovernment literature, or a tax only on blacks? Does it allow collection techniques that violate the Fourth Amendment?

In a passage I quoted earlier, Victor Thuronyi is right, in some sense, when he argues that “[t]he constitutional challenge to deployment of a particular missile system would (and should) go nowhere in court. But that’s a trivially easy case. Let’s get closer to reality (or as close as we can after putting standing issues aside). Does Thuronyi mean to suggest that any expenditure would be constitutionally acceptable simply because Congress declared it to be for national defense?20 The defense umbrella covers a lot, but does it really cover everything—such as Congress mumbles the word “defense” in its deliberations? If constitutional lan...
The income tax wasn't an entirely new idea; one had been used during the Civil War. But it wasn't until enactment of the 1894 income tax that many people contemplated an income tax as a permanent part of the revenue system. 28


25 The income tax wasn't an entirely new idea; one had been used during the Civil War. But it wasn't until enactment of the 1894 income tax that many people contemplated an income tax as a permanent part of the revenue system. 28

26 Michael J. Graetz, The Decline [and Fall?] of the Income Tax 222 (1997).

Nevertheless, critics have suggested to me that the difference between a direct-consumption tax and an income tax is just a matter of accounting (that is, whether taxpayers should be entitled to deductions or exclusions to reflect savings), and accounting issues don’t rise to constitutional levels. Moreover, it’s possible to pick passages out of Supreme Court opinions to support that position. For example, the Court wrote in 1934, “Unquestionably Congress has the power to condition, limit or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax.”

If we were talking about an isolated deduction or exclusion, I’d agree that the Constitution is likely to be irrelevant: determining one’s entitlement to most deductions or exclusions doesn’t require constitutional analysis. But this is different: exempting the savings component of income from taxation would fundamentally change our conception of what income is. The Sixteenth Amendment didn’t constitutionalize the Haig-Simons definition of income, of course, and a tax needn’t reach all increases in wealth to constitute a valid income tax. But exempting savings is different from the selective exclusion of certain income items in today’s code. The exclusion of broad categories of income items — of what everyone concedes can be included in “incomes” constitutionally — may leave a tax base that isn’t income in any generally accepted sense.

The economic literature can’t be controlling in interpreting a constitutional provision, but it’s instructive to see how economists have promoted the flat tax and the USA tax by emphasizing how different those taxes would be from the existing scheme. As the terms are ordinarily used in the literature, an income tax is the opposite of a consumption tax. At least since the time of Irving Fisher, consumption tax advocates have complained about an income tax’s being imposed both on the receipt of capital and on the income generated by the capital. In contrast, a pure consumption tax avoids double taxation, either by exempting the capital, or by exempting income from the capital, from tax.

It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation. It is not suggested that there has ever been any general scheme for taxing income on any other basis. The computation of income annually as the net result of all transactions within the year was a familiar practice, and taxes upon income so arrived at were unknown, before the Sixteenth Amendment. . . . It is not to be supposed that the amendment did not contemplate that Congress might make income so ascertainable as a basis of a scheme of taxation such as had been in actual operation within the United States before its adoption. While, conceivably, a different system might be devised . . . Congress is not required by the amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the more familiar method, even if it were practicable.

Id. at 365.

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33 But I don’t mean to say that the current code is the standard by which constitutionality of tax legislation should be measured, and I reject the idea that anything hidden in the code under the heading “Income Taxes” is necessarily constitutional. An unapportioned tax on real estate wouldn’t become constitutional merely because Congress put it into subtitle A of the code. See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) (“If the statute lays taxes on the part of the building occupied by the owner or upon the rental value of that space, it cannot be sustained, for that would be to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment.”).

Some cases that could be interpreted as taking a cavalier position on the meaning of income or as standing for the proposition that accounting is all-powerful, like Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), do nothing of the sort. Yes, the Court deferred to the system of annual accounting in a case where, over time, the taxpayer had little or no net income; the result, therefore, was that an “income” tax was imposed on a person without economic income. But the case merely held that allowances must be made for accounting practicality, as that practicality was understood in 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified:

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Id. at 365.

34 And, as I’ve already suggested, it would be inconsistent with the conception in 1913 — and that’s significant. See Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (focusing on “the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution”).

