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United States Policy on Southern Africa: A Myopic Vacuum?

by Charles K. Ebinger*

Mr. Ebinger's article explores the recent developments in United States foreign policy on southern Africa. He measures the policies against the economic, military, and ideological pressures on the political forces competing for control of the area. His analysis indicates that the demands of the developed countries on the natural resources of the area and United States foreign policy which ignores the factors essential to African national and interstate stability have contributed to the tenseness of the situation in southern Africa today.

INTRODUCTION

THE ORGANIZATION of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) embargo of 1973-74 which followed the 1973 Middle Eastern War stimulated awareness of and concern over the present pattern of international economic relationships. Although much attention has been focused on the security implications of Western dependency on Middle Eastern oil, increasingly, a growing interest in the security aspects of other strategic minerals and their international logistics systems has shifted interest away from the Arabian Gulf to other regions, the most important of which is southern Africa. This shift, however, has not been accompanied by the development of coherent United States foreign policies on southern Africa.

The southern African littoral States served as a pivotal link in Western communication systems during World War II. Nevertheless, after the end of the war the area received little attention from Western strategic planners until the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Middle Eastern War focused attention on the vulnerability of oil transportation routes around the Cape of Good Hope. But despite the concern generated in some circles, most geopolitical theorists remained enmeshed either in East-West great power relations or in the events in Southeast Asia. The continuation of the status quo white regimes in the southern tier of the continent seemed so secure through the 1970's that then National Security Adviser Kissinger began to plan in February 1969 a subtle shift in the United States' policies toward

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southern Africa based on the assumption of such continuation. Kissinger prepared for President Nixon a "realistic" set of secret policy options designed to foster American interests, and presented them in a National Security Council briefing.¹

Kissinger was aware that friendly African States, such as Zambia and Tanzania, might castigate the United States for subordinating its professed belief in the right of self-determination to the protection of its material interests. He assumed that white rule in even the weakest link of the system—the Portuguese colonies—would continue for the foreseeable future. This was a gross miscalculation which starkly exhibits the dangerous tendency of strategic analysts to view the southern African arena only from an anti-Soviet geopolitical vantage point. This view is deficient because it neglects serious analysis of the constellation of local political forces (guerrilla groups, the Front-line States, African nationalist groups) that will, in the final analysis, be the critical elements determining the political evolution of the area.²

Indeed, by the early 1970's, there were many indications that Portugal's days as a Eurafrican power were numbered. The Caetano regime was beset by demoralization and defection within its African forces as it suffered from rising economic dislocation and inflation at home. During this time more than 1.5 million job seekers and draft evaders emigrated to western Europe and the Portuguese government was besieged by escalating levels of anti-regime terrorism and sabotage.³

However, despite these indications of internal weakness, Kissinger, and other high level State Department officials chose to overlook the vulnerability of the Caetano regime. As a result, although NSSM 39 stated that the United States had no strategic interests in Angola that were vital to United States national security, Kissinger believed that America would have to direct its policies in favor of the white-ruled southern African regimes so as to maintain access to military facilities in the Azores.

The importance of the Azores base in the American resupply airlift to Israel during the October 1973 War reinforced Kissinger's belief in

²For an elaboration of these issues see Ebinger, External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War, 20 ORBIS 669 (1976).
the need to maintain good relations with the Caetano regime. By the spring of 1974, Kissinger, in the wake of the OAPEC embargo and the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, was forced to reassess the geopolitical significance of Portuguese Africa to United States security.

Although the Lisbon coup of April 1974 had made the United States strategy as outlined in NSSM 39 irrelevant, Kissinger, concerned about the significance of the Soviet naval build-up, made another major diplomatic mistake when he decided that the United States' strategic interests would best be served by supporting General Antonio de Spinola's plan for a Lusitanian commonwealth. He enlisted the help of America's old ally, President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, to ensure that the Zairois-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLNA) would play a major role in the ensuing political struggle in Angola.

Kissinger, ignoring the advice of his high-level officials in the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs, believed that Mobutu's influence in African nationalist circles would guarantee an FNLNA political triumph over the Marxist-oriented Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The fallacy of the policy's fundamental tenets have been elucidated elsewhere and need not detain us here. What is important for analytical purposes is the fact that Kissinger's parochial understanding of the local dynamics of the Angolan civil conflict placed the United States in an untenable position following the breakdown of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 and led to the victory of the Soviet-supported MPLA forces by early 1976.

Although these Angolan events focused world attention on southern Africa for the first time in many years, twelve months after the triumph of the Cuban-Soviet supported MPLA forces, the political milieu in the southern African arenas remains more volatile and complicated than ever before. Even though the new Carter Administration has pledged itself, unlike its predecessor, to work for a peaceful transition to majority rule in those regimes still remaining under white domination, the Administration has to date exhibited an appalling ignorance of the conflict dynamics of the area and has embarked on

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*See Ebinger, supra note 2.

policies that are at best ill-conceived, and are undeniably contradictory.

In the ensuing analysis, it will be demonstrated that the continued inadequacy of United States foreign policy in the southern African arena arises from (1) a parochial understanding of the conflict dynamics of the region which, while centered on the quest for majority rule in Namibia, South Africa, and Rhodesia, extends into other areas of interstate conflict; (2) a preoccupation on the part of State and Defense Department Officials, supported by private strategic analysts, with viewing the region's dynamics in polarized U.S.-Soviet damage limitation terms rather than in terms of the complex constellation of political forces competing in the area; and (3) the adherence to the basic Kissinger strategy, outlined during the Secretary's visit to southern Africa in April 1976, despite the fact that recent events have made the strategy largely irrelevant.

BACKGROUND

Most analysts assumed that with the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique following the April 1974 Lisbon coup, the black-ruled Front-line States, in concert with the nationalist movements, would push forward with the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa itself. Such assessments, however, were a gross oversimplification of a highly complex political situation.

Indeed, in the wake of the Portuguese coup, the power vacuum that emerged in Mozambique was so intense that the new Frelimo government, desperate to consolidate its own economic and political position, moved to defuse the volatile political situation reigning in southern Africa. Meanwhile in Angola, the Portuguese coup unleashed a fratricidal conflict among rival claimants for power that effectively excluded it from the unfolding dialogue between white southern Africa and the black-ruled States to the north. Likewise in Zambia, President Kaunda, also confronting an extremely volatile political and economic crisis, believed that a peaceful diplomatic solution to the Zimbabwe and Namibian political disputes would be more beneficial to Zambia's national interest than an all-out race war.

