Global Neighborhoods’ Contribution to Declining Residential Segregation

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INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOODS’ CONTRIBUTION TO DECLING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Residential segregation remains high for African Americans. Despite the progress achieved since the historic high point of black ghettoization (around 1970), change is best described as slow and uneven. One of the authors has previously described a set of large Northeastern and Midwestern metropolitan areas, home to about one in five African Americans in 2010, as “America’s Ghetto Belt.” In these metros, segregation remains close to its 1980 levels. Major legislative

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3 Id.
and court battles have been waged during this period seeking to engage state power in the struggle for fair housing. Yet the main legislative accomplishment, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, has been described as “intentionally designed so that it would not and could not work.”

Other legislation at the state level in the same era was “characterized by narrow-to-modest coverage, weak enforcement provisions, and tentative moves by administrators.” Among major court victories by fair-housing advocates are the Mount Laurel decisions—which imposed regional housing responsibilities on localities in New Jersey—and United States v. Yonkers Board of Education and Hills v. Gautreaux—both of which addressed the siting of affordable housing in poor and minority neighborhoods. One extensive review of these cases identifies very modest real-world impacts of the remedies in the Mount Laurel and Yonkers cases. Where there was progress, as in Gautreaux, success hinged on implementing a special counseling program and providing Section 8 housing vouchers that could be used outside Chicago, innovations that proved to be temporary.

In this study, our point is that the patterns of change and the persistence of segregation are unlikely to be influenced as much by public policy as by more profound structural changes in the white and

6. The two main Mount Laurel cases are Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), and Southern Burlington City NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
11. See id. at 311, 319, 321.
minority populations. We are not arguing against fair-housing efforts; we suspect that these efforts have played an indirect role in creating the conditions for neighborhood diversity. Instead we wish to make the case that fair-housing advocates need to be aware of and seek to leverage the underlying population shifts that create new potential for reducing segregation. Here, we emphasize specifically the massive increase in Hispanic and Asian residents in urban areas fueled by post-1980 immigration. Previous studies have demonstrated that the new multiethnic composition of the metropolis seems favorable to increasing neighborhood diversity.\textsuperscript{12} We document here the emergence of more diverse kinds of neighborhoods in all parts of the country and the increasing shares of residents who live in such neighborhoods, especially in multiethnic metros. We then show how much these trends have affected segregation of blacks from whites in the last three decades.

**Population diversity and neighborhood change**

Conditions have changed since the period when black–white segregation grew to extreme levels across the country in the early and mid-twentieth century. With the cutoff of European immigration in the 1920s, the main source of new populations in growing urban areas became migration from the South, principally, but not entirely, African American.\textsuperscript{13} Already well established by 1940, the Great Migration accelerated after World War II, moving African Americans into cities that were beginning to be left behind by white suburbanization.\textsuperscript{14} In this context, the predominant pattern of urban-neighborhood change was what social scientists referred to as “invasion-succession.”\textsuperscript{15} Black residents were becoming concentrated in high-density black neighborhoods and spilling over into previously all-white neighborhood, leading to white flight and racial succession.\textsuperscript{16} For some time, there has


been speculation that this pattern would be disrupted by the arrival of immigrant minorities.\textsuperscript{17} Frey and Farley hypothesized that immigrants would provide a “buffer” between whites and blacks, making it less likely that whites would leave neighborhoods that became more diverse.\textsuperscript{18} We confirmed this idea in a study of racial transitions in multiethnic metropolitan areas between 1980 and 2000.\textsuperscript{19} We showed that although white flight continued, there was a strong counterround toward more diverse neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{20} Specifically, we identified a pathway of change in which Hispanics or Asians or both entered all-white neighborhoods, after which African Americans could also enter without necessarily stimulating white flight.\textsuperscript{21} We called such cases where all four groups were present “global neighborhoods.”\textsuperscript{22}

**MEASURING THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOODS**

In order to document the extent of new forms of neighborhood diversity and their impact on residential segregation at the metropolitan scale, we analyze data from the Census of Population in 1980 and 2010. We categorize residents into four major racial or ethnic groups: non-Hispanic whites (single race in 2010), non-Hispanic blacks (including combinations of black and another race in 2010), non-Hispanic Asians (including combinations of Asian with another race except black in 2010), and Hispanics.\textsuperscript{23} We treat the census tract as a

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\textsuperscript{19} Logan & Zhang, *supra* note 12, at 1069–70.

