The Logical Nexus between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib

Evan J. Wallach

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/21

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
THE LOGICAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE DECISION TO DENY APPLICATION OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA AND THE MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN ABU GHRAIB*

Evan J. Wallach†

Our values are non-negotiable for members of our profession. They are what a professional military force represents to the world.1

* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: “Terrorism on Trial” at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, on Friday, October 8, 2004.


The author’s interest in the issues here discussed springs, in part, from his service as an Attorney/Advisor in the International Affairs Division of the Office of TJAG during the Persian Gulf War working on, inter alia, prisoner of war and war crimes issues. This article is respectfully dedicated to my mother, Sara Florence Rothaus Wallach. In answer to Cain’s question, Genesis 4:9, so many times she told us, “You are your brother’s keeper.” The author, as a Judge Advocate in the Nevada National Guard from 1989 through 1995, used those words in briefing the 72nd Military Police Company on the laws of war. About the 72nd Military Police Company, the Schlesinger Committee Report noted:

When Abu Ghraib opened, the first MP unit was the 72nd MP Company, based in Henderson, Nevada. Known as “the Nevada Company”, it has been described by many involved in investigations concerning Abu Ghraib as a very strong unit that kept tight rein on operational procedures at the facility. The company called into question the interrogation practices of the MI Brigade regarding nakedness of detainees. The 72nd MP Company voiced and then filed written objections to these practices.


To those citizen soldiers this article is also dedicated, with pride and respect. The author also wishes to thank Charles Gittings for his excellent web site, Project to Enforce the Geneva Convention (PEGC), devoted to enforcement of the Geneva Conventions. http://pegc.no-ip.info/. His extensive efforts made this research much easier. The views here expressed represent those only of the author and not of any person with whom, or entity with which, he is affiliated.

Those who do battle with monsters must take care that they do not thereby become a monster. Always remember that when you gaze into the abyss, the abyss gazes back into you.  

I. Introduction

Revelations of sexual indecencies committed by United States military personnel against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, and allegations of other misconduct, followed by repeated leaks of documents related to the decision making process regarding the status of captured enemy combatants, forced the release of at least some additional government documents ("the government memos") relating to the issue. Taken as a whole, these documents, other known facts, and applicable law demonstrate that: 1) the legal, and perhaps, the factual basis for the classification of many Afghan prisoners outside the Third Geneva Convention appears flawed; 2) the treatment of persons entitled to the rights of prisoners of war in ways forbidden by the Third Geneva Convention appears to be neither inadvertent nor incidental; and 3) the application of those coercive treatment methods to the Abu Ghraib prisoners appears to be related to the sexual misconduct by prison guards.

This article examines the international law aspects of the determination by the United States government that Guantanamo detainees – and indeed all members of the Taliban, including those held and questioned in Afghanistan without transportation to Guantanamo – are unprotected by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 ("GC3"). The government memos and other information released in, for example, press reports and Red Cross reports demonstrate that the government based its decision either on a finding that the Taliban was not the de facto government of Afghanistan and therefore its military forces were unprotected by GC3, or on a finding that the Taliban was the de facto government but its forces were unprotected for failure to meet certain purported requirements of Article 4(2) of GC3. The article discusses the requirements of Article 5 of GC3.

---


3 MG Antonio Taguba, U.S. Dep't of the Army, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Finding of Fact Regarding Part One of the Investigation, at para. 5, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2004/800-mp-bde.htm (last visited March 19, 2005) [hereinafter Taguba Report] (characterizing them as "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses...inflicted on several detainees"); see also id. at Conclusion, para. 1 (concluding that they constituted "grave breaches of international law").


5 See discussion infra. at VI.A.2.
which provides that should any doubt exist as to the status of a captured person, a presumption of POW status continues until a decision to the contrary has been made by a competent tribunal. This article examines government memos and other recent information and demonstrates that reasonable doubt does exist as to at least Taliban\textsuperscript{6} detainees' status, and that because they have not, to date, been screened by a competent tribunal, they continue to be entitled to treatment as POWs. The article also examines the interrogation methods used to question those detainees and concludes that: 1) as to protected persons, the methods constitute a breach – in some instances a grave one – of the Third Geneva Convention and 2) the determination that POW status did not apply appears to have been driven by a desire to use those interrogation methods to obtain information from battlefield detainees in a manner not permitted by GC3, and then to admit that information in trial proceedings using procedural and evidentiary rules forbidden by GC3.

Finally, the article analyzes the development of those interrogation methods, their migration to Iraq, and their application to prisoners at Abu Ghraib. It determines that the sexual misconduct by the Abu Ghraib prison guards, while not necessarily ordered or directed by higher authority, was an evolution reasonably foreseeable from the violations of GC3 already in place. Finally, the article concludes that many of the extraordinary interrogation methods, as applied, may constitute breaches of both domestic and international law, depending on the facts of each detainee's case.

\textbf{II. Background}

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade center and the Pentagon, the President of the United States immediately characterized those strikes as "an act of war."\textsuperscript{7} The United States took swift military action against the perpetrators; members of al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization. President Bush demanded that Afghanistan's ruling party, the Taliban, turn members of al Qaeda over to

\textsuperscript{6} Al Qaeda detainees present a different question. Their only potential claim to protected status rests on whether they were, in fact, acting as part of the Taliban when captured. The issue, depending on individualized facts such as the place, time and manner of capture, might or might not present an issue for resolution before a competent tribunal. This article does not examine other arguments which an al Qaeda detainee, who is not a prisoner of war, might assert regarding the legality of interrogation techniques. For examples of such arguments, see, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Torture Convention].

American custody. On September 18, 2001, in a joint resolution, Congress, without declaring war, authorized military action against the Taliban. By the end of September, the United Nations Security Council had also adopted two resolutions which (1) identified the attacks on the United States as a threat to international peace and security, and (2) mandated that states "[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts." On October 7 with the consent of countries surrounding Afghanistan, the United States began extensive air attacks on the Taliban military infrastructures and the al Qaeda terrorist organization. On October 17, the commander of CENTCOM issued an order instructing that the Geneva Conventions were to be applied to all captured individuals in accordance with their traditional interpretation. By December 21, 2001, the allied coalition held in custody in Afghanistan about seven thousand suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order providing for the trial before military tribunals of non-U.S. citizens who were members or culpable supporters of al Qaeda. Following a screening process, in January of 2002 a number of those prisoners identified by the United States as particularly interesting were transferred to a prison on the U.S. military


12 Opening Attacks, supra note 8.

13 See Hon. James R. Schlesinger, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations 80 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/report/2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (last visited March 20, 2005) [hereinafter Schlesinger Committee Report] ("Belligerents would be screened to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner of war status. If an individual was entitled to prisoner of war status, the protections of Geneva Convention III would apply. If armed forces personnel were in doubt as to a detained individual’s status, Geneva Convention III rights would be accorded to the detainee until a Geneva Convention III Article 5 tribunal made a definitive status determination.").


base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By mid 2004, approximately 640 such prisoners were held at that base.  

On April 27, 2004, CBS’s Sixty Minutes broadcast the first photographs showing prisoner abuse by American personnel at Abu Ghraib prison. In early May 2004, the New Yorker Magazine published an article by Seymour Hersh which revealed the existence of an internal Army report authored by Major General Antonio M. Taguba. According to Hersh:

Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to [BG Janice] Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the wrongdoing:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added—“detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their “extremely sensitive nature.”

---

20 Hersh, supra note 18.
Hersh published follow-up articles in two subsequent issues of the New Yorker. Following the first Hersh article a stream of leaked photographs and memoranda became a torrent. The materials eventually included provision to Congress of disks containing thousands of sexually explicit photographs depicting sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners, as well as memoranda drafted by personnel in the White House and by the Departments of Justice and State. The Bush administration, including the White House, specifically and repeatedly disavowed the use of sexual abuse as a means of interrogation, and claimed it had never authorized the use of torture to interrogate prisoners. The leaked memoranda, combined with other known facts, tell a more convoluted, complicated and nuanced tale.

What follows is a progression of legal rationales. These legal rationales seem to have originated with the decision to try certain captured prisoners before military tribunals, then they dealt with objections, based on the Third Geneva Convention, to those tribunals by a Presidential determination that captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban were uncovered illegal combatants, and then they determined that because those individuals were outside the Convention they could be interrogated through means prohibited by its terms. It appears that it was the application of these legal rationales, and the Geneva-prohibited interrogation techniques they approved, which eventually resulted in the abuses of Abu Ghraib.

---

21 See Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command*, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040517fa_fact2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Seymour M. Hersh, *The Gray Zone*, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). Citing the Taguba Report, Hersh wrote that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander of the detention and interrogation center at Guantanamo, “urged that the commanders in Baghdad change policy and place military intelligence in charge of the prison.” Id. Moreover, Hersh notes that the Taguba Report “quoted Miller as recommending that ‘detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.’” Id. Hersh said that Miller “also briefed military commanders in Iraq on the interrogation methods used in Cuba – methods that could, with special approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat, and placing prisoners in ‘stress positions’ for agonizing lengths of time. (The Bush Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and other captured members of international terrorist networks to be illegal combatants, and not eligible for the protection of the Geneva Conventions.).” Id.


23 See discussion, infra Section III.

III. The Bush Administration’s Path to Determination of POW Status

What follows is a chronological paper trail. For the ease of the reader, the two central analytical memoranda, the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002 and the Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002 are more fully discussed and analyzed at the end of this section. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued his military tribunal Order. That Order, and subsequent statements by the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and the White House Counsel

25 See Military Order, supra note 15. That Order provides, in part, that individuals subject to the order include current or past members of al Qaeda, individuals who “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore” which adversely affected wide United States interests, or who “has knowingly harbored one or more individuals” described above. Id.

26 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Tribunals Needed in Difficult Time, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001 at B5 (quoting President Bush as saying that the nation was fighting “against the most evil kinds of people, and I need to have that extraordinary option at my fingertips.”).

27 See Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6. Vice President Dick Cheney, responding to a question following a speech to the United States Chamber of Commerce on 14 November, 2001, “spoke favorably of World War II saboteurs being ‘executed in relatively rapid order’ under military tribunals set up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Id. A military tribunal, Cheney said, “guarantees that we’ll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve.” Id.

28 See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, White House Push on Security Steps Bypasses Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A1 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft as saying, “Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United States, in my judgment, are not entitled to and do not deserve the protections of the American Constitution, particularly when there could be very serious and important reasons related to not bringing them back to the United States for justice…. I think it’s important to understand that we are at war now.”).

29 See Steven Lee Myers & Neil A. Lewis, Assurances About Military Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B10 (“[Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld acknowledged that the rules for military tribunals would be decidedly differently [sic] from those for civilian trials. And Pentagon officials said today that they were devising regulations that were likely to include a more flexible standard for evidence than civilian trials would accept. They said the tribunals would probably allow a conviction of a suspected terrorist on a two-thirds vote of the officers on the panel.”); see also Military Order, supra note 16 (providing for “sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present…”).

made it clear that the tribunals were intended to follow procedural and evidentiary rules similar to those used to try spies and war criminals during and after the Second World War.\footnote{31} Those World War II era rules included a rule of evidence first articulated in the 1942 military commission trial of eight German saboteurs.\footnote{32} Louis Fisher, in his work \textit{Nazi Saboteurs On Trial} noted that the Quirin rule provides that "[s]uch evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the President of the Commission, have probative value to a reasonable man."\footnote{33} Section 4(c)(3) of the Bush Order provided for "admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission . . . have probative value to a reasonable person."\footnote{34} That rule, as applied in World War Two and in the post-war tribunals was repeatedly used to admit evidence of a quality or obtained in a manner which would make it inadmissible under the rules of evidence in both courts of the United States or courts martial conducted by the armed forces of the United States.\footnote{35}

Eventually, the rules under which tribunals are to be conducted were substantially modified retaining only the World War II evidence rule and a limited appellate process. To date, no memorandum has been released by the Bush administration detailing the reason for retaining those two rules. It is a not unreasonable conclusion that the rules were promulgated and retained with the specific intention of admitting evidence obtained through means which would require their exclusion under the Federal Rules of

Evidence and applicable constitutional authority which prohibits or limits the use of illegally obtained evidence.\textsuperscript{36} 

On January 18, 2002, President Bush made a presidential decision that captured members of Al Quaeda and the Taliban were unprotected by the Geneva POW Convention.\textsuperscript{37} That decision was preceded by a

\textsuperscript{36} See Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama, supra note 35; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (noting that over 70 years ago, the Court’s predecessors eloquently stated:

“The maxim ‘Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare’ had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.”); Dep’t of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations 65-66 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Working Group Report, Apr. 4]; but see Dep’t of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Working Group Report, Mar. 6] (earlier draft of report which differs to a very large degree from the Apr. 4, 2004 report).

\textsuperscript{37} See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales Memo] (“On January 18, I advised you that the department of Justice had issued a formal legal opinion concluding that the Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPWIII) does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. I also advised that the DOJ’s opinion concludes that there are
Memorandum dated January 9, 2002, submitted to William J Haynes II, General Counsel to the Department of Defense, by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, which provides legal counsel to the White House and other executive branch agencies, and written by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty.  

A. The Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002

The Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum, along with the Bybee Memorandum, provided the analytical basis for all which followed regarding blanket rejection of the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention to captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Its validity is, accordingly, analyzed in some detail at the end of this discussion.

B. The Rumsfeld Order January 19, 2002

In a Memorandum dated January 19, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform combat commanders that "Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals . . . are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949." He ordered that commanders should "treat them humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions of 1949." That order thus gives commanders permission to depart, where they deem it appropriate and a military necessity, from the provisions of the Geneva

reasonable grounds for you to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict with the Taliban. I understand that you decided that GPW does not apply and accordingly that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war under the GPW.


41 Id.
Conventions. The Memorandum was promulgated as an order by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same date.42

C. The Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002

The Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002 from Jay Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, follows the same structural pattern, and sometimes the exact phrasing, as the Yoo/Delahuntty Memo, but with additional analysis of certain international law and law of war issues.43 Parts of it are also discussed below.

D. The Alberto Gonzales Memorandum of January 25, 2002

On January 25, 2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales sent a Memorandum ("the Gonzales Memo") to President Bush regarding a presidential decision on January 18, 2002 that captured members of the Taliban were not protected under the Geneva POW Convention ("GPW"),44 a convention to which the legal advisor to the Secretary of State had objected.45 He advised that "there are reasonable grounds for you to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict with the Taliban."46 Mr. Gonzales argued that grounds for the determination might include:

1) "a determination that Afghanistan was a failed state because the Taliban did not exercise full control over the territory and people,

---


43 See Bybee Memo, supra note 39.

44 The White House had issued an Order to that effect, dated February 7, 2002. See infra Part III.F.

45 Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President 1 (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999363 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). Secretary of State Powell argued vigorously that failure to apply the Geneva POW Convention to the Taliban as a group reversed long-standing U.S. policy and would adversely affect the nation’s standing in the international arena. Id. at 3-5. His projections of potential issues, including legal problems, proved to be substantially accurate.

46 Gonzales memo, supra note 37, at 1.
was not recognized by the international community, and was not capable of fulfilling its international obligations.\footnote{Id; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discussing definition of statehood).} and/or

2) "a determination that the Taliban and its forces were, in fact, not a government, but a militant, terrorist-like group."\footnote{Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 1.}

Mr. Gonzales then identified what he believed were the ramifications of Mr. Bush's determination.\footnote{Id. at 2-4.} On a positive note, he felt they preserved flexibility, stating that:

The nature of [the war against terrorism] places a high premium on ... factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors ... and the need to try terrorists for war crimes ... [T]his new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners ... \footnote{Id. at 2. In 1945, Provost Marshal General of the United States Army, Maj. Gen. Archer Lerch, offered some thoughts on the validity of the 1929 Geneva Convention that seem relevant to arguments about obsolescence:

The War Department has followed strictly the terms of this treaty in all the orders and directives that it has issued governing the treatment of prisoners of war. And I do not believe that any thoughtful person would have the War Department do otherwise.

The Geneva Convention, I might emphasize is law. Until that law is changed by competent authority, the War Department is bound to follow it.

That treaty, like other laws, can be changed but it cannot be changed by the War department's regarding it as a "scrap of paper." Such an attitude on the part of the War department would mean that our government is no more honest than others it severely condemned. It would mean that this government had sacrificed the place of honor and moral leadership that it has earned in the eyes of the world and had sunk to the level of Japan whose emissaries talked peace while its army went to war.

I do not intend to indicate that I think the Convention should be changed. I do not think that any of us are now emotionally fitted to tackle the job of re-evaluating one of the few international laws that has withstood, with a considerable measure of success, the hatred and lawlessness that war breeds.

He also believed the determination "eliminates any argument regarding the need for case-by-case determinations of POW status." The determination, Mr. Gonzales said, also reduced the threat of domestic prosecution under the War Crimes Act. His expressed concern was that certain GPW language such as "outrages upon personal dignity" and "inhuman treatment" are "undefined . . . and it is difficult to predict with confidence what actions might be deemed to constitute violations of the relevant provisions of GPW." Moreover, it would be "difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terrorism." He believed that a determination of inapplicability of the GPW would insulate against prosecution by future "prosecutors and independent counsels."

Mr. Gonzales then identified the counter arguments from the Secretary of State, which included:

- Past adherence by the United States to the GPW;
- Possible limitations on invocation by the U.S. of the GPW in Afghanistan;
- Likely widespread condemnation by allied nations;
- Encouragement of potential enemies to find "loopholes" to not apply the GPW;
- Discouraging turnover of terrorists by other nations;
- Undermining U.S. military culture "which emphasizes maintaining the highest standards of conduct in combat . . . ."

In response to these arguments, Mr. Gonzales says, inter alia, that "even if the GPW is not applicable, we can still bring war crimes charges against anyone who mistreats U.S. personnel." He adds that "the

---

51 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 2.
53 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 2.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Powell Memo, supra note 45.
57 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 3 (identifying and responding to counterarguments raised by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his memo of Jan. 26, 2002); see also Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (commenting on the Gonzales Memo and stating: "The President should know that a decision that the Conventions do apply is consistent with the plain language of the Conventions and the unvaried practice of the United States in introducing its forces into conflict over fifty years.").
58 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 3.
argument based on military culture fails to recognize that our military remain bound to apply the principles of GPW because that is what you have directed them to do." In light of subsequent events, that last sentence is of particular interest.

