No Way Out? The Question of Unilateral Withdrawals of Referrals to the ICC and other Human Rights Courts

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No Way Out? The Question of Unilateral Withdrawals or Referrals to the ICC and Other Human Rights Courts
Michael P. Scharf * and Patrick Dowd **

"Relax," said the night man. "We are programmed to receive. You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave!"
The Eagles, Hotel California, Asylum Records, 1976

I. INTRODUCTION

The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") entered into force on July 1, 2002.1 Today, 108 states are party to the Court’s Statute.2 One of the ways cases come before the Court is through referrals of the states parties. The ICC has received and accepted a total of four referrals of “situations” to date, three of which have been “self-referrals,” where the state party on or in whose territory the alleged crimes have occurred or are occurring referred the
situation to the ICC. The drafters of the Rome Statute assumed that no state party would ever actually self-refer, despite technically providing for such action in the Rome Statute, and a current situation has presented the Court with a second unexpected twist: President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, having made the first-ever state party referral to the ICC in the name of Uganda in December 2003, suddenly announced in November 2004 that Uganda might “withdraw” its case from the ICC, in order to make peace with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”).

The Rome Statute, however, does not appear to provide for such a withdrawal. By now, the ICC and its Chief Prosecutor have invested substantial resources over the past four years investigating and preparing the case for trial. Two distinguished commentators have noted that “[a] withdrawal in these circumstances would incur a considerable loss of credibility for the Court and would . . . represent a defeat for the policy against impunity, the principle that animates the very idea of the Court.”

This Article addresses the consequent issue: What if a state, self-referring or referring the situation in another country, changes its mind and attempts to “withdraw” its ICC referral? What is the role and appropriate response of the ICC at that point? This issue becomes especially relevant and pressing as events in Uganda unfold and the possibility looms of an attempted “withdrawal” of Uganda’s referral. This Article examines the Rome Statute, the drafting history, and the expert commentaries, together with the statutory and case law of the other major human rights courts and bodies, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), in an effort to provide a comprehensive analysis of whether a state party can lawfully withdraw a referral from the ICC. To set the stage, it first examines the self-referral phenomenon and explores the reasons why attempted withdrawal of self-referrals is likely to arise.

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3 See International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008) (the fourth was the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation).


5 ICC Statute, art 14(1) (“A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed . . . .”).


7 ICC May Drop LRA Charges, New Vision (Nov 15, 2004).

II. BACKGROUND

A. CURRENT REFERRALS BEFORE THE ICC

In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni “took the decision to refer the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,” marking the first-ever state party referral to the fledgling ICC of a situation occurring on a state party’s own territory. President Museveni sought a new option for ending the horrors inflicted upon the people of northern Uganda after twenty-plus years of civil war with the rebel LRA and faced with “persistent international indifference coupled with the exhaustion of available alternatives.” After the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, officially opened an investigation into the situation, however, President Museveni unexpectedly announced in November 2004 that Uganda might “withdraw its case” from the ICC, having recently negotiated a partial ceasefire and the framework for a peace settlement with the LRA leaders.

Museveni’s claim drew immediate outcry from human rights groups and the international community. Amnesty International quickly noted that

There is not a scrap of evidence in the drafting history or in commentaries by leading international law experts on the Rome Statute suggesting that once a state party has referred a situation that it can “withdraw” the referral. As soon as the situation has been referred, the ICC has jurisdiction and the state cannot “withdraw” its referral.

While this claim seems logical, given the absence of any clear language in the Rome Statute regarding withdrawal of a referral, Amnesty International did not provide any detailed analysis to support its conclusion. Since these events, no other careful scrutiny of the issue of withdrawal has emerged, and the Prosecutor has since issued warrants for the top five LRA leaders. However, the LRA leaders have seized upon Museveni’s statement and repeatedly insisted

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9 ICC Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation, ICC-20040129-44-En (cited in note 6).
that they will not consent to any peace settlement until the referral is withdrawn and the ICC warrants are dropped. President Museveni therefore can claim the dubious distinction of having created the current confusion over withdrawal of a referral, which has imperiled the entire ICC referral procedure.

Three other referrals have been made to the ICC subsequent to the initial Ugandan referral. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic each also referred situations occurring within their own territory, in April 2004 and January 2005, respectively. Additionally, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC in March 2005.

Finally, the Ivory Coast made the first-ever non-state party provisional declaration to the ICC in February 2005. The Ivory Coast signed the Rome Statute soon after it was opened for signature in 1998 but has never subsequently ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the Statute.

B. THE BASIC REFERRAL PROCEDURE

The Rome Statute outlines a basic procedure for a state to refer a situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC. The Statute makes clear that only a state party (or the UN Security Council) may refer a situation. A state party is one that signed the Rome Statute prior to December 31, 2000 and has subsequently ratified,
accepted, or approved the Statute, or one that has otherwise acceded to the Statute since December 31, 2000.21 By definition, a state party “accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5,”22 namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.23 A state party may thereafter “refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed,”24 in writing,25 so that the Prosecutor may subsequently investigate the situation and charge specific individuals with those crimes. The Court may then exercise its jurisdiction specifically over that situation.26 The referral procedure therefore has three steps: first, a state becomes a party to the Rome Statute and accepts the Court’s general jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes; second, a state refers a specific situation to the Court and “triggers” the Court’s jurisdiction; and third, the Court exercises its jurisdiction.

The Rome Statute provides a number of options for delay, deferral, and termination of an investigation or prosecution once a referral has been made. For example, the UN Security Council can delay or suspend an investigation or prosecution indefinitely under Article 16.27 Articles 17 through 19 establish a broad platform for determining admissibility and jurisdiction for a given case. Not only can an interested state28 or an accused29 challenge admissibility or jurisdiction based on various criteria, but the Court itself can also voluntarily question the admissibility of a case30 and must “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”31 The Prosecutor can defer an investigation in light of admissibility issues under these articles. Article 53 provides that the

21 Id, art 125.
22 Id, art 12(1).
23 Id, art 5(1).
24 Id, art 14.
26 ICC Statute, art 13.
27 Id, art 16, stating that
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
28 See generally id, arts 18–19.
29 See generally id, art 19.
30 Id, art 19(1) (“The Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case . . . .”).
31 Id.
Prosecutor may decline to prosecute following an investigation and that he may reconsider a decision to investigate or prosecute a case. He also may amend or withdraw charges against an individual pursuant to Article 61. The Statute generally contains flexibility in favor of states in light of “exceptional circumstances,” “change of circumstances,” and “new facts or information.” Each of these options represents a procedural check on the power of the Court that could conceivably be leveraged by any interested and determined party.

States not party to the ICC may not make referrals. Rather, those states may make ad hoc declarations accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over the Rome Statute’s crimes without actually becoming a state party, thereby allowing the Prosecutor to initiate investigations related to situations in their territory at his discretion using his Article 15 *proprio motu* privileges. Although the drafters of the Statute may have intended the Court to interpret these declarations “in the sense of ‘situation in question,’” they arguably did not mean for the Court to...

32 Id, art 53.
33 Id, art 61.
34 Id, art 19(4) (“In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge (of admissibility) to be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial.”).
35 Id, art 18(7) (“A State . . . may challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19 on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances.”). A “change of circumstances” can also work against a state. See art 18(3) (“The Prosecutor’s deferral to a State’s investigation shall be open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.”).
36 Id, art 53(4) (“The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.”).
37 On the other hand, one ICC analyst has noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber has no power to restrain the Prosecutor “once the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements have been satisfied.” The Prosecutor’s discretion is his only control at that point. “Although there are institutional checks on the power of the Prosecutor . . . bureaucratic realities provide no procedural boundaries to check—or assist—his decision to prosecute when the ‘interests of justice’ are in question.” J. Alex Little, *Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal Court*, 38 Georgetown J Int'l L 363, 379 (2007).
39 ICC Statute, art 12(3).
treat an acceptance of such declarations as analogous to a state party referral.\textsuperscript{42} Several expert observers have noted:

To treat a declaration under Article 12(3) in the same way as a referral would grant third states a privilege that was reserved to states parties to the Statute. Article 14 limits the possibility of referrals expressly to states parties, and the article’s drafting history confirms that this limitation was intended.\textsuperscript{43}

Otherwise, non–states parties could take advantage of the powers and resources of the ICC “without sharing the burdens and obligations assumed by states parties, such as budgetary contributions and duties of cooperation.”\textsuperscript{44} Due to this inability of non–states parties to make formal referrals, this Article does not directly address the issues involved in a non–states party declaration.

This Article also does not specifically address issues concerning the Security Council’s referrals to the ICC. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the Security Council with the power to indefinitely defer the investigation or prosecution of any case;\textsuperscript{45} therefore, the question of whether the Security Council may withdraw a referral is effectively moot since it can accomplish the same end through Article 16. Where relevant, however, conclusions that relate to Security Council referrals as well as state referrals are noted.

