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Erik M. Jensen

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SPECIAL REPORT

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW MEETS THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: WARBUS v. COMMISSIONER

by Erik M. Jensen

The relationship of the Internal Revenue Code to American Indians isn't a hot topic in the academy, for obvious reasons. Most Indian law scholars, like most scholars generally, avoid federal tax issues like the plague, and very few tax scholars dip into the American Indian law literature.

That's unfortunate. Federal tax law and American Indian law can intersect in fascinating ways. A recent Tax Court decision, Warbus v. Commissioner, is unlikely to attract scrutiny in the practitioner journals since it involves the interpretation of a specialized code provision, section 7873, that few practitioners will ever come across. But it presents issues ranging from the mundane to the marvelous, and it raises important questions about the judicial system’s difficulty in handling cases, even those that are factually simple, if the disputes implicate more than one legal specialty.

Relying on section 7873, which provides an exemption for income from “fishing rights-related activity” Warbus, a member of the Lummi Nation, didn’t pay tax on discharge of indebtedness (DOI) income arising from the foreclosure of his fishing boat. His position was plausible, and it deserved serious consideration. Nevertheless, Special Trial Judge John F. Dean rejected it in a strikingly cursory opinion, an opinion adopted by the Tax Court. The American Indian law flavor of the case was apparent; section 7873 has no effect outside the Indian law context. But Judge

1The phrase “tax issues like the plague” is not supposed to suggest that the plague is a tax issue, although the plague might have estate-planning implications. My point is that American Indian law professors spend very little time on federal tax issues (although state power to tax within Indian country comes up all the time in the typical introductory course).


4The tax law/Indian law nexus is unusual, but everyone is familiar with fights about whether a case sounds in tort or in contract.

5Section 7873.

6The jurisdiction of Special Trial Judges is set out in section 7443A(b) and Tax Court Rules 180 through 188.

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TAX NOTES, April 5, 1999
Dean’s opinion is bereft of references to basic American Indian law doctrine, including the so-called “canons of construction” that often play a controlling role in this area.7

If Warbus were a throwaway case, it would deserve little notice. But it isn’t. Warbus is a published opinion of the Tax Court, and it’s intended to have precedential effect.8 Since section 7873 hasn’t been the subject of prior judicial decisions, Warbus could have enormous effect in developing the understanding of that section.9 Even more important, Warbus could come to stand for the proposition that the Tax Court can ignore American Indian law principles in tax disputes that involve Indian tribes or Indian tribal members.

I’ll show why none of that should happen. Warbus deserves to be discarded as precedent for at least two reasons. First, as I’ve noted, the opinion shows no awareness of fundamental American Indian law principles. Second, the decision is flawed even in its narrow, more technical aspects. The court did an inadequate job on the issues that should have been evident to any tax lawyer reading section 7873. In fact, the judge misread the statute.

Warbus deserves to be discarded as precedent for at least two reasons.

I emphasize that my criticisms of Warbus are based on professional concerns about the opinion and what it could mean for the development of the law. I’m afraid that at times I may seem unfair to Judge Dean. Many of the problems in the opinion weren’t his fault. Judge Dean received little or no guidance from the litigants on some critical points, especially the basics of American Indian law. But regardless of where the fault lies, strong criticism is necessary to demonstrate why Warbus should be disregarded in later disputes arising from the intersection of American Indian law and federal tax law.


Around 1984, Warbus, a member of the Lummi Nation, bought a fishing boat, the Denise W, a purchase financed partly through borrowing from a commercial lender and partly by Warbus’s note issued to the boat’s former owner. In 1984, Warbus borrowed another $50,000 from the commercial lender, a loan secured by the Denise W.10 The proceeds were used, among other things, to acquire a salmon net, to make a payment on the earlier loan, and to make insurance and mortgage payments.11 The Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed the $50,000 loan.12

From 1986 until 1991, Warbus was engaged in tribal fishing activity protected by the Treaty of Point Elliott,13 and Warbus used the Denise W in that activity. However, around 1993, Warbus defaulted on the $50,000 loan. The boat was repossessed, and in 1993 the BIA had to fulfill its obligation as guarantor, paying over $13,506, partly principal and partly interest, to the commercial lender. The BIA sent Warbus the appropriate form (a “1099”) to indicate that he had $13,506 in DOI income.14

Warbus didn’t report the DOI income. In fact, he didn’t file a tax return or pay estimated taxes for 1993.15 Since Warbus conceded that he had had rental income of $6,000 and self-employment income of $3,700 in that year, and he therefore unquestionably owed some tax, Warbus wasn’t the most sympathetic litigant.16 Nevertheless, although the fisherman’s hands weren’t very clean, the proper tax treatment of the DOI income was a legitimate issue on its own.