\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 1071.

\textsuperscript{21} Id.

\textsuperscript{22} Id.

\textsuperscript{23} Here we refer to the three non-Hispanic groups as whites, blacks, and Asians. We acknowledge that these categories only begin to describe the racial and ethnic diversity of neighborhoods. The Hispanic category, for example, includes Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Central and South Americans, all who have very different population characteristics and representation in different parts of the country. The same is true for
proxy for residential neighborhood. With about 4,000 inhabitants on average, census tracts are designed to be relatively homogeneous units with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.\footnote{U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Areas Reference Manual 10–1, 10–6 (2018).} We rely on data from “the Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB), which provides public-use tools to create estimates within 2010 tract boundaries for any tract-level data (from the census or other sources) that are available for prior years as early as 1970.”\footnote{John Logan et al., Census Geography: Bridging Data for Census Tracts Across Time, Brown U.: Diversity & Disparities, http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Researcher/Bridging.htm [https://perma.cc/4UJT-Z2AH] (last visited May 29, 2020).} The consistent tract geography is crucial for our purpose of studying racial and ethnic change. This study focuses on a set of twenty-two multiethnic metros where the combination of historically large black populations and substantial Hispanic and Asian groups is especially likely to create global neighborhoods.\footnote{See infra Appendix A.} We also present some data based on all 342 metropolitan regions, each of which had at least 50,000 residents in each year from 1980–2010, except for five years in which more than a quarter of employment was military. These metros include both metropolitan areas and metropolitan divisions based on the 2009 definitions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The multiethnic metros have some distinctive characteristics, including high rates of transition to global neighborhoods, but we have previously shown that similar trends are also found in other kinds of metropolitan areas.\footnote{Wenquan Zhang & John R. Logan, Global Neighborhoods: Beyond the Multiethnic Metropolis, 53 Demography 1933, 1943–44 (2016).}

A crucial measurement issue is how to classify neighborhoods (census tracts) according to their racial and ethnic composition. We adopt the “quarter rule” that we previously implemented.\footnote{Id. at 1940; see also Logan & Zhang, supra note 19, at 1105–07 (explaining the methodology behind the “quarter rule,” and comparing it to other measurements).} “By this criterion, if a group’s share in the neighborhood is less than one-quarter of their average share in all sampled metros, then it is so underrepresented that it can be treated as ‘absent.’”\footnote{Zhang & Logan, supra note 27.} We base the cutting points on the composition of the multiethnic metros in our sample. The multiethnic metros were 63.3% white in 1980, so we use one quarter of that level (15.8%) as the threshold for white presence in Asians, who come from countries with very distinct cultures, languages, and occupational backgrounds.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[26.] See infra Appendix A.
  \item[28.] Id. at 1940; see also Logan & Zhang, supra note 19, at 1105–07 (explaining the methodology behind the “quarter rule,” and comparing it to other measurements).
  \item[29.] Zhang & Logan, supra note 27.
\end{itemize}
1980. In 2010, the multiethnic metros were 42.0% white, so the quarter-rule threshold is set at 10.5%. One would not say that whites were absent at levels of 10–15%, but they were very substantially underrepresented. The thresholds for blacks are 4.7% in 1980 and 4.5% in 2010, also declining slightly over time. Thresholds for Hispanics and Asians increased from 3.6% for Hispanics in 1980 to 7.4% in 2010, and from 0.7% for Asians in 1980 to 2.4% in 2010.