E. The Ashcroft Letter of February 1, 2002

On February 1, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent President Bush a letter which strongly indicates the administration’s consideration of conduct which might violate the Third Geneva Convention. Mr. Ashcroft articulated two possible theories to support the conclusion that the protection of POWs under the Geneva Convention did not apply. The first was the failed-state theory, holding that Afghanistan was not a party to the treaty; the second an argument that although the Convention applied, the Taliban were not entitled to POW status because they acted as unlawful combatants. In arguing for the first option, made through a Presidential determination that Afghanistan was a failed state, Mr. Ashcroft stated:

Thus, a Presidential determination against treaty applicability would provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges that American military officers, intelligence officials, or law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees. The War Crimes Act of 1996 makes violation of parts of the Geneva Convention a crime in the United States.

Attorney General Ashcroft’s letter seems to make it clear that by the end of January, at least, consideration was being given to conduct which might violate GC3’s strictures regarding the detention and interrogation of prisoners of war.

---

59 Gonzales Memo, supra note 37, at 4 (emphasis added).
61 Id.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
F. The Presidential Order of February 7, 2002

On February 7, 2002, President Bush signed an Order accepting the reasoning of the Yoo/Delahunty, Bybee, and Gonzales memos and of the Attorney General’s letter validating the order issued by Secretary Rumsfeld on January, 19, 2002. That Presidential Order was the

---

63 Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Dick Cheney, et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/images/06/22/bush.memo.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Presidential Order]. The Schlesinger Report notes that before Mr. Bush signed the February 7th Order, the Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “many of the military service attorneys” had agreed with the Department of State’s position that “the Geneva Conventions in their traditional application provided a sufficiently robust legal construct under which the Global War on Terror could effectively be waged.” Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13. at 7. Further, “[a]t the February 4, 2002 National Security Council meeting called to decide this issue, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that all detainees would get the treatment they would be entitled to under the Geneva Conventions.” Id. at 34.

64 Presidential Order, supra note 63, at 1-2. The Presidential Memorandum was directed to Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, CIA Director George Tenet, Presidential Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Joint Chiefs Chair Richard Myers. It referred to “[o]ur recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees,” and noted the discussions confirmed that application of the Third Geneva Convention to the detainees “involves complex legal questions.” Id. at 1.


White House lawyers thought long and hard about the situation before making recommendations to Bush, Rumsfeld said. The lawyers were worried about the precedent their decision could set about detainees in future conflicts, he added.

“Prudence dictated that the U.S. government take care in determining the status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees,” he said. “When the Geneva Convention was signed in 1949, it was crafted by sovereign states to deal with conflicts between sovereign states.” The current war on terrorism is not a conflict envisioned by the framers of the Geneva Convention, he said.

Rumsfeld stressed that from the beginning, U.S. forces have treated all Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees humanely. He issued an order in January mandating all detainees be treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention.

“Notwithstanding the isolated pockets of international hyperventilation, we do not treat detainees in any other manner than a manner that is humane,” Rumsfeld said. Id.

66 The Presidential Order of Feb. 7, 2002 was somewhat nuanced. In reliance on the Bybee Memo of Jan. 22nd and the Ashcroft Letter of Feb. 1st, the Presidential Order
articulated basis for all following actions which simply took as a given that
the Third Geneva Convention was inapplicable to any Guantanamo
detainee.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{67} As the process was explained by Lawrence Di Rita, a Department of Defense Spokesperson:

\begin{quote}
[We]ve been quite clear that the president had determined that the conflict with al Qaeda was not subject to the Geneva Conventions and that the conflict with the Taliban, while it was subject to the Geneva Conventions, people picked up as Taliban would be considered unlawful enemy combatants because weve had a character of how they fought. \ldots So this was the character of the people who were in Guantanamo, not prisoners of war, but unlawful enemy combatants and known al Qaeda terrorists. \ldots [A]nd it was on that basis that what ultimately
\end{quote}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
G. Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002

On March 21, 2002, the Secretary of Defense issued Military Commission Order No. 1 ("Commission Order 1") which prescribed procedures under the President's Military Order. While Commission Order 1 finessed the Presidential Order's two/third's sentencing requirement, it retained the World War II evidentiary rule and failed to provide a system of independent appeals.

From the sequence of events, and discussion by White House Counsel, it appears fairly clear that the decision by Mr. Bush, and the subsequent orders from Mssrs Bush and Rumsfeld, were based on the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002 and the Bybee Memorandum of January 22, 2002. A close analysis of those documents is accordingly appropriate.

IV. Analysis of the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum of January 9, 2002

This Memorandum is written in four parts. The first part examines 18 U.S.C. Section 2441, the War Crimes Act, and some of the treaties it implicates. The second part examines whether members al Qaeda can claim protection of the Geneva Conventions and concludes they cannot. The third part examines application of those treaties to members of the Taliban. It concludes non-applicability because it says: 1) "the Taliban was not a government and Afghanistan was not . . . a functioning State", 2) "the President has the constitutional authority to suspend our treaties with Afghanistan pending restoration of a legitimate government", and 3) "it..." News Transcript, Lawrence Di Rita, United States Department of Defense, DoD Background Briefing (May 20, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040520-0788.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Background Briefing].

The assumption persists unquestioned. Thus, for example, the Schlesinger Committee Report, in discussing the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions, simply accepts that "As a result of a Presidential determination, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and Taliban combatants." Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 79.


69 It provides that "An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members is required to determine a sentence, except that a sentence of death requires a unanimous, affirmative vote of all the members." Id. at § 6(F).

70 Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38, at 1.

71 Id. at 1-2.

72 Id. at 2.
appears . . . that the Taliban militia may have been . . . intertwined with Al Qaeda” and thus on the same legal footing. Finally, the fourth part concludes that customary international law does not bind the President or restrict the actions of the United States military, under a constitutional analysis.

The Memorandum is questionable on many grounds. Its central operative flaw, however, from the viewpoint of international law, is that as long as there is a genuine issue of fact or law regarding the status of captured individual combatants who are members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 must apply, until properly otherwise determined. Article 5 of GC3 provides, in part, that “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”

The key to whether any genuine issue of fact or law exists resides in the Yoo/Delahunty Memo itself, which is the authoritative basis for all the actions which follow. Leaving aside the Yoo/Delahunty Memo’s American constitutional arguments which present no bar to a delict in international

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 The author suggests the fact or law standard of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it is one with which American courts and lawyers have considerable experience. The any “doubt language” might constitute an even higher barrier to a non-determination of POW status, but the author is satisfied that existing facts and statements of opposition by officials of the United States Government are sufficient to meet test of Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986).
76 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
77 The Yoo/Delahunty and Bybee Memos argue at length that the President, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, must, ipso facto, be endowed with all powers necessary to defend the nation in war time. Thus, they conclude, any action by Congress which derogates from that power would be inherently unconstitutional. As an example they cite the War Powers Act. The Memos raise an interesting question of domestic law. Might a military defendant in an action for breach of the War Crimes Act, raise as a defense, the superior orders of the President requiring a breach of a congressional mandate? The argument raises fundamental separation of powers issues which cut to the core of how American government functions. See Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38; Bybee Memo, supra note 39. In its stated form, the argument appears unanswered, but existing authority would seem to cut against it. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (“The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon themselves to ‘make’ a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a
law, its argument for non-applicability of Geneva III rests on the claim that as a matter of fact and law the Taliban did not constitute a *de facto* government. The short answer is that while the position is certainly arguable, it is also reasonably arguable that the Taliban were the *de facto* government. They controlled a substantial geographic territory and population, enacted and enforced laws and mandates, carried on relatively complex military operations, appointed persons to governmental posts and received diplomatic recognition from several nations. The core validity of that point is admitted, albeit inadvertently, in the following quote from the Memorandum from Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales and William Haynes on January 22, 2002:

> Whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the detention and trial of members of the Taliban presents a more difficult legal question. Afghanistan has been a party to all four Geneva Conventions since September, 1956. Some might argue that this requires application of the Geneva Conventions to the present conflict with respect to the Taliban militia . . . Nonetheless, we conclude that the President has more than ample grounds to find that our treaty obligations under Geneva III toward Afghanistan were suspended during the period of the conflict.

> . . . [T]he weight of informed opinion indicates that, for the period in question, Afghanistan was a “failed state” whose territory had been held by a violent militia or faction rather than by a government. . . Second, there appears to be developing evidence that the Taliban leadership had become closely intertwined with, if not utterly dependent upon, al Qaeda.

---

78 See, e.g., U.S. Military Commision, *Trial of General Anton Dostler, Commander of the 75th German Army Corps*, in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 22 (1947) [hereinafter The Dostler Case]. Those arguments present a startling analogy to the arguments raised by defendants at the post World War II Nuremburg trials and elsewhere that, because they were required by national law to obey superior orders, they had an absolute defense against war crimes committed in carrying out those orders. That so called “superior orders” defense was, and has been since, roundly rejected, although that rejection represented a change from prior law. See id. at 27-33. The point is, of course, that whatever their validity under U.S. national law, they present no defense to an otherwise valid charge of a war crime under international law.

79 Note also that in his Memorandum to the President, Mr. Gonzales states that there are “reasonable grounds ... to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict with the Taliban.” Gonzales Memo, *supra* note 37. The existence of reasonable grounds is simply not the standard for a determination the Third Geneva Convention does not apply. Rather, as noted, the standard is the existence of any doubt.
This *would have rendered* the Taliban more akin to a terrorist organization... 80

Later in the Memorandum, Jay Bybee continues:

We want to make clear that this Office does not have access to all of the facts related to the activities of the Taliban militia and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the available facts in the public record would support the conclusion that Afghanistan was a failed State... Indeed, *there are good reasons to doubt* whether any of the conditions were met. 81

What is of particular interest in this analysis is the emphasized language. It is that of argument, not fact, and what it seems to effectively admit is that there is indeed some doubt as to the status of the Taliban detainees. 82 That, of course, triggers the requirements of Geneva Convention Article 5 for a competent tribunal to determine status, and

81 *Id.* at 16 (emphasis added).
82 The doubtful nature of the argument is emphasized by the enemy combatant trilogy of cases issued by the Supreme Court on June 28, 2004. The Court decided various issues affecting the legal status of persons regarded by the administration as enemy combatants unprotected by the Third Geneva Convention. See *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004); *Rasul v. Bush*, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004). *Hamdi* is of particular importance here. In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor twice refers to "the Taliban regime" and the "Taliban government." *Hamdi*, 124 S.Ct., at 2635 (emphasis added). That reference does not appear inadvertent. Justice O'Connor goes on to say that "it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention", citing AR 190-8 § 1-6. *Id.* at 2651. Moreover, Justice Souter in his concurrence notes that:

For now it is enough to recognize that the Government's stated legal position in its campaign against the Taliban... is apparently at odds with its claim here to be acting in accordance with customary law of war... In a statement of its legal position cited in its brief the Government says that "the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees." *Id.* at 2657-58 (citation omitted).

83 In *Swift v. Rumsfeld*, for example, the government stated that "United States and coalition forces have removed the Taliban from Power." Brief for Respondent at 5, *Swift v. Rumsfeld*, No. CO4-0777 RSL (W.D. Wash. 2004) (emphasis added). The government went on to state that "[i]n the context of... the removal of the Taliban from power... the United States... has seized and detained numerous persons fighting for and associated with the enemy during the course of the ongoing military campaign." *Id.* (emphasis added),
mandates treatment of a prisoner as a POW until the tribunal is held. Judge Bybee later discusses Article 5:

"Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act, and having fallen into the hands of the enemy," Article 5 of Geneva III requires that these individuals "enjoy the protections" of the Convention until a tribunal has determined their status. As we understand it, as a matter of practice prisoners are presumed to have Article 4 POW status until a tribunal determines otherwise.

Although these provisions seem to contemplate a case-by-case determination of an individual detainee's status, the President could determine categorically that all Taliban prisoners fall outside article 4. Under Article II of the Constitution, the President possesses the power to interpret treaties on behalf of the Nation. He could interpret Geneva III, in light of the known facts concerning the operation of Taliban forces during the Afghanistan conflict to find that all of the Taliban forces do not fall within the legal definition of prisoners of war as defined by Article 4. A presidential determination of this nature would eliminate any

---

84 As usual, Hays Parks makes the point most cogently:

References to al Qaeda and the Taliban as separate entities constituted an incomplete and inaccurate picture. The enemy consisted of a loose amalgamation of at least three groups: the Taliban regime (until its December 2001 collapse, following which it reverted to its tribal origins), the al Qaeda terrorist group, used as the Praetorian Guard for the Taliban leadership (both for internal security prior to and following commencement of US/Coalition operations), and foreign Taliban. The picture was further complicated by the tendency of some to refer to the Taliban as the de facto government of Afghanistan, because it exercised rough control over 80 percent of Afghanistan. This was open to debate until the collapse of the Taliban, at which time it ceased to be an issue. Until the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001, a strong case could be made that this was an internal conflict between non-state actors in a failed state. By the time Army Civil Affairs entered Afghanistan, the case was absolute.

W. Hays Parks, supra note 66, at 505 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Interestingly, John Yoo and James Ho make the same point at a later date:

Unlike al Qaeda, the Taliban Militia arguably constituted the de facto government of Afghanistan. To be sure, there is a good case to be made that the Taliban militia was not even the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan had all the characteristics of a failed state. .... On the other hand, the Taliban militia did effectively control a majority of the territory and population of Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conventions.

Yoo & Ho, supra note 66, at 218 (emphasis added).

This statement by Yoo & Ho was followed by an argument that the Taliban failed to meet the four part test of GC3 Article 4(2).
This argument presents an interesting question of domestic law as to whether a Commander in Chief can order a violation of international law by making a factual finding unsupported by independent evidence. Could one charged under the War Crimes Act assert as a defense that as a matter of domestic law there was no grave breach, even though it was clearly a violation of international law? The answer to that proposition is beyond the scope of this discussion, although it appears questionable. What the argument does not do, however, for the same reasons discussed above, is

85 Bybee Memo, supra note 39, at 30-31. After an effective concession that Articles 4 and 5 "seem to contemplate" status determination on an individualized basis, Judge Bybee's conclusion that presidential treaty interpretation power allows a categorical factual determination seems to be a logical non sequitur. Interpretations of law, no matter how phrased, are simply not determinations of factual status. While, perhaps an argument could rationally be constructed to claim that the President could constitutionally determine the interpretation of a treaty, this rationale veers off that path to state instead that the President, having the power to interpret the meaning of a treaty, can then alter the reality of existing facts, even if the treaty means what it "seems to contemplate." Any such approach is incompatible with the core concepts of rule of law, coequal branches of government, and separation of powers. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). What the Memorandum does not discuss is what appears to the author of this article to be a fundamental question, namely, how could the Taliban have harbored members of al Qaeda without controlling a defined territory and population?

In a speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush noted that "The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country." President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). He demanded that, inter alia, the Taliban "deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land," and that it "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities . . . The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate." Id. International law defines a state generally as "an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2nd Cir. 1995). The Taliban did obtain formal recognition as the de jure government from three U.N. member states. Prior to September 11, 2001 the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan had formally recognized the Taliban as the government and entered into diplomatic relations with them. See UAE Withdraws Recognition of the Taliban, CNN.COM, Sept. 22, 2002, at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/21/gen.america.under.attack (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).

It would seem axiomatic that the other two requirements of statehood must have been met. That is, unless the Taliban controlled a defined territory and population, the United States could not have demanded that they deliver all the al Qaeda terrorists "who hide in your land." President Bush's reference to the Taliban's control of "most of that country" only strengthens that position. See also Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama, supra note 35.

86 See The Dostler Case, supra note 78.
present any defense to charges by any other Geneva III signatory charged to prosecute perpetrators of grave breaches wherever they may be found.

In any case, because doubt as to the POW status of Taliban detainees appears with considerable force to exist, the language of Article 5 provides them with POW status until determined otherwise by a proper tribunal. 87

V. The Legal Effects of Applicability of the Third Geneva Convention

Article 5’s requirement that prisoners shall enjoy protection as prisoners of war until properly determined to be outside the Convention, 88 creates a duel dilemma for the United States. Not only has it promulgated rules for military tribunals which constitute grave breaches of GC3, it has also treated detained individuals in a manner which clearly violates the Convention’s strictures. To the extent that persons entitled to the “any doubt” standard of Article 5 have not properly had their status determined before a competent tribunal, that protection continues in force. It appears beyond doubt that such a tribunal was not provided, and that the decision to deny it was intentional.

A. No Captured Persons Held at Guantanamo Have Been Provided With or Offered a Tribunal Which Satisfies Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention

None of the screening processes applied to the Guantanamo detainees, either pre-shipment from Afghanistan, during incarceration, or following the Supreme Court’s mandate in Hamdi, 89 meets the requisites of Article 5.

87 In an appearance with the author at the Federalist Society in New York on September 27, 2004, John Yoo said to the audience that, in fact, his arguments regarding non-state status had been rejected by the White House, and that determination of non-combatant status was based on the four part test of Article 4(2). That rationale does not appear from the Presidential Order. See Presidential Memo, supra note 63. However, if this rationale is correct, the concession that the Taliban were the army of a de facto state only makes the existence of a genuine doubt as to POW status more compelling. Not only is the four-part test inapplicable to state armed forces but its factors, as applied to irregular forces not part of the state’s army, may arguably require an individualized determination varying from unit to unit. Thus, for example, the wearing of a recognizable sign, the bearing openly of arms, and the obeying the laws of war may well vary from person to person and unit to unit.

88 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4.

89 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). In her plurality opinion Justice O’Connor pointed out that “the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as [enemy combatants].” Id. at 2639.
Those requirements are satisfied by the Army Regulation dealing with Prisoners of War, but its provisions have not been applied at Guantanamo.

1. No Article 5 Tribunal Has Been Convened or Held Regarding Any Captured Member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban

The Army Regulation governing treatment of POWs directly incorporates Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. Army Regulation 190-8 provides that:

a. In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the... Convention, until such time as their status is determined by a competent tribunal.

c. A competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of field grade... Another officer, [preferably a JAG officer] shall serve as the recorder.