Under traditional tax analysis, Warbus had taxable income from the discharge of indebtedness. He had borrowed money tax-free, and later he was relieved of the obligation to repay some of the borrowed dollars.

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"See infra Part II A.

"There’s a never-ending dispute within the Tax Court about the precedential effect of the court’s non-officially-published memorandum opinions, which are supposed to be limited to those having no value as precedent [i.e., any case decided solely upon the authority of another, cases involving subjects already well covered by opinions appearing in the bound volumes of the reports, failure of proof cases and some others.] J. Edgar Murdock, "What Has the Tax Court of the United States Been Doing?" 31 A.B.A. J. 297, 299 (1945); see Mark F. Sommer & Anne D. Waters, "Tax Court Memorandum Opinions — What Are They Worth?" Tax Notes, July 20, 1998, p. 384; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenges and Reform 163 n.9 (1996) (collecting commentary). Whatever the value of memorandum opinions, however, a published opinion like Warbus is unquestionably precedent.

"The only published authority on section 7873 before Warbus was Notice 89-34, 1989-1 C.B. 674, which set out the government’s position on some matters that aren’t directly relevant to this article. In Kieffer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-202, Doc 98-17481 (9 pages), 98 TNT 106-14, decided shortly after Warbus, Judge Dean had occasion to cite section 7873 once again, concluding inter alia — in what must be the least controversial ruling of the year — that income from timber sales is not income from a "fishing rights-related activity."
That's the classic scenario for DOI income: you don't have to report the dollars when received because you're obligated to pay them back. However, if you're later released from the payback obligation, you then have income. In effect, DOI income represents a deferred inclusion of previously untaxed loan proceeds.

There may have been a discharge of indebtedness, or something substantively similar, but Warbus could point to a special Internal Revenue Code section that arguably applied to his situation. Section 7873, added to the code in 1988, provides in pertinent part that "no tax shall be imposed . . . on income derived . . . by a member of an Indian tribe directly or through a qualified Indian entity . . . from a fishing rights-related activity of such tribe."

That's my case, argued Warbus. And the government conceded that, between 1986 and 1991, Warbus was engaged in a "fishing rights-related activity": "any activity directly related to harvesting, processing, or transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recognized fishing right of [an Indian] tribe or to selling such fish but only if substantially all of such harvesting was performed by members of such tribe." In general, "recognized fishing rights" means "fishing rights secured . . . by a treaty between [the] tribe and the United States or by an Executive order or an Act of Congress" — exactly the sort of rights reserved to the Lummi Nation by the Treaty of Point Elliott.

For section 7873 to exempt income from taxation, therefore, (1) a fishing rights-related activity must be in operation, and (2) the income at issue must be "derived directly from" that activity. The protected activity was conceded to exist in Warbus. If the DOI income was sufficiently connected to the treaty-provided fishing activity, Warbus should have prevailed.

II. How the Warbus Court Erred

The issue in Warbus, simply stated, was this: Was the DOI income of Warbus "income derived . . . directly . . . from an activity that was conceded to be "a fishing rights-related activity" of the Lummi Nation?

When I first saw squibs describing Warbus, my response to this question was "Why not?" Warbus used the Denise W in a tribal activity that the government agreed was a fishing rights-related activity, and the DOI arose from the foreclosure of that boat. After studying the issue, my response — now, I hope, a bit more thoughtful — is still "Why not?"

If the DOI income was sufficiently connected to the treaty-protected fishing activity, Warbus should have prevailed.

As I understand Judge Dean’s opinion, he had two basic problems with Warbus’s arguments: First, there was no express exemption of the DOI income from taxation and, second, the income was not closely enough connected with the treaty-protected activity.

In a moment I’ll show why each of these is a non-problem. But first, to set the stage, I’ll briefly describe the so-called "canons of construction" in American Indian law, canons that should have informed Judge Dean’s opinion. If Warbus’s arguments had any merit at all, the canons should have made his position a sure winner.