We depart from previous studies by highlighting three types of tracts that are especially salient to black–white segregation: all-white tracts, all-minority tracts (that is, no non-Hispanic whites are present), and global neighborhoods (each of the four groups is present). We combine all other combinations of whites with some other group in a large and heterogeneous “other” category. These are of interest in themselves, though there is not space here to discuss them in detail. They include, for example, the previously all-white tracts that have added Hispanics or Asians or both and are the most likely to transition to global neighborhoods.

**Changes in the shares of group members in each type of neighborhood**

A direct way to assess the scope of neighborhood changes is to count the number of people who lived in these four kinds of places in 1980 and 2010. Table 1 provides these numbers first for the twenty-two multiethnic metros and second for comparison with the full national set of metros. The largest shift was in the shares of people living in global neighborhoods, which reached nearly one-third of residents in the multiethnic metros. The share in all-minority neighborhoods, however, also rose modestly at the same time, limiting the overall impact of these changes on segregation. Evidently, the global neighborhood arises in a context where segregation and white flight continue to operate.
Table 1: Distribution of group members by neighborhood type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Multi-ethnic metros</th>
<th>All metros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-minority</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-white</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-minority</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-white</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-minority</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-white</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-minority</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-white</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-minority</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All-white</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us consider the changes for each group in more detail, starting with whites. In multiethnic metros, the white share living in all-white neighborhoods was already modest (11.5%), and it dropped by half. In these metros, whites had mostly been living in neighborhoods whose diversity did not include blacks. But the share of whites living in global neighborhoods increased substantially to nearly one-third of white residents. In these neighborhoods, the share of white residents declined as racial diversity increased, but it remained well above our threshold criterion for a substantial presence. The same kinds of changes occurred nationally, though all-white neighborhoods were (and remained) a more prominent category for whites and global neighborhoods have not developed so fully elsewhere.
The most common neighborhood type for blacks was the all-minority neighborhood, housing almost two-thirds of the black population of multiethnic metros in 1980. Two kinds of changes occurred in this category. First, there was a large decline to just under half. Second, the composition of all-minority neighborhoods also changed, from being predominantly black to mostly Hispanic (not shown in Table 1). By 2010, blacks were living in more diverse neighborhoods than they did three decades earlier. Many more lived in global neighborhoods (up from 14.7% to 28.6%), and where whites were absent, more neighbors were Hispanic or Asian. Again, the same patterns of change occurred for black residents at a national level.

The faster growing groups, Hispanics and Asians, had a different experience. On the one hand, for both groups (but especially in multiethnic metros), their presence in all-minority neighborhoods increased. Many neighborhoods became all-Hispanic or mixed black and Many neighborhoods became all-Hispanic or mixed black and Hispanic as the Hispanic population in the region grew from both immigration and fertility. New Asian immigrants in working-class occupations were also sometimes found in these neighborhoods (less often in exclusively Asian tracts). On the other hand, they also ended the period with a much larger share living in global neighborhoods.

**Mapping changes over time: the case of Dallas**

We gain another perspective on these changes by mapping them. A comparison of thematic maps for a metro in 1980 and 2010 offers a sense of how much area was occupied by different neighborhood types and how that changed over time, which corresponds roughly to the changing population counts in Table 1. More than this, it reveals which neighborhoods were changing and where they were in the metropolitan region. Where are the white neighborhoods now, which neighborhoods are becoming global, and what is happening to all-minority zones? Here, we offer one example of a multiethnic metropolis as an illustration. Elsewhere, we have provided an extended analysis of similar changes in the Chicago metropolitan area.

Our example here is the Dallas-Plano-Irving Metropolitan Division. In 1980, there were 1.4 million non-Hispanic whites and 313,000 non-


Hispanic blacks living in the metro. By 2010, the black population more than doubled to 692,000, and the white population rose to 1.9 million. In the same period, segregation between blacks and whites declined substantially. We rely on the standard measure, the Index of Dissimilarity (D), which calculates the proportion of blacks who would need to move into different tracts in order to equalize the distribution of blacks and whites in the region. It ranges from 0 to 1, with a value of .60 or above typically considered to be very high. In Dallas, the value of D dropped from .78 in 1980 (well above the national average) to .55 in 2010 (about average). How did this happen? Figures 1A and 1B show the locations of key types of neighborhoods in the metro area in 1980 and 2010. We see a dramatic spatial transformation of the neighborhood landscape during the period.

