Kicked up from the seabed, the tsunami amplified in size and slowed in speed as it moved into the shallows beside the Japanese coastline, and by the time it touched land it was a wall of water, black and smooth. It was as tall in places as a three-story building, moving at fifty miles per hour. It flicked fishing trawlers over seawalls, crushed them against bridges. It sent fleets of cars and trucks hurtling from parking lots, and turned homes into chips of wood and tile….

The revolutionary wave sweeping [the Arab world] shows that once the masses are mobilized, no force on earth can stop them . . . . If it can happen in Egypt, it can happen anywhere.

From what we’ve read from overseas, if the Wikileaks release of classified documents could be recorded on an International Diplomatic Richter Scale, the measurement would be on par to a massive, catastrophic earthquake . . . .

By all measures, 2011 has already proven be a year of seismic ruptures both natural and political. The tectonic earthquakes that devastated Japan and New Zealand symbolize like nothing else the violent shocks to established patterns of domestic governance and international relations humanity has witnessed in recent months. World attention has been focused first and foremost on North Africa and the Middle East, but the sheer magnitude of events in that region obscures

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the countless smaller tremors rattling the political status quo in country after country across the globe.\textsuperscript{4}

Although the conditions giving rise to this turmoil surely vary, and each country’s situation is in large part unique, the global economic crisis’ role in fueling political friction everywhere has not gone unnoticed.\textsuperscript{5} But there is a second common thread uniting today’s turbulent international headlines, and that is the seemingly ubiquitous presence of U.S. State Department cables containing classified communications between American ambassadors and their diplomatic counterparts in foreign embassies.\textsuperscript{6} Australian-born anti-secrecy activist Julian Assange publicly disclosed files from a massive cache containing 250,000 of such cables to five newspapers\textsuperscript{7} through his website WikiLeaks on November 28, 2010\textsuperscript{8} after having received them from an anonymous source\textsuperscript{9} inside the government who had clearance to


\textsuperscript{8} See Shane & Lehren, supra note 6, at A1.

access them. Since then, Assange has been slowly releasing more and more such files day-by-day, week-by-week, and month-by-month. The published cables have been credited with critically galvanizing the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and with fundamentally destabilizing governments everywhere else.


Popular outrage over Manning’s treatment at Quantico, which allegedly involved being forced to sleep naked, is widely cited as having prompted his transfer to Leavenworth. See Knickerbocker, supra.

WikiLeaks emphasizes the anonymous nature of its sources, and puts a great deal of effort into guaranteeing that anonymity. Submissions, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/Submissions.html (“Wikileaks does not record any source-identifying information and there are a number of mechanisms in place to protect even the most sensitive submitted documents from being sourced.”)(last visited May 2, 2011).

Assange has so far released only around one percent of the entire cache of 251,287 cables and continues to slowly release only a handful or two per day. Rafael G. Satter, WikiLeaks: 1 Percent of Diplomatic Cables Published, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/23/wikileaks-one-percent-cables-published/.


Assange himself has taken credit for helping the Arab uprisings through the release of certain cables. See Assange Claims Wikileaks Boosted Mid East Uprisings, BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-12758380.
Leaks substantiating long-standing allegations that in July 2008 it had bribed members of parliament to enter a vote of confidence on a nuclear deal between India and the United States.\(^\text{16}\) Cables obtained by Peru’s leading newspaper *El Comercio* have seriously compromised the populist and nationalist credentials of multiple presidential candidates weeks before the country’s upcoming elections, portraying them as little more than American stooges masquerading as left-wing populists.\(^\text{17}\) The U.S. ambassador to Mexico resigned after a WikiLeaks cable was published that quoted him complaining of “inefficiency and


infighting among Mexican security forces in the campaign against drug cartels.”

Perhaps most disturbingly, a cable published by The Guardian on March 14, 2011 quotes a Japanese parliamentarian accusing Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry—the agency that oversees nuclear energy—of “covering up nuclear accidents, and obscuring the true costs and problems associated with the nuclear industry.”