A. Canons of Construction

American Indian law is full of ambiguity: ancient treaties and statutes don’t speak in modern terms. This problem isn’t a new one — the relationship of treaty and statutory language to everyday usage has always been tenuous at best — and long ago judges developed a set of principles, the so-called "canons of construction," to deal with the inherent ambiguity in this field.

The canons originated in treaty interpretation. Treaties with the Indian tribes have often been likened to contracts of adhesion, the powerful United States imposing its will on the relatively weak and powerless tribes. Everything, including the language used in the "negotiations" and final document, favored the United States at the expense of the tribes. To implement those treaties in a fair and reasonable way, judges must try to understand what the affected tribal officials thought they were agreeing to, or would have thought if they had been able to imagine the nature of twentieth century controversies, regardless of the actual treaty language used. As Chief Justice John Marshall made the point in Worcester v. Georgia:

The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of, which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense.25

More recently, the Court has concluded that "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith."26

If there is a question about whether ambiguity exists, the canons point toward finding an ambiguity, one that must then be resolved favorably to Indian interests.

That principle has remained the law. The canons are phrased in different ways in different cases, but the basic tenets remain: Try to understand provisions as statutes, executive orders, and regulations as well. This affected tribe or the affected tribal member. It wouldn't be overstating matters much to say that, in disputes arising from the interpretation of treaties, statutes, and other documents, if a court sees ambiguity in the relevant language, the position of the tribe or the tribal member will prevail. 28

In fact, the canons ought to apply in determining whether there is an ambiguity needing resolution.29 It's entirely consistent with the canons as they have developed to require courts to look for ways to interpret controlling language in favor of the affected tribe or tribal member. Put another way: If there is a question about whether ambiguity exists, the canons point toward finding an ambiguity, one that must then be resolved favorably to Indian interests.

The application of the canons may not always be clear, and judges have circumvented the canons by purporting to find no ambiguity in inherently ambiguous documents. However, even when that happens, judges typically acknowledge the existence of the canons and explain why the canons don't affect the result.30 The canons, after all, are part of the law. To altogether ignore the canons, and to make no attempt to honor their commands, is unacceptable in a late twentieth century American Indian law case.

But that's what happened in Warbus.

There's no particular reason to expect a Tax Court judge to be aware of the canons. Judges need help in understanding areas of the law with which they are unfamiliar, but Judge Dean was left to his own devices. Other than citing cases in which the canons had been discussed,31 the parties gave Judge Dean no hint of the canons' existence.32 The fault was not the judge's, but his innocence does not make Warbus any more palatable as authority.

B. Taxability Presumption; Its Relationship to Indians

With the American Indian law canons of construction as a backdrop, I now examine Judge Dean's problems with Warbus's argument.

It's not the case, noted Judge Dean, that a Native American's income is presumed to be exempt from federal taxation. Quite the contrary. The judge wrote, "Tax exemptions, including those affecting native peoples, are not granted by implication. If Congress intends to exempt certain income, it must do so expressly."33

That tax exemptions cannot be granted by implication is a generally unobjectionable proposition, and American Indians are federal taxpayers, except in special situations.34 But it's not clear what that proposition

30See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying canons generously to forbid excise tax on sale of fee land within reservation boundaries while generally downplaying effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on such lands was permissible).
31E.g., Squire v. Carpenter, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); see infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
32Indeed, Warbus's Reply Brief credited the commissioner with having "recite[d] an unexceptional history of the intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law," even though there had been no mention of the canons in the government's brief. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). There was no recitation of the canons, even in boilerplate form, in any brief.
33Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83.
34For example, a treaty might protect members of a particular tribe from having to pay otherwise applicable federal taxes, or a statute like section 7873 could exempt all of a tribal member's income.
I before the enactment of section 7873, the Tax Court had held reference as to the existence or non-existence or scope of any exemption from tax for income derived from fishing rights that included the net proceeds from the timber sales. Like Judge Dean in Warbus, the Squire Court accepted the general proposition that "exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed." But that proposi-

Squire v. Capoeman was no ordinary tax case.

That's what the Supreme Court did in the 1956 case Squire v. Capoeman, which dealt with the tax liability of an Indian couple. The Capoemans claimed exemption from federal income taxation on the proceeds of timber sold from their allotted lands — lands for which they hadn't yet been issued a patent in fee simple.