C. THE SELF-REFERRAL PHENOMENON

The factual background to the withdrawal issue necessarily includes the fact that “self-referrals” are themselves something of an unexpected phenomenon. As Mahnoush Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman, two expert commentators on the ICC, have observed:

Before and during the Rome negotiations, no one—neither states that were initially skeptical about the viability of an international criminal court nor states that supported it—assumed that governments would want to invite the future court to investigate and prosecute crimes that had occurred in their territory. To the contrary, it was assumed that the Court would become involved only in those states that were unwilling or refused to prosecute, staged a sham prosecution of their governmental cronies, or were simply unable to prosecute. There is no indication that the drafters ever contemplated that the Statute would include voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult cases arising in their own territory. By voluntary referral we refer to situations in which the sole basis for satisfying the Court’s admissibility test is the referral—whether

\textsuperscript{42} Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olasolo, 99 Am J Int’l L at 424 (cited in note 40).
\textsuperscript{43} Id.
\textsuperscript{44} Id at 425. See also Williams, \textit{Article 13: Exercise of Jurisdiction}, \textsection 3 (cited in note 38) (noting that the ILC similarly believed that restriction of referrals to states parties would enhance cooperation and encourage ratification).
\textsuperscript{45} ICC Statute, art 16.
effected formally or implicitly—by the state in which a crime or the situation subject to investigation has taken place.\textsuperscript{46} In other words, the expectation was that states parties would refer only situations occurring in other states.

The first (and current) ICC Prosecutor altered this expectation upon accepting his position at the Court. The Prosecutor issued an important policy paper in September 2003 in which he outlined some principles and goals of the Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP"), as well as some basic organizational issues—sort of a "State of the OTP" address.\textsuperscript{47} He made two particularly noteworthy remarks in this paper, for the purposes of this discussion. First, he declared his intention for the OTP to "function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity," in which his office would pursue leaders "who bear most responsibility for the crimes" while encouraging "national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators."\textsuperscript{48} Second, in keeping with a "two-tiered approach," he stated that, rather than working only on potentially adversarial situations where a state is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute,

there is no impediment to the admissibility of a case before the Court where no State has initiated any investigation. There may be cases where inaction by States is the appropriate course of action. For example, the Court and a territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour is the most logical and effective approach.\textsuperscript{49}

The Prosecutor integrated the ideals of complementarity, effective prosecution, and the "duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes" embodied in the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{50} He essentially declared his intention and desire to work with states parties, and not against them.

The Prosecutor’s policy declaration had three tangible effects. First, the policy paper itself highlighted the Prosecutor’s dynamic and innovative approach to applying and interpreting the Rome Statute, especially in light of the ambiguities built into the Statute\textsuperscript{51} and the lack of adjudicative history at the ICC

\textsuperscript{46} Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 386–387 (cited in note 4).


\textsuperscript{48} Id at 3.

\textsuperscript{49} Id at 5.

\textsuperscript{50} ICC Statute, preamble.

\textsuperscript{51} A surprising number of Rome Statute article and draft history discussions conclude with some version of the observation that the drafters “failed to solve the problem and decided to leave it for the Court to resolve.” Stahn, El Zeidy, and Olatosolo, 99 Am J Intl L at 429 (cited in note 40)
to date. The drafters of the Rome Statute apparently left the possibility of self-referral or waiver of complementarity to the Court’s interpretation,\(^\text{52}\) and the Prosecutor gave the question some definition. Arsanjani and Reisman characterize this as “the law-in-action of the International Criminal Court.”\(^\text{53}\)

Second, the Prosecutor has in fact worked closely with states parties, and he succeeded in obtaining the first three referrals to the ICC as self-referrals. He has noted that he worked especially with both Uganda and Congo to encourage those states to self-refer their situations.\(^\text{54}\) This seemingly cooperative achievement has a potential dark side, however. This cooperation amounts to something of a hybrid between the power of self-referral and the Prosecutor’s \textit{proprio motu} powers under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.\(^\text{55}\) As such, it could be seen as an unwarranted circumvention by the Prosecutor of the authorization he is required to obtain from the pre-Trial Chamber to start an investigation \textit{proprio motu} under Article 15\(^\text{56}\) and an abuse of the automatic investigation mandated by a state party referral under Article 53.\(^\text{57}\) The Prosecutor must therefore take care that this process of encouraged self-referral occurs transparently and by the book.

Third, however, the self-referral phenomenon has itself generated the current confusion over whether a state party can withdraw a referral.

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\(^\text{52}\) El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at 100 (cited in note 51).


\(^\text{54}\) Luis Moreno-Ocampo, \textit{The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice,} Address at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Lecture in Global Legal Reform) (Oct 16, 2007), transcript available online at <http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20071016&type=wmv> (visited Dec 5, 2008).

\(^\text{55}\) ICC Statute, art 15 (“The Prosecutor may initiate investigations \textit{proprio motu} on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).

\(^\text{56}\) Id, art 15(3) (“If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected.”).

\(^\text{57}\) Id, art 53(1) (“The Prosecutor shall . . . initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute.”). See generally Paola Gaeta, \textit{Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?}, 2 J Intl Crim Just 949 (2004) (discussing in greater depth this and other “possible pitfalls” of self-referrals and the Prosecutor’s policy).
Theoretically, as the drafters expected, a state party referring a situation in another state would have little desire to withdraw a referral; any situation grave enough to warrant a referral would be unlikely to dissipate enough to cause the referring state to change its mind.\(^{58}\) Alternatively, the drafters feared that the ICC would receive only “throwaway” referrals, because “states might abuse such an option by trying to send frivolous or politically motivated referrals with regard to situations in the territory of a political adversary.”\(^{59}\) To address such concerns, the drafters built a screening process into the Rome Statute for the Prosecutor and a notification process for the referred state.\(^{60}\) This notification process may actually provide the lone avenue for withdrawal for a self-referring state (discussed further below in Section III.B).

Instead, with the apparent proliferation of self-referrals, the ICC must deal with the variety of reasons that a state may seek to withdraw its referral. As Mahnoush Arsanjani and Michael Reisman have observed:

Considering the pressure for resolving disputes through negotiation and the recognition that some of these disputes are not susceptible to military solutions, is it not likely that some states that have made voluntary referrals may later agree, as part of the negotiating process with their adversaries, to withdraw their referral to the ICC? Grounds for withdrawal . . . could be that the state has decided to use its national judicial system to deal with crimes . . . .”\(^{61}\)

More drastically, a newly elected government, a government that overthrows the previous one, or a brand new government taking power in the wake of a state’s fracturing or state succession would be especially likely to try to withdraw a referral from the ICC.

Whatever the cause, the issue of withdrawal is now unavoidable, and the evolution of the ICC referral process must be considered as part of the backdrop to the discussion.

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\(^{60}\) Id; ICC Statute, arts 53 (creating a screening process for the Prosecutor’s determination of whether to initiate an investigation) and 18(1) (“[T]he prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.”).

D. THE PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE CONUNDRUM

The Uganda situation is not particularly unique. Notwithstanding the notion of “no peace without justice” that was popular in the 1990s, achieving peace and obtaining justice are sometimes incompatible goals—at least in the short term. In order to end an international or internal conflict, negotiations often must be held with the very leaders who are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. When this is the case, insisting on criminal prosecutions can prolong the conflict, resulting in more deaths, destruction, and human suffering. Thus, Payam Akhavan, then Legal Adviser to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, observed a decade ago: “it is not unusual in the political stage to see the metamorphosis of yesterday’s war monger into today’s peace broker.”

Reflecting this reality, during the past thirty years, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uruguay have each, as part of a peace arrangement, granted amnesty to members of the former regime or insurgency that committed international crimes within their respective borders. With respect to five of these countries—Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and South Africa—“the United Nations pushed for, helped negotiate, and/or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace and democratic government.”

In addition to amnesty (which immunizes the perpetrator from domestic prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country (which may put the perpetrator out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution) are often used to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements, with the blessing and involvement of significant states and the UN. Peace negotiators call this the “Napoleonic Option,” in reference to the treatment of French emperor

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62 As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted article: “The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow.” Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 Hum Rts Q 249, 258 (1996).
65 Scharf, 59 Law & Contemp Probs at 41 (cited in note 64).
Napoleon Bonaparte who, after his defeat at Waterloo in 1815, was exiled to St. Helena rather than face trial or execution. More recently, a number of dictators and warlords have been granted sanctuary abroad in return for relinquishing power. Thus, for example, Ferdinand Marcos fled the Philippines for Hawaii; Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France; Mengistu Haile Miriam fled Ethiopia for Zimbabwe; Idi Amin fled Uganda for Saudi Arabia; General Raoul Cedras fled Haiti for Panama; and Charles Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria—a deal negotiated by the US and UN envoy Jacques Klein.

Except in cases involving a treaty that requires prosecution, such amnesty and exile deals are not inconsistent with international law. This conclusion finds support in the observations of the 2004 Report of the International Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone:

The Commission is unable to condemn the resort to amnesty by those who negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement [which provides amnesty to persons who committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone]. The explanations given by the Government negotiators, including in their testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are compelling in this respect. In all good faith, they believed that the RUF [insurgents] would not agree to end hostilities if the Agreement were not accompanied by a form of pardon or amnesty . . . . The Commission is unable to declare that it considers amnesty too high a price to pay for the delivery of peace to Sierra Leone, under the circumstances that prevailed in July 1999. It is true that the Lomé Agreement did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it provided the framework for a process that pacified the combatants and, five years later, has returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need not fear daily violence and atrocity.