Thus, the relaxation of tension and the ensuing negotiations that followed were based on the degree of coincidence of interests among South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia. These interests concerned the need for a negotiated Zimbabwe settlement and for the avoidance of a political disintegration in Mozambique. To reflect this mutuality of in-
terests, South African Prime Minister Vorster announced on October 23, 1974, that southern Africa had entered a crossroads where it had to make a choice between peace and the escalation of conflict. Zambia's response came a few days later when President Kaunda referred to Mr. Vorster's speech as "the voice of reason" for which Africa had been waiting long to hear.

The dynamics of Vorster's detente strategy have been well delineated elsewhere and need not detain us here. What is significant for analytical purposes is the fact that the resumption of the dialogue process among South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana arose because the black countries saw some advantage in cooperating with South Africa for the achievement of a specific limited objective—the decolonization of Rhodesia.

To accomplish their goal of bringing a peaceful solution to the Zimbabwe situation, Nyerere, Kaunda, Khama, Vorster and Machel moved to institute a settlement between the Smith regime and the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) leadership. As part of the agreement, the Rhodesian regime was to release detained Zimbabwe nationalists; the Kaunda regime was to close all the Zimbabwe guerrilla camps on Zambian territory; South Africa was to withdraw its ground forces from Rhodesia; and Botswana and Tanzania agreed to pressure the divided Zimbabwe leadership to close its ranks and to come to the negotiating table. The outcome of this effort, culminating in meetings among the various parties at Victoria Falls in August 1975, was renewed wrangling among the Zimbabwe nationalists. This, combined with Smith's intransigence and the escalation of the conflict in Angola, doomed the negotiations to failure.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER APRIL 1974

The Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, totally eclipsed the southern African strategy outlined by Kissinger in NSSM 39. Nonetheless, because of his concern about the strategic significance of the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean Basin, Kissinger believed

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6Statement by the South African Prime Minister in the Senate, Cape Town, Oct. 23, 1974. For a complete text of this speech see SOUTHERN AFRICAN RECORD, March 1975, at 1 (published by the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg).

7Address by President Kaunda at the University of Zambia, Oct. 26, 1974. See SOUTHERN AFRICAN RECORD, June 1975, at 17.

that continued United States access to harbor facilities in Angola and Mozambique was vital and could best be assured by supporting General Spinola's plan for a Lusitanian commonwealth. At the same time, Kissinger acted behind the scenes to enlist the help of the United States' old ally President Mobutu, of Zaire, to ensure that the pro-western, Zairois-backed FNLA would play a major role in the political evolution of Angola.

With regard to Zimbabwe, United States policy, while publicly praising the dialogue policy of the South Africans and the Front-line States, continued as what is best characterized as the "Tar Baby Option" of benign neglect. As to Namibia, the United States, while continuing to voice support for majority rule, consistently refused to press Pretoria on the issue because of Secretary Kissinger's belief in the strategic importance of South Africa both as a pivotal link in the western defense capability along the Persian Gulf-Cape sea corridor and as a major supplier of strategic minerals to western Europe, the United States and Japan.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1974, the fallacy of the fundamental tenets of Kissinger's southern African policy became apparent. The growth of radicalism in the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement led Portuguese policymakers to direct their support toward the leftist-oriented MPLA movement in Angola. By September, Admiral Coutinhos' pro-MPLA policies in Luanda forced General Spinola to assume personal control over all Angolan negotiations. Spinola attempted to negotiate an accord with Mobutu designed to eliminate the MPLA from the Angolan political scene by supporting the FNLA and the dissident MPLA factions. Spinola, however, was ousted from power on September 28th before the policy could be implemented. The fall of the Spinola government, and the increasingly pro-MPLA position of the Portuguese armed forces, left the United States with no viable Angolan policy. The United States had no alternative but to hinge its policy on the success of a negotiated compromise among the rival parties developing out of the Alvor Agreement of January, 1975.

Kissinger's Angolan policy was in shambles when the last vestige of hope for a negotiated settlement was lost with the failure of the Nankuru Summit in June, 1975. Once the agreement broke down, Kissinger saw no alternative but covertly to support the FNLA and later

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*A. Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (1976).*
the FNLA-UNITA coalition. In this regard, it should be noted that the Africa Bureau of the State Department vigorously lobbied with Kissinger to shift American policy in favor of the MPLA. The failure of the Kissinger policy lies in the fact that once Soviet and Cuban forces intervened on the side of the MPLA following the failure of the Nankuru Summit, Kissinger's parochial view of the Angolan conflict, focusing only on U.S.-Soviet great power rivalry, precluded the United States from seeing the more important regional and international context of the Angolan struggle.

It should be noted that the congressional actions of December, 1975 and January, 1976, which placed a ceiling on the level of U.S. funding for the FNLA-UNITA coalition, severely restricted Kissinger's options. Nonetheless, his failure adequately to assess the regional and global dynamics of the conflict led to a series of policy errors that continue to plague the implementation of an effective southern African policy to this day.

Most prominent among Kissinger's errors were the failure to evaluate (1) the importance of the anti-Chinese component of the Soviet Angolan policy, (2) the implications of the South African intervention on behalf of the FNLA-UNITA coalition with regard to viability of dialogue in southern Africa, (3) the ineffectiveness of the FNLA-UNITA coalition arising from the inveterate ethnic hatred of the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu, (4) the significant divisions within the MPLA leadership, (5) the fact that Brazzaville's alignment with the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the Angolan conflict was primarily designed to counter Zairois machinations in Cabinda and Angola, and (6) the devastating effects that the triumph of a radical regime in Angola could have on the economies of Zambia and Zaire. This misapprehension was a classic case of myopic worst-case analysis.