AR 190-8 1-6(e) then establishes the procedures for a competent tribunal. It requires, inter alia, that tribunal members and the recorder be sworn, that a written record be made of the proceedings, that the proceedings be open except for deliberation and voting or other matters which would compromise security, that persons whose status is to be determined be advised of their rights, be allowed to attend all open hearings, be allowed to call reasonably available witnesses and to question witnesses called by the Tribunal, to testify or otherwise address the Tribunal, and that they may not be compelled to testify. Lastly,


91 The status of an al Qaeda detainee is, of course, problematical and fact driven. Often, it appears most closely analogous to pirates or common criminals. The problem arises if captured persons functioned, as alleged in the Yoo/Delahuntly Memo, as an intertwined part of al Qaeda. See Yoo-Delahuntly Memo, supra note 38. Given the amorphous nature of al Qaeda, on any given day the individual's status might be as a Taliban fighter, an irregular militia supporter, a Taliban agent, a terrorist, or a common criminal.

92 AR 190-8, supra note 90, at §1-6.

93 Id. at §1-6(e)
"Preponderance of evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this determination."\textsuperscript{94}

The Army's adoption of specific procedures to satisfy the competent tribunal requirement is not, of course, definitive. While it demonstrates the Army's conclusion that the procedures set out in AR 190-8 meet the procedural requirements for such a tribunal, there might be any number of other processes designed by GC3 signatories that result in a competent tribunal using differing national standards consistent with the underlying notions of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the Convention.\textsuperscript{95}

What adoption of those procedures does definitively establish, however, is 1) a set of self-binding administrative regulations which cannot be haphazardly abandoned under domestic law,\textsuperscript{96} and 2) more importantly in the international context, a concession that in order to meet the Convention's underlying requirement that national standards applicable to capturing powers' own soldiers be used in judging potential liability of enemies captured on the battlefield,\textsuperscript{97} standards at least consistent with national procedures, as well as the Third Geneva Convention must be applied.\textsuperscript{98} In any case, having established the national standard for

\textsuperscript{94}Id. at §1-6(e)(9). Of particular interest here, the Regulation requires that where a witness is not reasonably available, "written statements, preferably sworn, may be submitted and considered as evidence." Id. at §1-6(e)(6). Thus there appears to be a vital distinction between AR 190-8 screening and the tribunal procedure. While the screening panel is permitted to admit affidavit evidence (which would be, unless it met an exception, hearsay), and indeed unsworn affidavit evidence where necessary, it is not permitted to use evidence obtained in violation of the protections provided to POWs by the Third Geneva Convention. That right against forced self-incrimination is clearly articulated: "Persons whose status is to be determined may not be compelled to testify before the tribunal." Id. at §1-6(e)(8).

\textsuperscript{95}See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 99 ("No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.").

\textsuperscript{96}The United States Supreme Court has held that while an agency is free to change its policy based on either a change of circumstances or a changed view of the public interest, "an agency [that changes] its course must supply a reasoned analysis" for the change. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).

\textsuperscript{97}See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.

\textsuperscript{98}Thus, for example, the requirements of AR 190-8 1-6(e) that proceedings be open except for deliberation and voting "or other matters which would compromise security," comports with Article 105's provision that "representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case, unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the interest of State security." AR-190-8, supra note 90, at §1-6(e)(3)&(8); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 105. Moreover, Article 105's provision that "they may not be compelled to testify" seems mandated by Article 99, which states that "[n]o moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused," as well as U.S. national standards. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 105 & 99.
determining who is a POW, the United States may not abandon it at will. To do so would fly in the face of every concept of rule of law and regulation of armed conflict developed over the past two hundred years. It would also be a direct and criminal violation of the standards for minimal conflict in war time developed at Nuremburg. Unfortunately, however,


Principle I

Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

Principle II

The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

Principle III

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.

Principle IV

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

Principle V

Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.

Principle VI

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:

Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on
the screening processes developed for those persons confined at Guantanamo have not met AR 190-8 standards.

2. The Process Used For Screening Enemy Combatants Prior to Incarceration at Guantanamo Does Not Meet Article 5 Requirements

According to a Fact Sheet issued by the Department of Defense in February, 2004, the process for screening persons shipped to Guantanamo included an initial enemy combatant determination, assessment in the field, centralized assessments in the area of operations, a general officer review, DOD review, and a further assessment at

political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.

Principle VII

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under international law.

Id.

Failure to meet those standards is not, of course, in itself a crime. What it may create, however, is a situation in which a prisoner continues to be entitled to POW status and GC3 protections because he has not been determined to be otherwise by a competent tribunal. That status, and its protections, may then constitute an element of a criminal violation, where other facts, such as improper interrogation techniques, or a trial in violation of Article 102, are present. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.


"At the time of capture and based on available information, combatant and field commanders determine whether a captured individual was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and engaged in an armed conflict against the United States. Such persons are enemy combatants." Id.

"A military screening team at the central holding area reviews all available information, including interviews with detainees. With assistance from other U.S. government officials on the ground (including military lawyers, intelligence officers, and Federal law enforcement officials) and considering all relevant information (including the facts from capture and detention, threat posed by the individual, intelligence value, and law enforcement interest) the military screening team assesses whether the detainee should continue to be detained and whether transfer to Guantanamo is warranted." Id.

"When determining whether a detainee should be transferred, the combatant commander considers the threat posed by the detainee, his seniority within hostile forces, possible intelligence that may be gained from the detainee through questioning, and any other relevant factors." Id.
None of those reviews comports with, or even resembles, the requirements of AR 190-8. Although there is some procedural improvement, the Combatant Status Review Panels established in 2004 to screen all Guantánamo detainees have similar failings.

3. Combatant Status Review Panels Do Not Meet the Requirements of Article 5

On July 7, 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, following the issuance of the Supreme Court's enemy combatant trilogy, promulgated an Order establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. That procedure requires that a detainee be notified of the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant and be assigned a military officer to assist in the review process and with the ability to review "reasonably available" DOD information relating the detainee's classification. Each Tribunal is to be composed of three neutral

---

105 Id. “An internal DOD review panel, including legal advisors, reviews the recommendations of the combatant commander and advises the Secretary of Defense on proposed detainee movements to Guantánamo. All available information is considered, including information submitted by other governments or obtained from the detainees themselves.” Id.

106 Id. “Reviews are based on all relevant information, including information derived from the field, detainee interviews, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement sources, and foreign governments.” Id.

107 For example, “a military screening team at the central holding area reviews all available information, including interviews with detainees” and considers “all relevant information” to assesses “whether the detainee should continue to be detained and whether transfer to Guantánamo is warranted.” Guantánamo Detainees, supra note 101. This screening provides none of the procedural safeguards, such as a right against self-incrimination, found in AR 190-8 and GC3 Article 99. See AR 190-8, supra note 90, at §1-6(e)(8); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 99.


Petitioners' allegations — that although they have engaged in neither combat nor acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two years ... without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing — unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2698 n.15 (citations omitted).


110 Id. at 1-2.
commissioned officers including a judge advocate, with another officer as a non-voting Recorder. Section g of the Order establishes the tribunal’s procedures. Section (g)(9) is of particular interest:

The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law. Instead the Tribunal shall be free to consider any information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue before it. At the discretion of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the reliability of such evidence in the circumstances. The Tribunal does not have the authority to declassify or change the classification of any national security information it reviews.\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

Comparison of that procedure with AR 190-8, Section 1-6(e)(8) is enlightening.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 3.} The Army-created screening panel allows hearsay affidavits as a specific exception. It does not provide the wholesale \textit{Querin} exception to evidentiary procedure found in the Rules for Military Tribunals. That exception is apparently intended to vitiate the right against self-incrimination by allowing the admission of information obtained in a fashion which would make it excludable in a court of law.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 3. at §1-6(e)(8).}

\textit{Id.}

 otherwise,
the change in language from AR 190-8 to Section (g)(9) to make hearsay exemplary rather than exclusive makes no sense. Essentially then, what the DOD has done in promulgating this Order is to reiterate its ability to obtain information in a manner in violation of the Third Geneva Convention and to use that information in a manner adverse to the person from whom it was obtained. If that individual is someone who is, in fact, presumed to be a POW under GC3 Article 5, the implications are troubling.

B. Failure to Screen Under Article Five Leaves Captured Enemy Combatants In A Presumed POW Status Which Is Not Retroactively Vitiated By A Later Proper Screening

The language of the Prisoner of War Convention is very clear. Article 5 of GC3 provides, in part, that:

Carol Leonnig, Panel Ignored Evidence On Detainee, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at A1 (underlying source materials unavailable to author at time of final submission for publication).

The Post then noted that in a “recently declassified version” of a January decision by Judge Joyce Hens Green, she wrote that the panel’s decision appeared to be based on a single document labeled “R-19.” Id. She said she found that to be one of the most troubling military abuses of due process among the many Guantanamo cases that she has reviewed. The R-19 memo, she wrote, “fails to provide significant details to support its conclusory allegations, does not reveal the sources for its information and is contradicted by other evidence in the record.” Id. Green reviewed all the classified and unclassified evidence in the case. Id.

The incident reinforces the lesson learned in earlier conflicts. Procedural fairness matters. Discussing why the Central Intelligence Agency failed in to detect Soviet spies, James Jesus Angleton, the former head of CIA counter-intelligence, was quoted in a different but analogous context: The real problem, Angleton concluded, “was that there was no accountability. And without real accountability, everything turned to shit.” JOSEPH TRENTO, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA 478-79 (2005).

115 In any case, the Combatant Status Review Panels are in violation of Article 5 because they act in violation of the Article. That argument is not circular. In a recent filing in Al Ajmi v. U.S., the government provided a copy of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal related to Al Ajmi attached to the Declaration of James R. Crisfield Jr. Respondents’ Factual Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioner Abdullah Saleh Ali Al Ajmi at 1, Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah v. U.S. (D.C. 2004) (No. 02-CD-0828). The conclusion of the Tribunal is telling: “The detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant because he willingly affiliated himself with the Taliban.” Id. at para. 7(b) (Emphasis added). Thus, the screening authorities are still taking as binding authority the Presidential Order of February 7, 2002, and they are still failing to make an independent judgment about a detainee’s status. Having failed to do so, as long as doubt continues to exist about an individual status, the presumption of Article 5 persists, and violation of his rights under the Third Geneva Convention continue to violate the law.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.116

Accordingly, any such persons are protected by the Third Geneva Convention until a competent tribunal determines otherwise. The language of the Convention on determination of non-POW status is purely prospective, and it appears quite certain that such a determination, if it did occur, would not operate retroactively to validate actions by captors which were otherwise violations of the rights of protected persons.

Thus, in United States v. Uchiyama,117 a United States military commission tried the Commanding General of the Japanese Fifteenth Area Army, his Chief of Staff, his Judicial Officer, the three members of the Japanese commission, the prosecutor and the executioner who carried out death sentences imposed by that body and confirmed by the convening authority. Defense counsel attempted to argue that the executed American airmen had, in fact been guilty of war crimes for the firebombing deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians.118

The prosecution argued, and the court accepted the argument, that the substantive guilt or innocence of the executed Americans was irrelevant to the case at hand.119 Rather, it argued, a capturing power was bound to apply certain minimum trial standards, even to crimes not committed as a POW,120 and that the failure of the Japanese court martial to do so resulted

---

116 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
117 Case 35-46, United States v. Uchiyama, War Crimes Branch Files, Records of the Judge Advocate General, Record Group 153 (Tried at Yokohama, July 18, 1947) (National Archives, Suitland, MD) (on file with author) [hereinafter Uchiyama Case].
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Yamashita v Styre, 327 U.S. 1 (1945). At the time, under the 1929 Geneva Convention, the United States took the position that fair trial requirements applied only to crimes committed while the accused was a prisoner of war, and not to war crimes before capture. Accordingly, the defense moved for acquittal. Id. at 22-23. The prosecution argued, based on other similar trials of Japanese convening authorities, that while the specific procedural protections of the 1929 Geneva Convention did not apply, the customary protections of the laws of war did. Id. at 24-26. The Motion was denied. Id. at 26. The Yamashita position regarding applicability of Geneva procedural protections only to post capture crimes was specifically rejected and changed by the drafters of the 1949 Prisoner of War Convention. Article 85 of GC3 contains a provision, not found in the 1929 Convention analyzed in Yamashita, that: “Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 85. In discussions of
in substantive liability of the convening authority, the members of the court, and the prosecutor for the deaths of the American defendants caused by an unfair trial, even if the airmen had been guilty of illegally bombing civilians.\textsuperscript{121}

The analogy here to the \textit{Uchiyama} authority is straightforward. A capturing power may not treat a person protected by the laws of war or the Geneva Conventions in a manner which violates those laws or the Convention, and then be heard to say that it later learned he should have been unprotected.\textsuperscript{122}

---

\textsuperscript{121} The prosecution's opening statement before that U.S. commission is telling:

\begin{quote}
From a reading of the trial brief filed by the defense in this case prior to the arraignment, . . . it became apparent to the prosecution that by way of defense the accused would have the Commission conduct a posthumous trial of Lt. Nelson and Sergeant Augunas with the hope of having them adjudicated guilty of some offense ... Now the prosecution desires to emphasize and make abundantly clear this one fact: We are now charging the accused with having failed to have applied to these prisoners of war the type of procedure that they were entitled to. In other words they applied to them a special type of summary procedure which failed to afford them the minimum safeguards for the guarantee of their fundamental rights which were given them both by the written and customary laws of war. While we do not for a moment admit that Lt. Nelson or Sergeant Augunas were guilty of any offense, we none the less say that if they were guilty, under international law they were nevertheless entitled to the minimum standard of a fair, lawful and impartial trial. \textit{What they may have done cannot now be heard as a defense for failure of these accused to afford them a proper trial as defined under international law.}
\end{quote}

\textit{Uchiyama Case, supra} note \textsuperscript{117}, at 20-21 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{122} See also Case 33, Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, in \textit{6 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals} \textsuperscript{66} (U.N. War Crimes Commission eds., 1948), available at \texttt{http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/Hisakasu.htm} (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
C. The Effects of Denying Screening Are Not Merely Procedural

The protection provided to a captured person by the Article 5 presumption is not merely procedural. As long as the Convention protects an individual, grave breaches of its provisions constitute a breach of both U.S. and international law.

Article 130 of the Convention provides that grave breaches include any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^3\)

Similarly, the War Crimes Act provides, in part, that any national of the United States who commits a war crime, “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.”\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^4\) The term “war crime” as used in the statute means, inter alia, any conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva August 12, 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^5\)

Thus, the status of individuals tried before military tribunals is not one of mere academic curiosity. If a detainee, classified by the United States as an enemy combatant unprotected by the Third Geneva Convention, is tried in a manner violative of that Convention, and if there is some doubt as to his status as a POW, the trial is itself a grave breach if it does not follow regular court martial procedures.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^6\)

D. Conclusion Regarding Legal Effects of Application of GC3

The Bush Orders of January and February 2002, denying Geneva Convention protection to captured members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda appear inherently flawed. The international law analysis upon which they are based relies on a factual position, that the Taliban were not the de facto government of Afghanistan, or on a legal analysis, that the Taliban were required to meet the four part test of Article 4(2), which is subject to some doubt. Thus, acts carried out in furtherance of those Presidential Orders, if themselves violations, might, accordingly, constitute war crimes. The

---

\(^{123}\) Third Geneva Convention, *supra* note 4, at art. 120.


\(^{125}\) *Id.*

\(^{126}\) For a more detailed discussion of these rights and procedures, see *Afghanistan, Quirin* and *Uchiyama, supra* note 35.
that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were uncovered by the Third Geneva Convention seems logically to be the first of a two step process undertaken by the Bush Administration to legally justify the use of interrogation methods in violation of that Convention. An examination of those methods, their rationale, and legality is thus appropriate, for as a DOD Working Group determined in examining useful interrogation techniques:

it became apparent that any decision whether to authorize a technique is essentially a risk benefit analysis that generally takes into account the expected utility of the technique, the likelihood that any technique will be in violation of domestic or international law, and various policy considerations. Generally the legal analysis that was applied is that understood to comport with the views of the Department of Justice. Although the United States, as a practical matter, may be the arbiter of international law in deciding its application to our national activities, the views of other nations are relevant in considering their reactions, potential effects on our captured personnel in future conflicts, and possible liability to prosecution in other countries and international forums for interrogators, supervisors and commanders involved in interrogation processes and decisions.\(^{127}\)

**VI. Interrogation Techniques Used Against Members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda Violated the Third Geneva Convention and, If Any Such Person Was Protected by the Convention, Constituted A Grave Breach**

From the date the United States began capturing prisoners in Afghanistan \(^{128}\) questions of their Geneva Convention status, and thus how

\(^{127}\) WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 65-66 (emphasis added); see also discussion infra Part VI.A.1.c.

\(^{128}\) The first substantial U.S. ground operations against the Taliban commenced on October 19, 2001. John Diamond, *First U.S. Ground Raid Hits Taliban*, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2001, at C1, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/911/showcase/chiwarinafghanistanstrike,0,7664856.story (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Much of the ground combat was conducted by allied Afghan forces supported by U.S. special operations troops and air power. Harold Kennedy, *Will Special Ops Success ‘Change the Face of War?’*, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Feb. 2002, available at http://www.nationaldefense magazine.org/issues/2002/ Feb/Will_Special.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Following initially desultory combat, the Taliban rapidly collapsed before the allied forces which captured Herat on November 12th, Kabul on November 13th, and Kunduz on November 24th. By November 25th, substantial U.S. conventional ground forces (Marines) were landing in Afghanistan for the first time, and enough prisoners were held from Kunduz alone, that a prison revolt in Mazar-i-Sharif by Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters resulted in the deaths, inter alia, of a CIA agent, about 30 Northern Alliance soldiers, and more than 500
they could be questioned, necessarily arose.\textsuperscript{129} The Third Geneva Convention, of course, substantially limits methods for interrogating enemy POWs.