Figure 1A. Dallas neighborhoods by racial composition, 1980.

In 1980, the mixed neighborhoods (the dark areas in the map) were scarce and mostly within the central city area. The presence of non-white neighborhoods (the hashed areas) was significantly clustered inside the central city boundary. The white-only neighborhoods (the grey areas) were located mainly in the suburbs. These were areas of extreme segregation: on average, 87% of the residents in the non-white neighborhoods were black, while the all-white neighborhoods were 96% white.

How did the population distribute among these areas? The all-minority neighborhoods housed 11% of the total population in the metro area; but those neighborhoods housed over 60% of the non-Hispanic black population and only 0.6% of the white population. The all-white neighborhoods hosted 12% of the metro population, with about 15% of the total white population living there, and only 1% of the black population. The mixed neighborhoods accounted for 10% of the total population, and 10% of the white population and 8% the of black population. The majority of the white population resided in the intervening areas, which were shared by non-Hispanic whites, Asians, and Hispanics. Later on, many of these non-black neighborhoods added blacks and became integrated neighborhoods.
During the following decades, the metro population increased significantly from 2.0 million in 1980 to 4.2 million in 2010.\textsuperscript{33} While all groups became larger, the Hispanics and Asians reported faster growth.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, the Hispanic share of the total population rose from 9% in 1980 to 29% in 2010, and Asian from 1% to 7%, respectively.\textsuperscript{35} By 2010, the landscape was transformed. First, the suburban all-white neighborhoods all but disappeared. The number of white-only neighborhoods dropped from 166 to 9. Second, the global neighborhoods had sprawled from 72 to 385, both inside the central city boundary and beyond. The share of the total population that lived in a global neighborhood increased from 10% in 1980 to 45.3% in 2010. Notably, many of the previous all-white areas now have a significant presence of all major racial/ethnic groups. Since 48% of whites and 41% of blacks are now living in integrated areas, it is no surprise that Dallas’s segregation score dropped so significantly during the period. Here we see visual evidence for the encouraging trend of residential integration and the significant effect of global neighborhoods on segregation reduction.

Also notable, however, is that the previously non-white areas mostly remain non-white. In addition, the all-minority neighborhoods expanded from 49 to 115 tracts and appeared well beyond the confines of the city boundary. Diversity is rising in these all-minority neighborhoods but without whites. While all-minority neighborhoods were 87% black in 1980, by 2010 they were only 39% black. Meanwhile, their Hispanic share rose from 9% to 54%.

**HOW NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGES AFFECT LEVELS OF SEGREGATION**

The predominant patterns of neighborhood change result in changes in residential segregation. The emergence of global neighborhoods as a more common community form should exert downward pressure on black–white segregation. Whereas during most of the twentieth century increasing black presence was almost always accompanied by white flight (as its result or its cause), there is now an alternative potential outcome if black arrival is preceded by Hispanics or Asians or both.\textsuperscript{36} To test this hypothesis, we have calculated the rate of increase from 1980–2010 in the number of global-neighborhood census tracts in every

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Id. (identifying the particular rise of Hispanic and Asian populations in the Dallas-Plano-Irving Metropolitan Division from 1980–2010).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Logan & Zhang, supra note 19, at 1070.
\end{itemize}
One of the twenty-two multiethnic metros, and also the change in the Index of Dissimilarity between whites and blacks (the most common measure of segregation). Figure 2 visualizes these data as a scatterplot. The correlation between these changes is 0.54, meaning that more than 25% of the variation in segregation change can be accounted for by the change in global neighborhoods. This is impressive considering all the other factors that could influence segregation.