Simply put, the government's primary position in Squire was that, as American citizens, the Capoemans were subject to federal income taxation. As the Court explained, "The government urges us to view this case as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty, relevant statutes, congressional policy concerning Indians, or the guardian-ward relationship between the United States and these particular Indians." While it's true, wrote Chief Justice Warren, that "in ordinary affairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, [Indians] are subject to the payment of income taxes as are other citizens," Squire v. Capoeman was no ordinary tax case.

The Capoemans' situation wasn't ordinary because there were statutory provisions, relating to allotted lands, that arguably exempted their timber income. Therefore, the Court examined provisions of the General Allotment Act of 1887 and a 1906 amendment to that act — enactments that defined the nature of the Capoemans' interest in the lands from which the timber had been taken. The General Allotment Act could be interpreted as precluding all taxation of allotted land until a patent had been issued. It was only after the issuance of a patent that "all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed." This language suggested to the Court "a congressional intent to subject an Indian allottee to all taxes only after a patent in fee is issued to the allottee." Indeed, said the Court, if there was any doubt about how the General Allotment Act should be read in these circumstances, the canons of construction removed that doubt. With the "doubtful expressions" of the Act read favorably to the Capoemans, no federal tax could be imposed on income from the allotted land. Moreover, relying on writings of Indian law scholar Felix Cohen, the Court interpreted the exemption to apply to "income derived directly" from the land, a category that included the net proceeds from the timber sales.

Like Judge Dean in Warbus, the Squire Court explained, "The Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed. . . ." Squire, 351 U.S. at 7.

38 Id. at 5-6.
39 Id. at 6.
42 25 U.S.C. section 349 (emphasis added). In its nearly full form, the proviso to Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, as amended, reads as follows: That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed . . . .
43 Squire, 351 U.S. at 7.
45 Squire, 351 U.S. at 9 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 265 (1942)).
46 Id. at 6.

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Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned statutory analysis of a sort that tax lawyers do every day.

All of which brings us to the interpretation of section 7873, the claimed express exemption in Warbus. I'll argue that the canons of construction weren't necessary to find an "express" exemption for Warbus's DOI income, since section 7873 is clear enough on its own terms. But whether that argument is right or not, the canons should have made this an easy case for the taxpayer.

C. Section 7873: Income and 'Activity'
Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned statutory analysis of a sort that tax lawyers do every day.

1. The structure of section 7873. Warbus, Judge Dean wrote, "argue[d] that the purchase of the Denise W and expenditures for associated equipment and operating expenses are fishing-rights related and that therefore the income from discharge of indebtedness incurred to meet these expenses is fishing-rights related."39

What precisely is the problem with that argument?

Since the government had conceded that a "fishing rights-related activity" existed, the problem had be to that Warbus's DOI income was insufficiently connected with that activity. In Judge Dean's words, the DOI income was the result of the freising of [Warbus's] assets from obligations by the BIA in 1993, not from any activity by him 'directly related' to harvesting, processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe.41

This is the passage that I would like to focus on in the Warbus opinion.

To begin with, Judge Dean garbled the statutory language. Compare the Warbus quotation, with its reference to "activity by him" and the quotation marks around "directly related," with the actual language of section 7873.42 The statute doesn't include the words "by him."43

As I discuss below, Judge Dean improperly personalized the "activity" requirement. Moreover, the "directly related" phrase that Judge Dean highlighted is merely part of the definition of "fishing rights-related activity," and that definition wasn't at issue in Warbus. Because the government had conceded that a qualifying activity existed, the only question should have been whether the income at issue was "derived ... directly ... from" the qualifying activity. None of the language in the quoted passage addresses that portion of section 7873.

Suppose Warbus had been able to show that he purchased the boat, paid expenses, and therefore incurred the associated debt only for the purpose of engaging in the Lummi Nation's treaty-protected activity. If he could have shown that — a position that the government largely conceded44 — surely that would have been enough of a connection to make the DOI income tax-exempt.

Or would it? If I'm reading the passage from Judge Dean's opinion correctly, one of his concerns was the relative passivity of the DOI income; for all we know, Warbus may have been asleep at the precise moment the DOI income was realized. I interpret Judge Dean's phrase "from any activity by him" as drawing this activity versus passivity distinction. It doesn't matter, that is, why the Denise W was acquired and how it was used; it doesn't matter why the borrowing occurred. If so, Warbus would mean that DOI income can never be section 7873 income.