But American public officials have the most to fear from the existence of the cables and their constant, slow trickle, because U.S. diplomacy is the hub through which each and every one of these scandals travels. To date, the world has learned from WikiLeaks that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ordered American diplomats to spy on the United Nations officials and obtain their “DNA data—including iris scans and fingerprints—as well as credit card and frequent flier numbers,” that President Obama has been fighting a “secret war” in Yemen, ordering cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorists, and that the United States pressured Spain to stop investigating torture and rendition at Guantanamo Bay. We have also learned from WikiLeaks that the “Obama and Bush administrations repeatedly characterized Bahrain as more open and reform-minded than its neighbors” and pushed back against human rights groups that have criticized the Bahrain government for the arrest of protesters and lawyers. And further, that Omar Suleiman, the United States’ preferred successor to

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ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, ruthlessly oversaw the horrific torture of detainees the CIA had “rendered” to Egypt.24

Senator Joe Lieberman, who has suggested prosecuting not only Assange but even the New York Times and other newspapers reporting on the cables, 25 may have been thinking about a certain recently-leaked cable dating to February 23, 2009 when he decided not to run for reelection in 2012.26The cable depicts him asking President Mubarak’s hated investment-banker son and erstwhile heir apparent Gamal for his advice, as “an experienced international financier,” on U.S. fiscal policy after the trillion-dollar Troubled Asset Relief Program27 failed to halt Wall Street’s free fall.28 The younger Mubarak advised Lieberman to “inject even more money into the system” and the senator “agreed on the need for bold measures to restore confidence.”29

Lieberman has been at the forefront of a bipartisan effort to extradite and prosecute Assange30 from the day WikiLeaks first began pub-

28 Moreno, supra note 27.
29 Id.
30 Mirkinson, supra note 25. Attorney General Eric Holder launched a criminal investigation of Assange and WikiLeaks soon after the release of the cables, and vowed to hold “accountable” and “responsible” “anybody who was involved in the breaking of American law…..” Pete Yost, Holder Says WikiLeaks Under Criminal Investigation, ABCNEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wiresStory?id=12266154. He offered, however, “little in the way of specifics about the American legal strategy . . . .” Justin Elliott, Holder Threatens Wikileaks, Again, SALON (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/12/06/holder_on_assange_again. The question of what U.S. law Assange may have violated is and will remain speculative unless and until the American government successfully manages to secure his
lishing the cables. He and Representative Peter King have sought to broaden the scope of Section 798 of the Espionage Act of 1917 to cover non-state “transnational threat[s]” such as WikiLeaks.

31 Lieberman’s role as chairman of the Homeland Security Committee has given him the opportunity to bring the power of the federal government to bear against WikiLeaks in ways that go beyond legislative measures and include coercing private companies like Amazon.com and PayPal to cease doing business with Assange and WikiLeaks. Alan Greenblatt, WikiLeaks Fallout: Unease Over Web Press Freedoms, NPR (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/08/131905226/wikileaks-fallout-unease-over-web-press-freedoms.


33 §§ 791-98, 2388.

34 The current Section 798 reads in part:

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information—

(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or

(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or

(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or

(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section—

The term “classified information” means information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;

The terms “code,” “cipher,” and “cryptographic system” include in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications;

The term “foreign government” includes in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States;
government favors an interpretation of the Act more generally that subjects to criminal liability not only government employees who leak classified information they are cleared to access but also third party recipients of that information who publish it—the category under which Assange and WikiLeaks fall—provided the latter’s intent to harm national security can be proven.\footnote{35}

Senator Dianne Feinstein popularized the idea of prosecuting Assange and WikiLeaks under the Espionage Act soon after the initial release of the cables,\footnote{36} evoking Justice Holmes’s well-known analogy

The term “communication intelligence” means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients;

The term “unauthorized person” means any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States.

\section*{§ 798. The Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination ("SHIELD") Act would add “or transnational threat” to Section 798(a)(1) and would insert the two new subsections, “(4) concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government” and “(5) concerning the identity of a classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United States[,]” to Section 798(a). See S.315, 112th Cong. (2011). The Act would define “human intelligence” as “all procedures and methods employed in the collection of intelligence through human sources” and would define “transnational threat” as follows:

(A) any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime that threatens the national security of the United States; or
(B) any individual or group that engages in an activity referred to in subparagraph (A).