35 If Eiser v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), is still good law, as about three people in the world (including me) think, an income tax couldn’t reach all appreciation in wealth.

36 It’s been said to me that a gross receipts tax — a tax that permits no deductions, even for legitimate business expenses — may be a “tax on incomes,” and there is lower court authority for that proposition. See Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960). But taxing someone who has no net income (say receipts of $100,000 but also expenses of $100,000) under an “income” tax is absurd. (Note the reference to “net” in the text accompanying supra note 32.) The goal of the Sixteenth Amendment was to reach higher-income, no-net-income, persons.

The difference between a gross receipts tax and an income tax isn’t merely a matter of accounting. Permitting this deduction or that may be an accounting issue; deciding whether to permit any deductions at all is decidedly not a simple accounting question. Cf. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1913) (concluding that basis or cost-of-goods-sold concept was implicit in statutory definition of “income”: “In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that existed at the commencement of the period under consideration.”).

37 See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2411-13.

38 I hate to admit it, but I’m indebted to Calvin Johnson for these points. He’s really not a bad guy.


40 Professor Fisher and, more recently, Professor Jeff Strnad have argued that a true income tax wouldn’t impose a double tax on capital. See id.; Jeff Strnad, “Taxation of Income From Capital: A Theoretical Appraisal,” 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1023 (1985).
Despite its hybrid status, our current "income" tax satisfies the double-tax criterion for an income tax. Indeed, if the income tax didn't reach most sources of capital, it wouldn't have come into being. In contrast, the flat tax and the USA tax don't satisfy the double-tax criterion; that's part of their attraction.

4. The Supreme Court for years didn't think the definition of 'incomes' was 'inherently malleable.' The idea that the term "taxes on incomes" is "inherently malleable" is a modern one. The Supreme Court clearly didn't accept that notion for a long time (and, for that matter, there's not much evidence that the Court has a position one way or the other on that issue today).41

We all know Eisner v. Macomber,42 which held that shareholders couldn't be taxed on the receipt of totally proportionate stock dividends. In Macomber, in 1920, the Court stated that a

proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that [the Sixteenth] Amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and it is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.43

And

it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is used [in the Sixteenth Amendment]; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution. . . . 44

Clear enough? Macomber is rejected by most commentators today, as if it were aberrational,45 but it isn't the only case in which the Court assumed that "incomes" had content. Consider, for example, the well-known 1929 case of Taft v. Bowers,46 regarding the basis of property transferred by gift: "Under former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income."47

In Taft v. Bowers, the donee-taxpayer's position (that the income tax couldn't reach appreciation in property that had occurred while the property was held by the donor) didn't prevail, so that the language about the restrictive nature of the Sixteenth Amendment could be viewed as dictum. But in the 1925 decision in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.,48 the taxpayer, a railroad company, was successful in urging that it couldn't be taxed on subsidy payments made by the Cuban government: "The subsidy payments taxed were not made for services rendered or to be rendered. They were not profits or gains from the use or operation of the railroad, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."49 In short, they weren't the sort of benefit — if benefit they were — that people think of when they think of income, and "[t]he Sixteenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used."50

**One doesn't necessarily have to have an all-encompassing theory of 'income' to decide whether a particular item is or isn't income.**

In 1921, in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,51 the Court had written that "in determining the definition of the word 'income' . . . , this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."52 That kind of language lends itself to ridicule by modern commentators. For example, the Third Circuit, in 1940, stated that the test relied on "some illusory theory that the state legislatures who ratified the 16th Amendment had some idea of an 'ordinary meaning' for such an economic abstraction."53 The Tax Court has been particularly unsympathetic to Sixteenth Amendment claims. In 1978, for example, in rejecting a con-
ststitutional challenge to section 83, the court referred to a “long-abandoned” Supreme Court effort to fashion a concept of income.

The Court may not have considered the meaning of “incomes” for a long time, but I’m not sure that the effort has actually been abandoned, or if it was abandoned, what that means. One doesn’t necessarily have to have an all-encompassing theory of “incomes” to decide whether a particular item is or isn’t income. That is, one doesn’t need to be able to feel certain how all conceivable cases would be treated to rule on a particular case; that’s the genius of the common law.