If that's what he meant, Judge Dean misunderstood the word "activity" in section 7873. Return to the statutory language: "income derived ... directly . . . from a fishing rights-related activity."45 The "activity"
required by the statute is the "fishing rights-related activity," which includes "harvesting, processing, or transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recognized fishing right."\textsuperscript{56} The statutory language is as clear as it can be that the required "activity" is the overall structure of treaty-protected behavior that a tribe engages in and from which tribal members derive income; "from a fishing rights-related activity of such tribe."\textsuperscript{57} The requirement that there be such an activity was satisfied in \textit{Warbus}; the government had conceded the point for the Lummi Nation.

In the passage quoted above, Judge Dean would instead have us ask whether the income was "from any activity by \textit{[Warbus]} . . . 'directly related’ to a [treaty-protected activity]." That's too much activity for me,\textsuperscript{58} and it's more activity than section 7873 requires. By mixing up the "activity" requirement and the "income derived directly" requirement of section 7873, Judge Dean effectively rewrote the statutory provision. Section 7873 focuses on the connection of the income with the protected activity, not on whether the particular taxpayer is doing physical activity at the time an item of income is earned or an expenditure is made.

\textbf{By mixing up the 'activity' requirement and the 'income derived directly' requirement of section 7873, Judge Dean effectively rewrote the statutory provision.}

\section*{2. The meaning of 'activity' in other code sections.}

Judge Dean's conception of the term "activity" doesn't fit section 7873, and it's not supported by the way the term is used elsewhere in the code.\textsuperscript{59} To make that point, I'll discuss the oxymoronic passive activity loss (PAL) rules of section 469, enacted in 1986, only two years before the passage of section 7873, and the at-risk rules of section 465, enacted in 1976 but significantly extended in 1986.\textsuperscript{60} These two sections were the primary, and largely successful, weapons used against abusive tax shelters.

I'm going to try, as simply as possible, to show that use of the term "activity" in an internal Revenue Code provision doesn't necessarily mean that a taxpayer must be engaged in vigorous exercise to be subject to the statute. Indeed, the PAL rules would make no sense with such a requirement. To have an interest in a passive activity, and therefore to be subject to section 469, requires that a taxpayer not be personally active.\textsuperscript{61} The at-risk rules also were intended to attack certain loss-generating investments, denominated "activities," in which investors were likely to be personally inactive.

\textbf{a. Passive activity loss (PAL) rules.} Suppose a taxpayer-doctor has a loss attributable to his interest as limited partner in a limited partnership that engages in a trade or business. There is, by definition, activity going on, but the taxpayer doesn't participate very much, if at all, in the activity. That's the quintessential interest in a passive activity, a trade or business in which the taxpayer doesn't materially participate,\textsuperscript{62} and that's the sort of loss-generating investment section 469 addresses.

Section 469 made losses from passive "activities" much less valuable than they had been under pre-Tax Reform Act of 1986 law, in that such losses can be used only to offset income from passive activities.\textsuperscript{63} The doctor can't use his PALs to currently offset his active income from medical practice, nor can he use the passive losses to offset his portfolio income — the dividends, interest, and so on he earns from his investments.\textsuperscript{64} He can carry the currently usable losses forward to use when he has generated additional passive activity income\textsuperscript{65} but, all other things being equal, deferred losses aren't as valuable as currently usable ones. By limiting the utility of PALs, section 469 made investments in loss-generating passive activities much less attractive than had been the case before 1986.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{56} Section 7873(b)(1).
\textsuperscript{57} Section 7873(a)(1).
\textsuperscript{58} I agree with the statement usually attributed, probably erroneously, to Robert Maynard Hutchins: "Every time I think about exercise, I lie down until the thought passes."
\textsuperscript{59} Judge Dean made no reference to the term's use elsewhere. This failure (and it is a failure) wasn't entirely his fault. As with the canons of construction, he received no help from the parties. On the other hand, interpreting code language is part of his job.
\textsuperscript{60} Whatever the empirical validity of the assumption that members of Congress have any knowledge of the language used in other code provisions, that assumption is made all the time by courts. See, e.g., \textit{Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller}, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts."). This is an assumption that seems particularly appropriate when a term, like "activity," was used in 1988 legislation, only two years after it was a centerpiece of the widely noted PAL rules.
\textsuperscript{61} Of course, taxpayers generally don't want to be subject to section 469; those with losses don't want the losses limited by the PAL rules. But a taxpayer with PALs that would otherwise not be currently deductible wants income to be characterized as coming from a passive activity.
\textsuperscript{62} Section 469(h)(1). Material participation is defined in section 469(h)(1). Interests in limited partnerships are presumptively interests in passive activities. Section 469(h)(2).
\textsuperscript{63} Section 469(a)(1) disallows the deduction of a "passive activity loss," which is defined as the excess of losses from passive activities over income from passive activities. Section 469(d)(1). The effect is that losses from passive activities may be deducted currently to offset any income from passive activities.
\textsuperscript{64} Section 469(e)(1) defines such income as not being from a passive activity.
\textsuperscript{65} Section 469(b). When a taxpayer disposes of substantially his entire interest in a passive activity in a fully taxable transaction, (e.g., by selling the limited partnership interest), he can then deduct the previously suspended losses. Section 469(g)(1) (defining such losses as not from a passive activity).
\textsuperscript{66} As a result, doctors won't passively invest in such activities to generate losses to offset their medical income. Section 469 has been so effective because it has largely eliminated the objectionable behavior to which the provision would otherwise apply.
now suppose our hypothetical limited partnership recognizes some DOI income associated with the trade or business it conducts. The doctor’s limited partnership interest remains an interest in a passive activity.