See id. The Act would define the terms “informant” and “intelligence community” as they are currently defined in the National Security Act of 1947. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 426 (2006)).

\footnote{35} Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Res. Serv., Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information\footnote{11} (rev. ed. 2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41404.pdf (“[It] seems that there is ample statutory authority for prosecuting individuals who elicit or disseminate many of the documents at issue, as long as the intent element can be satisfied and potential damage to national security can be demonstrated.”).

\footnote{36} See Dianne Feinstein, Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act: Just as the First Amendment is not a License to Yell ‘Fire!’ in a Crowded Theater, it is also not a License to Jeopardize National Security, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2010),
in *Schenck v. United States*: 37 “Just as the First Amendment is not a license to yell ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater,” she claimed, “it is also not a license to jeopardize national security.” 38 But Feinstein omitted a small detail in her paraphrase of Holmes that is actually highly relevant in the WikiLeaks context. Holmes wrote of “a man . . . falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” 39 As much of a panic Assange’s release of the WikiLeaks cables has surely caused among the world’s governing classes, the cables all contain content that is nothing if not true. That is not to say, of course, that each and every one of the documents contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 40 Among of the most scandalous, controversial, and widely discussed cables are those that reveal one world leader’s *opinion* of another world leader 41 or an ambassador’s frank and uncensored, *subjective* assessment of a country’s political situation. 42 The veracity of these documents is rather a product of manner in which they were produced, hidden from public view, and subsequently revealed. WikiLeaks “accepts a range of material but . . . [does] not solicit it” and provides a high security anonymous drop box fortified

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575653280626335258.html

38 Feinstein, *supra* note 36.
39 *Schenck*, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
40 When computer security firm HB Gary conspired with Bank of America and several other “top online security firms” to “destroy WikiLeaks,” one of their primary strategies was “planting fake documents with the group and then attacking them when published.” Glenn Greenwald, *The Leaked Campaign to Attack WikiLeaks and Its Supporters*, SALON (Feb. 11, 2011, 4:12 ET), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2011/02/11/campaigns. The unique authenticity and hence credibility of the documents is one of the most threatening aspects of WikiLeaks in the opinion of those who have both power and something to hide.
by cutting-edge cryptographic information technologies.\(^{43}\) The organization’s journalistic staff “asses[es] the submission. If it meets the criteria, our journalists then write or produce a news piece based on the document.”\(^{44}\) It then publishes both a news story highlighting the most interesting parts and an analysis of the document along with the document itself.\(^{45}\)

As proof of “the truth of the matter asserted”\(^{46}\) within it, each cable is mere hearsay—a “drip” that rarely causes more than a ripple in the political waters of a nation.\(^{47}\) This hearsay quality of individual cables is what those who claim their release “reveals little more than gossip on the embassy circuit” have in mind.\(^{48}\) But as cumulative evidence of a hidden “international state system based on realpolitik, cynicism and cold self-interest, in which moral calculations are conspicuously absent,”\(^{49}\) the cables in their totality have overrun the calm harbors of diplomatic trust between sovereign governments and smashed into those governments’ edifices of democratic legitimacy with tsunami-like force.\(^{50}\)

The colossal volume of state-secret-containing digital files in Assange’s possession and the utter futility of suppressing public knowledge of their contents after WikiLeaks releases them to an Internet-wired world are both products of a revolution in communications technology that has fundamentally shifted political power from rulers to the ruled. In our current age, the monetary costs of obtaining, re-


\(^{44}\) Id.

\(^{45}\) Id.

\(^{46}\) FED. R. EVID. 801(c).