My point in mentioning these old cases isn’t to argue that the reasoning or results were necessarily right one-by-one. I’m citing the cases for the proposition that the early understanding was that the Sixteenth Amendment didn’t grant unlimited power to Congress. The Court consistently rejected the idea that the meaning of the term “incomes” — in the words of Professors Gabinet and Coffey — ought “to float freely on the shifting tides of tax theologies.” Despite all the difficulties that can arise in categorizing cases at the margin, I would be very surprised to have the Court today subscribe to the notion that Congress can define a constitutional term however Congress wishes.

5. It’s not impossible to distinguish consumption and income taxes. It’s true that the Supreme Court hasn’t heard a lot of Sixteenth Amendment cases recently, but that doesn’t mean defining “incomes” is a hopeless project. This has unfortunately become a common method of legal argument: drawing lines is difficult, and, if a line is drawn, some cases at the margin may be wrongly decided. Moreover, we can always come up with difficult, marginal cases. Therefore (the argument goes) meaningful distinctions can’t be made at all. Because some people have trouble distinguishing Playboy and Penthouse for First Amendment purposes, many wind up deciding that no legally meaningful lines can be drawn between The New York Times and Hustler.

I’m not saying we should necessarily draft a rule that treats the Times and Hustler differently. I’m suggesting only that the difficulty of making distinctions at the margin shouldn’t blind us to our ability to distinguish quite different phenomena.

That we might fight about whether a particular taxed item is really part of a “tax on incomes” doesn’t mean that there are no important distinctions to be drawn between income taxes and consumption taxes.

6. The assumption that Congress has unlimited power to define ‘incomes’ has been based on the assumption that Congress would broaden the income tax base. To this point, I’ve been questioning the proposition that the term “incomes” is so inherently malleable that Congress can define the term however it wants. I’ll now briefly shift gears.

Deference to Congress in characterizing a tax as an income tax isn’t a principle I’m happy with, but you know what? It really doesn’t matter with the direct-consumption taxes we’re talking about because Congress wouldn’t purport to define the tax base as “incomes.” Put another way: we don’t need to defer to a congressional definition of “incomes” if Congress doesn’t say it’s defining “incomes,” or if Congress does say it’s defining incomes but is engaging in a subterfuge.

It’s my impression that most commentators who have stressed how broad the congressional taxing power is have assumed that Congress would make a good-faith effort to define “incomes.” That’s true of Thronyak and Kornhauser, the commentators I quoted on the inherently malleable point. Take away that assumption, and the case for deference disappears.

Congress knows the flat tax and the USA tax aren’t income taxes, or it will before a vote is taken. We’ll make sure of that in our debates on these proposals. As a result, Congress shouldn’t be able to rely on the Sixteenth Amendment as authority to enact a direct-consumption tax.

In addition, those who have argued that the term “taxes on incomes” is inherently malleable — or something similar — have assumed that Congress would act to broaden the definition of income. When Professor Kornhauser refers to a “broad and evolutionary” portion of income — as “congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated” — she doesn’t have in mind shrinking the tax base. She

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Footnotes:

54 The challenge was to the part of section 83 that defines the phrase of a restriction as a taxable event in some circumstances.

55 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.

56 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. If nothing else, this discussion illustrates some of the peculiarities that arise from treating constitutional and legislative definitions of “income” as if they necessarily coinide. What does it mean to say that Congress defines “incomes” under the Sixteenth Amendment? It can’t be that Congress defines the constitutional terms in a way that has effect on other governmental bodies or even on Congress itself. If Congress were to cut
doesn't have in mind, that is, a tax like any of the proposed direct-consumption taxes.