In early 1976, United States policy in southern Africa was still in a shambles. The South African intervention into Angola was an unmitigated disaster domestically, regionally, and internationally.¹ In one stroke, Pretoria destroyed previously orchestrated diplomatic relations designed to defuse the volatile political situation reigning in southern Africa. Pretoria's intervention discredited the moderate detente policies of Zambia and Botswana, and further, fueled the skepticism of Mozambique and Tanzania toward the motivations behind Pretoria's detente policy. In addition, the regime of President

Mobutu, although never known for its championship of the cause of African liberation, was thrown into disrepute because of its support for the South African-tainted FNLA-UNITA coalition.

In February, the final stage of the Smith-Nkomo talks collapsed without a settlement. This was another setback for the moderate policies of Zambia and Botswana and left those countries little choice but to join Mozambique and Tanzania in formally scrapping the negotiations on Rhodesia, and to endorse the guerrilla leadership of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). By March, the political situation in southern Africa was further intensified by Mozambique's decision to close the border with Rhodesia and to give full support to the ZIPA revolutionary high command in its struggle against the Smith regime.

This move toward a more militant posture by the Machel regime posed grave problems for United States foreign policy on southern Africa. The closing of the Rhodesia-Mozambique border, and the escalating Rhodesian conflict placed both the moderates, Kaunda of Zambia and Khama of Botswana, in a difficult position. Due to their extremely tenuous economic and political stability, it became increasingly difficult for them to exert a moderating influence on the Frontline States.

ZAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-ANGOLAN PERIOD

The triumph of the Neto regime in Angola posed grave problems for the Kaunda regime. By gaining control over the Benguela railway, the Neto regime obtained an economic strangle hold over the Zambian economy and thus over Zambian foreign policy. One of the chief reasons that Kaunda had supported the UNITA forces during the Angolan civil war was that the Benguela railway ran through territory controlled by UNITA, and Kaunda feared that in the event of a tripartite partition of Angola, Zambia would be dependent on UNITA support. This fear of dependence was heightened following the closure of the Rhodesian-Zambian border in January, 1973, when Zambia was forced to divert a substantial portion of its foreign trade to the Angolan port of Lobito via the Benguela railway.

The importance of the Benguela railway to Zambia should not be underestimated. In 1975, prior to its closing during the Angolan civil war, the railway carried nearly forty percent of Zaire's and Zambia's foreign trade, incuding more than one-third of each country's copper exports. The magnitude of Neto's leverage over Kaunda became apparent when, by 1975, the export of copper accounted for ninety-five
percent of export earnings of Zambia and sixty-five percent of those of Zaire.

The triumph of the MPLA forces in Angola posed acute problems for the Kaunda regime. Although Zambia could divert some of her exports to the jammed ports in Tanzania and Mozambique, via Malawi, both countries were staunch MPLA supporters. In addition, 1975 was a terrible year for the world copper market. Although copper prices had picked up somewhat early in the year (ranging between £510 and £725 per ton), Zambia's high cost of production (£600 per ton), combined with the high rate of foreign indebtedness, meant that the Zambian government, given even the best circumstances, could scarcely anticipate any dividends, royalties, or tax payments from the copper companies.

To illustrate the seriousness of the problem that Kaunda faced, it is necessary to note that while 1974 was a good year for copper prices, Zambia's payments surplus was only eighteen million Kwacha; while its deficits in 1975 and 1976 were 180 million Kwacha and 225 million Kwacha respectively. These deficits occurred despite sizable restrictions on imports, with licenses only being issued for agricultural, transport and construction equipment, and food. The situation was so bleak that even if copper prices had risen to £800 per ton, the problem would have remained.

Throughout 1975 and on into 1976, Zambia's deepening economic and political crisis led to an increasing dependency on international financial aid. Although Zambia was able to obtain three separate loans of nineteen million dollars each from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) compensatory finance fund, Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) and special emergency standby facilities, Zambia still owed the World Bank seventy-three million pounds on eighteen unpaid loans borrowed between 1956 and 1975.

The Zambian request for United States aid in 1975 generated an acute debate in the United States foreign policy establishment. Secretaries Kissinger and Simon opposed the aid request, even though it was supported by the African Bureau and Agency for International Development (AID) because they believed that Kaunda's increasingly militant speeches on the Rhodesian issue were an indication of Kaunda's switch to the militant camp. Moreover, the fact that both Kaunda and the U.S.S.R. supported the Nkomo faction vis-à-vis the Rhodesian conflict led Kissinger to believe that Kaunda had to be watched closely.
The dangers of Zambia's political situation were apparently lost on both Kissinger and Simon. By early 1976, Kaunda's detente policy with Vorster was under serious attack. The disastrous South African intervention in Angola, the failure of Vorster to press the Smith regime to make serious concessions, and the failure of Kaunda to criticize Pretoria's continued occupation of Namibia following the expiration of the U.N. deadline all served to discredit Kaunda's dialogue policy.

Likewise the MPLA's victory in Angola, combined with a dramatic upsurge in the Shipanga factor of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrilla activity in Namibia, presented a new challenge to the Kaunda regime. This new SWAPO vitality disturbed Kaunda because it occurred against the backdrop of a serious split in SWAPO ranks. Kaunda's concern was heightened by apparent ties between the Shipanga wing and anti-Kaunda Zambian dissidents in Zambia's Barotse Province. This alliance, combined with the influx of dissident Ngangela and Chokwe tribesmen from Angola forced Kaunda to place a large number of SWAPO officials under "protective" custody.

Kaunda's actions placed him in a highly volatile political situation. With the radical Neto regime able to harass him both economically and politically from Angola and with his only other remaining outlet to the coast passing through Rhodesia, Botswana, and South Africa, Kaunda clearly had no choice but to move closer to the more militant Front-line States of Mozambique and Tanzania.

In order to counteract the African reaction to his detention of high-level SWAPO officials, Kaunda used the pretext of Kissinger's visit in April to travel to Mozambique for consultations. In Maputo, Kaunda gave a militant speech on the southern African situation, pledging full Zambian support for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and calling for the end of apartheid in South Africa. Although there was an element of political chicanery in his remarks, the Maputo speech signaled a move by Kaunda to bring his policies into greater coordination with the policies of the other Front-line States. In this regard, it is interesting to note that while Kaunda continues to attack the Republic, South African-Zambian trade via Mozambique is on the rise.