It is a common misconception that trading amnesty or exile for peace is equivalent to the absence of accountability and redress. Amnesties and exile


68 For example, an amnesty or exile deal would be incompatible with the duty to prosecute or extradite found in the Genocide Convention, the Grave Breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, and the Torture Convention. See Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 339, 350–66 (2006).

69 William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 UC Davis J Intl L & Pol'y 145, 163–64 (2004). Schabas, the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, was a member of the International Truth Commission for Sierra Leone.

70 See William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 Harv Intl L J 467, 482–518 (2001) (classifying amnesties into four categories, from least to most legitimate: (1) “Blanket Amnesty”; (2) “Locally Legitimized, Partial
deals can be tied to accountability mechanisms that are less invasive than
domestic or international prosecution. Ever more frequently in the aftermath of
an amnesty- or exile-for-peace deal, the concerned governments have made
monetary reparations to the victims and their families, established truth
commissions to document the abuses (and sometimes identify perpetrators by
name), and have instituted employment bans and purges (referred to as
“lustration”) that keep such perpetrators from positions of public trust.\(^7\)
Another approach that is in vogue is the utilization of informal tribal-justice
mechanisms, such as Rwanda’s “Gacaca” process.\(^2\) While not the same as a full-
scale criminal prosecution (and hence falling outside the ICC’s concept of
“complementarity”\(^7\)), these mechanisms do encompass much of what justice is
intended to accomplish: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation.
Indeed, some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute “a
second-best approach” when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many
situations they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice.\(^7\)

Consequently, during the negotiations for the Rome Statute creating the
ICC, the US and a few other delegations expressed concern that the ICC would
hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and democracy
in places like Haiti and South Africa.\(^7\) UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
responded that it would be “inconceivable” for the ICC to undermine an
amnesty-for-peace arrangement by pursuing prosecution in a situation like South
Africa.\(^7\) According to the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
Philippe Kirsch of Canada, the issue was not definitively resolved during the
Diplomatic Conference. Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect
“creative ambiguity” that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of

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\(^7\) Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights at 282–91 (cited in note 64).


\(^7\) The “complementarity provision,” Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, requires the court to
dismiss a case where “[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution.”

\(^7\) See Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* 9
(Beacon 1998) (contending that prosecutions “are slow, partial, and narrow”).

\(^7\) See US Delegation Draft: State Practice regarding Amnesties and Pardons 1 (Aug 17, 1997), available
online at <www.iccnw.org/documents/USDraftonAmnestiesPardons.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008) (“The U.S. delegation has raised the difficult matter of how to address amnesties and
pardons in the context of a statute for an international criminal court.”).

\(^7\) Darryl Robinson, *Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International
Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony).
the ICC to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty or asylum exception to the jurisdiction of the court. Should such creative ambiguity be read as permitting a state to withdraw a referral in order to pursue an amnesty or exile for peace deal?

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE TEXT OF THE ROME STATUTE

The Rome Statute does not expressly provide for withdrawal of a state party referral anywhere, either on its face or under more nuanced scrutiny. The glaring absence of such a provision, taken together with the abundance of other procedural safeguards available to both the state party and the Prosecutor, strongly suggests that the Statute simply does not allow a referral to be withdrawn. Rather, the Statute as a whole conveys the impression that once a referral has been made and the Court has exercised its jurisdiction, control and power over the referral lies entirely in the hands of the Court.

The Statute itself makes reference to withdrawal in only four of its 128 articles, and only three of these references directly concern states parties. Article 127 deals exclusively with withdrawal from the Rome Statute as a whole and provides the best context for the Statute's treatment of the concept of "withdrawal." Article 127 states in full:

1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.

Taken as a whole, Article 127 affirms the sovereign right of a state to withdraw from the ICC as with any other treaty, yet binds a withdrawing state to its existing obligations under the ICC. The one-year notice allows the Court ample time to take under consideration any relevant matter and to thwart a state

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party seeking to evade responsibility for crimes not yet connected "with criminal investigations and proceedings" by withdrawing. Moreover, Article 127 provides unambiguous notice to states that they will be held to their obligations once they sign on to the ICC.

The mere existence of the general withdrawal clause in Article 127 is itself evidence that the Statute does not explicitly or implicitly permit withdrawal of a specific referral. As noted above, the referral process comprises three steps. The provision for withdrawal from the first step (becoming a state party) but not the others (specifically, making a referral) suggests, if not the negative implication of deliberate omission,\(^7^8\) then at least the lack of consideration of the capability to withdraw a referral under the Statute. Viewed together with the many other options for delay, deferral, and termination of a case, this omission or lack of consideration is conspicuous.

Article 121 briefly addresses withdrawal from the treaty "with immediate effect" as a legitimate response by a state party to an amendment to the Rome Statute, but conditions the withdrawal on compliance with Article 127(2).\(^7^9\) This article therefore similarly affirms a state's sovereign right not to be bound involuntarily to new treaty obligations while holding that state accountable for those obligations already in place. Of course, Article 121 does not have any effect until 2009 at the earliest.\(^8^0\)

Article 124 allows a state party to withdraw "at any time" a declaration limiting its recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICC;\(^8^1\) in other words, the Statute does not restrict a state party from entering further into the auspices of the Court, as opposed to withdrawing from it. Finally, Article 61 establishes the Prosecutor's power to withdraw charges in certain circumstances and does not relate to states parties' actions.

In order to more fully consider the concept of withdrawal of a referral with respect to the Statute, it is helpful to more clearly define the concept. A referral is the submission by a state party of a situation to the Prosecutor;\(^8^2\) upon the Prosecutor's recommendation, the Court can then exercise its jurisdiction over

\(^7^8\) *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,* "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed 2004). This canon of construction is "at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context." Id, quoting F. Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* 234–35 (Little, Brown 1975). Fortunately, the Rome Statute provides ample context in which to examine this idea.

\(^7^9\) ICC Statute, art 121(6).

\(^8^0\) Id, art 121(1); amendments to the Rome Statute cannot be proposed until July 1, 2009 ("After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.").

\(^8^1\) Id, art 124.

\(^8^2\) Id, art 14(1).
specific crimes in that situation. Several ICC experts have described a self-referral more specifically as a state party’s voluntary decision to relinquish its domestic jurisdiction over a situation. Self-referral implies also that the state party will not be invoking complementarity to prevent the ICC from prosecuting. Logically, then, a withdrawal of a referral is the unilateral removal or retraction of a situation from the Court’s jurisdiction, assuming the Court has taken the steps to exercise its jurisdiction.

In this respect, the Rome Statute is crystal clear. Article 19(1) states that “the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.” The notion of compétence de la compétence, a court’s power to determine its own jurisdiction, is so well settled in international law that “the requirement in this paragraph that the Court satisfy itself in any case before it that it has jurisdiction was not strictly necessary.” A state may challenge the jurisdiction or the admissibility of a case under Rule 19 once the Court has taken jurisdiction, but a state party cannot unilaterally supersede the authority of the Court to deny jurisdiction.

83 Id, art 13(a), stating
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14 . . . .

84 Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 388 (cited in note 4); El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at 100, 102, 104 (cited in note 51); Akhavan, 99 Am J Intl L at 404, 413–416, 418 (cited in note 10). All three articles cite the 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court as the origin of the “relinquish” language (discussed further in Section III.B), in the context of discussing the legitimacy of self-referrals. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 50th Sess, Supp No 22, ¶ 47, UN Doc A/50/22 (1995). Arsanjani and Reisman contend that a case deriving from a self-referral is inadmissible before the ICC, while El Zeidy and Akhavan (writing at about the same time and using very similar language) seem to agree that self-referrals are legitimate and admissible. Arsanjani and Reisman, 99 Am J Intl L at 386–391 (cited in note 4); El Zeidy, 5 Intl Crim L Rev at 104 (cited in note 52) (“There is no logic in rejecting a State’s attempt to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the Court from the outset.”); Akhavan, 99 Am J Intl L at 415 (cited in note 10) (“[T]here is no basis, in law or policy, for the assertion that states cannot voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the ICC.”). The current Chief Prosecutor seemingly takes the latter view.

85 See Section III.C.2.a for discussion of whether and when the Court’s jurisdiction has been exercised.

86 Christopher K. Hall, Article 19: Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case, in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute, ¶ 2 (cited in note 38) (citing the case of Prosecutor v Tadic from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).

87 ICC Statute, arts 19(2), (4), (5), (7).
B. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE ROME STATUTE

The drafting history of the Rome Statute, like the Statute itself, contains virtually no discussion of the possibility of withdrawal of a state party referral. This fact is unsurprising, given that this issue arose out of the self-referral phenomenon, which was itself barely considered by the drafters. However, the absence of discussion of withdrawal, the minimal consideration of self-referral, the drafters’ heavy focus on issues of complementarity and jurisdiction, and the language of the draft statute itself, taken as a whole, convey the strong impression that the drafters did not intend to provide a state with the power to unilaterally withdraw a referral from the Court and did intend to bind states to their obligations under the Statute.