\(^{49}\) Matthew Carr, Why Persecuting Bradley Manning is a Futile Gesture: Whistleblowers Have an Important Part to Play in Democratic Societies—has Obama Himself Has Said, FIRST POST (UK) (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:20 AM), http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/75979,news-comment,news-politics,why-persecuting-bradley-manning-is-a-futile-gesture-wikileaks-assange#ixzz1GQqBMVRS.

producing, and disseminating information reduce to zero, the ability to
do so anonymously is without historical precedent, and the social and
legal consequences of doing so illicitly is thus substantially dimin-
nished.51 The sheer power of the individual under such circumstances
seems destined to overtake traditional debates about the rights of the
individual.52 Only in such a world does Professor Geoffrey Stone’s
reference to “the problem [that] arises when the public disclosure of
secret information is both harmful to the national security and valu-
able to self-governance” make any sense.53

The evolving judicial doctrine that has accompanied the First
Amendment since the aftermath of World War I is ill equipped to
cope with the brave new world of WikiLeaks. It too has been engulfed
by the tidal wave of political truth the cables have set in motion. The
uproar over “prior restraint” that followed President Nixon’s attempt
to enjoin the New York Times from publishing Daniel Ellsberg’s Pen-
tagon Papers54 appears in hindsight almost medieval given the ease

51 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009) (discussing the effect of the new technology reality on
First amendment law and how network neutrality will affect future information poli-
cy); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 M N N.
L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of NSA’s eavesdropping outside of
FISA); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Free-
that digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech and therefore should
change the focus of free speech theory).

52 For a thorough treatment of the havoc that the information revolution has
wreaked on traditional conceptions of individual rights, see generally DAVID BRIN,
THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (forecasting that information technology in the twen-
ty-first century will be a double-edged sword, forcing much greater public transpare-
cy while at the same time eroding individual privacy).

53 The Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by
[hereinafter WikiLeaks Hearing] (Statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor of Law,
University of Chicago).

54 Ellsberg was “a high-level Pentagon official” and considered his role in
leaking the documents to the Times to be roughly analogous to Bradley Manning’s
alleged leak of the embassy cables to Julian Assange. Ashley Fantz, Pentagon Papers
03-19/us/wikileaks.ellisberg.manning_1_daniel-ellisberg-pentagon-papers-young-
man?_s=PM:US. The Pentagon Papers were 7,000 top-secret documents that showed
that American leaders knew the “Vietnam War was an unwinnable, tragic quagmire.”
Id. In considering the leak, the Supreme Court denied Nixon his injunction in New
York Times v. United States holding that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expres-
sion [bears] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” N.Y. Times Co.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). Ellsberg, meanwhile, was tried under the Espio-
nage Act, but “a number of bizarre twists” in the course of Ellsberg’s 1973 trial re-
with which any individual can anonymously upload classified information to the Internet and the ease, in turn, with which that information can suddenly “go viral.” The only recourse the current administration has against WikiLeaks that is at all feasible today is a post-publication criminal indictment. The only way to prevent the WikiLeaks exception from swallowing the norm of a free press is to distinguish Assange’s peculiar trade from proper “journalism” and to distinguish WikiLeaks from “the press.” Those who are interested in squaring the First Amendment circle in order to “constitutionally” bring down Assange and his organization invariably settle on the pub-

sulted in the dismissal of all charges against him. See Judge William Byrne; Ended Trial Over Pentagon Papers, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at C09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/14/AR2006011401165.html. These “bizarre twists” involved improprieties by the very same Nixon administration operatives whose Watergate hotel break-in ended Nixon’s presidency prematurely. Id. They included “a disclosure by the government prosecutor that White House operatives had burglarized the Beverly Hills office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist” and various illegal wiretapping revelations. Id. The trial judge ultimately declared that “[t]he totality of the circumstances of this case . . . offend a sense of justice” and “have incurably infected [its] prosecution” and therefore dismissed the case entirely. Id.