Can DOI income attributable to such a passive activity be income from a passive activity to our hypothetical limited partner? Absolutely, if the connection with the passive activity is shown. That is, the income can be associated with an activity even though the taxpayer is completely inactive; that’s the nature of income from a passive activity. And that’s one of the lessons to transfer to the analysis of section 7873.

**In Judge Dean’s defense, there are facts in Warbus that could reasonably have given the court pause on the statutory interpretation issue.**

DOI income is neither inherently active nor inherently passive; its character under section 469 depends on the nature of the activity to which it’s allocated. That characterization has almost nothing to do with the extent of the actual efforts involved in generating the DOI income. Under the PAL rules, the extent of a taxpayer’s participation is significant in determining whether his interest is a passive activity. Does he materially participate? — but the characterization of a particular item of income or loss isn’t inherently passive; its character under section 469 is attributable to the passive, or non-passive, activity.

**b. At-risk rules.** Another example of the use of “activity” can be found in the at-risk rules of section 465, Congress’s first attack on tax shelters. In general, section 465 limits a taxpayer’s ability to take deductions relating to an “activity” to the amount that the taxpayer has “at risk” in the activity. As is true with the PAL rules, the at-risk rules make certain sorts of deductions much less valuable than used to be the case (in general, deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt and other risk-limiting arrangements used in almost all abusive tax shelters). One doesn’t avoid being subject to section 465’s limitations by arguing that one is inactive. In addition, income, including DOI income, can be attributable to an “activity” even though a particular taxpayer’s efforts in the activity are minimal or nonexistent.

The relevant determination under the PAL and at-risk rules is whether the DOI income relates to an “activity.” The question isn’t whether the particular taxpayer engaged in a certain level of activity with respect to that one income item. There’s no apparent reason why the same analysis shouldn’t apply under section 7873.

3. **Connection of DOI income with the Lummi Nation ‘activity.’** We know that there was a “fishing rights-related activity” in Warbus, since the government conceded that point. The appropriate question, the only question, should have been whether the DOI income was “derived . . . directly . . . from” that activity, not whether Warbus was “active” in generating the DOI income.

It wouldn’t strain the statutory language at all to see DOI income attributable to the foreclosure of a fishing boat acquired for use in a “fishing rights-related activity” as being “derived directly from” that activity, just as DOI income can be income from a passive activity. If that was Warbus’s situation, and it is consistent with what we know of the facts, he should have won. Such an interpretation of section 7873 wouldn’t create serious opportunities for manipulation by members of treaty-protected tribes; the connection between the DOI income in Warbus and the protected activity was hardly imaginary. And it wouldn’t create tax shelter opportunities that Wall Street could take advantage of.

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67See Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-2 C.B. 103 (discussing allocation of DOI income between passive activity expenditures and other expenditures); cf. LTR 9522008, 95 TNT 108-24 (holding DOI income to be investment income on the facts). The focus is allocation “at the time indebtedness is discharged.” Characterization of income as passive would generally be a good thing for taxpayers who have otherwise nondeductible PALS. See supra note 61.