As discussed above, the drafters of the Rome Statute apparently never “contemplated that the Statute would include voluntary state referrals to the Court of difficult cases arising in their own territory.”88 On the contrary, the drafters envisioned a “typically interstate trigger mechanism”89 like those in place at other human rights bodies, and the debate over state referrals therefore centered primarily on which states could refer, and whether states should refer, situations or individual cases.90 Secondary to these concerns was the drafters’ fear of abuse of the process by states for “frivolous or vexatious purposes.”91

The drafters also believed that states would submit referrals only rarely anyway. As one observer has pointed out, the interstate complaint mechanism “is not particularly suitable for the purpose of individual criminal justice,” because “state complaints are, typically, aimed at initiating proceedings before the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal entrusted with the task of settling a dispute between States and possibly ascertaining an internationally wrongful act.”92 Additionally, a number of drafters and ICC experts have cited the general failure of states to use the interstate complaint procedures available at various other human rights bodies as evidence that states would be reluctant to initiate “independent international inquiries into human rights violations” by other states at the fledgling ICC.93 Consequently, it was expected that the ICC

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89 Antonio Marchesi, Article 14: Referral of a Situation by a State Party in Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute, ¶ 6 (cited in note 38).
90 See generally Kirsch and Robinson, Referral by States Parties (cited in note 58); Williams, Article 13: Exercise of Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (cited in note 38).
92 Marchesi, Article 14: Referral of a Situation by a State Party, ¶ 6 (cited in note 89).
93 Id (“Certain precedents, including the failure of the interstate complaint procedure provided for by the ICCPR, indicate that Governments are not inclined to set off independent international
would have to rely primarily on Security Council referrals (at least at first) and the Prosecutor’s independent powers in order to actually exercise the Court’s jurisdiction and prosecute individual cases.

A lone example of the consideration of self-referral exists in the drafting history, disguised as a question of “waiver of complementarity.” The first President of the ICC Assembly of States Parties, Mohamed M. El Zeidy, succinctly describes this example in his discussion of the Ugandan self-referral:

The question of waiver first arose during the discussions of the 1995 Adhoc Committee and seemed to be controversial. While it has been proposed that the Statute should permit a situation where a State might “voluntarily decide to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour” of the ICC, the proposal did not gain support from some delegations. Some of them believed that such a proposal would be inconsistent with the principle of complementarity as the ICC “should in no way undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems and should only be resorted to in exceptional cases.” A footnote was inserted to that effect in subsequent drafts and remained until the Rome Conference. It was not discussed however, during the Conference as many delegations thought that the issue would be better dealt with in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Rules, however, were silent regarding this question and it seems that this issue was left to the Court’s interpretation.

inquiries into human rights violations by other Governments . . . .”); Gaeta, 2 J Intl Crim Just at 951 (cited in note 57) (“In practice, however, states are likely to take advantage of this opportunity rarely, as the small number of interstate complaints within the framework of human rights treaties clearly shows.”); Kirsch and Robinson, Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor at 662–63 n 28 (cited in note 58) (“[T]he experience under various human rights conventions was a persuasive indication that reliance on States to refer situations would not be ideal.”). Kirsch and Robinson further note that no inter-state human rights complaints had, to date, been brought either under the ICCPR or to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the American Convention on Human Rights, and that only seven such cases had been brought before the European Commission on Human Rights, of which only one came before the European Court.

Also, as the website for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights helpfully states: “Several of the Human Rights Treaties contain provisions to allow for State parties to complain to the relevant treaty body about alleged violations of the treaty by another State party. Note: these procedures have never been used.” Human Rights Bodies—Complaints Procedures: Inter-State Complaints, available online at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/> (visited Dec 5, 2008).

94 Williams, Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, ¶ 3 (cited in note 38); Marchesi, Article 14: Referral of a Situation by a State Party, ¶ 5 (cited in note 89).

95 Kirsch and Robinson, Referral by States Parties at 663 (cited in note 58); Marchesi, Article 14: Referral of a Situation by a State Party, ¶ 5 (cited in note 89).

At this point, of course, the Prosecutor has encouraged, and the Court has apparently accepted, self-referrals as a means of triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. Given the low profile of this note in the drafting history over the years, the drafters never focused on the additional implications of such a concept—such as the possibility of withdrawal of a self-referral.

The drafters were also preoccupied with the definition of jurisdiction in two important respects, for the purposes of this discussion. First, Professor Sharon A. Williams’s analysis of the drafting history of Articles 12 and 13 demonstrates that the drafters very carefully constructed the jurisdictional regime for these two articles. The resulting articles were a compromise, especially with regard to Article 12, that backed away from giving the Court universal or inherent jurisdiction and instead created very heavy reliance on state party consent and referral for the Court to function. The sudden and unilateral withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Court would therefore interfere with the functioning of the Court, at best, and destroy the Court’s functioning altogether, at worst. Such withdrawal is incompatible with the jurisdictional structure created in these articles.

Second, the drafting history shows that the drafters strongly supported the inclusion of the concept of competence de la compétence in Article 19. This concept is so well established as to be almost taken for granted by the Court, as discussed above in Section III.A. John T. Holmes, one of the Rome Statute’s drafters, has noted that “the principle that the Court must always satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction was widely supported. The language eventually agreed upon made clear that this duty existed throughout all stages of the proceedings.” The drafters therefore always intended for the Court to control decisions regarding a case over which it had exercised jurisdiction. The idea that a state could unilaterally withdraw jurisdiction from the Court directly contradicts the drafters’ intentions and the eventual Rome Statute’s language.

Finally, the 1998 Draft Statute, the penultimate version of the Rome Statute, provides additional insight into the drafters’ thinking. Like the final Statute, the 1998 Draft Statute contains no mention of withdrawal of a referral, only withdrawal in unrelated contexts or regarding the statute as a whole. There is one semi-exception, however. Article 9 of the Draft Statute (which would eventually become Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) contains several options for “Acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.” Option 2 of this draft article

97 See generally Williams, Article 12: Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction (cited in note 94); Williams, Article 13: Exercise of Jurisdiction (cited in note 38).
99 See, for example, 1998 Draft Statute, arts 58, 59, 61, 87, 90, 109, 110, 115 (cited in note 96).
100 Id, art 9, ¶¶ 32–33.
would allow a state to accept the jurisdiction of the Court after the state becomes a party "at a later time, by declaration lodged with the Registrar," \(^{101}\) rather than automatically as a condition to becoming a state party (like the eventual Rome Statute Article 12(3)). Option 2 further provides:

A declaration may be made for a specified period, in which case it may not be withdrawn before the end of that period, or for an unspecified period, in which case it may be withdrawn only upon giving a six month's notice of withdrawal to the Registrar. Withdrawal does not affect proceedings already commenced under this Statute. \(^{102}\)

Although the drafters ultimately rejected this option in favor of automatic consent to the Court's general jurisdiction, \(^{103}\) its inclusion reveals the drafters' specific intention to bind states parties to the obligations incurred by a state's consent to jurisdiction, even when allowing a state flexibility in its consent. This translates directly to the notion that a state cannot rescind a decision to relinquish jurisdiction over a situation to the Court, as would happen in the case of withdrawal of a referral.

C. BEYOND THE ROME STATUTE—COMPARISON WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES

The ICC has yet to produce any case law with which to analyze this issue concerning the Rome Statute. It is useful, therefore, to look to the other international human rights supervisory and adjudicative bodies for comparison and analysis. It is worth noting that the ICC is not itself a comprehensive human rights court or treaty; rather, the Court is a criminal court with jurisdiction over those abuses of human rights that constitute "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." \(^{104}\) The Court is therefore a limited or secondary human rights body. Article 21 of the Rome Statute specifically requires that the Court apply, in addition to the Statute and rules of the Court itself, \(^{105}\) "applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law," \(^{106}\) and requires that "the application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human

101 Id, art 9, Option 2 ¶ 1(b).
102 Id, ¶ 3.
103 ICC Statute, art 12(1) ("A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.").
104 Id, art 5(1).
105 Id, art 21(1)(a) ("The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence . . . .").
106 Id, art 21(1)(b).
The Court will no doubt look to the other international criminal tribunals as it prosecutes specific crimes and addresses issues of criminal procedure. On the other hand, the international human rights bodies are especially relevant with regard to broader issues of human rights principles and procedures.

1. The Statutes of the Major Human Rights Bodies

A simple comparison between the Rome Statute and the statutory basis of every other human rights body shows that these statutes uniformly uphold the principle of *competence de la compétence* and reject unilateral withdrawal from the jurisdiction of that body, where and when they speak to these issues. Two types of relevant international human rights supervisory bodies currently exist. First, there are the four international human rights courts: the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR"), the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Second, five of the core international human rights treaties of the UN have established supervisory, quasi-adjudicative bodies that hear cases or complaints: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") has established the Human Rights Committee to monitor implementation of the Covenant; additionally, a supervisory Committee has been established for each of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against

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107 Id, art 21(3).

108 The ICJ is not a human rights court per se; rather, the ICJ is a human rights court incidentally as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” whose purposes include “promoting and encouraging human rights.” United Nations Charter, arts 1(3), 92.