Figure 2. The relationship between growth of global neighborhoods and declining segregation in multiethnic metropolitan regions, 1980–2010.

![Change of Index of Dissimilarity and Global Neighborhoods, 1980-2010](image)

Every point in this figure represents a metropolitan region. The figure reveals that most metros experienced some decline in black–white segregation. In addition, there is a tendency for points that had greater increases in global neighborhoods to have greater declines in segregation. The regression coefficient is -0.29, which means that for every percentage point increase in global neighborhoods, segregation declined by 0.29 points. At one extreme, in the Las Vegas-Paradise MSA, the number of these tracts grew by more than 60%, while segregation declined by more than 25 points (on a scale of 0 to 100). Of course, there is variation around the best-fitting straight line, and segregation declined in some metros even with no change in the number of global neighborhood tracts. Two such cases were Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City Beach and College Station-Bryan MSAs—both relatively small metro areas with few global neighborhoods. In both cases, there was a significant increase of neighborhoods shared by whites, blacks, and Hispanics (but not Asians). About 40% of whites and more than half of the black and Hispanic population lived in such
areas in 2010. On average, though, change in black–white segregation is directly correlated with the creation of new global neighborhoods.

**Conclusion**

Prior research has depicted increasing neighborhood-level diversity as a near universal trend in urban areas. We have found broadly similar trends in quite distinct metropolitan regions. The similarities are due in part to the fact that Hispanic and Asian populations are growing and white populations are shrinking, in relative terms, across all kinds of areas.

One common phenomenon in all kinds of metropolitan regions, but especially in multiethnic ones, is that neighborhoods are shifting to more diverse combinations of residents. At the same time, there is movement to less-diverse forms (unpredicted from the standard transition matrix), though on a smaller scale. These shifts follow a pattern. Increasing diversity mostly stems from minority entry into white neighborhoods, rarely by blacks alone, and often resulting in global neighborhoods. Declining diversity is almost always a result of white flight.

Regardless of the pathway, the very diverse categories of neighborhoods that include blacks—where whites and blacks live alongside Hispanics or Asians or both—are now the most common form in all types of metropolitan regions. Increasing shares of people live in these global neighborhoods. In multiethnic metros, global neighborhoods are the most common place of residence for whites and Asians. They house close to 30% of blacks and Hispanics (though larger shares of both groups still live in all-minority neighborhoods). This is a marked change from the situation in 1980, and it would not have been possible under the old regime of invasion and succession. One would hope that the emergence of these alternative routes toward black integration would be a harbinger of a rapid reduction of residential segregation and a new possibility of stably integrated neighborhoods. Yet in all types of metro areas, we also observe a persistence of all-minority neighborhoods. Even integrated neighborhoods are still subject to white exodus. This observation leads us to the same quandary we previously identified: Will processes of increasing and decreasing diversity continue to coexist, eventually reaching a stable equilibrium in which white flight and minority entry into new areas are in balance with one another? Or is there a point at which whites will stop leaving mixed neighborhoods, when the experience of growing up in an all-white neighborhood becomes so rare as to change the dynamics of white residential choice?

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37. Logan & Zhang, *supra* note 19, at 1104–05.
APPENDIX A. LISTING OF MULTIETHNIC METROPOLITAN REGIONS.

Ann Arbor, MI Metropolitan Statistical Area
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL Metropolitan Division
College Station-Bryan, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX Metropolitan Division
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metropolitan Division
Gary, IN Metropolitan Division
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Metropolitan Statistical Area
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Metropolitan Division
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL Metropolitan Division
Newark-Union, NJ-PA Metropolitan Division
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA Metropolitan Statistical Area
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ Metropolitan Division
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Metropolitan Division
Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City Beach, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area
Trenton-Ewing, NJ Metropolitan Statistical Area
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area
Vineland-Millville-Brigantine, NJ Metropolitan Statistical Area
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical Area
Waco, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Division