For example, in a number of articles, Professor Kornhauser sees "ability to pay" (particularly as reflected in a progressive rate structure) as a defining feature of the income tax: "[T]he graduated rate has been integrally connected under U.S. tax laws to the ability-to-pay theory that underlies the income tax."63

[A] progressive rate structure has been a constant feature of the income tax since 1913, when the first income tax was enacted under the Sixteenth Amendment. At that time, most of the general public, politicians and economists accepted the idea of progressivity (though they disagreed as to the appropriate rates) because it conformed to their conception of "ability to pay," which was the basis of the income tax.64

And Victor Thuronyi has commented:

An issue that has been important in the past, and may become important in the future if Congress becomes more creative with the income tax, is the definition of 'income' as used in the Sixteenth Amendment... [I]t may be appropriate to base the definition of income for purposes of the Constitution on tax equity. A constitutional definition of income in terms of tax equity would recognize that as long as Congress is striving to impose a tax based on the relative annual financial positions of taxpayers, according to its concept of fairness, the Court should not overturn its determinations.65

If Congress isn't trying to do that, it seems to me the inference from Kornhauser's and Thuronyi's discussions is clear.66

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back on the meaning of income, I can't believe that anyone would say that the narrow definition had constitutional status. Congress can't tie its own hands in the future by defining "incomes" narrowly today, or can it?


"Thuronyi, supra note 14, at 99-100 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

"Of course, one might argue that the term "taxes on incomes" has no content at all, and that the state of the law is such that, whatever the language of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress can do whatever it wants. Professor Ackerman has recently done just that: "Under the constitutional regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the national government's taxing, spending, and regulatory power where the economy is concerned..." Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3. And, with respect to the Sixteenth Amendment, he brushes aside the idea that we should try to figure out what "taxes on incomes" means: "When the People mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems particularly inappropriate for the Justices to respond in a niggling fashion," Id. at 55. In particular, Ackerman picks up on Holmes's dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, to the effect that "[t]he known purpose of the [Sixteenth] Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes." Macomber, 252

(Footnote 63 continued in next column.)

Conclusion

"Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a tax on income."64

Those words of Lord Macnaghten, in London County Council v. Attorney-General, written in 1900, obviously can’t be direct authority in interpreting the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It’s an English case, interpreting a passage from a century-old English revenue act.65 But to my mind those words suggest the appropriate method of analysis in determining whether a tax is a “tax on incomes,” and they suggest that not every levy is a tax on incomes.

Policymakers who proceed as if there were no constitutional issues associated with direct-consumption taxes do so at their — and ultimately our — peril.

I’ve presented some evidence that both historically and currently commentators have tended to think of income taxes and consumption taxes as fundamentally different. It is for that reason I question the generally held assumption that a consumption tax could be enacted, without apportionment, under the authority of the Sixteenth Amendment.

Of course, this conclusion is only as good as the assumptions that I made for purposes of this discussion. If a direct-consumption tax isn’t a direct tax, within the meaning of the Constitution, or if the direct-tax apportionment rule is a dead letter, then any debate about the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is irrelevant to the consideration of direct-consumption taxes.

U.S. at 219-20 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Ackerman, supra note 3, at 45; see also Kahn, supra note 12, at 139 (also approvingly citing Holmes's dissent). Suffice it to say for present purposes that Ackerman's sweeping statements aren't based on constitutional text or structure; his interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment makes sense only if we ignore the Amendment's language. Moreover, Justice Holmes cited no authority or evidence in support of his Macomber dissent. That fact reduces Professor Ackerman to making the bizarre argument that we should defer to Holmes because "we can never recapture the directness of his lived experience of the [Sixteenth Amendment's] ratification campaign." Ackerman, supra note 3, at 45; see also id. at 45-46 ("[W]e are left with Holmes's ipse dixit concerning original understanding — certainly an important resource, but one that may be too easily dismissed by readers who have not themselves lived through the process of amendment ratification."). Why Holmes's "lived experience" during Sixteenth Amendment ratification was superior to the experiences of the Macomber Court’s majority is never explained.


"The language was "upon payment of any interest of money or annuities charged with income tax under Sched. D and not payable or not wholly payable out of profits or gains brought into charge to such tax."
But if direct-consumption taxes are direct taxes — as I think they are — and if the apportionment rule still has effect — as I think it does — then the constitutionality of direct-consumption taxes hinges on the meaning of “taxes on incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment. If nothing else, I hope I’ve shown why it’s not self-evident that a direct-consumption tax is exempt from the apportionment requirement. Policymakers who proceed as if there were no constitutional issues associated with direct-consumption taxes do so at their — and ultimately our — peril.

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