Women, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.\textsuperscript{111}

Every one of the statutes or treaties that serves as the foundation of these nine human rights bodies and allows denunciation or withdrawal from the treaty, or withdrawal from a conditional acceptance of the court's or committee's jurisdiction to hear cases or complaints, contains a stipulation that such withdrawal or denunciation shall not release the state from obligations arising, acts occurring, and/or cases or complaints commencing while that state was still party to the treaty or statute.\textsuperscript{112} Every treaty or statute providing for denunciation requires at least six months' notice,\textsuperscript{113} and four of them require a


\textsuperscript{112} See ICRMW, arts 89(3) (denunciation), 77(8) (conditional acceptance); ICERD, art 14(3) (oddly, conditional acceptance only); CEDAW Optional Protocol, art 19(2) (denunciation only); CAT, arts 21(2) (conditional withdrawal), 31(2) (denunciation); ICCPR, art 41(2) (conditional acceptance only; the ICCPR does not allow denunciation or withdrawal from the Covenant, see Section III.C.2.b.iv below); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Ser No 36, 1144 UN Treaty Ser 123, art 78(2) (denunciation) (July 18, 1978), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/SerLV/II/82 doc6 rev1 at 25 (1992); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention on Human Rights"), as amended by Protocol No 11 (with Protocol Nos 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13), art 58(2) (denunciation), signed Nov 4, 1950, entered into force on Sept 3, 1953, 213 UN Treaty Ser 221. The ICJ and the African Court do not provide for either denunciation or any sort of limited withdrawal, creating the "rebuttable presumption" under Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention") that they are not subject to denunciation or withdrawal. See generally Protocol to the African Charter; Vienna Convention, art 56(1), concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969, entered into force on Jan 27, 1980 ("A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty."); Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute"), 59 Stat 1055, 3 Bevans 1153 (1945).

\textsuperscript{113} See CEDAW Optional Protocol, art 19(1); European Convention on Human Rights, art 58(2).
full year. Finally, all four of the human rights courts stipulate their *competence de la compétence*, such that the court alone decides disputes or issues of jurisdiction.

One could reasonably conclude, based on this unified overview of the other major human rights bodies, that the narrow realm of international human rights treaties and courts has developed a customary international law relating to the procedure for withdrawal, in that such courts must alone decide matters of jurisdiction, that states remain bound to obligations incurred under such treaties in the event of withdrawal or denunciation, and that such withdrawal or denunciation requires at least six months notice, where it is permitted at all. The case law of these bodies bolsters this view as well.

2. The Case Law of the Major International Human Rights Judicial Bodies

The major international human rights judicial bodies have produced a considerable amount of directly relevant case law and legal analysis with which to further examine the issue of withdrawal of a referral. The IACtHR in particular has come out with several comprehensive legal rulings that provide excellent context for consideration of issues of jurisdiction, withdrawal, treaty interpretation, and human rights law. The IACtHR also delivers the sole convincing case in favor of withdrawal of a referral in very narrow circumstances. These other human rights bodies have generally given the seemingly narrow issue of withdrawal important depth and definition.

*Case law supporting the right of withdrawal.* In one of its earlier cases, the IACtHR held that a party may, in fact, legally and unilaterally withdraw a case from the Court in certain, limited circumstances. In the *Cayara Case* (*Cayara v Peru*), the Inter-American Commission submitted four joint cases against Peru to the Court after completing the standard Commission investigative procedure. But the Commission withdrew the case from the Court shortly thereafter in response to strenuous protestations from the Peruvian government over alleged procedural errors. Significantly, the Commission did not request permission to withdraw the case; rather, the Commission Chairman simply declared his decision in a note to the Court Secretariat “for the time being to withdraw the case from the Court, in order to reconsider it and possibly present it again at

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114 See ICRMW, art 89(2); ICERD, art 21; CAT, art 31(1); and American Convention on Human Rights, art 78(2).

115 See ICJ Statute, art 36(6); American Convention on Human Rights, art 62(1); European Convention on Human Rights, art 32(2); Protocol to the African Charter, art 3(2).


117 Id.
some future date,” and withdrew it.\textsuperscript{118} The Secretariat acknowledged the Chairman’s note and apparently accepted the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{119} The Commission then amended the referral to correct the irregularities and resubmitted the case to the Court several months later.\textsuperscript{120}

Peru specifically objected to the withdrawal of the case in its preliminary objections, claiming that the Commission’s action was illegal and the case was “annulled,” due to the fact that neither the American Convention nor the Court rules “contemplate the possibility of withdrawing... a case submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.”\textsuperscript{121} The IACtHR, however, found the withdrawal to be perfectly legitimate in light of the objection’s basis in Article 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{122} Article 51 addresses, in part, whether a matter has been “submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted.”\textsuperscript{123} After conceding the absence of any statutory or procedural reference to withdrawal of an application,\textsuperscript{124} the Court stated:

This does not mean that it is inadmissible. General principles of procedural law allow the applicant party to request a court not to process its application, \textit{provided the court has not begun to take up the case. As a rule, that stage begins with the notification of the other party.} Furthermore, the foundation of the Court’s jurisdiction, as set forth in Article 61(1) of the Convention, lies in the will of the Commission or of the States Parties.

49. In a case before the Court, formal notification of the application does not occur automatically but requires a preliminary review by the President in order to determine whether the basic requirements of that action have been met. This is spelled out in Article 27 of the Rules in force, which reflects the long-standing practice of the Court...

51. In the instant case, the request for withdrawal presented by the Commission occurred before the President of the Court was able to conduct the preliminary review of the application and, consequently, before he was in a position to order the notification of same. The President had not even been apprised of the communication... by which the Commission notified the Government that the case had been referred to the Court...

\textsuperscript{115} Id.
\textsuperscript{119} Id, ¶ 27.
\textsuperscript{120} Id, ¶ 30.
\textsuperscript{121} Id, ¶ 46. Comically, Peru’s objection to the withdrawal was also based in part on apparent indignation at the claim that Peru had requested the withdrawal; Peru had actually requested that the case not be submitted at all. This is not the last example of Peru’s sensitive disposition towards the Court.
\textsuperscript{122} Id, ¶¶ 35, 54.
\textsuperscript{123} American Convention on Human Rights, art 51(1).
\textsuperscript{124} Id, ¶ 48.
\textsuperscript{125} Id, ¶¶ 48, 49, 51 (emphasis added).
The Court therefore concluded that the withdrawal occurred in the window that exists after the Commission referred the case and before the Court accepted jurisdiction, and it ultimately recognized the withdrawal as legitimate (while upholding Peru’s objections on other grounds).126

It is logical to conclude that states parties may similarly withdraw a referral from the ICC before the ICC has taken any steps to exercise jurisdiction. As the current Prosecutor has noted, “neither referrals nor private communications automatically ‘trigger’ the powers of the Prosecutor.”127 Instead, once a case is referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor must “conduct an analysis”128 and evaluate the information made available to him;129 determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed and commence an investigation;130 notify all States Parties and those States which . . . would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned,”131 and, finally, initiate an investigation.132 The Prosecutor additionally has stated that “not every situation can be immediately investigated” and that “some situations must be carefully monitored for some time.”133

The Rome Statute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not state explicitly when a case has been “taken up” or when the jurisdiction of the Court is officially in effect. The plain language of Article 13 of the Rome Statute, stating that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if a referral is made, suggests that the Court or the Prosecutor must take affirmative action to accept jurisdiction, analogous to Article 51 of the American Convention. The current Prosecutor’s statements indicate his position that his response to a referral by gathering and assessing of relevant information represents the commencement of the ICC process.134 Alternatively, the IACtHR, which uses initial procedures

126 Id., ¶ 51–63. The Court does not actually conclude on the withdrawal issue; it merely proceeds on the presumption that the withdrawal was not “unjustified or arbitrary.” Id., ¶ 52.


128 Id.

129 ICC Statute, art 53(1) (“In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: (a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed . . . .”).

130 Id., art 18(1).

131 Id.

132 Id, art 53(1).


134 Id at 1–4.
similar to those of the ICC, noted that its own participation begins “with the notification of the other party.” In the case of the ICC, such commencement occurs when the Prosecutor notifies states parties which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the Crimes concerned and opens an investigation.

The fact is virtually indisputable, in light of the Prosecutor’s statements and the Rome Statute’s regime, that a temporal gap exists between the referral of a case to the ICC and the actual exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction. The admitted existence of this gap sufficiently satisfies the IACtHR holding and establishes the possibility that a referring party (including the Security Council) can withdraw a case within this limited window under the Rome Statute as well. The recognition of this possibility by the ICC could show flexibility and offer comfort to both states parties and those states considering accession to the Rome Statute. This possibility also could provide political cover for those states (or the Security Council) whose referral is met with immediate or severe protestation by its own citizens, its neighbors, or the international community. While the current Prosecutor has expressed firmly that a state may not withdraw a case already well-under investigation, he has shown creativity and flexibility with ICC law in his Policy Paper and might consider this accommodating, though limited, possibility.