68Would DOI income attributable to an activity not be income from a passive activity if the taxpayer materially participates in the activity? Again the answer is yes. DOI income can clearly be treated as income from a “trade or business,” a term that presupposes the existence of activity. Section 108, which provides for special deferral rules for DOI income in special circumstances, assumes that DOI income can be associated with a trade or business.

Section 465(a)(1). Taxpayers are generally at risk for the amount of cash and the adjusted basis of property contributed to the activity, and for the amount of borrowing for which they are personally liable. Taxpayers generally aren’t at risk for amounts borrowed on a nonrecourse basis. See section 465(b), (c).

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69Section 465(b), (c).

70This isn’t to say that nonrecourse debt is necessarily abusive. It is to say that abusive shelters routinely used nonrecourse debt, or what purported to be nonrecourse debt.

71See supra note 54.

72The government emphasized that section 7873 should not be used to confer “tax-free status on other income derived by Indians from other sources.” Respondent’s Brief in Answer at 12, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) (quoting Hearings on S. 1239 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. of Finance, 100th Cong. 13 (1988) (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy)). That principle is unobjectionable as a general matter, but it’s hard to see how holding this DOI income exempt — income from foreclosure of a fishing boat — would create opportunities to exempt income from other sources.

73At least I don’t think it would, but one should never underestimate the creativity of tax planners: “The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given the chance, those people will do you in.” Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg) (quoted in Jonathan L. Entin, “Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Law Reform,” 38 Mercer L. Rev. 835, 835 (1987)).
One shouldn't interpret the "derived directly from" language in section 7873, particularly when read with the canons of construction, as requiring an impossibly difficult showing of a connection between the income at issue and the protected activity. That wasn't the purpose behind the language. It was intended to require allocation between exempt income and non-exempt income — not all fishing income is necessarily exempt to a tribal member — not to impose insuperable burdens of proof.

The Senate Report on the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, which included the new section 7873, notes that the act "exempts only that income 'derived' from fishing rights-related activities. Thus, . . . individual tribal members . . . are required under the bill to allocate income and expenses among fishing rights-related activities and all other activities." Fair enough: the "directly derived" rule is an allocation rule, not a burden of proof provision. Life is made up of activities, and it's necessary to allocate income items, like DOI income, among those activities.

The report then contains an example of when allocation is required:

If . . . an individual tribal member derives 60 percent of his or her gross income in a taxable year from fishing in protected waters and the remaining 40 percent from fishing outside protected waters, then 60 percent of the member's income would be exempt from tax . . . , and any expenses . . . attributable to such exempt income could not be used to offset gross income derived from fishing outside prohibited waters or any other income.

If Warbus had used the Denise W in part for treaty-protected fishing, and in part for other purposes, then some of the DOI income should not have been exempt.

But except for one obscure footnote in a Senate Finance Committee report, a footnote that is hardly controlling, nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history suggests that all $13,506 of DOI income should have been automatically taxable.

Perhaps there are weak spots in this analysis; lawyers can pick holes in almost any argument. But with the canons of construction as reinforcements, I'm confident that any manufactured doubts should have been resolved favorably to Warbus. The Supreme Court in Squire v. Capoeman interpreted similar "derived directly" language liberally (although, in that case, a phrase interpreting statutory language rather than a phrase taken from the controlling statute) to hold some of a tribal member's income exempt from federal income taxation.

The opinion in Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis. That fact by itself should give us pause in relying on the Warbus opinion in future cases.

In Judge Dean's defense, there are facts in Warbus that could reasonably have given the court pause on the statutory interpretation issue. The borrowing occurred in 1984, a couple of years before Warbus participated in the fishing activity of the tribe. Perhaps that's a significant fact although, if so, one wishes that the judge would have explained its significance.

Rights-related activities. Without the special rule, a boat sale could therefore have disqualified an otherwise qualified entity. If boat sales proceeds are not section 7873 income, the government continued, neither is income attributable to a boat's foreclosure. Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96).

The government's argument has some force, but it gives much too much weight to what is, after all, a footnote in a report on a tangential issue. The purpose of the 90 percent test is to determine whether an entity is a qualified Indian entity; it has nothing to do with whether an individual's income is attributable to treaty activity. In addition, the footnote's purpose is to suggest that, consistent with the canons, the apparently all-or-nothing test to be a qualified Indian entity should not be applied in a draconian way. It would turn the canons on their head to use this passage to restrict exemption under section 7873. Finally, for what it's worth, gain from the sale of an asset and DOI income are not the same thing. Cf. section 108(a) (permitting deferral of DOI income but not gain in some circumstances).