55 “To go viral” originated as a marketing term during the late 1990s and early 2000s as the Internet was first blossoming into a commercial space. See, e.g., Alan L. Montgomery, Applying Quantitative Marketing Techniques to the Internet, 31 INTERFACES 90, 93 (2001). The advent several years later of social media platforms, however, shifted the usage of the term away from the corporate boardroom and into the living rooms of ordinary individuals, each of whom could potentially share an idea with the online community that would strike a popular nerve and spread from computer to computer with the speed of a mouse click. See generally, e.g., PATRICIA MARTIN, TIPPING THE CULTURE: HOW ENGAGING MILLENNIALS WILL CHANGE THINGS (2010). The disputed but still palpable role of social media in fueling social unrest in the Arab world and elsewhere in recent months has more thoroughly shifted “going viral” from the commercial to the political sphere and arguably gave it a newly anti-commercial character. See, e.g., Allison R. Soule, Fighting the Social Media Wildfire: How Crisis Communication Must Adapt to Prevent from Fanning the Flames (2010) (unpublished Masters of Journalism thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http://rightsideofright.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Soule_Thesis_UBGwebsite.pdf.


lisher’s *specific intent* “to cause harm to the national security of the United States and/or benefit to a foreign power.”

This specific intent standard for criminal third-party publisher liability under the Espionage Act collapses into mangled rubble the carefully compartmentalized distinction between, on the one hand, the executive branch’s prerogative to classify documents as secret and maintain their secrecy for national security reasons, and on the other hand, the constitutional prohibition of Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The Court has long appreciated the symbiotic relationship between education and advocacy in its First Amendment jurisprudence; for decades it has recognized that “[t]he right to express viewpoints would mean little if government could stifle the exchange of facts underlying such viewpoints.”

The theory under which the government might attempt an Espionage prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks would change this standard such that the government *could* constitutionally stifle the exchange of facts if it

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58 *WikiLeaks Hearing*, supra note 53, at 68 (Statement of Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law).

59 The *Pentagon Papers Case* does not fall under this category because it concerned the issue of a prior injunction against publishing classified material, not a post-publication prosecution under the Espionage Act or another statute. There is very little precedent involving prosecutions for leaks of classified information with an intent to publish for the whole world to see as opposed to an intent merely to share with an enemy state, as with classic espionage. Heidi Kitrosser, *Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech*, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 899 (2008). The most notable cases include United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction under Espionage Act of U.S. Naval Intelligence employee’s leaking of satellite photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to a British magazine in violation of a nondisclosure agreement he had signed) and United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction under Espionage act of two lobbyists for “obtain[ing] national defense information from various sources within the United States government and unlawfully pass[ing] that information to other [lobbyists], foreign officials, and members of the news media.”).

60 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, cl. 3-6. See, e.g., Bartnickiv. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (stating unambiguously that disclosing or publishing information is speech and not “conduct” and describing the disclosure of “truthful information of public concern” as implicating “the core purposes of the First Amendment”; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (overturning an Alabama law restricting picketing during labor disputes and citing “the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (holding that primary purpose of the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause is “to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information” and describing “informed public opinion” as “the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment”).

could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the exchanger of facts intended to harm national security.

The philosophical conundrum of defining national security in a democracy, a political system in which the people in theory are self-governing sovereigns, suddenly resurfaces after nearly a century of efforts by Justice Holmes, Justice Black, Alexander Mieklejohn, and others to bury it. The “clear and present danger” analysis that has shaped First Amendment doctrine in the twentieth century emerged out of the wartime contradiction between individual liberal freedoms and collective republican loyalty that the same Espionage Act of 1917 that the government currently wants to use against Assange. But the

62 Popular sovereignty was an idea that in Europe entailed a conceptual transference from the person of the royal prerogative of the absolute monarch to the “general will” of the “constituent power.” The philosophical alienation between sovereignty and the rule of law is a theme that eternally polarizing and controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt explored during the politically turbulent years of the Weimar Republic. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005). The United States, however, never had a king, and the American understanding of popular sovereignty has always been looser and less defined than in Europe. See Christian G. Fritz, American Sovereignties: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition before the Civil War (2008); Carl J. Friedrich, The Deification of the State, 1 Rev. Pol. 18 (1939).