A. Interrogation Methods Against Members of the Taliban And Al Qaeda

The key to legal analysis of the position taken by the United States regarding interrogation of captured members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as it relates to any prisoner of war status they might possess, may be found in a Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales from Jay S. Bybee of the Office of Legal Counsel on August 1, 2002, concerning standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §2340-2340A.\textsuperscript{130} The essence of that Memorandum is that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention for POWs need not be considered in interrogations because they are inapplicable to Al Qaeda and the Taliban.\textsuperscript{131} Judge Bybee makes no attempt to justify the use of such violative conduct against POWs; he simply distinguishes it from torture.\textsuperscript{132} Thus the questions for discussion

\textsuperscript{129} It is worth noting that President Bush issued his Military Order providing for trials before tribunals which permitted the admission of evidence which would, in the context of the Third Geneva Convention, be inadmissible, on November 13, 2001, before the United States held substantial numbers of POWs. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004). The Order was also well before he determined that the Third Geneva Convention was inapplicable to the Taliban and al Qaeda. See discussion infra Part III.F & notes. The determination to use such evidence seems to indicate early consideration of the use of non-standard interrogation techniques, since ipso facto, evidence obtained through the interrogation techniques found in FM 34-52 is not dissimilar from that obtained using standard American police techniques, and would be admissible in courts martial or district courts.

\textsuperscript{130} Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales 5 (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo 20020801.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo II] (opining that no International Criminal Court jurisdiction would lie for acts discussed because under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, "to constitute a war crime, torture must be committed against `persons protected under the relevant Geneva Conventions'" and that per President Bush's determination, neither members of the Taliban nor al Qaeda are so protected.).

\textsuperscript{131} Similarly, the Working Group Report of April 4, 2004, while recognizing the impropriety of application of many of the interrogation techniques to Prisoners of War, largely avoids the issue by accepting as valid the command determination that all captured persons at issue in the Report are unlawful combatants unprotected by GC3. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 3-4, 58.

\textsuperscript{132} Bybee Memo II, supra note 130.
here become: 1) what interrogation methods were used and against whom?, 2) were they permissible under GC3?, and 3) what is the relationship of their use to the legal analysis previously discussed?

There is considerable firsthand evidence of interrogation methods consisting of statements by the United States government, accusations by former detainees, and leaked or released information, documents and photographs; more may be inferred from what is known. Thus, for example, if it is a known fact that detainees were forcibly shaved prior to their transportation to Guantanamo Bay, and that the maintenance of a full beard is considered a religious obligation by such individuals, it may be inferred that a possible object of that shaving was intimidation or psychological degradation of the prisoner. This analysis will first discuss admitted interrogation techniques (including some which the United States government says were unauthorized). Then it will look at allegations of interrogation methods alleged by former detainees which have not been revealed, or which the administration says were not authorized for use against that detainee at the time or place alleged. The legal analysis articulated by the United States will then be briefly discussed. Finally, this section will examine what appears to be the relationship of the tribunal’s rules and procedures, and Department of Justice positions on applicability of the Third Geneva Convention and on standards of conduct for interrogation.

---


135 See Sclessinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 94 (referencing in its glossary a Behavioral Science Coordination Team which it defines as a “[t]eam comprised of medical and other specialized personnel that provides support to special operations forces”). It might be a fruitful area of research to review those teams’ analyses of cultural weaknesses of Moslem prisoners.

136 Thus, for example, certain interrogation techniques authorized for use at Guantanamo during a relatively short time between Dec. 2002 and Jan. 2003, were allegedly used against prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Iraq in 2004.
1. Interrogation Techniques Revealed By the United States

A number of interrogation techniques have been discussed internally by the United States government as used or approved for use. They include standard Army methods in compliance with the Third Geneva Convention, as well as other approaches which are either questionable or clearly exceed the strictures protecting POWs. Several of the latter may also violate other limitations outside the scope of this article. The best place to begin any analysis of interrogation techniques used by the United States in war time is with the standard interrogation approach found in the U.S. Army's field manual on Intelligence Interrogation.

a. The Army Intelligence Interrogation Field Manual

Army FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogation*, is the Army’s standard procedure for interrogation of captured enemy personnel. It was the basis for the initial interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo.139 The DOD says that from January 11, 2002, when the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo, the “doctrine contained in Field Manual 34-52 guided interrogations” until December 2002, and that “initial approaches governing interrogations at Guantanamo were in accordance with the standing doctrine outlined in FM 34-52. These procedures include 17 techniques such as direct questioning and providing incentives.”140

That Field Manual requires in Chapter 1, under the heading “Prohibition Against Use of Force,” that:

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.

The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.

Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat.

---


Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques.\textsuperscript{141}

In its discussion of proper interrogation techniques, FM 34-52 identifies five pertinent phases of interrogation, including approach and questioning.\textsuperscript{142} It notes that "all approaches in interrogations have the following purposes in common: to establish and maintain control over the source and the interrogation; to establish and maintain rapport between the interrogator and the source; and to manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation."\textsuperscript{143} It adds that "[t]he number of approaches used is limited only by the interrogator's imagination and skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are not violated. The Geneva Conventions do not permit an interrogator to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or as a member of the Red Cross (Red Crescent or Red Lion)."\textsuperscript{144}

Interrogation then shifts to the questioning phase. "Although there is no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the questioning phase begins, generally the questioning phase commences when the source begins to answer questions pertinent to the specific objectives of the interrogation."\textsuperscript{145} The questioning techniques discussed are not dissimilar to those found in domestic police investigations: the use of non-pertinent questions, for example, "to conceal the interrogation's objectives or strengthen rapport," and of repeated questions to assess the source.\textsuperscript{146}

b. The Development of Additional Counter Resistance Strategies

Following the creation of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, interrogators apparently used methods approved by FM 34-52 but with limited success.\textsuperscript{147} By October 2002, Joint Task Force authorities were seeking approval for the use of additional means.

\textsuperscript{141}FM 34-52, supra note 138, at ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{142}Id. at ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{143}Id.
\textsuperscript{144}Id.
\textsuperscript{145}Id.
\textsuperscript{146}Id.
\textsuperscript{147}See, e.g., Memorandum from LTC Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, to Commander, Joint Task Force 170, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (discussing the use of those methods, and their limitations). The limitations of FM 34-52 and the Third Geneva Convention, however, were apparently not entirely observed even prior to this date. At least
i. The Request For Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies

In early October 2002, Joint Task Force 170, the SOUTHCOM entity charged with prisoner interrogation at Guantanamo Bay, forwarded a Request for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies ("Request for Approval") of October 11, 2002. That Request for Approval, in turn, from the time prisoners were shipped to Guantanamo, their beards were forcibly shaved. U.S. Authorities justified the act as necessary for hygiene. See, e.g., Letter from Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, to the Honorable Chair and Members of the United States Armed Services Committee 3 (May 13, 2004), at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/lt%20to%20Senate%20may04v2.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Shafiq Rasul Letter]. Article 14 of GC3 provides, in part, that "Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14. Article 16 provides for no adverse distinction based upon, inter alia, "religious belief." Id. at art. 16. Article 34 provides that "[p]risoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities." Id. at art. 34. In 1946, Australian authorities prosecuted Japanese guards who shaved the beards of Sikh prisoners of war and forced them to smoke cigarettes in violation of their religious beliefs. See Case No. 65, Trial of Tanaka Chuichi and Two Others, in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 62 (U.N. War Crimes Commission. eds., 1948).

"United States Southern Command [SOUTHCOM] established Joint Task Force 160/170, which was responsible for operating the detainee detention facility and conducting interrogations to collect intelligence in support of the War on Terrorism. Joint Task Force 160 was established in January 2002 and was tasked with taking care of captured enemy combatants from the war on terrorism. Joint Task Force 170 was stood up by Southern Command on 16 February 2002, and tasked with handling interrogation operations for the Department of Defense as well as ensuring coordination among government agencies involved in the interrogation of the suspected terrorists." Joint Task Force GTMO, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jtf-gtmo.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). In August 2002, "based on difficulties with the command relationships," they merged into Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 71.

Memorandum from Major General Michael B. Dunlavey, to Commander of U.S. Southern Command 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). The request was accompanied by a Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies. See Beaver Memo, supra note 139 (presuming the correctness of the proposition that detainees at Guantanamo were unprotected by the Geneva Conventions); see also discussion infra Part VI.B.
was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the SOUTHCOM Commander on October 25, 2002.150

The Request for Approval noted that the "current interrogation guidelines" limit the ability of interrogators to counter advanced resistance.151 It proposed three categories of interrogation techniques.152


151 See Dunlakey Memo, supra note 149, at para. 2; see also Beaver Memo, supra note 139 (identifying "current techniques" as those outlined in FM 34-52). The Field Manual discusses low intensity conflicts in chapter 9, and under the heading "Legal Status of Insurgents, it provides that:

EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and are governed by the guidelines and limitations provided by the Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subversive underground elements who are seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency do not hold legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host-government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions beyond the basic protections in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to the internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of US forces, however, will be governed by existing agreements with the host country and by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. FM 34-52, supra note 138, at ch. 9.

Under the heading "Handling of Insurgent Captives and Suspects," it provides:

Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. It is not usually a conflict of international character, and it is not a recognized belligerency. Therefore, insurgent captives are not guaranteed full protection under the articles of the Geneva Conventions relative to the handling of EPWs. However, Article 3 of the Conventions requires that insurgent captives be humanely treated and forbids violence to life and person -- in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. It further forbids commitment of outrages upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, passing of sentences, and execution without prior judgment by a regularly constituted court.

Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance with Article 3, if for no other reason than to render them more susceptible to interrogation. The insurgent is trained to expect brutal treatment upon capture. If, contrary to what he has been led to believe, this mistreatment is not forthcoming, he is apt to become psychologically softened for interrogation. Id. (emphasis added).
Category I included an initial comfortable environment, but if the detainee was determined by the interrogator to be uncooperative, could include 1) yelling (but not loudly enough to cause physical pain), and 2) techniques of deception including multiple interrogators and misidentification of the interrogator as a citizen of a foreign country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.\textsuperscript{153}

Category II, which required the permission of the General in Charge of the Interrogation Section, included the use of stress positions, including standing, for a maximum of four hours, the use of falsified documents or reports, solitary confinement for up to thirty days,\textsuperscript{154} interrogation in other than the standard interrogation booth, sensory deprivation,\textsuperscript{155} hooding with unrestricted breathing, removal of all comfort items, including religious items, feeding cold Army rations, removal of clothing, forced grooming, including shaving of facial hair, etc. and the use of detainees individual phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} If from no other source, the Joint Task Force was aware of certain cultural issues involving the detainees through discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross. See Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate T.L. Miller, to Commander Joint Task Force 160 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/GitmoMemo01-21-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). In notes from a meeting between, inter alia, Judge Advocates from SOUTHCOM and JTF 160, and ICRC representatives on January 21, 2002, the Red Cross raised the issues of privacy and beards. JAG notes from that meeting include “Islamic people are very private as concerns their bodies” and “Could closely trimmed beards be tolerated?” Id. at enclosure(1). They also note regarding “red/orange colored clothing” that “[i]n their culture, red clothing as a sign that someone is about to be put to death.” Id. The ICRC also articulated the detainees’ desires for prayer caps, prayer beads, Korans, and prayer tapes. Id. Two days later, in a Memo to File dated January 24, 2002, the JTF 160 SJA noted initial responses to the issues raised, including the placing of opaque plastic around the showers because “showering in front of the guards is a great embarrassment to the detainees, and men of the Muslim culture are much more sensitive about their privacy than men in the Western culture.” Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate, to File, at para. 5 (Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/gitmomemos.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). Regarding the issue that “[d]etainees wish to grow a short beard in accordance with their religion,” it was noted the matter, along with return of prayer beads, was “under consideration.” Id. at para. 12. Korans were distributed.

\textsuperscript{153} Phifer Memo, supra note 147.

\textsuperscript{154} Phifer Memo, supra note 147, at para. 2.b.3 (stating that “[e]xtensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General,” and that “[f]or selected detainees, the OIC [Officer in Charge], Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.”).

\textsuperscript{155} Id. at para. 2.b.5 (describing sensory deprivations as “[d]eprivation of light and auditory stimuli”).

\textsuperscript{156} See id. at para. 2.b.1-12.
Category III techniques include the use of "scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family," exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring), "use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation," and "use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger and light pushing."

ii. Approval of Additional Counter Resistance Techniques

On December 2, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved Category I and II techniques and the fourth technique in Category III, i.e. mild, non-injurious physical contact. The use of death threats to family, exposure to cold weather and water, and simulated drowning was not approved, although DOD General Counsel advised they "may be legally available." A number of those techniques were apparently used. On
January 15, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his approval of Category II and one of the Category III techniques pending a study by DOD General Counsel. He noted that "[s]hould you determine that particular techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you should forward that request to me." Approval of Category I techniques apparently remained in effect.

On March 6th, the Working Group issued a Draft Report, and on April 4th a final version of the document.

c. The Working Group Report

The Working Group consisted of representatives from a broader spectrum than the government's prior analytical reports on interrogation. They produced a document which, except for one central flawed

165 See Press Release, Office of Dep't of Defense General Counsel, GTMO Interrogation Techniques (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/daily/graphica/interrogation_062304.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (identifying Category I and II techniques used between December 2002 and January 15, 2003, including under Category I, yelling (not directly into ear) and deception through introduction of a confederate detainee and Arole playing by interrogator in next cell; and under Category II, applied techniques include removal from social support, segregation, isolation, interrogation in a different location (still at Guantanamo), deprivation of light (using a red light), introducing stress through use of a female interrogator, up to 20 hour interrogations, removal of all comfort items including religious items, serving MREs instead of hot rations, forced grooming (to include shaving facial hair and head), and use of false documents).

166 See Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 7 (stating that Rumsfeld rescinded his approval as a result of concerns raised by the Navy General Counsel).


168 Rumsfeld Memo to USSOUTHCOM, supra note 167.

169 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Mar. 6, supra note 36.

170 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36.

171 The Working Group included representatives from the Offices of the Undersecretary of (Defense Policy), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the General Counsels of the Air Force, Army and Navy and Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and the Joint Staff Legal Counsel and J5. Id at 2.
assumption, is sophisticated, well wrought and legally supportable.\textsuperscript{172} That flawed assumption is the validity of the Presidential determination that the detainees were facially uncovered by the Third Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{173} Thus, the Report opines that:

Due to the unique nature of the war on terrorism in which the enemy covertly attacks innocent civilian populations without warning, and further due to the critical nature of the information believed to be known by certain of the al-Qaida and Taliban detainees regarding future terrorist attacks, it may be appropriate for the appropriate approval authority to authorize as a military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful

\textsuperscript{172} The Working Group Report constitutes both factual and legal analysis. It is discussed here, but also is compared and contrasted with the Bybee and Beaver Briefs. \textit{See} discussion \textit{infra} VI.B. The sea change reflected in the Working Group Report may indicate the shift to at least considering some input from military lawyers:

Lawyers from the military's Judge Advocate General's Corps, or JAG, had been urging Pentagon officials to ensure protection for prisoners for two years before the abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison came to light, current and former JAG officers told ABCNEWS. But, the JAG lawyers say, political appointees at the Pentagon ignored their warnings, setting the stage for the Abu Ghraib abuses. "If we, 'we' being the uniformed lawyers, had been listened to, and what we said put into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred," said Rear Admiral Don Guter (ret.), the Navy Judge Advocate General from 2000 to 2002. Specifically, JAG officers say they have been marginalized by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and William Haynes II, the Pentagon's General Counsel, whom President Bush has nominated for a judgeship on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.


\textsuperscript{173} Thus, the Report states that:

The laws of war contain obligations relevant to the issue of interrogation techniques and methods. It should be noted, however, that it is the position of the U.S. Government that none of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of Aug. 12, 1949 (Third Geneva Convention) apply to to al Qaida detainees because, because, \textit{inter alia}, al Qaida is not a High Contracting Party to the Convention. As to the Taliban, the U.S. position is that the provisions of Geneva apply to our present conflict with the Taliban, but that Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.

combatants in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{174}

After extensive discussion of domestic and international legal implications,\textsuperscript{175} the Working Group discusses considerations affecting policy.\textsuperscript{176} That discussion noted the policies articulated by FM 34-52\textsuperscript{177} and its predecessor, FM 30-15.\textsuperscript{178}

The fundamental principle underlying Army doctrine concerning intelligence interrogations [prior to FM 34-52] is that the commander may utilize all available resources and \textit{lawful} means in the accomplishment of his mission and for the protection and security of his unit. However, a strong caveat to this principle noted, "treaty commitments and policy of the United States, international agreements, international law and the UCMJ require the conduct of military to conform with the law of war." FM 30-15 also recognized that \textit{Army intelligence interrogations must conform to the specific prohibitions, limitations and restrictions established by the Geneva Conventions...} for the handling and treatment of personnel captured or detained by military forces.\textsuperscript{179}

The Working Group also noted that "FM 30-15 emphasized a prohibition on the use of force during interrogations," including the "actual use of force, mental torture, threats and exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind."\textsuperscript{180} It pointed out that:

\begin{quote}
FM 30-15 stated that experience revealed that the use of force was unnecessary to gain cooperation and was a poor interrogation technique, given that its use produced unreliable information, damaged future interrogations, and induced those being interrogated to offer \textit{[false information].} However, FM 30-15 stated that the prohibition on the use of force, mental or physical, must not be confused with the use of psychological tools and deception techniques...\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id.} at 3 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{175} This discussion was limited by the Presidential Declaration of inapplicability of GC3. For more information and discussion of the domestic and international legal implications, see discussion infra Part VI.B.

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Working Group Report, Apr. 4, supra} note 36, at 51-61.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{See} discussion supra Part VI.A.1.a.