Kaunda saw that by adopting an alliance with Machel, he could receive Machel's support in his conflict with Neto. Kaunda knew that Machel distrusted the Cubans as a result of their earlier hostile attitude toward Mondlane. He believed that Machel would help to

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forestall any massive introduction of Soviet and/or Cuban troops into the Zimbabwe struggle. Machel, like Kaunda, trusted the Chinese more than the Russians and expected that Peking would be helpful in limiting Moscow's influence among the Zimbabwe nationalists. Tragically, these dynamics appear to have exerted little influence on United States foreign policy makers who continued to view Machel as a Soviet puppet, and Kaunda as similarly situated.

THE APRIL KISSINGER-RUMSFELD VISITS

The fiasco of the Angolan intervention and subsequent failure of South Africa's policy of detente left United States policy in southern Africa in ruins. As a result, in early 1976 Washington conducted a major reappraisal of its policy. This reappraisal led to the visits of Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld to Kenya, Zambia, and Zaire that spring. The western press heralded the visits as an indication of a growing United States interest and involvement in southern African affairs. However, a close analysis of the Kissinger-Rumsfeld visits not only gives little cause to be sanguine, but also shows the appalling lack of official United States sensitivity to the conflict dynamics of the southern African arena. All analyses show that the spring visits did not signal a major change in United States foreign policy. Rather, the results of Washington's reappraisal were merely to recast a policy whose fundamental tenets already had been proved to be out of touch with the realities of the southern African political milieu.

The cornerstone of Kissinger's policy reappraisal was the belief that the West must move quickly to bolster the resolve of the moderate Front-line States and Zaire. He feared that the Soviet Union, fresh from the euphoria of its victory in Angola, might attempt to introduce Soviet and/or Cuban troops into the Rhodesian and Namibian theatres. Kissinger believed that the precedent created by Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola argued for the necessity of developing a political base from which Western influence could be exercised to limit communist adventurism. Although the Kissinger strategy might have been sound six months earlier, by the spring of 1976, it was doomed to failure.

When Kissinger visited Zambia in April, he found the Kaunda regime in dire straits. The February withdrawal of the South African forces from southern Angola, combined with the collapse of the UNITA-FNLA coalition, had forced Kaunda to adopt a public posture more favorable to the MPLA. In early April, the dramatic upsurge in
SWAPO guerrilla activity against Namibia directed from southern Angola and southwestern Zambia, necessitated the adoption of a more militant posture on the Rhodesian conflict and the further alignment of Zambian policies with those of the other Front-line States. Kissinger and Congress viewed with alarm the growing militancy of Kaunda's speeches. The subtleties of his exposed position were lost on them both. Consequently, the minuscule amount of economic aid extended to Zambia provided little solace and virtually no influence.

It seems evident that Kaunda could ill afford to estrange both Angola and Mozambique. Such a policy would force him to rely exclusively on South Africa to move his country's exports, a dangerous move domestically. As a result, in order to play off Neto, Kaunda had little choice but to follow the lead of President Machel of Mozambique regarding the Zimbabwe conflict. Tragically, Kissinger's skepticism about a "moderate" like Kaunda associating with an inveterate Marxist like Machel reflects a failure of policy that continues to hamper the Carter Administration's policy regarding the Zimbabwe conflict. In order to understand the dynamics of the Machel-Kaunda relationship it is necessary first to turn to a brief examination of the foreign policy of Mozambique.

MOZAMBIQUE

Beset by major domestic economic and political crises, the Machel regime attempted in April 1974 to establish a dialogue with the South African government on the Rhodesian conflict. However, following the South African intervention into Angola and the continued intransigence of the Smith regime, Machel increased aid to the Zimbabwe guerrillas and upgraded their base areas in Mozambique. Nonetheless, Machel's relations with the Republic have remained correct, if somewhat cool.

The primary motivations behind the continuation of relations between Maputo and Pretoria are economic. Under an agreement dating back to 1909, Mozambique provides over 140,000 workers to the South African mines. This arrangement generates about $150 million per annum in badly needed foreign exchange for Mozambique. When South Africa's own ports are heavily congested, Maputo serves as a major port for the overflow. Maputo also serves as the export link for all of Swaziland's iron ore exports. The giant Carbora Bassa dam forges yet another link between the two countries. Mozambique relies upon the South African market to purchase the excess power generated by the
The overall importance of these ties with South Africa is seen in the fact that South Africa now accounts for eighty to ninety percent of Mozambique's foreign exchange. Machel further increased his country's dependence on South Africa by closing the border with Rhodesia in March 1976. This action could result in an estimated $130 to $160 million loss for Mozambique in the first year alone.

Important to Mozambique's foreign policy is its relationship with other southern African countries. It has trade and defense agreements with Tanzania and a somewhat cooler relationship with Zambia. Mozambique is dedicated to the liberation of Zimbabwe and will continue to encourage and assist the fall of the Smith regime. Barring massive foreign intervention on the side of Smith, however, Machel is unlikely to encourage sizeable foreign intervention on behalf of the guerrillas. He deeply believes in the necessity of a nationalist struggle being waged by nationalists only. Therefore, it is doubtful that massive infusions of either Russian and/or Cuban troops into the Mozambique camps will be permitted. Indeed, until recently only the Chinese have been allowed to send advisors into the forward base areas, attesting that Machel keeps a firm rein on membership in the Zimbabwe guerrilla camps.