63 Holmes repudiated the “meager clear and present danger test formulated in” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), in favor of the “imminent threat test” he applied in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Ronald K.L. Collins & Sam Chaltain, We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free: Stories of Free Expression in America 112 (2011). The imminent threat test was more context dependent and therefore de-emphasized the actual content of the defendant’s speech. Black and MiekleJohn took a broader, more philosophical approach to the First Amendment and considered in the general context of democratic self-government and popular sovereignty. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 879 (1960), noting: Misuse of government power, particularly in times of stress, has brought suffering to humanity in all ages about which we have authentic history. Some of the world’s noblest and finest men have suffered ignominy and death for no crime—unless unorthodoxy is a crime. Even enlightened Athens had its victims such as Socrates. Because of the same kind of bigotry, Jesus, the great Dissenter, was put to death on a wooden cross. The flames of inquisitions all over the world have warned that men endowed with unlimited government power, even earnest men, consecrated to a cause, are dangerous. See also Alexander Mieklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 (“The First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to speak.’ It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’ It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.”).

64 Both Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test in Schenck and his “imminent threat” test in Abrams concern the particular exigencies of the World War I home front. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
formative free speech decisions of that era for the most part focused not on the publication of classified information but on the advocacy of resistance to and obstruction of America’s war effort. Title 1, Section 3 of the original 1917 act read:

> Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies,…and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause, or attempt to cause . . . insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct…the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States,…shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both . . .

Schenck v. United States, the source of Holmes’s “fire” quote, concerned this 1917 language. But the following year, Congress amended the Espionage Act in what became known as the Sedition Act of 1918. The language of Section 3 was expanded so as to cover any constitutional right.”). If the Government in its prosecution of Assange were to extend the post-9/11 War on Terror idea of a global battlefield and an indefinite conflict, then there would be presumably no limit to the extent to which “unorthodoxy,” as Justice Black might put it, could be constitutionally criminalized.

65 See WALTER NELLES, ed., NAT'L CIV. LIBERTIES BUR., ESPIONAGE ACT CASES WITH CERTAIN OTHERS ON RELATED POINTS: NEW LAW IN MAKING AS TO CRIMINAL UTTERANCE IN WAR-TIME 1-2 (1918).
67 See id. at 53 (“The fact that the Act of 1917 was enlarged by the amending Act of May 16, 1918, of course, does not affect the present indictment and would not, even if the former act had been repealed.”) (citation omitted); see also RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 367 (1987) (noting that the repeal of the 1918 Sedition Act in 1921 meant that “the law which had produced Schenck remained on the books, but not the law which had produced Abrams.”).
68 For some historical context regarding the manner in which the Espionage and Sedition Acts were debated and enacted, see generally Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War I, and Republican Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192 (2008); Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (2003) (claiming that the repressive effect attributed to the Espionage Act was more judicial construction than legislative intent). For some scholarly perspective from the period, see Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War Time; The Espionage Act, 17MICH. L. REV. 621 (1919); Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resume, 30 YALE L. J. 48 (1920); John B.
whole categories of political advocacy speech that had been untouch by the original 1917 language:

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies, or shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements, or say or do anything except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice to an investor . . . with intent to obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds . . . or the making of loans by or to the United States, or whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause . . . or incite . . . insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct . . . the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag . . . or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any language intended to bring the form of government . . . or the Constitution . . . or the military or naval forces . . . or the flag . . . of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute . . . or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully . . . urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this country of any thing . . . necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war . . . and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both . . .

To Title XII of the Act, moreover, was added a provision which in the current WikiLeaks age would be absurdly futile, empowering direct


NELLES, supra note 65, at 1-2.
government interference with the circulation of offending publications through the mails:

When the United States is at war, the Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or concern is using the mails in violation of . . . this Act, instruct the postmaster at any post office at which mail is received addressed to such person or concern to return to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed all letters or other matter so addressed, with the words ‘Mail to this address undeliverable under Espionage Act’ plainly written or stamped upon the outside thereof, and all such letters or other matter so returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to the senders thereof under such regulations as the Postmaster General may prescribe. 70

Finally, the Attorney General issued the following statement to federal prosecutors regarding the importance of proving disloyal intent when prosecuting speakers under the expanded Act:

The prompt and aggressive enforcement of this Act is of the highest importance in suppressing disloyal utterances and preventing breaches of peace. It is also of great importance that this statute be administered with discretion. It should not be permitted to become the medium whereby efforts are made to suppress honest, legitimate criticism of the administration or discussion of government policies; nor should it be permitted to become a medium for personal feuds or persecution. The wide scope of the Act and powers conferred increase the importance of discretion in administering it. Protection of loyal persons from unjust suspicion and prosecution is quite as important as the suppression of actual disloyalty. 71

The evolution of the Court’s First Amendment doctrine from the decisions that arose out of prosecutions under this Act 72 to the modern principle requiring imminent harm to national security interests is required before political speech can be restricted 73 was defined by the

70 Id. at 2.
71 Id. at 2-3.
72 The trilogy of cases typically credited with initiating the Court’s modern First Amendment doctrine are Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
73 Traditionally, the requirement of imminent harm to national security made possible a clear distinction between political advocacy (and informative) speech,
slow, if uneven, divergence between radical political advocacy (and the facts underlying such advocacy) per se\textsuperscript{74}—and the national security exception to the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{75}

The WikiLeaks cable disclosures inflict upon Washington with the same seismic force as they do upon its allies and enemies “the embarrassment of having their corrupt, war-mongering ways published for all the world to see” and sitting in the front row of this theater of political voyeurism is “an increasingly restless and volatile electorate.”\textsuperscript{76} Under such circumstances, the distinction between disloyal

which is constitutionally protected under the strictest of scrutiny standards, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969)(“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”), and security-compromising conduct, such as leaking classified information, see New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (“The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle. A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. That debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress.”) (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{74} During World War I, prosecutors and appellate judges often did not sympathize with the defendant’s insistence on the truth of his utterance. See United States v. Motion Picture Film ‘The Spirit of ’76’, 252 F. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1917) (finding defendant filmmaker guilty under the Espionage Act for maligning the government of the UK, America’s wartime ally, by producing a film about the American War of Independence that depicted eighteenth-century British Redcoats committing atrocities against American colonists). See id. at 947 (“History is history, and fact is fact. There is no doubt about that. At the present time, however, the United States is confronted with what I conceive to be the greatest emergency we have ever been confronted with at any time in our history. There is now required of us the greatest amount of devotion to a common cause, the greatest amount of co-operation, the greatest amount of efficiency, and the greatest amount of disposition to further the ultimate success of American arms that can be conceived, and as a necessary consequence no man should be permitted, by deliberate act, or even unthinkingly, to do that which will in any way detract from the efforts which the United States is putting forth to serve or postpone for a single moment the early coming of the day when the success of our arms shall be a fact and the righteousness of our cause shall have been demonstrated.”).


\textsuperscript{76} Angela H, WikiLeaks, Espionage and Sedition: We are ALL Guilty, ACTIVISIONARY (Jan. 24, 2011), http://actvisionary.info/?page_id=46&preview=true/#/discussion/3/wikileaks-espionage-and-sedition-we-are-all-guilty/p1.
sedition and loyal criticism that the U.S. Attorney General in 1918 advised his subordinates to honor is even less meaningful than it was during World War I. Under the specific intent standard of Espionage Act liability with which the Government wants to prosecute Assange and WikiLeaks, a trial jury could very well end up convicting or acquitting based on its assessment of a prosecutor’s closing argument worded identically to the following assertion by The National Review’s Rich Lowry:

Assange’s goal is wanton destruction, pure and simple. He wants to expose to retribution those who cooperate with us on the ground in war zones. He wants to undercut domestic support for our wars. He wants to embarrass our foreign allies and exact a price for their trust in us. He wants to complicate sensitive operations like securing nuclear material in Pakistan and attacking terrorists with missiles in Yemen. Assange is Noam Chomsky with a knack for computers and a determination to do the “American empire” more harm than just lashing out against it in feverish books gobbled up by college sophomores.77

As the current century progresses, more and more of us will develop a sufficient “knack for computers” to be able to inflict the type of political damage Assange has inflicted by releasing the cables. If technological savvy is all that is necessary to make a federal felon out of every questioning soul who dares follow in the footsteps of the kindly old MIT linguistics professor with a political chip on his shoulder, there will be little of substance left of the First Amendment before long.

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