\textsuperscript{178} Army Field Manual 30-15 was in effect from 1945 until its replacement in 1987 by FM 34-52. Its provisions were also applied by the other armed services of the United States. \textit{Working Group Report, Apr. 4, supra} note 36, at 51.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added). FM 30-15 noted that violations of customary and treaty law would normally also violate the UCMJ and be prosecuted under it, as well as giving rise to potential command liability. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{See id.} at 52.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Id.}
In its discussion of FM 34-52, the Working Group pointed out that it had "adopted the principles and framework for conducting interrogations of FM 30-15," and that it, along with the curriculum at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, "continue to emphasize a prohibition on the use of force."\(^{182}\) It noted:

The underlying basis for this prohibition is the proscriptions contained in international and domestic U.S. law . . . Army interrogation experts view the use of force as an inferior technique that yields intelligence of questionable quality.\(^{183}\)

The Working Group also identified a number of policy considerations articulated by the Department of Defense.\(^{184}\) The core of that policy is that "[c]hoice of interrogation techniques involves a risk benefit analysis in each case bounded by the limits of DOD policy and U.S. law."\(^{185}\)

The DOD policy guidance confirmed that priority was being given to intelligence gathering, but stated that there would be continued assessment of "the value of information on detainees for prosecution considerations."\(^{186}\) In the event of a request to shift that priority, it noted, factors to be considered would include "potential benefit derived from an effective

\(^{182}\) Id. at 53.

\(^{183}\) Id. (emphasis added).

\(^{184}\) The policy statement was provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict). Id. at 54. The Assistant Secretary is Thomas O'Connell.

\(^{185}\) Id. at 55. The Assistant Secretary's policy guidance also includes what the author considers a wise and highly perceptive statement of a core policy reason for the importance of international law to the armed forces of the United States:

When assessing whether to use exceptional interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and self-image, which at times in the past may have suffered due to perceived law of war violations. DOD policy, reflected in the DOD Law of War Program implemented in 1979 and in subsequent directives, greatly restored the culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing high benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit of the law of war and thereby humane treatment of all persons in U.S. Armed Forces' custody. In addition consideration should be given to whether implementation of such exceptional techniques is likely to result in adverse effects on DOD personnel who become POWs, including possible perceptions by other nations that the United States is lowering standards relating to the treatment of prisoners generally.

Id. (citations omitted).

\(^{186}\) Id. at 54.
interrogation compared to potential benefit from a better opportunity for effective prosecution." It provided that:

For interrogations involving exceptional techniques approved by [Secretary Rumsfeld], standard doctrine may be used as well as the specifically authorized exceptional techniques. However, such interrogations may only be applied in limited, designated settings approved by [Secretary Rumsfeld or his designee], staffed by personnel specifically trained in their use and subject to a command/decision authority at a level specifically [designated by Secretary Rumsfeld].

It is in its discussion of the potential effect of interrogation techniques on prosecutions that the Working Group Report is most directly relevant to the analysis here. It notes, Adepending on the techniques employed, the admissibility of any information may depend on the forum considering the evidence. It then considers two issues of direct relevance here: prosecution by the United States before a military commission, court martial or Article III court, and the effect of the Geneva Conventions if they are indeed applicable despite the Presidential Determination.

i. The Working Group’s Analysis of Admissibility of Evidence Obtained By Extraordinary Interrogation Techniques Before a Commission, Court Martial, or District Court

The Working Group noted that although the standard of admissibility for military commissions is fairly low, i.e. probative value to a reasonable person, "many of the [interrogation] techniques may place a burden on the prosecution's ability to convince commission members that the evidence meets even that lower standard." Their analysis is encouraging, even if it is incongruent with the past history of the evidentiary standard.

---

187 Id. at 55. It is at this point that the DOD seems to recognize on the record that the two might be mutually exclusive, a point which seemed lost on the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 38 & discussion supra Part IV.

188 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 55. The DOD policy also required all interrogations involving exceptional methods had to be applied in the context of a comprehensive plan which had to include at least appropriate approval authority. Id. at 56.

189 Id. The Report points out that admissibility is necessarily fact specific depending on the exact techniques used. Id.

190 Id.

191 See discussion supra note 37. The analysis would be much more persuasive if the appellate process was through the courts rather than the executive branch.
As the interrogation methods increase in intensity, the likelihood that the information will be deemed coerced and involuntary and thus held inadmissible increases. Although voluntariness of the confession is not a specific threshold question on admissibility, it can reasonably be expected that the defense will raise voluntariness, challenging the probative value of the information and hence, its admissibility. If the statement is admitted, voluntariness will undoubtedly be a factor considered by the members in determining the weight given to the information.192

The Working Group’s speculation that a fair approximation of at least the policies underlying the exclusionary rule would be applied in a commission unbound by law and precedent is, unfortunately, contrary to past experience. As previously noted, examination of past applications of the Quirin evidence rule include substantial abuses, often offensive to basic notions of fair play. Their analysis of the admissibility of extraordinary interrogation results in a court martial or U.S. District Court is much more congruent with precedent. Under those standards the Working Group noted:

If the actions taken to secure a statement constitute torture the statement would be inadmissible.193 It should be noted that conduct does not need to rise to the level of "torture" or "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" for it to cause a statement to be involuntary, and therefore inadmissible. As such, the more aggressive the interrogation technique used, the greater the likelihood it could adversely affect the admissibility of any acquired statements or confessions.194

To the extent that court martial or district court standards apply, the emphasized language above is a direct refutation of Judge Bybee’s torture analysis. It straightforwardly supports a core proposition of this article—that use of evidence obtained through violations of the Third Geneva Convention would violate a POWs rights under GC3 Article 102.195

---

192 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 56-57 (emphasis added).

193 Citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding confessions procured by means “revolting to the sense of justice” could not be used to secure a conviction).

194 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 57 (emphasis added). The Working Group raises a number of other concerns including public reaction to methods of interrogation, and “balancing the stated objective of open proceedings with the need not to publicize interrogation techniques.” Id.

195 “A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 102.
Following its analysis of domestic legal issues, the Working Group discusses its view of problems with the interrogation techniques under international law. It finesses the Presidential Declaration of inapplicability with a statement that the law...although not binding on the United States, could be cited by other countries to support the proposition that the interrogation techniques used by the U.S. contravene international legal standards. While it says its purpose is to inform the DOD’s policy considerations when deciding how to treat unlawful combatants, the discussion constitutes a clear and direct warning of the potential problems arising from violations of the Third Geneva Convention.

ii. The Working Group’s Analysis of the Effects of Application of the Geneva Conventions

The Working Group notes that “to the extent that other nation states do not concede the U.S. position,” Articles 13, 14, 17, 130, and

196 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 57
197 Article 13 states:

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 13.

198 "Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor." Id. at art. 14.

199 Article 17 states:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Id. at art. 17.

200 Article 130 states:
129\textsuperscript{201} may be relevant to considerations of interrogation techniques. The Working Group warns that:

These articles of the Third Geneva Convention may provide an opportunity for other States Parties to allege that they consider the United States to be in violation of the Convention through its treatment of detainees. \textit{To the extent any such treatment could be considered by them to be torture or inhumane treatment, such acts could be considered "grave breaches" and punishable as war crimes.}\textsuperscript{202}

Despite these warnings, the Working Group, operating on the assumption that the Presidential Directive of inapplicability of GC3 is mandatory, recommends an interrogation program containing many of the

\begin{quote}
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention." \textit{Id.} at art. 130.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{201} "Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts." \textit{Id.} at art. 129.

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{WORKING GROUP REPORT}, Apr. 4, \textit{supra} note 36, at 58. The Working Group also notes that even if other States Parties concur that POW status is inapplicable they may still claim coverage under Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. \textit{Id.} The First Additional Protocol states:

[p]ersons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons.

Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37, 16 I.L.M..1391 (1977) (prohibiting acts including violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons including murder, torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; corporal punishment; and mutilation; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; taking of hostages; collective punishments; and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts).
elements previously discussed. It is, however, substantially limited in their application.

iii. The Working Group’s Recommended Interrogation Techniques

The Working Group recommends limited use of many of the non-standard techniques previously approved by Secretary Rumsfeld but hedged with numerous limitations, safeguards and caveats. Secretary Rumsfeld suggested:

The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a detainee with the least intrusive method, always applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators.

The steps the Working Group proposes to ensure compliance with that standard are enlightening, both because they circumscribe interrogator conduct, and because they explain in clear terms the psychological and emotional manipulation at the core of effective interrogation techniques. The Report notes that interrogations must consider “often interlocking factors, such as . . . a detainee’s emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses . . . [and] an assessment of possible approaches . . . in an effort to gain the trust of the detainee . . .” They add:

Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detainee’s emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close cooperation with the units detaining the individuals. Detainee interrogation involves a plan tailored to an individual and approved by senior interrogators. Strict adherence to policies/standard operating

---

203 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 62-65; see text infra Appendix 4 (reproducing the list of techniques); see also FM 34-52, supra note 138 (presenting many of the techniques discussed by the Working Group).


205 WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 62 (noting that interrogations “must always be planned, deliberate actions...” with operating instructions “based on command policies to ensure uniform, careful and safe application of any interrogations of detainees” and adding this caveat: “While techniques are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, techniques are usually used in combination; the cumulative effect of all techniques used must be considered before any decisions are made regarding approval for particular situations.”).

206 Id.
procedures governing the administration techniques and oversight is essential. 207

The Working Group's Report was a carefully drafted document, which attempted to substantially limit and control potential abuses, and to re-cork, as much as possible, the bottle from which the evil genie of prisoner abuse had been released. 208 Unfortunately, even though Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Working Group's Report, and implemented even further restrictions, the damage to the carefully restricted intelligence interrogation culture had already been inflicted; 209 damage which may prove to have had fatal consequences.

iv. Secretary Rumsfeld's Approval

On April 16, 2002, after considering the Working Group's Report, Secretary Rumsfeld informed the Commander of SOUTHCOM that he had approved counter-resistance techniques limited to interrogations of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 210 He declined to approve some of the interrogation methods recommended by the Working Group, including most of the methods in Categories I and II of the original

207 Id. (emphasis added).

208 It is most unfortunate that initial consideration of these matters gave short shrift to the concerns expressed about potential adverse affects on military culture. The Bybee Memo's rationale that the military will "do as it's told" reflects a substantial failure of civilian authorities to comprehend the complex interplay among rules, culture, honor and duty in the armed forces. Telling any human that a subset of his or her behavioral rules may be dismissed with a wink is inherently unsettling to societal norms. In a closed society like the military, the essential purpose of which is to provide closely regulated lethal force for national defense, adherence to a moral code is essential. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 22-100 ARMY LEADERSHIP: BE, KNOW, DO (Aug. 31, 1999) [hereinafter FM 22-100]; Fay Report, supra note 133, at 111-12 ("Leaders must balance mission requirements with unit capabilities, soldier morale and effectiveness. Protecting Soldiers from unnecessary pressure to enhance mission effectiveness is a leader's job.").

209 Thus, for example, the Executive Summary of the Jones and Fay AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigades notes that:

Confusion about what interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from the proliferation of guidance and information from other theaters of operation; individual interrogator experiences in other theaters; and, the failure to distinguish between interrogation operations in the other theaters and Iraq. This confusion contributed to the occurrence of some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses.

Fay Report, supra note 133, at Executive Summary 3.

210 Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1-4; see text infra Appendix 5 (reproducing the list of techniques). The list of techniques is reproduced in Appendix 5.
and noted that as to the methods of "Incentive/Removal of Incentive," "Pride and Ego Down," "Mutt and Jeff," and "Isolation" the Commander "must specifically determine that military necessity requires its use and notify [Secretary Rumsfeld] in advance."\(^{211}\)

The Department of Defense has verified that some of the techniques eventually approved by Secretary Rumsfeld were used between December 2, 2002 and January 15, 2003.\(^{212}\) From January 16 until April 15, 2003, interrogators at Guantanamo used FM 34-52 techniques with three added Category I techniques: yelling, multiple interrogators and interrogator identity.\(^{213}\) They were applied by the Joint Task Force 170 at Guantanamo under the Command of a Military Intelligence officer, Major General Geoffrey Miller.\(^{214}\) Eventually they migrated\(^{215}\) to Abu Ghraib Prison in

\(^{211}\) Compare Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 2-4, with Working Group Report, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 64-65. The methods eliminated from the Working Group recommendations included Hooding; Mild Physical Contact; Threat of Transfer; Use of Prolonged Interrogations; Forced Grooming; Prolonged Standing; Sleep deprivation; Physical Training; Face slap/Stomach slap; Removal of Clothing; and Increasing Anxiety by Use of Aversions. Working Group Report, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 64-65. Moreover, Secretary Rumsfeld directs the SOUTHCOM commander: "If in your view, you require ... additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee." Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1.

\(^{212}\) Rumsfeld Memo, supra note 204, at 1-4.

\(^{213}\) Background Briefing, supra note 67 (noting that a Senior Defense Official stated: "I believe that there were some techniques that eventually were approved were used in the initial phase which began and then stopped.").

\(^{214}\) Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 108-09.


There is no indication that the training provided by the JTF-GTMO Team led to any new violations of the Geneva Conventions and the law of land warfare. Training focused on screening, the use of pocket litter during interrogations, prioritization of detainees, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, interpreter control, deception detection, reporting, automation, and interrogation booths.

Fay Report, supra note 133, at 18.

\(^{216}\) Seymour Hersh claims in his book Chain of Command that the decision to use extraordinary interrogation techniques in Iraq was made by Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 60 (2004) (quoting a Pentagon consultant as saying: "The White House subcontracted this to the
Iraq, in some instances based on intentional command decisions, in some on cultural dispersion. As the Schlesinger Committee Report notes:

Pentagon, and the Pentagon subcontracted it to Cambone, [and therefore] [t]his is Cambone's deal, but Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program.

In his AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, LTG Anthony R. Jones determined that:

Interrogation techniques, including Counter-Resistance Techniques, were developed and approved for the detainees in Guantanamo and Afghanistan who were determined not to be EPWs or protected persons under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The OSD Memo promulgated in December 2002 [i.e. the first Rumsfeld Order], approving techniques and safeguards for interrogation of unlawful combatants in GTMO, included the use of dogs to induce stress and the removal of clothing as Counter-Resistance techniques. This memo was rescinded in January 2003. A General Counsel Interrogation Working Group was subsequently formed and published a revised memo in April 2003 under the signature of SECDEF on Counter-Resistance Techniques. This memo produced by the Working Group and the techniques outlined in FM 34-52 were referenced by Colonel Warren and his staff to develop the limits of authority memo for LTG Sanchez. The provisions of Geneva Convention IV, Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, did apply to detainees in Iraq.

... [LTG Sanchez' memos on interrogation techniques] inadvertently, left certain issues for interpretation: namely, the responsibility for clothing detainees, the use of dogs in interrogation, and applicability of techniques to detainees who were not categorized as “security detainees.” Furthermore, some military intelligence personnel executing their interrogation duties at Abu Ghraib had previously served as interrogators in other theaters of operation, primarily Afghanistan and GTMO. These prior interrogation experiences complicated understanding at the interrogator level. The extent of “word of mouth” techniques that were passed to the interrogators in Abu Ghraib by assistance teams from Guantanamo, Fort Huachuca, or amongst themselves due to prior assignments is unclear and likely impossible to determine. Jones Report, supra note 1, at 14-15.

According to the Schlesinger Committee Report:

MG Miller had indicated his model was approved only for Guantanamo. However, CJTF-7 using reasoning from the President's Memorandum of February 7, 2002, which addressed Aunlawful combatants, believed additional, tougher measures were warranted because there were Aunlawful combatants mixed in with Enemy Prisoners of War and civilian and criminal detainees. The CJTF-7 Commander [i.e. LTG Sanchez], on the advice of his Staff judge Advocate, believed he had the inherent authority of the Commander in a Theater of War to promulgate such a policy and make determinations as to the categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions. CENTCOM viewed the CJTF-7 as unacceptably aggressive, and on October 12, 2003, [LTG Sanchez] rescinded his September directive and disseminated methods only slightly
[Extraordinary] interrogation techniques were authorized only [for use against al Qaeda and the Taliban]. More important, their authorization in Afghanistan and Guantanamo was possible only because the President had determined that individuals subjected to these interrogation techniques fell outside the strict protections of the Geneva Conventions. \(^2\)

Thus, if the presidential determination was legally erroneous, the entire structure crumbled. The first shockwaves of that collapse began at Abu Ghraib.

d. The Taguba Report\(^2\)

General Sanchez stated in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"stronger than those in Field Manual 34-52. The policy memos promulgated at the CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned."

Schlesinger Committee Report, supra note 13, at 10 (emphasis added).

Note that CJTF-7 was Combined Joint Task Force 7, the forward deployed headquarters for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and commanded by LTG Ricardo Sanchez. \(^2\)

The Schlesinger Committee Report notes:

Interrogation techniques intended only for Guantanamo came to be used in Afghanistan and Iraq. Techniques employed at Guantanamo included the use of stress positions, isolation for up to 30 days and removal of clothing. In Afghanistan techniques included removal of clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, use of stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs, and sleep and light deprivation. Interrogators in Iraq, already familiar with some of these ideas, implemented them even prior to any policy guidance from CJTF-7. Id. at 68.

\(^2\) Id. at 82 (emphasis added); The Schlesinger Committee's reference to Afghanistan is telling. The United States Army has charged MP SGT James P. Boland with permitting the beating of one Afghan prisoner, and the shackling of another to the ceiling with his hands above his shoulders. Carlotta Gall & David Rohde, Afghan Abuse Charges Raise New Questions on Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A10. Both prisoners at Bagram Air Base, according to the charge sheet, later died in December, 2002. Id. According to the New York Times, classified portions of an Army report [the Times story is unclear but the reference is apparently to either the Taguba or Fay Reports] on Abu Ghraib stated that “In Afghanistan, techniques included removal of clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, use of stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs, and sleep and light deprivation.” Id. The classified portions of that report also identified as approved interrogation methods “shaving their heads and beards” and “20 hour interrogations.” Id.