Unfortunately, the United States Congress and defense community seem unconcerned about Machel's exposed position. Mozambique is in dire financial straits. If the United States were to send aid to Maputo, Machel's position seemingly would be strengthened. The tendency of the defense community, however, is to see Machel only as an implacable Marxist, who will buckle under the Soviet yoke, which is a serious policy misconception. Indeed, there is evidence that the United States' failure to support Machel could bring about the very situation (i.e. increased Soviet influence) that the United States is trying desperately to avoid. Ironically, it is the effort to keep Soviet influence at a minimum that underlies the foreign policies of the Kaunda, Nyerere (of Tanzania) and Machel regimes towards the Zimbabwe conflict. It is a high-risk policy decision by Zambia and Mozambique to support a major guerrilla campaign in Zimbabwe. Not only are they extremely vulnerable to economic and political pressures, but also they are vulnerable to Rhodesian "hot pursuit" or punitive raids. Nonetheless, the commitment was made out of the belief that their intervention alone could hasten the transition to majority rule and ensure that they, and not other external powers, would govern the pace of events.
Because the United States failed to make an adequate assessment of the nature of the Machel-Kaunda relationship, United States policy towards Rhodesia floundered during the summer and fall of 1976. The strategy that Kissinger employed was inadequate because it was based on the same power relationships that had existed following the overthrow of the Lisbon regime. According to this strategy, the Front-line Presidents (Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, and Khama of Botswana) would pressure the fractious Zimbabwe nationalists into a coalition and toward the negotiating table while Vorster would put pressure on Smith. Kissinger believed that the successful outcome of the ensuing negotiations would ensure (1) the pre-emption of the political-military liberation groups, (2) a transition environment that would allow state-to-state relations with the successor government, (3) that a large segment of skilled white Rhodesians would remain and avert repetition of the Angolan debacle, (4) sufficient international legitimacy for the successor government, forestalling continued liberation efforts.

Kissinger failed to note that by the summer and fall of 1976 the Rhodesian political situation had changed dramatically. The Soweto riots, following closely upon the Angolan fiasco, effectively destroyed any remaining credibility Pretoria may have had as an agent of peaceful change in southern Africa. South Africa's failure to understand the subtleties of Kaunda's exposed position and its bombing of Zambian villages while pursuing SWAPO terrorists were gross policy errors. Finally, Pretoria's response to increased SWAPO raids was a military build-up in northern Namibia. Although a sound military policy, this move did little to lend credence to Vorster's mid-1976 claim that Namibia would achieve independence under constitutional terms by December 31, 1978.

By the spring of 1976, any pretense that the Front-line Presidents would be able to keep together a coalition of the rival Rhodesian nationalist movements was shattered as fratricidal conflict among the groups, both inside and outside Rhodesia, escalated to new levels. Kissinger failed to realize that the only actor in the Zimbabwe struggle benefiting both from the declining unity of Zimbabwe nationalists and the sagging fortunes of Vorster was Ian Smith. By the time Kissinger put forward his Rhodesian proposals in September 1976 the wily Smitt saw a means by which he could torpedo the negotiations while at the same time proclaiming a willingness to pursue the Kissinger initiatives. Throughout the fall and winter of 1976, Smith capitalized on divi-
sions within the nationalist ranks, a lame-duck United States Administration, and an effective counter-insurgency program to buy time. Following the inauguration of the new United States President, and the creditable effort by the British diplomat, Ivor Richard, to break the stalemates negotiations, Smith rejected the British proposals stating that agreement had already been reached on the Kissinger plan. If the Zimbabwe exiled nationalist groups refused to live by the agreement, then Smith would enact the proposals unilaterally and begin to negotiate a “transition to majority rule.” In his pronouncement rejecting the Richard proposals, Smith announced that all racially discriminatory legislation would be repealed, although he did not pinpoint which specific laws. Apparently, Smith hoped that if his initiatives were viewed favorably in the West, there might be a lifting of economic sanctions against the regime.

Smith’s position was further strengthened by the announcement on January 9, 1977, by the Front-line Presidents in Lusaka that henceforth their total support would go to the Patriotic Front, headed by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. The eclipse of the popular Bishop Muzorewa left Smith the possibility of negotiating with Muzorewa, Sithole, or Chikerema under the framework of the Kissinger proposals.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Unfortunately Kissinger’s inability to deal competently with the realities of southern African regional politics passed on to the Carter Administration. In the general euphoria accompanying his first major diplomatic trip to Africa, Ambassador Young stated that United States policy on Rhodesia was to follow the lead of the Front-line States in support of the Patriotic Front. By failing to note the justifications of Zambian and Botswanan support for the Front, i.e. their exposed positions, Young allowed United States policy to drift into a dangerous new area. If Smith concluded an agreement with Muzorewa which would install a moderately popular elected government, United States policy, as outlined by Young, would be eclipsed. Ironically, Kaunda was sensitive to this danger. He took the unprecedented step of utilizing Soviet President Podgorny’s March 1977 visit to announce that Zambia would not impose a political solution on Zimbabwe. Realizing the inadequacy of United States sensitivity to intra-Zimbabwe nationalist politics, Kaunda signaled to Muzorewa that the final political solution for Rhodesia might not rest with the Patriotic Front and that he should not foreclose his options by dealing with Smith.
In viewing Kaunda's rebuff of the Soviets in conjunction with the cool reception that Nyerere also gave to Podgorny, it should be apparent that the Front-line Presidents are far from allowing the Soviets to dictate a political solution to the Zimbabwe conflict. Even though Podgorny received a warm welcome in Maputo, Machel was careful to make clear that the Soviets would not gain a naval base in Mozambique. This should be viewed as a signal to Washington, Peking and Pretoria that Machel, although firmly committed to Zimbabwe's liberation, will not allow the Soviets a more active presence in Mozambique.

The danger to United States policy lies in the failure to discern these signals and effectively pressure Smith through Pretoria. All of the Front-line Presidents may have to turn to the Soviets to protect their frontiers from the increasing number of Rhodesian punitive attacks. Already, there are indications that Mozambique has requested the introduction of Soviet SAM missiles to use against Rhodesian aircraft.

BOTSWANA

Botswana is another important actor in the Zimbabwe conflict. United States policy has been woefully inadequate in responding to the political, economic and military plight of the Khama government.

Geographically, Botswana is at the center of the southern African crisis, nearly surrounded by Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Despite its strategic position, Botswana's role in the evolving crisis is limited because of its barren landscape. The vast Kalahari Desert and Okavango Swamps comprise much of Botswana. Also, even though Botswana is the size of France, it has only about 650,000 people.

Dependent on South Africa and Rhodesia for almost all of its essential supplies, the Khama Government has been a consistent critic of the evils of apartheid and racial discrimination in neighboring countries. As in Zambia, the escalating crisis in Rhodesia has posed a difficult dilemma for Khama. An assessment of Botswana's strategic position reveals two possible courses of action against its neighbors. First, it could close down the branch of the Rhodesia Railway running through its territory connecting Rhodesia and South Africa. However, this would have serious repercussions on the Botswana economy, while Rhodesia could shift its goods to the direct rail link with South Africa over the Beit Bridge. Second, Botswana could open up its territory to Zimbabwe guerrillas and bring a new front to the struggle. In the past, some guerrillas have been allowed to operate from its territory, but
publicly adopting this policy could leave poorly-armed Botswana open to direct or covert attack. In fact, it has already been bombed by Rhodesian forces. Its exposed position leaves Botswana little choice but to continue its work for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems.