The problem, of course, from a state’s perspective is that such a withdrawal could provide temporary cover but does not allow the state to fully escape the Court’s jurisdiction. As long as a state remains party to the Rome Statute and its acceptance of the Court’s general jurisdiction remains in place, the Prosecutor may still exert his proprio motu power with respect to that state. If sufficient conditions exist to prompt a state to refer a situation in the first place, then the Prosecutor may well agree enough to exert that power once a case is withdrawn. In this regard it is significant that Luis Moreno-Ocampo has said that his prosecutorial decisions would not be governed by political considerations, and that if the international community wants the ICC to defer to an amnesty or exile deal then it should be for the Security Council to make that decision under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.

b) Case law opposing the right of withdrawal. The case law and legal analysis of the other international human rights bodies reaffirms the prerogative of

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136 Cayara Case, ¶ 48.

international courts to determine their own jurisdiction and rejects the ability of a state to withdraw from treaty obligations or the jurisdiction of the requisite court, just as their statutory and treaty counterparts do. The ICJ in particular defined some of the basic limitations to withdrawal or modifications of obligations under an international agreement. Moreover, this case law and analysis establishes a higher plane of obligation and greater restrictions on the ability of a state party to withdraw or derogate from a human rights treaty. The IACtHR and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee have clarified and strengthened the nature of human rights treaties. This law and analysis further establish that a state party cannot unilaterally withdraw from its obligations under a human rights treaty.

(1) The International Court of Justice. The ICJ addressed the most famous (or notorious) attempt by a state to unilaterally evade its treaty obligations and sidestep a court’s jurisdiction in the case of Nicaragua v United States. In 1984, Nicaragua announced that it was filing a case against the US at the ICJ, pursuant to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the two countries, over US support of Nicaraguan rebels and mining of Nicaraguan harbors. In a transparent attempt to preempt the case, the US notified the ICJ three days prior to the filing (which the United States knew was imminent) that the US had “modified” its declaration of recognition of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, such that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or related to events in Central America,” and stating that “this proviso shall take effect immediately.” The US then argued at the ICJ that “States have the sovereign right to qualify an acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.”

The Court laid out the fundamental precepts of jurisdiction and withdrawal (or modification) in denying the US’ contention. The Court noted that “both Parties apparently recognize that a modification of a declaration which only takes effect after the Court has been validly seized does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction”; that is, once the Court has exercised jurisdiction over a case, neither party can then unilaterally exert some effect over that jurisdiction. The Court then noted that the US’ attempted modification was really an attempt to exempt itself from its obligations vis-à-vis the Court’s jurisdiction under the bilateral treaty in question. While a state is free to enter into such obligations


\[139\] Id., ¶13.

\[140\] Id., ¶53.

\[141\] Id., ¶54.

\[142\] Id., ¶58.
with respect to other states, it cannot then freely break legal obligations once established. The Court cited the customary legal concept of *pacta sunt servanda*\(^\text{143}\) to clarify that good faith is "one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations. . . . Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected."\(^\text{144}\) The Court concluded that such a modification as attempted by the US required a "reasonable period of notice,"\(^\text{145}\) and it thereby rejected the US attempt to quash the ICJ's jurisdiction in the case and defined one of the best-known rules with regard to the issue of withdrawal.

The ICJ later briefly expanded on its holding in *Nicaragua* in the 1998 case of *Cameroon v Nigeria*.\(^\text{146}\) Citing *Nicaragua*, the Court noted that "withdrawal ends existing consensual bonds, while deposit establishes such bonds. The effect of withdrawal is therefore purely and simply to deprive other States which have already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of the right they had to bring proceedings before it against the withdrawing State."\(^\text{147}\) This holding makes clear that an immediate, unilateral withdrawal from a treaty not only violates the legal obligations voluntarily entered into by a state, but it also deprives the rights of those also legally protected under the treaty.

The ICJ simultaneously defended the power of the Court to define its own jurisdiction and rejected the prerogative of a state to unilaterally withdraw from, and therefore violate, its legal obligations under a treaty. This finding bolsters the conclusions already established with respect to the Rome Statute. Additionally, the Court's language noting the deprivation of the rights of other parties by a withdrawal helps clarify the special protection afforded to human rights treaties, as is similarly affirmed by the IACtHR.

(2) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In a set of cases in the 1990s, the IACtHR dealt simultaneously with issues of interference with the Court's *competence de la compétence*, and unilateral withdrawal both from a case and from a human rights treaty. The Inter-American Commission referred two cases against Peru to the IACtHR in March and July of 1999 respectively, the *Ivester*
Bronstein Case\textsuperscript{148} and the Constitutional Court Case.\textsuperscript{149} The Court in turn notified Peru of each of the applications, according to procedure.\textsuperscript{150} In response first to the Constitutional Court Case, the Peruvian government simply returned the application to the Court and submitted a note to the Court Secretariat stating that

On July 9, 1999, the Government of the Republic of Peru deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States the instrument wherein it declares that, pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights, the Republic of Peru is withdrawing the declaration consenting to the optional clause concerning recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights . . . . The withdrawal of recognition of the Court's contentious jurisdiction takes immediate effect as of the date on which that instrument is deposited with the General Secretariat of the OAS, in other words, July 9, 1999, and applies to all cases in which Peru has not answered the application filed with the Court.\textsuperscript{151}

Peru subsequently responded identically to the Ivcber Bronstein Case\textsuperscript{152} and thereafter made no other response to either case.

The Court delivered its ruling on "the question of Peru's purported withdrawal of its declaration recognizing the contentious jurisdiction of the Court and of its legal effects" in the two cases the following September.\textsuperscript{153} The Court first noted that not only does it possess the inherent authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a given case, "as with any court or tribunal,"\textsuperscript{154} but also that a state party's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction according to the American Convention necessarily implies that the state also "accept[s] the Court's right to settle any controversy relative to its jurisdiction."\textsuperscript{155} The Court consequently found that "recognition of the Court's binding jurisdiction is an ironclad clause to which there can be no limitations

\textsuperscript{148} Ivcber Bronstein v Peru, (Competence), Judgment of (Sept 24, 1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) no 54, available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54_ing.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Ivcber Bronstein Case").

\textsuperscript{149} Constitutional Court v Peru, (Competence), Judgment of (Sept 24, 1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) no 55, available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_55_ing.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Constitutional Court Case").

\textsuperscript{150} Constitutional Court Case, ¶ 22; Ivcber Bronstein Case, ¶ 19.

\textsuperscript{151} Constitutional Court Case, ¶ 23.

\textsuperscript{152} Ivcber Bronstein Case, ¶ 23.

\textsuperscript{153} Constitutional Court Case, ¶ 31. The Court ruled on the two cases separately but delivered virtually identical holdings. From this point, this article will refer and cite specifically to the holding of the Constitutional Court Case, with the understanding that the language and conclusions are nearly identical to those in the Ivcber Bronstein Case, that opinion containing only minor and insignificant grammatical differences.

\textsuperscript{154} Id, ¶ 31.

\textsuperscript{155} Id, ¶ 33.
except those expressly provided for" in the Convention.\textsuperscript{156} Using the Vienna Convention as a guide,\textsuperscript{157} and noting the absence in the American Convention of any provision for withdrawing recognition of the Court's jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{158} the Court concluded that a state party to the American Convention "can only release itself of its obligations under the Convention by following the provisions that the treaty itself stipulates."\textsuperscript{159} In these cases, "the only avenue the State has to disengage itself from the Court's binding contentious jurisdiction is to denounce the Convention as a whole," in accordance with the Convention provisions, which additionally require one year's notice.\textsuperscript{160}

The Court then moved to a broader discussion of human rights treaties, noting first that to allow a state party to defy the Convention itself would effectively be to allow that state to suppress or restrict the human rights that the Convention exists to protect.\textsuperscript{161} The Court stated that human rights treaties "are inspired by a set of higher common values (centered around the protection of the human person)... and have a special character that sets them apart from other treaties."\textsuperscript{162} Citing its own case law and that of several cases from the ICJ and the ECtHR in support of the rigorous enforcement of human rights treaties,\textsuperscript{163} the Court contended that a state that accepts the Court's jurisdiction under the Convention "binds itself to the whole of the Convention and is fully committed to guaranteeing the international protection of human rights that the Convention embodies."\textsuperscript{164} Ultimately, given the rigorous construction of the Convention and the elevated nature of human rights treaties, "States cannot expect to have the same amount of discretion" in human rights cases as they may have in "international disputes involving purely interstate litigation."\textsuperscript{165}

The Court concluded with the finding that

The American Convention is very clear that denunciation is of "this Convention" (Article 78) as a whole, and not denunciation of or "release" from parts or clauses thereof, since that would undermine the integrity of the whole. Applying the criteria of the Vienna Convention (Article 56(1)), it does not appear to have been the Parties' intention to allow this type of denunciation or

\textsuperscript{156} Id, ¶ 35.
\textsuperscript{157} Id, ¶ 37.
\textsuperscript{158} Id, ¶ 38.
\textsuperscript{159} Id, ¶ 39.
\textsuperscript{160} Id.
\textsuperscript{161} Id, ¶ 40.
\textsuperscript{162} Id, ¶ 41.
\textsuperscript{163} Id, ¶¶ 42–44.
\textsuperscript{164} Id, ¶ 45.
\textsuperscript{165} Id, ¶ 47.
release; nor can denunciation or release be inferred from the character of the American Convention as a human rights treaty.\textsuperscript{166}

In closing, the Court also cited \textit{Nicaragua v United States} in reiterating the broader principle that "in order for an optional clause to be unilaterally terminated, the pertinent rules of the law of treaties must be applied. Those rules clearly preclude any possibility of a termination or 'release' with 'immediate effect'."\textsuperscript{167}