\(^2\) Taguba Report, supra note 3, at 1.
In September [2003], a team headed by General [Geoffrey] Miller assessed our intelligence interrogation activities and human detention operations. We reviewed the recommendations with the expressed understanding, reinforced in conversations between General Miller and me, that they might have to be modified for use in Iraq where the Geneva Convention was fully applicable.\textsuperscript{222}

After the revelation of sexual and physical abuse at Abu Ghraib, the CENTOM commander appointed MG Antonio Taguba to conduct an Article 15-6 investigation into the detention and internment operations of the 800th Military Police Brigade ("The Taguba Report"). The Taguba Report identified acts of intentional abuse of detainees by military police officers which included: punching, slapping and kicking detainees and jumping on their bare feet; videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in sexually explicit positions for photographing; forcing detainees to disrobe and keeping them naked for several days at a time; forcing male detainees to wear women's underwear; forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed; arranging naked male detainees in a pile and jumping on them; positioning a naked detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head and attaching wires to his fingers, toes and penis to simulate electric torture; writing "I am a rapist" on the leg of a detainee; placing a dog chain around a naked detainee's neck and having a female soldier pose for a picture with him; sexual intercourse with a female detainee; using unmuzzled military working dogs to intimidate and frighten detainees with at least one severe injury from a dog bite; and photographing dead Iraqi detainee.\textsuperscript{223} The Report also accepted as credible detainees allegations of breaking chemical lights and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees; threatening detainees with a pistol; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing non-medical personnel to stitch a wounded detainee; and sodomizing a detainee with a broom stick and possibly a chemical light.\textsuperscript{224}

The Taguba Report, as well as some of the photographs which precipitated it, came into the hands of American reporters and initiated the chain of events discussed above.\textsuperscript{225} Following the appointment of MG Taguba, a separate investigation was ordered by LTG Sanchez to investigate the role of military intelligence personnel in abuses at Abu


\textsuperscript{223} Taguba Report, supra note 3, at 16-17.

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{id.} at 17-18.

\textsuperscript{225} See text supra Part II.
That investigation conducted by MG George R. Fay, and later supplemented by appointment of LTG Anthony R. Jones, as an additional investigating officer, resulted in the disclosure of substantial additional information.

e. The Fay and Jones Reports

LTG Jones more closely examined the chain of command above the 205th M.I. Brigade. He determined that "[t]he chain of command directly above the Brigade was not directly involved in the Abu Ghraib," but that policy memoranda promulgated by LTG Ricardo Sanchez "led indirectly to some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses," because they "allowed for interpretation in several areas, including use of dogs and removal of clothing." 227 He noted that:

Particularly, in light of the wide spectrum of interrogator qualifications, maturity, and experiences (i.e. in GTMO and Afghanistan), the memos did not adequately set forth the limits on interrogation techniques. 228

MG Fay's investigation, which was principally directed at the Brigade level and below, was by its nature considerably more detailed. It identified forty-four alleged instances or events of detainee abuse committed by Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers, as well as by civilian contractors employed by the Army. Military Intelligence solicitation of MP abuse included "the use of isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs as an interrogation tool and physical abuse." 229

MG Fay extensively discussed how extraordinary interrogation techniques migrated from Guantanamo (GTMO) to Abu Ghraib:

Non-doctrinal approaches, techniques and practices were developed and approved for use in Afghanistan and GTMO as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques, approaches and practices became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities

226 See Fay Report, supra note 133, at 1 (indicating that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, which had Abu Ghraib within its sphere of responsibility, were the objects of the Fay investigation); see also U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 381-10: U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 16 (July 1, 1984), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r381_10.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter AR 381-10] ("Procedure 15. Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable Activities").

227 Jones Report, supra note 1, at 4, 16.

228 Id. at 16.

229 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 7.
or safeguards. Soldiers were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation techniques such as sleep adjustment, isolation and the use of dogs. Many interrogators and personnel overseeing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib had prior exposure to or experience in GTMO or Afghanistan. Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non field-manual approaches came from documents and personnel in GTMO and Afghanistan.\footnote{230}{Id. at 8; see Douglas Jehl, The Reach of War: Abu Ghraib Scandal; Army’s Report Faults General in Prison Abuse, NY TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A1. According to the New York Times, a classified section of the Fay Report sheds new light on the role played by a secretive Special Operations Forces/Central Intelligence Agency task force that operated in Iraq and Afghanistan as a source of interrogation procedures that were put into effect at Abu Ghraib. It says that a July 15, 2003, "Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility Policy," drafted for use by Joint Task Force 121, which was given the task of locating former government members in Iraq, was adopted "almost verbatim" by the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, which played a leading role in interrogations at Abu Ghraib.

That task force policy endorsed the use of stress positions during harsh interrogation procedures, the use of dogs, yelling, loud music, light control, isolation and other procedures used previously in Afghanistan and Iraq. \textit{Id}.

\footnote{231}{Fay Report, supra note 133, at 9-10 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that MG Fay specifically does not say they cannot be indirectly tied to those policies.}}

He then discussed those techniques in detail:

Physical and sexual abuses of detainees ... spanned from direct physical assault such as...head blows rendering detainees unconscious to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in [CIA] custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee. These abuses are, without question, criminal. . . . Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. . . . The environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. \textit{What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians.}\footnote{231}{Fay Report, supra note 133, at 9-10 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that MG Fay specifically does not say they cannot be indirectly tied to those policies.}

In additional to the physical and sexual abuse, MG Fay identified three principal areas of detainee mistreatment. Those were the use of dogs, nudity and isolation:

Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at Abu Ghrail . . . Dog teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG G. Miller's assessment team from
MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues. Interrogations at Abu Ghraib, however, were influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. The use of dogs in interrogations to Afear up detainees was utilized without proper authorization.

The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters in support of GWOT... The lines of authority and prior legal opinions blurred. ... The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating “de-humanization” of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur.

... LTG Sanchez approved the extended use of isolation on several occasions, intending for the detainee to be kept apart, without communication with their fellow detainees. The technique employed in several instances was not, however, segregation but rather isolation—the complete removal from outside contact other than required care and feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI. ... [Lack of] proper training, clear guidance or experience ... stretched the bounds into further abuse; sensory deprivation and unsafe or unhealthy living conditions. Detainees were sometimes placed in excessively cold or hot cells with limited or poor ventilation or light.232

The Fay Report summarizes detainee abuse in several categories including: 1) physical abuse including slapping, kicking, twisting hands, restricting breathing, poking an injury and forcing an internee to stand while handcuffed in such a way as to dislocate his shoulder,233 2) use of dogs to threaten and terrify detainees,234 3) humiliating and degrading treatment including nakedness,235 photographs in undress and degrading

232 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

233 The similarity to torture techniques used by the North Vietnamese against captured American pilots is disturbing. Although nothing as extreme as the odious nature of the North Vietnamese treatment is alleged, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than moral culpability. See STUART I. ROCHESTER & FREDERICK KILEY, HONOR BOUND: AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973, at 144-148 (1998).

234 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 83. The Fay Report says that interrogations at Abu Ghraib were influenced by “several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs.” Id. The document lists an 11 October 2002 JTF 170 memorandum. Id.

235 Id. at 87. The Fay Report notes that “removal of clothing was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO.” Id. The Fay Report adds:
positions, forcing detainees into simulated sexual positions, improper use of isolation, failure to safeguard detainees, and failure to report detainee abuse.

2. Other Sources of Information about Alleged Abuses

In addition to official reports, allegations of and information about abuse has surfaced from several sources in the press. Those include claims by former prisoners, publicized reports by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and reports of continuing prosecutions of military personnel for abuse especially involving Afghanistan. In addition, in September

[At GTMO Secretary Rumsfeld] granted this authority on 2 Dec. 2002, but it was rescinded six weeks later in January, 2003. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. Soldiers simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. Id. at 88.

236 Id. at 71-72. The Fay Report draws a causal connection between extraordinary interrogation techniques and sexual abuse. “The climate created at Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity for such abuse to occur and continue undiscovered.... What started as undressing and humiliation, stress and physical training, carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).


238 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 68-69.

239 The Afghan claims are particularly enlightening because they deal with treatment of detainees classified as unlawful combatants under the same Presidential Order as those at Guantanamo. From the limited amount of information revealed in the Abu Ghraib related reports, it appears extraordinary interrogation techniques were applied to detainees in at least some instances. Some of those persons may have been captured after the capture of Kabul, and the installation of the Kharzai government. As long, however, as effective resistance continues in Afghanistan under the Taliban leadership, and as long as they maintain armed forces “in the field,” the Third Geneva Convention should continue to apply. See Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 42, 36 Stat. 2277, I Bevans 631 (“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”); cf. Rev. Mons. Sebastiao Francisco Xavier dos Remedios Monteiro v. The State of Goa, All India Reporter 1970 SC 329 (March 26) (“There is however difference between true annexation on the one hand and premature annexation or as it is sometimes called ‘anticipated annexation’ on the other. Annexation is premature so long as hostilities are continuing and there is an opposing army in the field even if the Occupied Power is wholly excluded from the territory. Anticipated annexation by unilateral action is not true annexation. True annexation is only so when the territory is conquered and subjugated.”).
2004, Seymour Hersh published *Chain of Command* which contains a number of other specific allegations of mistreatment and misconduct.\textsuperscript{240}

According to the Fay Report:

The ICRC found a high level of depression, helplessness, stress and frustration especially by those detainees in isolation. Detainees made the following allegations during interviews with the ICRC: threats during interrogation; insults and verbal insults during transfer in Tier 1A; sleep deprivation; walking in the corridors handcuffed and naked, except for female underwear over the head; handcuffing either to the upper bed bars or doors of the cell for 3-4 hours. Some detainees presented physical marks and psychological symptoms which were compatible with these allegations. Also noted were brutality upon capture, physical or psychological coercion during interrogation, prolonged isolation, and excessive and disproportionate use of force.\textsuperscript{241}

Of particular interest to the ICRC was the status of a detainee kept “in a totally darkened cell, measuring about 2 meters long, and less than a meter across, devoid of any window, latrine or water tap, or bedding.”\textsuperscript{242} On the cell door was the inscription “the Gollum with a picture of the character from the Tolkien film trilogy.”\textsuperscript{243}

Press stories about Red Cross Reports also indicated the existence of abuses:

On the military side, a key focus is Army Col. Thomas Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. A controversial order last fall put Pappas in overall charge of Abu Ghraib on Nov. 19. The abuse of prisoners had already begun there, however, and Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Romig, Army judge advocate general, told a congressional hearing last week that the search for culpable officers may encompass others.

Red Cross inspectors who visited Abu Ghraib in early October 2003 and found many of the abuses that have since come to light spoke to an unnamed military intelligence officer before Pappas took command of the

\textsuperscript{240}See Hersh, supra note 216, at 1-72.

\textsuperscript{241}Fay Report, supra note 133, at 64-65.

\textsuperscript{242}Id. at 66. The Fay Report also refers to an isolation “Hole,” which subjected detainees to excessive cold in the winter and heat in the summer. “There was obviously poor air quality, no monitoring of time limits, no frequent checks on physical condition of the detainee, and no medical screening, all of which added up to detainee abuse.” Id at 93.

\textsuperscript{243}Id. The Fay Report says that the only response to ICRC complains about Abu Ghraib was a letter from BG Janice Karpinski dated December 24, 2003. The letter, the Report noted “tends to gloss over, close to the point of denying the inhumane treatment, humiliation, and abuse identified by the ICRC.”
prison. Romig told members of Congress last week, "Clearly ... we'd like to know who that was." Red Cross reports are kept confidential to prevent publicity-averse governments from denying the organization access to prisons around the world. Key witnesses are often not named.\textsuperscript{244}

Some claims of abuse have been made in the press by former prisoners. For example, three Britons freed from Guantanamo Bay claimed they suffered systematic brutality and sexual humiliation during their detention at the U.S. military base.\textsuperscript{245} A report released by their lawyers said prisoners at Guantanamo were stripped naked and forced to watch videotapes of other prisoners who had been ordered to sodomize each other. It also says one of the men was questioned with a gun to his head.\textsuperscript{246} Similar charges have been made by other prisoners.\textsuperscript{247}


\textsuperscript{245} \textit{But see} Neil A. Lewis, \textit{Guantanamo Detainees Deliver Intelligence Gains}, \textit{NY TIMES}, Mar. 20, 2004, at 18 ("The [American] officials denied the specific allegations of mistreatment made by prisoners recently returned to Britain whose accounts appeared in British newspapers and from Afghans who spoke to The New York Times in Kabul. Their accounts detail enforced privation, petty cruelty, beatings and planned humiliations.").


\textsuperscript{247} A Pakistani on-line press report claims that:

A Tunisian detainee testified other day before a U.S. military review hearing that he was abused while in captivity in Afghanistan before being brought to the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, a military official said.

The 35-year-old Tunisian told the review panel he was held in the dark and without sufficient drinking water for more than two months in Afghanistan, said a military officer who served as the tribunal recorder and whose identity was barred from being disclosed.

Military officials said the detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance before being turned over to U.S. troops. The man didn't specify which force was holding him at the time of the alleged mistreatment, but he told the panel the experience led him to falsely confess to training with militants, the tribunal official said.

The Tunisian told the panel he made the false confessions due to the "mistreatment he had received in Afghanistan, or as he phrased it, torture," the officer said.


In addition, reports of prosecutions arising from treatment of detainees in Afghanistan, especially by Special Operations forces, provide some potentially useful information. Thus, for example, charges against four Navy SEALs, involving abuse of a prisoner who later died, may result in testimony. The same applies to the charges against a civilian contractor for the CIA, David Passaro, who was recently indicted in Raleigh, N.C. for the beating death of an Afghan prisoner.

Finally, Seymour Hersh revealed additional facts in his *Chain of Command*. According to Hersh, in the late summer of 2002 a CIA analyst visited Guantanamo and interviewed at least thirty detainees. Hersh quotes one of the analyst’s colleagues:

> Based on his sample, more than half the people there didn’t belong there. He found people lying in their own feces, including two captives, perhaps in their eighties, who were clearly suffering from dementia.

Hersh claims that U.S. claims of providing a minimum of three hours of recreation a week to Guantanamo captives are, in some cases, not in compliance with the spirit of the Third Geneva Convention:

> For the tough cases . . . in mid-2002, at recreation time some prisoners would be strapped into heavy jackets, similar to straitjackets, with their arms locked behind them and their legs straddled by straps. Goggles were placed over their eyes and their heads covered with a hood. The prisoner was then led at midday into what looked like a narrow fenced-in dog run . . . and given his hour of recreation. The restraints forced him to move, if he chose to move, on his knees, bent over at a forty-five degree angle. Most prisoners just sat and suffered in the heat.

---


250 See generally Hersh, *supra* note 216. As is his practice, Mr. Hersh, a long-standing investigative journalist who first broke the My Lai story, did not reveal confidential sources. Given his history of accuracy, however, the author feels confident in at least adding them to the facts discussed here, especially since they are consistent with the pattern of events revealed in official investigations to date.

251 *Id.* at 2.

252 Hersh’s discussion does not indicate whether a distinction was made among detainees based on their status as Taliban, al Qaeda, or otherwise. It is, accordingly, impossible to determine on these facts whether this recreation was provided to persons arguably covered by the Third Geneva Convention.

253 *Id.* at 11-12. Hersh says his informant claims photographs of the procedure exist.
In another example, Hersh quotes a former Marine guard at Guantanamo who says he was encouraged by his squad leader to visit detainees "one or two times a month":

We tried to fuck with them as much as we could inflict a little bit of pain. . . . "There were always newspeople there," he said. "That's why you couldn't send them back with a broken leg or so. And if somebody died, I'd get court-martialed." The roughing up of prisoners was sometimes spur-of-the-moment, the former Marine said. . . One pastime was to put hoods on the prisoners and "drive them around the camp in a Humvee, making turns so they didn't know where they were." The prisoners would talk during the rides, the former Marine said, but "we didn't know what they were saying." I wasn't trying to get information. I was just having a little fun - playing mind control.254

Hersh also discussed the exhibition to the press of John Walker Lindh who was stripped, gagged, strapped to a board and exhibited to the press.255 He quotes an affidavit by Lindh's attorney, James Brosnahan:

a group of armed American soldiers blindfolded Mr. Lindh, and took several pictures of Mr. Lindh and themselves with Mr. Lindh. In one, the soldiers scrawled Ashithead across Mr. Lindh's forehead and posed with him...Another told Mr. Lindh that he was going to hang' for his actions and that after he was dead the soldiers would sell the photographs and give the money to a Christian organization.256

Following the delivery of this paper in October, 2004, additional facts were revealed which demonstrate that many of the claims of mistreatment and abuse were, in fact, true, and that many of the denials of such abuse

254 Id. at 12-13.
255 Id. at 4. Lindh was one of the "American Talibans."
256 Hersh, supra note 216, at 37. Hersh claims that the photographing of prisoners both in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to have been part of the dehumanizing interrogation process. Id. at 38-39. He quotes Gary Myers, the attorney for one of the Abu Ghraib MPs, as saying: "Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own?" Hersh claims that "the notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation had become a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives." Hersh bases his claim on The Arab Mind, a 1973 book by Raphael Patai. Hersh continues: "The Patai book, an academic told me, was 'the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior.' In their discussions, [the academic] said, two themes emerged - "one, that Arabs only understood force, and two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation." Id. at 39.

Hersh's claim for the source of this interrogation approach is interesting, if speculative. It adds weight to the need for any full investigation to determine the bases upon which it was designed, if only because it indicates potential criminal liability for persons engaged in developing the process.
were potentially suspect. Those facts were developed through three principal sources: documents obtained under Freedom of Information Act Requests and released by the American Civil Liberties Union; a Report prepared by Naval Inspector General Albert T. Church; and additional news reports of criminal investigations and charges against American personnel for alleged prisoner abuse at Guantanamo, or in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Revelation of that misconduct provides additional support for a close legal analysis of the status of individuals who claim mistreatment. To the extent that any of them qualify for protection under the Third Geneva Convention the legal implications for those who may bear command responsibility for Geneva violations may be quite important.

B. The Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques

Three principle defenses of the use of interrogation techniques outside FM 34-52 have been made public. They are the OLC Memorandum of August 1, 2002 to Alberto Gonzales, the JAG Brief by LTC Beaver of October 11, 2002, and the Working Group Report of April 4, 2003. These principle defenses share what the author considers to be a similar analytical defect; each presumes that the Third Geneva Convention is inapplicable to all Guantanamo detainees.


258 VICE ADMIRAL ALBERT T. CHURCH III, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INTERROGATION OPERATIONS, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/ d20050310exe.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) (full draft unavailable at time of review). In the Executive Summary, ADM Church revealed the existence of at least some substantiated abuse cases, although a number appeared to be absent.