Given its vulnerability, a violent turn in the southern African political milieu can only harm Botswana. However, if that eventuality comes to pass, Khama will most likely follow the lead of Kaunda and Nyerere and commit Botswana to the conflict. The vulnerability of all the Front-line States necessitates that the United States must move quickly if it wants to avoid an escalation in the level of the conflict. Clearly, the failure to act decisively will benefit only the Smith regime.

There is evidence that Smith believes that if he continues to strike out across Rhodesia's borders, then the Front-line Presidents will be forced to accept an ever-increasing Soviet and/or Cuban presence. This would justify his contention that the entire guerrilla struggle is another case of Soviet adventurism attempting to disrupt vital western interests. Apparently, Smith believes that combining this policy and negotiations based on the Kissinger proposals with moderate black groups will lend credibility to the Soviet threat. This threat might be accepted by hawkish and conservative forces in the western world.

Although this strategy may appear ridiculous on the surface, it could pose acute problems for United States policy if Smith could work out a deal with Muzorewa, Sithole, or Chikerema to install a popularly backed black government. To avoid this possibility the United States must move forcefully to dramatize its support for black rule in Rhodesia. The repeal of the Byrd amendment is a positive first step. However, the United States should (1) immediately establish compensatory aid on a significant scale for Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, (2) warn the Soviets and Cubans that interposition of their troops in Rhodesia would have grave ramifications in United States policy areas of real interest to them (grain sales, SALT, European security), (3) pressure the South Africans by threatening curtailment of bank loans and other economic benefits unless Smith's export links through the Republic are reduced in direct proportion to his continued intransigence, (4) warn Rhodesia that the United States and Great Britain will under no circumstances intervene on its behalf, (5) push for the establishment of a peace-keeping force from the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations that would be available on a contingency basis, (6) move for the enforcement of United Na-
tions sanctions under Article 39 if Smith does not reopen decisive negotiations with the nationalists within a narrow time period.

These recommendations may seem to be reckless and lacking any guarantee that they could or would bring Smith to heel. However, failure to implement them will further estrange the United States and the Zimbabwe leadership and situation of the Front-line States playing into the hands of the Soviet Union.

ANGOLA AND ZAIRE

The triumph of the MPLA forces in Angola in early 1976 made a shambles of United States policy towards southern Africa. That triumph also threatened to undermine the security of the moderate Mobutu and Kaunda regimes. For the Mobutu regime in Zaire the victory of the MPLA forces posed grave security problems. Zaire's foreign policy primarily focused on the question of access to foreign ports. Copper accounted for sixty-five percent of its export earnings. Until the civil war in Angola caused the closing of the Benguela railway, nearly fifty percent of Zaire's copper exports followed this route to Lobito and world markets. Sizeable quantities of minerals were also shipped through Zambia and Rhodesia to Maputo and Beira on the Mozambique coast. The closing of Zambia's and Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia closed this route. Although two other export routes theoretically exist—through Tanzania to Dar es Salaam, or through Uganda to Mombasa, Kenya—political, economic, and port congestion problems make these almost useless.

By early 1976 Mobutu was in serious trouble. All his export links to the sea were cut off except for Zaire's own antiquated route by road, rail and water to Matadi on the Atlantic Coast. Political problems were compounded on the economic front by the continuing slump in the world price of copper. This crisis undermined the confidence of Zaire's external creditors who refused to provide more credit when $500 million of interest-bearing obligations were already in default. It also produced a catastrophic drop in Zaire's international financial position, and severely curtailed many of Zaire's development plans.

Confronted by this disastrous situation, Mobutu in early 1976 moved to enter into negotiations with Neto in order to normalize relations. As part of the settlement package, Neto, confronting mounting political problems in his own country, agreed to stop his support for the Katangan gendarmes if Mobutu would (1) stop the transit of mercenaries through Angola, (2) deny the use of Zaire territory to remnant
forces of the defeated FNLA-UNITA coalition, and (3) cease his support for the Cabindan separatists who were trying to detach the oil-rich enclave from the rest of Angola.

Although Neto lived up to the terms of the agreement, Mobutu, despite his reiterated promises and denials, has continued to support the FNLA, the Cabindan separatists, and UNITA. He even allowed UNITA to establish an office in Kinshasa following its official expulsion from Zambia.

The level of FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA attacks increased dramatically following the spring 1976 visits to Zaire of Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld, a fact which raises the serious question of whether or not the United States has attempted to sow discord in Angola despite the congressional ban imposed on such activity in January 1976.

It is tragic that Kissinger's entire African policy was based on the erroneous assumption that the United States had to support the anti-MPLA coalition (FNLA-UNITA) because of the MPLA's complete domination by pro-Soviet elements. Kissinger's misapprehension of Soviet control over the MPLA was reinforced by almost all of the United States strategic studies community who, by their support of Kissinger's policies, exhibited an appalling ignorance of Angolan political realities.

Most of these analysts seemed unaware of the fact that since coming to power the Neto regime had moved to check the influence of the ultra pro-Soviet and anti-mulatto elements within the MPLA by removing them from the Cabinet. Instead, Neto placed Cubans in key positions to help him both institute a multiracial society and counterbalance the influence of Soviet technicians in certain key ministries.

What is disturbing is that although the Carter Administration has professed its desire to normalize relations with Angola, its continued widespread financial and military support for the Mobutu regime reflects a frightful ignorance of Zairois-Angolan relations and, more particularly, the political machinations of General Mobutu.

There can be little doubt that the increased level of FNLA-UNITA and FLEC activity, combined with ever greater incursions by South Africa across the Namibian border, has severely threatened the con-

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12Kissinger was opposed in this belief by most of the State Department's African Bureau.

13For a representative study see W. HAHN & A. COTTRELL, SOVIET SHADOW OVER AFRICA (1976).