The IACtHR expanded its jurisprudence on human rights treaties a few years later in the case of \textit{Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago}.\textsuperscript{168} In \textit{Caesar}, the Court affirmed the principle that "the denunciation clause under the American Convention [...] was surrounded by temporal limitations so as not to allow it to undermine the protection of human rights thereunder."\textsuperscript{169} Trinidad and Tobago is one of several Caribbean nations that continues to employ "corporal punishment" as part of its penal system; for example, some crimes are still punished by flogging with a "cat-o-nine tails."\textsuperscript{170} A number of these nations have denounced and withdrawn from the American Convention over controversy and conflict with the Convention arising from such practices. Due to such controversy and in anticipation of the filing of formal cases, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention in May of 1998\textsuperscript{171} pursuant to Article 78 of the Convention, which requires one year of notice and (similar to the Rome Statute) stipulates that "such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned from the obligations contained in this Convention with respect to any act that may constitute a violation of those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior to the effective date of denunciation."\textsuperscript{172} One day before the denunciation took effect in May of 1999, the Inter-American Commission filed a case against Trinidad and Tobago at the Court, followed by a succession of additional cases, all based on acts and incidents occurring prior to Trinidad's denunciation.\textsuperscript{173} Trinidad and Tobago declined to participate in any of the subsequent proceedings before the Court. The \textit{Caesar} ruling is the conclusion of only one of these cases, but the Court members elaborated at length on the issue of denunciation in this case especially.

\textsuperscript{166} Id, ¶ 50.
\textsuperscript{167} Id, ¶ 52.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago}, (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of (Mar 11, 2005), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) no 123 (2005), available online at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_123_ing.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Caesar").
\textsuperscript{169} Id, ¶ 55 (separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade).
\textsuperscript{170} Id, ¶ 3.
\textsuperscript{171} Id, ¶ 54 (separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade).
\textsuperscript{172} American Convention on Human Rights, art 78(2).
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Caesar}, ¶ 53 (separate opinion of Judge AA Cançado Trindade).
The Court addressed the effects of denunciation in its initial establishment of jurisdiction over the case. Noting that Article 78 of the Convention prevents a state from evading its obligations prior to denunciation, the Court turned to the Vienna Convention to assess the general treaty principles:

In interpreting the American Convention in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, bearing in mind the object and purpose of the American Convention, this Tribunal, in the exercise of the authority conferred on it by Article 62(3) of the American Convention, must act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the provisions of Article 62(1) of the Convention. It would be unacceptable to subordinate these provisions to restrictions that would render inoperative the Court's jurisdictional role, and consequently, the human rights protection system established in the Convention.

The Court thus not only affirmed the importance of the Vienna Convention in interpreting such treaties, but also spoke profoundly to the implications of a state's attempt to withdraw from its obligations under a human rights treaty.

The concurring judges took the opportunity in Caesar to expound further on the principles of human rights treaties. In a short concurrence, Judge Oliver Jackman invoked the principle of pacta sunt servanda, noting that "the principle that states should abide in good faith by the terms of treaties into which they voluntarily enter is the bedrock of international comity and international law." He also pointed out the enshrinement of this principle in the Vienna Convention. Judge Jackman then expanded this concept with regard to human rights treaties (echoing the Court in the Ivcher Bronstein and Constitutional Court Cases), stating "it ought to be obvious that good faith compliance is of even greater importance in the area of international human rights law, where what is at stake is not the impersonal interests of states but the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual." He proclaimed that Trinidad's "contumelious" refusal to abide by the obligations of a treaty which, by definition, extended a state's obligations beyond withdrawal "represents a gratuitous attack on the Rule of Law."

Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade (the presiding judge in the Ivcher Bronstein and Constitutional Court Cases), in his own concurrence, addressed at great length the special nature of human rights treaties and the consequent mandate that denunciations or limitations under such treaties cannot be used to detract from

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174 Id., ¶ 6.
175 Id., ¶ 9.
176 Id., ¶ 1 (Jackman concurring).
177 Id., ¶ 2.
178 Id.
179 Id.
the protection of human rights. He cites the Vienna Convention as establishing that "in practice...in the international law of human rights, somewhat distinctly, there has been a clear and special emphasis on the element of the object and purpose of the treaty, so as to ensure an effective protection...of the guaranteed rights." He later reaffirms that the Vienna Convention "open[s] the way to the taking into account of the nature or specificity of certain treaties." He also cites to the "converging case-law" of the IACtHR and the ECtHR, in consideration of the Vienna Convention, as furthering the establishment of a special nature for human rights treaties that, in turn, requires special protections. In light of the Vienna Convention and the case law of the human rights courts, Judge Trindade concludes that "permissible restrictions (limitations and derogations)" in human rights treaties must be "restrictively interpreted" and that "certain limits have been established with regard to the denunciation of such treaties." Specifically with respect to the American Convention, he highlights again that the denunciation clause in Article 78 is "surrounded by temporal limitations" that underscore the lasting protection of human rights and the requisite prohibition on a state's unilaterally undermining those rights. He summarized:

Thus, not even the institution of denunciation of treaties is so absolute in effects as one might prima facie tend to assume. Despite its openness to manifestations of State voluntarism, denunciation has, notwithstanding, been permeated with basic considerations of humanity as well, insofar as treaties of a humanitarian character are concerned. Ultimately, one is here faced with the fundamental, overriding and inescapable principle of good faith (bona fides), and one ought to act accordingly.

(3) The European Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR has no such dramatic examples of states seeking to unilaterally evade their treaty obligations through withdrawal as do the ICJ, the IACtHR, and the UN Human Rights Committee. (See Section III.C.2.b.iv below.) Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR contributes to the discussion of withdrawal and human rights treaties in two important respects: First, the Court has put forth several decisions promoting the "heightened" nature of human rights treaties over other treaties, suggesting that withdrawal from human rights commitments should be

180 Id, ¶ 4 (separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade).
181 Id, ¶ 47.
182 Id, ¶¶ 7, 63.
183 Id, ¶ 7.
184 Id, ¶ 47.
185 Id, ¶ 56.
more difficult than from ordinary treaty obligations. Second, the Court has consistently, if mundanely, asserted its jurisdictional control over any actual attempt by an applicant to the Court to “withdraw” an application.

Like the IACtHR, the ECtHR has elevated the protection to which human rights treaties in particular are entitled. In the IACtHR’s Caesar opinion which is discussed above, Judge Trindade cited at least thirteen European cases in support of the proposition that the “special character” of human rights treaties demands that such treaties allow no room for limitations or reservations and that they be restrictively interpreted.186

Additionally, the ECtHR has consistently and firmly exerted its jurisdictional control over any invocation of the “strike out” provision of Article 37 of the European Convention.187 Where an applicant individual or state party seeks to withdraw an application, the Court has addressed, as a preliminary matter, whether it should accede to the request under the particular circumstances.188 In Tyrer v United Kingdom, the Court supported the European Commission’s previous rejection of the attempted withdrawal; pointedly, the respondent Government conceded the Commission’s prerogative to do so and acknowledged the Court’s discretion in the matter.189 Similarly, the Court rejected the respondent Government’s request to strike out the application in Subocheva v Russia, the Government having based its request on a dubious application withdrawal by the applicant.190 In both cases, the Commission and the Court declined to relinquish jurisdiction over a case where questions of “respect for human rights as defined in the Convention” remained unanswered or unsettled.

On the other hand, in Akman v Turkey, the ECtHR acceded to the Turkish government’s request to strike out the pending application.191 Considering the Turkish government’s admission of liability and wrongdoing, implementation of forward-looking preventative measures, and offer of compensation to the applicant, the Court declared itself “satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application,” pursuant to Article 37(1)(c) of the

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186 See generally id.
189 Tyrer v United Kingdom, ¶¶ 24–25.
190 Subocheva v Russia, ¶¶ 16–20.
191 Akman v Turkey, ¶¶ 23–32.
Convention. Although the Court acceded based on criteria other than a "withdrawal," the Akman v Turkey decision suggests that the Court will embrace a flexible approach where the state party has made a real effort to rectify the human rights violation at hand. Such an amicable solution demonstrates the possibility of cooperation that exists in the Rome Statute’s complementarity scheme. Overall, the Court has shown both a reluctance to release jurisdiction where human rights violations are unresolved and a willingness to work cooperatively within the confines of a binding human rights treaty.

(4) The Human Rights Committee. The Human Rights Committee established by the ICCPR has provided an important and relevant piece of legal analysis regarding withdrawal of a party from a human rights treaty. In October of 1997, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the ICCPR, in response to the resolution of a UN sub-commission criticizing its human rights practices. In response, the Human Rights Committee adopted "General Comment No 26" shortly thereafter during its general session deliberations. Without specifically mentioning North Korea, the General Comment outlined the case against unilateral withdrawal from the ICCPR under customary international law.