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

Maybe he did so indirectly. Judge Dean noted that even had petitioner's loan proceeds been income in the first instance in 1984 [i.e., the year of borrowing], their source was not activity directly related to harvesting, processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe. Forgiveness of the repayment of those loan proceeds by a third party cannot convert the freeing of petitioner's assets into fishing-rights-related income merely because the loan proceeds were used to purchase equipment used in such an activity.

Warbus, 110 T.C. at 284. Putting aside the judge's continued conflation of the "derived directly from" and the "activity" tests, I suppose that passage can be interpreted as attaching significance to the fact that the borrowing preceded Warbus's participation in the tribal fishing activity: that is, the borrow-

(Footnote 81 continued on next page.)
addition, the DOI income was not recognized until 1993, a couple of years after Warbus had ceased participating in the activity. Perhaps that too is a relevant fact (although, again, one would like to know why). 82

III. A Final Canon Shot

As I read section 7873, Warbus had good arguments in support of his position even without the canons of construction. If we apply the canons, as we're obligated to do, the result is an easy one: DOI income arising from the foreclosure of a boat used in treaty-protected fishing activity is exempt.

A skeptical reader might suggest that the canons should not have been applied in Warbus because the section 7873 issue was not a typical "Indian rights" question. It was a tribal member rather than the Lummi Nation who would have benefitted directly by a different result in the case.

I'm not persuaded.

Section 7873 deals with traditional, treaty-protected tribal rights; applying the statute in a narrow way to a tribal member inevitably affects the economic well-being of the tribe. And it's not as though the canons have been applied only in cases in which tribal rights have been directly implicated. As we've seen, the Supreme Court, in its most important case discussing the federal income tax liability of individual Indians, Squier v. Capoeman, 83 applied the canons as a matter of routine. 84

In any event, as far as I can tell, Warbus wasn't the result of a principled determination that the canons were irrelevant. No such determination could have been made; the judge wasn't aware of the canons' existence.

The failure to apply the canons may not have been Judge Dean's fault, but it was a failing. As a result, the opinion in Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis. That fact by itself should give us pause in relying on the Warbus opinion in future cases.

IV. Conclusion

The world isn't necessarily made up of purely American Indian law cases or purely tax cases. Sometimes apparently discrete bodies of law intersect, and courts, practitioners, and scholars must deal with that overlap. Warbus should have been such a case.

Unfortunately, counsel for Warbus merely noted the "intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law" 85 and then did little or nothing to help Judge Dean deal with that intersection. It wouldn't have taken much. A boilerplate recitation of the canons of construction would have helped alert the judge to the American Indian law implications of the case.

I'm not sure why Warbus turned into such a disaster. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that it was not a big dollar case. The tax due on $13,506 of income, after taking into account the effects of standard deductions, personal exemptions, and low marginal rates, is very small. A case of this sort will therefore not elicit the legal effort that the larger issues might justify, and some of the technical issues would have taken substantial time to develop.

On the other hand, very little effort was necessary to get the American Indian law issues on the table. If nothing else, Warbus illustrates the dangers in having individual Indians litigating issues that affect larger, tribal interests. Section 7873 has important effects on tribal members who engage in protected fishing, but the ultimate beneficiaries are the tribes. Exempting members' income from federal income taxation promotes the economic position of tribes. Warbus's inadequate arguments led to an incredibly limited understanding of the income eligible for exemption, and it's tribal interests that will suffer if Warbus is taken seriously as precedent.

Obviously the Warbus opinion cannot be airbrushed out of the legal picture; 86 it's there in print (and on line) for us to ponder and criticize. But we should get as close as we possibly can to the effect of airbrushing: the next time a court hears a section 7873 issue it should act as if Warbus had never been decided.

82 Surely DOI income attributable to a taxpayer's passive activity would continue to be income from a passive activity even if it were recognized after the underlying trade or business ceased. Cf. section 469(f)(1) (permitting carried-over deductions from a former passive activity — e.g., because the taxpayer's level of participation has increased — to offset income from the no-longer-passive activity).

83 See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.

84 Although the tribal members lost in each case, the canons were nominally applied in the pre-section 7873 cases considering the federal income taxation of income derived from treaty-protected fishing. See supra note 35.