14Ebinger, supra note 2, at 697-98.
continued viability of the Neto regime. Indeed, from the report of a former aide of Senator Tunney who recently returned from Luanda, it is apparent both that MPLA search-and-destroy missions are occurring only thirty-five miles from the capital and that the bulk of the Cuban forces are needed in Cabinda to repulse growing attacks by the Cabindan separatist forces of FLEC and Molica.15

Beseiged on all sides by his enemies (particularly Zaire), Neto has a valuable trump card in the Katangan gendarmes. While the extent to which Angolan, Cuban, or Soviet forces controlled the gendarmes' recent incursion into Zaire remains uncertain, the Carter Administration has been disingenuous in not pointing out to the American people that the raison d'ètre for the invasion was largely a matter of Zairois internal politics dating back to the early 1960's. To the extent that external factors were involved, American support for Zairois political designs on Angola and/or Cabinda were at least as much a cardinal ingredient as was Soviet and/or Cuban adventurism. Indeed, there has been no firm evidence of Soviet complicity to date.

The absurd duality of United States policy in the current Zairois political crisis has been aggravated by the United States' insistence that improved relations with Havana and/or Luanda cannot occur until the Cuban forces are withdrawn from Angola. If the Cuban forces were to withdraw at a time when United States military aid to Zaire is on the rise, the Neto regime would be imperilled and would have no choice but to rely on the Soviet Union for enhanced support, thus bringing about the very situation that United States policy is struggling to prevent.

Although there can be no doubt that the "invasion" by the Katangan gendarmes poses a grave threat to the continuation of the Mobutu regime, there are several critical factors that should be assiduously weighed by the United States in formulating its policy towards a situation which may end in political crisis. These factors are: (1) The implications for our policy if the "invaders" receive continued long-term and widespread support from the local Katangan population or sizeable elements therein, (2) the degree to which our own increased aid to Zaire has precipitated the crisis by allowing Zaire to funnel the aid to anti-MPLA forces, (3) the impossibility of Cuban military withdrawal from Angola if the Neto regime continues to be beleaguered on all fronts, (4) the question of whether in fact the interests of Neto and the Cubans coincide with those of the Soviet Union, (5) the potential

for a disintegration of Zaire if the Katangan gendarmes link with other old-line anti-Mobutu elements and the question of how this could affect the stability of the region, (6) the effect of the crisis upon other United States relations in central and southern Africa, (7) the possibility that the assassinations of President Ngouabi and the Cardinal of Brazzaville may be linked with Soviet interests in Brazzaville and Brazzaville-Zaire relations, and (8) the question of whether the Carter Administration has been disingenuous with the American people in portraying the crisis, or merely naïve as to African political realities.

Until these questions are adequately addressed and until the Carter Administration begins both to reexamine the basis of some of the fundamental tenets of United States southern African policy (e.g., the pivotal role of the Mobutu regime) and to exhibit some understanding of the interaction of southern African events, United States policy will remain enmeshed in crisis diplomacy rather than be grounded in long term effective crisis management.

NAMIBIA

The geopolitical significance of Namibia lies in its importance as a significant producer of gem diamonds, arsenic, vanadium, lead, zinc, and lithium. By 1980 Namibia will be a sizeable producer of uranium. However, despite Namibia's attributes, it has two major problems relating to its industrial development: a lack of water and an incessant demand for a cheap supply of labor.

Indeed, one of the chief reasons South Africa intervened in the Angolan civil war was to protect the giant hydroelectric complex on the Cunene River in southern Angola. The Cunene complex is vital to the continued growth of almost all the developing mining industry in Namibia. The Cunene development project (consisting of about 40 dams) will supply water and power to drought-ridden Ovamboland, Grootfontein, the Tsumeb mining facility, Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Rio Tinto Zinc's complex at Rossing, which may hold one of the world's largest deposits of uranium.

Currently, Namibia's mining industry accounts for about sixty percent of the country's export earnings. The major producers are the American-owned Tsumeb Corporation (copper, lead, silver, and zinc) and the South African-owned Consolidated Diamond Mines. Namibia's diamonds are among the best in the world and were responsible for over forty percent of the giant De Beers conglomerate's profits in 1974.
In addition to these industrial giants, smaller copper mines are being developed at Otjihase, Witvlei and Oamites.

Of greatest interest to the future development of Namibia is the massive potential of the Rossing uranium complex owned by Rio Tinto Zinc. No project in southern Africa has generated as much controversy as has the Rossing complex. The debate on the Rossing project centers on the constitutional status of Namibia. Rio Tinto Zinc argues that South Africa is the administrative authority of Namibia. It rejects the view that the United Nations has the right to declare Pretoria's occupation of Namibia illegal and denies that the United Nations Council for Namibia has any administrative jurisdiction over the territory.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that in 1975 the United Nations General Assembly passed a decree banning mineral exploitation in Namibia without prior authorization from the United Nations Council for Namibia, and stated that exports of Namibian natural resources would be liable for seizure. Although Rio Tinto Zinc showed some willingness at least to talk with SWAPO officials during the latter half of 1976, the situation remains at an impasse. SWAPO, however, has warned Rio Tinto Zinc that the development of Rossing is helping to support South Africa's occupation of Namibia and that SWAPO, upon independence, might make demands for back payments of royalties and taxes paid to the South African government.

The largest customer of the Rossing mine in the future will be Great Britain. British Nuclear Fuels has contracted to purchase 7,500 tons of uranium oxide in the period from 1976 to 1982, a decision which has generated considerable debate within British Labor Party circles. The situation is complicated by the fact that Great Britain, unlike most of the rest of the international community, has not discouraged firms from investing in Namibia. The Rossing mine is important to Great Britain because, by the early 1980's, Rossing uranium could be providing more than half of Britain's total uranium requirements.

One may ask why, given the volatile political climate reigning in Namibia, Rio Tinto Zinc decided to develop the Rossing mine complex at all. The answer is simple. Rossing's low production costs combined with high uranium prices may enable Rio Tinto Zinc to recoup its enormous development costs (£120 million) within two or three years once the mine is in full production. The main risk for Rio Tinto Zinc remains the political one: Its continued profitability will be dependent
on whether it is able to come to terms with political developments in Namibia.