The Committee first noted that in the absence of express provision in a treaty for withdrawal or denunciation, the possibility of such must be evaluated according to the Vienna Convention, which establishes that the treaty is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal "unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or a right to do so is implied from the nature of the treaty." The Committee then stated that the existence of clear reference within the same treaty to withdrawal in other respects (referring to Article 41(2) of the ICCPR, allowing for withdrawal of a declaration of recognition of the competence of the Committee) indicates the awareness and deliberate rejection of the possibility by the parties drafting the treaty. More broadly speaking, the Committee found that a treaty that codifies and protects "universal human rights ... does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted,"

Id, ¶ 30–31.


Id, ¶ 1.

ICCPR, art 41(2).

General Comment 26, ¶ 2 (cited in note 194).
notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision to that effect." Furthermore, similar to arguments made at the IACtHR, the Committee reiterated its view, "as evidenced by its long-standing practice," that the human rights enshrined in the ICCPR "belong to the people living in the territory of the State party" and that the protection of those rights "continues to belong to them" and not to any state party or government. The Committee concluded that international law does not allow a state party to denounce or withdraw from the ICCPR.

The Committee's brief response to North Korea's attempt to pull out of the ICCPR appropriately wraps up the discussion of withdrawal and obligations under a human rights treaty. The Committee affirms the use of the Vienna Convention in analyzing human rights treaties, and it echoes the IACtHR in reiterating the particular bias against a state withdrawing from its obligations under a human rights treaty. These same principles apply to the ICC, given that provision for withdrawal simply cannot be found in the Rome Statute.

D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

The unilateral withdrawal of a state party referral from the ICC would appear to violate the Rome Statute according to the Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention naturally qualifies as one of the "applicable treaties" for interpretation of the Rome Statute, pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute. Gerhard Hafner, one of the drafters of the Rome Statute and a former member of the International Law Commission, has stated that "since the Statute constitutes a treaty concluded among States after the entry into force of the Vienna Convention, the latter is applicable to the Statute in relation to States parties which are also Parties to the Vienna Convention whereas the other States Parties to the Statute have to resort to customary international law which nevertheless has conformed to the regime of the Vienna Convention." Additionally, given the frequent use of the Vienna Convention by the other human rights bodies for addressing issues of withdrawal and jurisdiction, the Vienna Convention provides an appropriate means for analyzing this issue and complements the preceding case law.

198 Id., ¶ 3.
199 Id., ¶ 4.
200 Id., ¶ 5.
201 Vienna Convention, art 56.
202 ICC Statute, art 21(1)(b).
First and foremost, a withdrawal would contradict the Vienna Convention’s provision requiring that a treaty be interpreted with “the ordinary meaning” of its terms and “in the light of its object and purpose.” The ordinary meaning of the terms of the Rome Statute appears to reject the possibility of withdrawal of a referral. A withdrawal would only interfere with the functioning of the Court, in contradiction with the object and purpose of the Statute, which is the prosecution of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community” through cooperation between national jurisdictions and the Court. The preceding case law of the other human rights bodies has elevated the meaning of this provision with respect to human rights treaties. Applying the IACtHR’s ruling in Caesar, such a withdrawal “would render inoperative the Court’s jurisdictional role, and consequently, the human rights protection system established” in the Rome Statute. Even if a state sought to withdraw a referral for the sake of exercising its own criminal jurisdiction, the Statute provides a multitude of cooperative procedural options that negate the need for unilateral action.

The Vienna Convention also calls for the performance of treaty obligations in good faith; a unilateral withdrawal directly violates this provision, as a withdrawal is a means of avoidance of the obligations imposed by the Rome Statute. As Judge Jackman noted in Caesar, and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee affirmed, “good faith compliance is of even greater importance in the area of international human rights law, where what is at stake is not the impersonal interests of states but the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual.”

This attempt to avoid certain obligations under the Statute also implicates Article 44 of the Vienna Convention, which concerns “separability of treaty provisions.” Whether withdrawal of a referral is seen as a state party’s violation of the basic referral procedure, the admissibility or jurisdictional procedural requirements, or the other obligations to cooperate with the Court, in any sense withdrawal would be a state party’s attempt to selectively apply the rules of the Rome Statute. According to Article 44 of the Vienna Convention, however, if a treaty provides a party the right to “denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty” (as the Rome Statute does in Articles 121 and 127), a party may take such action only vis-à-vis the whole treaty and not

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204 Vienna Convention, art 31(1).
205 ICC Statute, preamble.
206 Caesar, ¶ 9.
207 Vienna Convention, art 26.
208 Caesar at 2 (Jackman concurring). See also General Comment 26, ¶ 4 (cited in note 194).
209 Vienna Convention, art 44.
with respect "solely to particular clauses." Withdrawal does not meet the exceptions to Article 44: state party referral and cooperation are integral to the treaty as a whole, and as such they are essential bases for other states parties consenting to participate in the Court. Continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would be manifestly unjust and effectively impossible, at least with respect to that state party. There is no justification under this article for a state party to the Rome Statute to suspend part of its obligations by withdrawing its referral.

Finally, the Vienna Convention allows for recourse to "the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" as a supplemental means of interpretation where the treaty leaves the meaning of any terms "ambiguous or obscure." The ordinary meaning of the Rome Statute is fairly clear for the purposes of this discussion, but an examination of the draft history, together with the finished Statute, overwhelmingly conveys that the drafters intended to preserve the strong jurisdiction of the Court once exercised and bind states parties to their obligations.

IV. CONCLUSION

The drafting history of the Rome Statute, like the Statute itself, does not address unilateral withdrawal of referrals, contains no discussion of withdrawal, and makes no allowance for withdrawal of a referral. Looking to comparable international practice, the IACtHR has recognized a unilateral withdrawal of a referral by the Inter-American Commission, within the very narrow temporal window between when a referral is made to the Court and when the Court actually exercises its jurisdiction over that case or referral. This limited possibility for withdrawal logically translates to the ICC, given the similar procedural regimes of the two courts. The Prosecutor of the ICC has no reason not to recognize this very limited form of withdrawal, considering the flexibility and versatility that the Prosecutor has shown with the Rome Statute to date. This recognition does not diminish the power or the nature of the Court and may reassure those states already wary of the powers and independence of the Court and its Prosecutor.

210 Id, arts 44(1), (3).
211 Id, art 44(3)(a).
212 Id, art 44(3)(b).
213 Id, art 44(3)(c).
214 Id, art 32(a).
Outside of this narrow exception, international practice, especially in the context of treaties designed to protect human rights, counsels against recognition of a State’s right to unilaterally withdraw a referral even in the absence of explicit provisions in a treaty prohibiting such a withdrawal. This practice translates directly to the circumstances of the ICC, which was set up to protect human rights and to punish the most egregious abusers of those rights, but which also fails to explicitly prohibit withdrawal of a referral once the Court has taken full jurisdiction.

Ultimately, the role of the ICC does not change in the face of an attempted withdrawal. The same issues of sovereignty, complementarity, and “peace versus justice” exist; the individual circumstances of a given situation must still be delicately considered; and the universal obligation to prosecute certain crimes remains. More importantly, an attempted withdrawal of a referral does not unavoidably truncate a case, foreclose all other options, or immediately require an abandonment of cooperation. Current and former members of the OTP have privately expressed that they would regard an attempted withdrawal simply as a challenge to admissibility or an invocation of complementarity, which is a reasonable alternative interpretation of a given State’s desire to withdraw a referral.

While it is clear that withdrawal of a referral is not currently a viable option under the Rome Statute, there is at least one good reason to favor establishing a limited withdrawal option. The Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and the Central African Republic (“CAR”) made nearly identical referrals to the ICC. Rather than submitting a detailed referral that “specif[ied] the relevant circumstances” and was accompanied by “supporting documentation,” both states referred to the Prosecutor “the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . committed anywhere in the territory [of the referring State] since . . . entry into force of the Rome Statute.” Both states have therefore relinquished broad, open-ended, unrestricted jurisdiction to the ICC, from now until eternity.

The DRC and CAR presumably do not want the ICC’s jurisdiction “triggered” forever; this would be an affront to notions of complementarity and sovereignty. Given that the Prosecutor has worked closely and successfully with states parties to create the self-referral phenomenon, he should similarly work

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216 ICC Statute, art 14(2). Arsanjani and Reisman would find these referrals even less admissible than an ordinary self-referral, no doubt.

with states to negotiate the termination or withdrawal of referrals, where appropriate. This is consistent with the Prosecutor’s cooperative, non-adversarial approach to policy at the ICC. Even states that make well-defined, limited self-referrals may eventually want to re-exert control and jurisdiction over the situation, at the conclusion of wars or conflicts, after succession of governments, etcetera. Similarly, the Rome Statute does not define how or when a non-state party’s Article 12(3) declaration terminates. Does the “rebuttable presumption” of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention apply, or is the non-state party bound to the same withdrawal procedure as states parties under Article 127 of the Rome Statute? The Ivory Coast made its declaration to the Court using very similar language as the DRC and CAR state party referrals. Presumably, the Ivory Coast also wants to reclaim jurisdiction eventually.

As the seventh anniversary of the Rome Statute’s entry into force approaches, the Prosecutor should work with the Assembly of States Parties and the UN to define these confusing concepts and to address them in amendments to the Court’s Statute or Rules. The issues surrounding withdrawal of referrals affect all states parties, the basic functioning of the ICC, and ultimately, therefore, the protection of human rights and the prosecution of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.