1. The Bybee Memorandum of August 1, 2002

On August 1, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee provided a Memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales ("Bybee Memo II"). The Bybee Memo II examines the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its implementation in 18 United States Code §§ 2340-2340A. It devotes considerable effort to distinguishing torture, which it agrees is usually banned, from "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." It points out, for example, that "both the European Court on Human Rights and the Israeli Supreme Court have recognized a wide array of acts that constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, but do not amount to torture." Of particular note here is that the Bybee Memo II almost entirely ignores the Third Geneva Convention. While there is some discussion of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which deals with conflicts not of an international character), the Bybee Memo II concludes...

---

260 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130.

261 But see id. § V, at 31 (arguing at length that the powers of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, authorize conduct which would be otherwise illegal, if necessary to the defense of the United States).

262 Compare, e.g., id. at 15 n.8 (analyzing the reservations placed by the U.S. on its ratification of the Torture convention), with id. at 21-22 & 27-31 (analyzing the intention of the enabling domestic legislation); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture).

263 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 31. The Bybee Memo II discusses the 1978 case Ireland v. United Kingdom, in which the ECHR considered interrogation methods which included 1) wall standing where the prisoner leaned against a wall standing on his toes and with all his weight on his fingers, 2) continuous hooding except during interrogation, 3) subjection to loud and continuous noise, 4) sleep deprivation pending interrogation and 5) deprivation of food and drink through a reduced diet during and pending interrogation. Id. at 29; see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 41 (1976). The Bybee Memo notes that the ECHR concluded "that the techniques produce 'intense physical and mental suffering' and 'acute psychiatric disturbances,' [but] they were not [sic] sufficient intensity or cruelty to amount to torture." Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30.

The Bybee Memo also discusses Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel. Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30. In that case, the Israeli Supreme Court considered five interrogation methods which included forceful shaking, stress positioning with an opaque hood and loud music, crouching stress positions, excessively tight handcuffs, and sleep deprivation. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471, at para. 9 (1999). The Bybee Memo notes: "While the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that these acts amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment, the court did not expressly find that they amounted to torture." Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 30.

264 See, e.g., Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 15 n.8. This footnote refers to a to-date unpublished Memorandum from James C. Ho to John C. Yoo regarding the possible interpretations of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the
its discussion on GC3 by stating that "the standards of conduct established by common article 3 of Convention III, do not apply to 'an armed conflict between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist organization.'"265

More importantly for the concerns discussed in this article, the entire discussion of the more general protections applied to POWs is found in a short footnote. That footnote states, in pertinent part:

While Article 17 of [GC3] places restrictions on interrogation of enemy combatants, members of al Qaeda and the Taliban militia are not legally entitled to the status of prisoners of war as defined in the Convention.266

The restrictions of Article 17 are, of course, much broader than torture alone. In effect, the Bybee Memo II makes the case that, whether they are torture, or merely "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," certainly the interrogation techniques of Categories II and III constitute prohibited conduct when applied to POWs protected under the Article 17's prohibitions not just against physical and mental torture, but also against threats, insults, or "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."267

265 Bybee Memo II, supra note 130, at 15 n.8. The statement is certainly correct within its limitations. The questions presented by the invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of a terrorist organization, however, have other and more complex ramifications, as discussed above.

266 Id. at 38 n.22 (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002)). Article 17 of GC3 states in part:

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.

267 The Bybee Memo II was, to some extent, repudiated by the administration as pure legal analysis for hypothetical purposes when it was leaked to the public. See supra Part VI.A.1.b.i and the more extensive legal analysis infra Part VI.C.1. In addition, GC3 has separate restrictions on solitary confinement as punishment. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 90.
2. The Working Group Report

The Working Group’s Report contains considerable analysis of the interplay of prisoner of war status with interrogation techniques. As noted above, however, it operates from the central premise that it is bound by the Presidential Directive mandating the inapplicability of GC3. Despite those ground rules, however, the participants managed to openly articulate their concerns that violations of the Third Geneva Convention could be found in the extraordinary interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo.

It is the author’s belief that those concerns were well-founded. If, as appears likely from the facts adduced above, persons protected by GC3 were questioned using Category II and III techniques, if they were subjected to intentional humiliation, denied their religious rights, placed in solitary confinement, or any number of the other techniques discussed above, the Working Group was indeed well advised to express its doubts.

3. The Beaver Brief of October 11, 2002

Another legal Memorandum of importance here is the Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies which accompanied the Request for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies. JTF Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver stated as a factual predicate to her analysis that “[t]he detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay Cuba...are not protected by the Geneva Conventions.” She noted that:

While the procedures outlined in [Army FM 34-52] are utilized, they are constrained by, and conform to the GC and applicable international law, and therefore are not binding. Since the detainees are not EPWs, the Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily would govern captured enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO.

268 The analysis operates under the rubric that other states might take the position the Third Geneva Convention applied, as well as for purposes of determining potential legal problems. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 4, 68.
269 Id.
270 See discussion infra Part VI.C.
271 Beaver Memo, supra note 139, at part Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies.
272 Id. at part Request for Approval of Counter Resistance Strategies.
273 Beaver Memo, supra note 139, at part Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies, para. 2.
274 Id.
Consequently, LTC Beaver looked to other international law including the Convention Against Torture, as well as to U.S. domestic law, to determine the legality of the proposed interrogation techniques. She concluded in part that, "An international law analysis is not required for the current proposal because the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these detainees since they are not EPWs." If any detainee was, in fact, entitled to protection under the Third Geneva Convention, her analysis is, of course, incomplete.

C. Analysis of the Legal Justification of the Techniques

To the extent the legal justification for application of extraordinary interrogation techniques ignores the requirements of Third Geneva Convention it is fatally flawed. Almost all the attorneys who dealt with this question, however, did exactly that. The Beaver Brief, the Working Group Report and the Schlesinger Committee Report all were premised on the assumption that the Third Geneva Convention was inapplicable to detainees from Afghanistan. They all based that assumption on President Bush's February 2002 Order. That Order, however, is legally flawed, and a battlefield detainee, at least from the Taliban, is, in fact, entitled to the presumption of POW status.

In every case where the Article 5 presumption entitles a detainee to POW rights until his status is determined by a competent tribunal, the use of interrogation tactics which violate those rights is itself a war crime. In some instances, it may well constitute a grave breach.

275 *Id.* at 5, para. 4.
279 Presidential Order, *supra* note 63.
280 See discussion *supra* at Part V.A. The author finds it, quite literally, incredible that no consideration was given to the legal effects of failure to provide an AR 190-8(6) tribunal. Somewhere, a memo must exist.
281 For example, acts of intimidation under Article 13, failure to respect their person under Article 14, insults or exposure to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind under Article 17, failure to provide or allow retention of religious under Article 34, and denial of basic standards of treatment under Article 126. Third Geneva Convention, *supra* note 4, at arts. 13, 14, 17, 34, 126.
282 Article 130 includes as grave breaches "torture or inhuman treatment ...[and] wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health." *Id.* at art. 130. To the extent a reviewing court found that extraordinary interrogation techniques either constituted torture or inhuman treatment, or that separately, they caused great suffering or serious injury to body or health, even if they did not amount to torture or inhuman treatment per se, it would...
1. Under The Third Geneva Convention\textsuperscript{283} Application of a Number of the Extraordinary Interrogation Techniques May Constitute War Crimes

As the Article 15-6 reports discussed above set out in detail, the extraordinary interrogation techniques developed for use and applied against al Qaeda and the Taliban consist of general categories including physical and emotional abuse, environmental manipulation, and solitary confinement. Each of those categories included activities which violate the rights of POWs under the Third Geneva Convention.

a. Physical and Emotional Abuse Clearly Violates GC3

The POW Convention makes it clear that individuals and military units may not set their own standards for treatment of captured enemy soldiers.\textsuperscript{284} Any unlawful act or omission which causes death or seriously endangers the health of a POW is a grave breach,\textsuperscript{285} and POWs are "entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor."\textsuperscript{286} Finally, prisoners of war may not be physically or mentally tortured, threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant treatment to obtain information.\textsuperscript{287}

\textsuperscript{283} This article deals solely with the status and rights of prisoners of war and is thus principally concerned with discussion of the Third Geneva Convention. Because of the much wider mix of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the AR 15-6 reports and the Schlesinger Committee Report also dealt with the Fourth (Civilians) Geneva Convention. They are, in many respects, similar regarding fundamental rights.

\textsuperscript{284} Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12 (providing: "Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.").

\textsuperscript{285} Article 13 of GC3 states:

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. ....

Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Id. at art. 13.

\textsuperscript{286} Id. at art. 14.

\textsuperscript{287} Article 17 of GC3 states:
The extraordinary interrogation conduct revealed at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan against detained individuals is facially illegal as applied against prisoners of war. While beatings and sexual assaults at Abu Ghraib were roundly condemned by investigators, it has become clear that physical abuse was a part of detainee interrogations, at least in Afghanistan, and that it exceeded mere shoving, light slapping and finger pointing. The principal conduct violating GC3, however, appears to be mental abuse and humiliation. It includes, inter alia, forcing men into homosexual positions and simulated acts, into wearing women’s clothing, exposing them unclothed to women, and photographing those acts. That abuse

---

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information...

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Id. at art. 17.

Iraq requires no analysis to determine violations. The detainees are admittedly covered, and the Article 15-6 reports discuss the violations in detail. The only exception is their failure to recognize that confinement of POWs with criminal populations (the reports repeatedly refer to the “mix” at Abu Ghraib) is a separate violation of GC3. See id. at art. 22 (“Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.”)

A number of military personnel have been charged with severe physical abuse from incidents in Afghanistan. See supra notes 247-49. In addition, prisoners released from Guantanamo allege beatings. See supra notes 246-47. The latter are currently largely unsubstantiated.

In its discussion of military intelligence interrogations of Iraqi police officers at Abu Ghraib, the Fay Report notes: “The [Iraqi Police] were kept in various stages of dress, including nakedness, for prolonged periods as they were interrogated. This constitutes humiliation which is detainee abuse.” Fay Report, supra note 133, at 56 (emphasis added). Humiliating treatment is specifically banned by the Geneva Conventions.

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion. GCIV, supra note 137, at art. 27.

Some of those acts, of course, were denounced by authorities as unauthorized perversions. Nevertheless, there is a common element among all which is inescapable, i.e. the attempt to degrade a prisoner’s resistance though manipulation of sexual taboos.
appears designed to be particularly offensive to the cultural and sexual mores of conservative Moslem prisoners.\footnote{Third Geneva Convention, \textit{supra} note 4, at art. 13 ("\textquoteright\textquoteright[P]risoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.").}

It is quite clear that for that reason, the extraordinary interrogation techniques include indecent exposure in various forms, forced shaving, and the refusal to allow prisoners access to religious clothing, paraphenalia and literature.

During transit to Guantanamo, prisoners were shaved, stripped of their religious garb\footnote{See \textit{id.} at art 34 (stating: "Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.").} and forced to wear orange coveralls.\footnote{Article 46 governs transport of prisoners of war to different facilities:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of prisoners of war, shall take into account the interests of the prisoners themselves, more especially so as not to increase the difficulty of their repatriation.
  \item \textit{The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions not less favorable} than those under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. Account shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to which the prisoners of war are accustomed and the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
  \item The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate precautions especially in case of transport by sea or by air, to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall draw up a complete list of all transferred prisoners before their departure. \textit{Id.} at art. 46 (emphasis added).
\end{itemize}

\footnote{Article 18 of GC3 states:}

All effects and articles of personal use ... shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war . . . Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment . . . articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war. \textit{Id.} at art. 18.
deprivation,296 cell temperature adjustments, loud music and light adjustments.297
c. Solitary Confinement

A number of detainees were subjected to solitary confinement, not as punishment for rule infractions, but rather as a means of interrogation. That confinement is a direct violation of the Third Geneva Convention.298 It was also, at least as reported by Generals Taguba and Fay, and as claimed by the ICRC,299 anecdotally by reports from ex-prisoners,300 often done in conjunction with environmental manipulation in the confinement facilities.

In sum, to facilitate the breaking of a prisoner, the prisoner was, at least on occasion, left alone in a dark and dank or sweltering cell, for days or weeks at a time. The similarity to prior mistreatment of Americans held as POWs in three Asian wars – World War II in the Pacific,301 Korea,302 and

296 Id. at art. 87 (stating in part that “imprisonment in premises without daylight [is] forbidden”).

297 Article 25 of GC3 states:

Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.

The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.

The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted . . .

Id. at art. 25.

298 See id. at art. 21 (providing, in part, that “prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary”); Id. at art. 90 (limiting, in a complementary fashion, confinement for punishment to no more than thirty days with a further limitation that when further disciplinary punishment is imposed, “a period of at least three days must elapse between the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of one of these is ten days or more.”)

299 See notes 239-43.

300 See notes 244-51.

301 See Telegram from Huddle, Secretary of State to the Charge in Switzerland, Japanese Treatment of American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees (Jan. 8, 1945), in VI FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 316 (1945).

Vietnam, mistreatment against which we violently protested – is despicable.

Finally, and in addition to those systematic breaches, required information about detainees was not provided. Detainees were denied access to representatives of the ICRC, and in at least some instances in Iraq, they were hidden from ICRC inspections.

303 ROCHERSTE & KILEY, supra note 233.
305 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 70 (“Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123 . . .”). Article 122 of the GC3 states:

Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power . . . Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to the conflict shall give its Bureau the information referred to in the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its power . . . This information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned. Subject to the provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as available to the Information Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number, place and full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the person to be informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.

Id. at art. 122.

AR 190-8 at § 1-7 articulates the information collection, storage and transmission requirements for the US National Prisoner of War Information Center. AR 190-8, supra note 90, at § 1-7(c)(1). In addition to requiring the NPWIC to collect and store Geneva Convention required information on EPWs and retained persons, it requires, inter alia, that the NPWIC “[o]btain and store information concerning [civilian internees] and [other detainees] who are kept in the custody of U.S. Armed Forces . . .” Id.

306 Article 126 of GC3 states:

Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
All of this conduct, to the extent that it was perpetrated upon prisoners of war, is a breach of the Third Geneva Convention; some constitute grave breaches\textsuperscript{308} punishable by all signatory powers.\textsuperscript{309} Much of it is punishable

Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.

The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.

Third Geneva Convention, \textit{supra} note 4, at art. 126 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{307}The Fay Report notes, as an example of so called “ghost detainees”:

For example, the CIA interned three Saudi national medical personnel working for the coalition in Iraq. CIA officers placed them in Abu Ghraib under false names. The Saudi General in charge of the men asked U.S. authorities to check the records for them. A search of all databases using their true names came back negative. Ambassador Bremer then requested a search, which produced the same results. .... Ultimately [...] Colin Powell requested a search, and as with the other requestors, had to be told the three men were not known to be in U.S. custody. Shortly after the search for the Secretary of State, a JDIC official recalled that CIA officers once brought three men together into the facility. A quick discussion with the detainees disclosed their true names, which matched the name search requests, and the men were eventually released.

Fay Report, \textit{supra} note 133, at 53-54 (citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{308}Article 130 of GC3 provides that:

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful [sic] killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully [sic] causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully [sic] depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention. Third Geneva Convention, \textit{supra} note 4, at art. 130.

\textsuperscript{309}Article 129 provides in part:

The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
under federal criminal law,\textsuperscript{310} the Uniform Code of Military Justice,\textsuperscript{311} and international law.\textsuperscript{312} In addition to the factual argument that detainees are not prisoners of war, the Yoo and Bybee Memos raised arguments relating to American constitutional law and other conventions.\textsuperscript{313} While those discussions are not applicable in this analysis of GC3 protections, certain potential defenses may be raised, and should at least, be examined.

2. Extraordinary Interrogation Techniques May Constitute Other Crimes

While extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that in addition to the direct criminality of breaching the Third Geneva Convention, other domestic and international criminal violations may be implicated.

a. U.S. Domestic Law

Violations of U.S. domestic law may arise from these facts both under military law doctrines and under criminal law applicable to all American citizens.

i. Military Law

Within the ambit of military law, the command responsibility doctrine and the Uniform Code of Military Justice would have application to uniformed service members involved in the development and application of any illegal interrogation or detention.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{310} See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.a (discussing the War Crimes Act and federal conspiracy law).

\textsuperscript{311} See discussion infra Part VI.C.2.a; see also supra note 120 (discussing the Yamashita case).

\textsuperscript{312} See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{313} See supra Part IV.

\textsuperscript{314} See supra note 131. The Working Group Report presents this issue comprehensively and lists potential charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, among which are, inter alia, Cruelty, Oppression or Maltreatment, Article 93; Reckless Endangerment, Article 134; Assault, Article 128; Involuntary Manslaughter, Article 119; Unpremeditated Murder, Article 118; Disobedience of Orders, Article 92; Dereliction of Duty, Article 92; and
The "principle of 'command responsibility' that holds a superior responsible for the actions of subordinates appears to be well accepted in U.S. and international law in connection with acts committed in wartime... That is because "a commander clearly must be held responsible for those matters which he knows to be of serious import and with respect to which he assumes personal charge. Any other conclusion would render essentially meaningless and unenforceable the concepts of great command responsibility accompanying senior positions of authority."

The essence of that point in both military and international law was articulated by a U.S. military tribunal in the High Command Case:

Under basic principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer who merely stands by while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors which he knows is criminal violates a moral obligation under international law. By doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international responsibility...

[The authority, both administrative and military, of a commander and his criminal responsibility are related but by no means coextensive.] Criminality does not attach to every individual in the chain of command. .... There must be a personal dereliction that can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be personal negligence amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the actions of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.

A number of other charges or crimes more directly analogous to civilian criminal law are also possibilities, as well, of course, as standard criminal charges under Title 18 of the United States Code and federal common law.

Maiming, Article 124. WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 45-47 (citing relevant articles from Uniform Code of Military Justice).

315 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3rd 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996).
317 Case No. 12: U.S. v. von Leeb (High Command Case), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10. NUREMBERG, OCTOBER 1946 - APRIL 1949, at 512 (1953); but see Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, at 15 (affirming command responsibility on a considerably lower standard).
318 See supra note 131; WORKING GROUP REPORT, Apr. 4, supra note 36, at 7-19 (citing possibilities such as Torture, Assault, Maiming, Murder, Manslaughter, Interstate Stalking and Conspiracy).
ii. Possible Criminal Liability Under Civilian Law

An agreement by officials, acting under color of law, to commit grave breaches of the Third Geneva Convention would seem to involve, at the least, violations of the War Crimes Act\(^{319}\) and federal conspiracy law.