The military victory of the MPLA-Cuban forces against the South African army in Angola, had profound ramifications in United States policy vis-à-vis Namibia. As noted above, prior to the Angolan crisis, United States policy had been predicated on the belief that by supporting the dialogue between the moderate Front-line States and Pretoria, a peaceful solution to both the Zimbabwe and Namibian political crisis could be found.

However, with the widespread international recognition of the Neto regime and thorough repudiation of Pretoria’s detente policy following its Angolan intervention, the dynamics of the Namibian political situation took on new dimensions. Clearly, with the installation of a friendly regime along Namibia’s northern frontier, SWAPO’s ability to wage an increasingly effective guerrilla campaign along the entire 1,000-mile border, and particularly against the Ovambo and Kavango Bantustans, was enhanced.

The change in the political situation in Namibia posed difficult problems for the United States. While the United States remained publicly committed to a peaceful transition to majority rule in Namibia through the constitutional talks (Turnhalle Conference) initiated by South Africa in mid-1975, South Africa’s burgeoning fortification of the Angolan-Namibian frontier furnished fuel to those critics of the talks who said the talks would lead to Namibia’s eventual annexation by the Republic.

The formulation of a coherent United States policy vis-à-vis Namibia has been complicated by the fact that SWAPO has been recognized by the United Nations as the sole representative of the Namibian people, although a large percentage of the Namibian population believe that SWAPO is an Ovambo-based organization having little support outside the northern area of the country. Although this is not precisely the case, the real extent of SWAPO’s support must be questioned. Neglect of this question could result in a black government installed through the Turnhalle Conference without the participation of SWAPO. If SWAPO then tries to overthrow it by force, a dangerous international crisis could develop.

The political situation in Namibia is further complicated by SWAPO’s recent decision not to participate in the Turnhalle Conference which was established by the South African government as a vehicle for bringing about Namibian independence within two years.
Although there are some indications that SWAPO's anti-Turnhalle position may be reassessed, SWAPO publicly continues to denounce the Turnhalle Conference as a well calculated and deliberate political maneuver aimed at bantustanism and subsequent annexation by South Africa. It should be noted, however, that in recent months many leading SWAPO members, impatient with the dogma of the Soviet-backed SWAPO leadership, have begun to return to Namibia to engage in the dialogue process.¹

What is appalling about United States policy towards Namibia is that there does not seem to be any rationale behind it. Although the United States has warned American investors that they cannot expect to receive diplomatic support if a future Namibian government questions the legality of their holdings, United States policy exhibits some serious shortcomings. For example, while opposing the proposal to establish the United Nations Council on Namibia, the United States has put forth no proposal of its own which might help facilitate the removal of the de jure illegal government.

Furthermore, despite United States public support for the rulings of the International Court of Justice and its obligation as a United Nations member, the United States continues to allow trade and investment in Namibia and permits all United States firms located there to take credit on their United States taxes for the taxes they pay to the illegal South African government. In addition, the United States has announced that it opposes implementation of the United Nations Charter enforcement procedures against South Africa.

In Namibia, the United States in confronted by a situation in which its current policy is inadequate. While the United States has always taken the position in the United Nations that it favors United Nations-supervised elections, a close reading of Kissinger's Lusaka speech reveals a contradictory approach. In Lusaka, through his support for an expanded Turnhalle Conference, Kissinger clearly gave the South Africans the green light to proceed with their current plan to bring Namibia to independence within two years. While speaking of the necessity of United Nations supervision of the elections, Kissinger also neglected to mention the need for United Nations “control” of the elections.

However, from a close reading of the Turnhalle documents, it is apparent that no one at the conference ever mentioned a future role

¹I am indebted to Dr. Richard Bissell of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia for calling this to my attention.
for the United Nations. Given this fact and given SWAPO's continued refusal to participate in the Turnhalle Conference, it is difficult to see where the current impasse leaves United States policy. In fact, Ambassador Young's recent comment that the United States' Namibian policy remains based on the principles laid down in the Kissinger Lusaka speech raises the questions of who makes African policy in the United States.

CONCLUSION

In the months ahead, the United States will confront a series of difficult choices in the formulation of its southern African policy. Since there will be widely varying perspectives concerning its interests and options, the fundamental dilemma confronting the United States will be to choose between its short term and long term interests.

Although the above analysis has been cursory in view of the magnitude of the problems involved, it is apparent that the United States has failed to implement an effective southern African policy. This failure is due both to its unwillingness to address seriously the constellation of political forces extant in the area and its reluctance to jettison ideological patterns of analysis which view all southern Africa events in terms of stark United States-Soviet great power rivalry.

In this regard, the failure of the Nixon and Ford Administrations to cast aside the assumption that there is a contradiction between United States interests and the end of white minority rule in southern Africa can only be viewed as tragic. Although the Carter Administration has pronounced itself ready to change past American policy errors and to work for a transition to black majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, its present policies with respect to Angola, Zaire, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique not only exhibit an appalling ignorance of African political realities but also raise doubts whether any reassessment of United States policy has occurred.

Although Kissinger's Lusaka speech has been much heralded as indicative of a basic change in United States southern African policy, it has been shown that the Lusaka speech is full of ambiguities and raises more questions than it answers. The fact that the Carter Administration points to this speech as the cornerstone of its policy gives little cause for solace.

It has been demonstrated that the overriding concern of United States policymakers with the "global view" of southern African events led three successive United States administrations to perceive African
political alignments in a way which prevented them from effectively utilizing forces in Angola and Mozambique to prevent the very increase of Soviet influence that United States policy was designed to thwart. Kissinger's policy with respect to both the MPLA and the Machel regime can only be viewed as a gross policy error.

Ironically, Kissinger's failure to understand the dynamics of the regional conflicts led him to neglect evaluation of the anti-Chinese component of the Soviet African policy with disastrous consequences for the region. The withdrawal of the Chinese paved the way for Pretoria's interventionary fiasco and led to the eclipse of viable United States policy options throughout the area.

Finally, although it would be encouraging to perceive the African diplomacy of the Carter Administration as heralding a new era in United States African policy perception, recent United States policies concerning the Katangan invasion, the Zimbabwe and Namibian conflicts, and the Angolan regime give little cause for confidence and much cause for alarm.