The Yoo/Delahunty and Gonzales Memos\(^{320}\) devote considerable time to raising the specter of prosecution under the War Crimes Act. Their refutation of its applicability rests solely on the argument that the Third Geneva Convention does not protect members of the Taliban or al Qaeda.\(^{321}\) If a grave breach does exist, then the language of the statute seems to create a *prima facie* case in the circumstances here discussed.\(^{322}\) In addition, there also seems to be a separate possibility of a conspiracy charge.

Federal conspiracy law is premised on the concept that a conspiracy is a distinct evil which, because it provides a unique synergy to the crime unavailable from individuals acting alone, is separately punishable.\(^{323}\) That enhanced criminality is especially true in the case of government officials,\(^{324}\) and if that criminal enterprise constitutes an international delict in the name of a national government, the policy reasons for the theory's application seem even more enhanced.\(^{325}\) In addition, once the conspiracy is joined, conduct arising from it, even if unforeseen, may create liability for all the conspirators.\(^{326}\)


\(^{320}\) See supra Part IV.

\(^{321}\) See id.

\(^{322}\) The War Crimes Act says, in part, that "[w]hoever [is a U.S. national and] ... commits a [grave breach of the Third Geneva Convention] ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death." 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (1997).

\(^{323}\) See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961); see also United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (stating that "[t]he essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.").


\(^{325}\) See, e.g., the Indictment in the "Doctors Trial: The Medical Case of the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings":

The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government in the prosecution of war criminals, charges that the defendants herein participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit and did commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, duly enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945.


Thus, to the extent that the Office of Legal Counsel and White House counsel erred in their analysis of the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention to prisoners captured on Afghan battlefields, and those errors led to grave breaches, they may have created a snare of immense proportions. They may also have implications in international realms.

b. Other International Law

This article is not a survey, but it bears mentioning that in addition to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to which the White House Memos devoted so much space, there are also possible violations of international law punishable in a number of arenas. Those include the classic common plan conspiracy of the post World War II trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo, and the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of signatory states under the Third Geneva Convention itself.

327 The availability of an advice of counsel defense in a conspiracy action might depend on good faith reliance. Cf. United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1195 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that “[i]n order to convict a defendant of conspiracy or mail fraud, the government must prove that he had the specific intent to commit the crime charged.”). Here, good faith might be difficult to find where the JAGs, service counsel, and Department of State were in overt disagreement with Yoo/Delahunt and Gonzales, and where it appears the military lawyers were "cut out of the loop" because their advice was unwelcome. It was the author’s experience as a civil litigator, that when “train wrecks” occurred because of counsel’s advice, quite often counsel had been informed of the result sought before the advice was rendered.

328 See Torture Convention, supra note 6.

329 See supra Part IV. The author tends to agree with the Government Memos’ argument that the United States reservation on constitutional definitions of torture may limit applicability of the Torture Convention. It is questionable, however, whether the reservation limits action by other states signatory, or whether it stretches anywhere nearly as widely as the Memos’ claim. The severe and permanent harm standard argued for by Judge Bybee sounds more like a defense counsels brief on appeal than a neutral memorandum of law.


331 Article 129 of GC3 provides in part:

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 129.
An additional interesting question is the possibility of International Criminal Court ("ICC") jurisdiction, a consummation devoutly opposed by two presidential generations. To the extent that a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute its own war criminals, ICC jurisdiction may attach where an appropriate complaint is filed by a signatory state. If the OLC interpretation of Presidential powers is correct, and binding upon the courts of the United States, it may have the unintended consequence of creating international jurisdiction separate from that required by the Third Geneva Convention.

None of this is to say that defenses or mitigating facts may not exist. At least some of the circumstances here were unique, and the United States was clearly the victim of an unlawful attack by international criminals harbored, inter alia, in the Afghan hills. It is difficult to imagine though, their applicability in circumstances as widely, cavalierly, and improperly applied as the extraordinary interrogation techniques used on persons covered by the Geneva Conventions.


333 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute] (providing in part that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes [and] [f]or the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: [g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.”); Id. at art. 13 (providing in part that “[t]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: [a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party.”); Id. at art. 17 (providing in part that “the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”); see also, Anthony Dworkin, International Criminal Court to be Launched in July, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Apr. 15, 2002, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-icc.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).

334 The situation is somewhat analogous to that which would exist if a President exercised constitutional pardon authority to block the ability of U.S. courts to prosecute a government official under the War Crimes Act. The binding nature of the pardon authority on the U.S. Courts is indisputable; the consequences might create ICC jurisdiction. See generally, Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Todd David Peterson, The Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225 (2003).
3. Possible Defenses or Circumstances in Mitigation

In the circumstances involving application of extraordinary interrogation techniques to the Taliban and al Qaeda, additional legal defenses or alleged mitigating factors may involve a necessity defense, a claim of superior orders, and some sort of ratification argument. All would, of course, be intensely fact driven, and each would require assertion on a case by case basis.

The Yoo/Delahunty and Bybee memoranda discussed the necessity defense at length. It is available under the law of war in certain limited circumstances, and is probably not best approached on the analytical basis in which necessity is considered in the standard problematical approach to law of war issues. Rather, given the mandatory nature of the Third Geneva Convention, and the open invitation for abuses, it would seem any exception should be strictly limited, if permitted at all.

The claim of superior orders was rejected as an absolute defense at Nuremburg but may still have validity either as a defense in limited circumstances, or in mitigation.

335 See, for example, the law governing siege (at least where Protocol I is inapplicable) which allowed conduct, otherwise illegal, under a necessity rubric. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 780 (1992): Annex VI.B, The Battle of Sarajevo and the Law of Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I) (1994), at Part VIII. (stating that "[s]ubject to article 17 of the Geneva Civilians Convention, which encourages the conclusion of local agreements for removal of some persons from besieged areas, and article 23 of the Civilians Convention, which provides for the free passage of medical and religious supplies for all persons and of essential food for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases, the commander of the investing force has the right to forbid all communications and access between the besieged place and the outside. Simply put, under the law as it existed prior to Protocol I, the investing force was, generally speaking, entitled to starve, freeze, or dehydrate the inhabitants of a besieged area into submission.").

336 That is to say, as one of the guiding principles identified by the commentators. See, e.g., Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, PART III: LAW OF WAR ON LAND, § 3, at 2 (1958).


338 See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 99.

339 See JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2000), Rule 916(d), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (stating that "[i]t is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.").
Finally, the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum appears to contain some sort of theory of ratification. That is, the authors seems to believe that by issuing an order under what they claim is his implied constitutional powers, President Bush has made the military actions of his subordinates, which are necessary to carry out those powers, inherently legal.

These possible defense arguments notwithstanding, it appears to the author that certain conclusions may be drawn from the facts and law developed above.

VII. The Symbiotic Relationship of Tribunals, Applicability of the Geneva Convention, and Improper Interrogation Techniques

To date, it appears beyond doubt that the United States has applied interrogation techniques, which are illegal under the Third Geneva Convention, to some captured persons who have at least a reasonable argument that they are within its protection. These facts, and the law discussed above, show a pattern of development with certain threads running through it.

First, well before any publicly revealed analytical memoranda established an argument that the Taliban were unlawful combatants, President Bush had signed an Order establishing military tribunals which applied an evidence rule which permitted the use of information obtained through means which would subject the information to exclusion in a court martial or U.S. district court. The White House, the Department of Justice, and civilian authorities in the Department of Defense appear to have fiercely rejected any attempts by uniformed lawyers to delete that rule.

Second, a small group of OLC lawyers seem to have developed both the legal justifications for non-application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and the legal analysis which permitted the use of interrogation techniques against Guantanamo detainees in violation of the Convention.

Third, some of the techniques developed for use against Taliban detainees, and applied to them at Guantanamo, were indeed in violation of the rights of a POW under the Third Geneva Convention.

Fourth, a number of the extraordinary interrogation techniques developed, approved and applied were specifically designed to exploit

---

340 See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, art. 8, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/war.term/trib_02.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (stating that "[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.").

341 See discussion supra Part IV.

342 Id.
cultural and religious susceptibilities of conservative Afghan Moslems. The use of nudity, dogs, shaving of beards, and denial of religious paraphernalia were all intended to intimidate and humiliate Moslem detainees. 343

Fifth, at least some cross-fertilization between Guantanamo and Iraq occurred when Major General Geoffrey Miller advised in August and September 2003, when MG Miller led a team to assess Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence using Guantanamo procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines, and when Guantanamo interrogation procedures were promulgated by LTG Ricardo Sanchez. Additional military cultural degradation was caused by confusion among military police and military intelligence personnel with Guantanamo and/or Afghan connections, regarding the applicability and rules of the Geneva Conventions in Iraq.

Sixth, in the context of persons protected by the Third Geneva Convention, the use of dogs and nudity at Abu Ghraib were an extension of the already illegal techniques developed for Guantanamo to soften Moslem detainees for interrogation. The use of sexual assault, including indecent exposure and forced cross-dressing, was not necessarily such an extension, but it was reasonably foreseeable where prison guards were tasked to intimidate and humiliate detainees based upon their cultural and sexual taboos.

Seventh, under the circumstances, the doctrine of command responsibility and the law of conspiracy must both be examined for their applicability. To the extent that a commander knew or should have known that his or her subordinates were engaged in unlawful conduct, or failed to adequately investigate and remedy abuses, command responsibility may create liability. In the civilian context, where government officials operating under color of law have entered into an agreement to violate a federal law, 344 all persons who joined in that agreement are liable for all reasonably foreseeable violations of law which were done in its furtherance. 345 Thus, even if a superior authority had ordered only some

343 See Seymour Hersh, who notes:

Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law, and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University explained. "Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other—it's all a form of torture," Haykel said. Hersh, supra note 216, at 23-24.

344 See, e.g., note 319 and accompanying text (discussing the War Crimes Act).

345 Thus, for example, a civilian order to apply extraordinary interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, if applied to a person who was, in fact, protected by the Third Geneva Convention, might result in a grave breach. A similar analysis could apply to use of a military commission to try a POW. If, as would be necessary, that decision was carried out
violations, the commission of others by his subordinates might still create liability.\textsuperscript{346}

Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to discern a logical nexus among these factors. The continued refusal to apply an exclusionary rule, even in the review panels created by Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, which demonstrates a continuing desire to obtain information with the advance knowledge that it might be considered illegally extracted by a court acting under the rule of law, combined with the continuous and connected application of interrogation techniques in violation of the Third Geneva Convention, appears to be more than coincidence.

VIII. Conclusion

This article has dealt with a relatively narrow issue, but that issue has extraordinary implications for the future of the rule of law, both in the United States and internationally. On the one hand, it concerns only the application of the sweeping protection, arising out of the global panoramas of the Second World War, to benighted tribal warriors who might, if they were aware of its existence, cheerfully deny its benefits to captured enemies. On the other, it threatens the hard won protection, such as it is, which remains the slim reed at which the captured soldier, airman, or marine may grasp in his or her time of deepest despair.

More importantly, it deals with the commitment by states to interpret their solemn obligations in good faith, when military advantage, and perhaps the general welfare of the home front, dictate otherwise. How convenient it would have been for the British to have tortured captured Luftwaffe air crew to determine the next target. How tempting for the United States to have threatened the Afrika Korps tanker to discern enemy plans. By and large, though, in times of the gravest national peril, the West stood fast against such misconduct.

Surely reciprocity counted. For much of the war, the Germans held our own as prisoners in at least equal numbers. But it was not reciprocity alone. National ideals, global public opinion, military culture, and what are now termed “obsolete concepts of chivalry” all mattered.\textsuperscript{347}

\textsuperscript{346} There should also, at some point, be a defense available. Where the command authority eventually issued orders rescinding prior interrogation techniques, and instituting safeguards, the decision to continue to apply those techniques and ignore the safeguards might be reasonably unforeseeable. That would, of course, be a determination for a trier of fact.

\textsuperscript{347} Article 5 of GC3 requires that POW status be determined in cases of doubt “by a competent tribunal” rather than by, \textit{inter alia}, executive fiat. This provision surely reflects the drafters’ belief that reciprocity and chivalry, as well as a certain empathy, would be
In its dry language, the Fay Report is damning:

[The Department of Defenses'] development of multiple policies on interrogation operations for use in different theaters of operations confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib. ... National policy and DoD directives were not completely consistent with Army doctrine concerning detainee treatment or interrogation tactics, resulting in CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policies and practices that lacked basis in Army interrogation doctrine. As a result, interrogators at Abu Ghraib, employed non-doctrinal approaches that conflicted with other DoD and Army regulatory, doctrinal and procedural guidance.348

Those who sow the wind should not be surprised at what they reap. The Third Geneva Convention was written in the light of the still glowing embers of Nazi death camps. Millions of POWs had perished there because of race, religion, and ethnicity.349 They had been subjected to that regime despite the strictures of the 1929 Geneva Convention, not merely because of Germany's disregard for the law, but also because of her perversion of its provisions.

At war's end, the world resolved to do better. The Third 1949 Geneva Convention was the child of that resolution. Its presumptions and protections are not mere words, they are not charming relics of a bygone era, and they are not obsolete. We disregard their strictures not merely at our peril, both legal and moral, but more importantly at the peril of our military personnel, in service and yet unborn.350

Who sets such precedents bears a heavy responsibility to remember what happens when we do battle with monsters. After the Abu Ghraib story broke, President Bush addressed the key issues in this article:

America stands against and will not tolerate torture. We will investigate and prosecute all acts of torture and undertake to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment in all territory under our jurisdiction. American

present in the minds of military officers examining facts to determine the fate of a captured warrior. Certainly, the experience of Allied POWs in Nazi Germany sometimes bore that out. See, e.g., Henry Chancellor, Colditz: The Untold Story of World War II's Great Escapes, 126-127 (2001) ("All the prisoners who encountered the military court were impressed by the fairness of the senior German officers who sat on it.").

348 Fay Report, supra note 133, at 112-13 (emphasis added).

349 Not to mention the abysmal treatment of the Japanese of all their prisoners, whatever their race or creed.

350 See Fay Report, supra note 133, at Executive Summary 5 (stating that "[s]oldiers/Sailors/Airmen/ Marines should never be put in a position that potentially puts them at risk for non-compliance with the Geneva Convention or Laws of Land Warfare.").
personnel are required to comply with all U.S. laws, including the United States Constitution, Federal statutes, including statutes prohibiting torture, and our treaty obligations with respect to the treatment of all detainees. The United States also remains steadfastly committed to upholding the Geneva Conventions, which have been the bedrock of protection in armed conflict for more than 50 years. These Conventions provide important protections designed to reduce human suffering in armed conflict. We expect other nations to treat our service members and civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Our Armed Forces are committed to complying with them and to holding accountable those in our military who do not.\textsuperscript{351}

That commitment by the Armed Forces of the United States to holding accountable violators of the Geneva Conventions is consistent with our history and values. Does it extend beyond the military to hold responsible all who conceived, ordered and abetted such violations; no matter how high their office? The abyss is gazing back at us.\textsuperscript{352}


\textsuperscript{352} As we began this article with a quotation about doing battle with monsters, so let us end it. Winston Churchill, speaking as First Lord of the Admiralty in a radio broadcast on January 20, 1940, stated:

Very few wars have been won by mere numbers alone. Quality, willpower, geographical advantages, natural and financial resources, the command of the sea, and, above all, a cause which rouses the spontaneous surgings of the human spirit in millions of hearts—these have proved to be the decisive factors in the human story. If it was otherwise, how would the race of men have risen above the apes; how otherwise would they have conquered and extirpated the dragons and monsters; how would they have evolved the moral theme; how would they have marched forward across the centuries to broad conceptions of compassion, of freedom, and of right? \textit{The War Situation} (BBC Broadcast, Jan. 20, 1940), available at http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Joybells.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
Appendix 1

Interrogation Techniques Permitted In FM 34-52 (Appendix H)\textsuperscript{353}

1. Direct Approach
2. Incentive Approach
3. Emotional Love
4. Emotional Hate
5. Fear Up Harsh
6. Fear Up Mild
7. Decreased Fear Down
8. Pride and Ego Up
9. Pride and Ego Down
10. Futility Technique
11. We Know All
12. Establish Your Identity
13. Repetition
14. File and Dossier
15. Mutt and Jeff
16. Rapid Fire
17. Silence

Appendix 2

Interrogation Techniques Requested By Joint Task Force 170 on October 11, 2002.\textsuperscript{354}

\textit{Category I Techniques}

1) Yelling at the detainee (Not directly in his ear or at the level it would cause physical pain or hearing problems)
2) Techniques of deception:
   a) Multiple-interrogator techniques
   b) Interrogator-identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an Interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.

\textsuperscript{353} For a complete description of these techniques, see FM 34-52, \textit{supra} note 138, at appendix H.

\textsuperscript{354} Phifer Memo, \textit{supra} note 147.
Category II Techniques

1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made to \[sic\] through the OIC, Isolation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent \[sic\] nature.\[355\]
4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.
5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
6) The detainee may have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.
7) The use of 20 hour interrogations.
8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
10) Removal of clothing.
11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc.).
12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress.

Category III Techniques

Techniques in this category may be used only by submitting a request through the Director, JIG, for approval by the Commanding General with appropriate legal review and information to Commander, USSOUTHCOM. These techniques are required for a very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees (less than 3%).\[356\] The following techniques, and other aversive techniques, such as those used in U.S. military interrogation resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies, may be utilized in a carefully coordinated manner to help interrogate exceptionally resistant detainees. Any of these techniques that require more than light grabbing, poking or pushing, will be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their safe application.

\[355\] Author's note: This statement seems to imply that isolation may be used for more than a limited category of selected detainees.

\[356\] Author's note: This statement seems to imply that Category I and II techniques are required for more than 3 per cent of detainees.
1) The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family.
2) Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring).
3) Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.
4) Use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.

Appendix 3

Interrogation Techniques Approved by the Secretary of Defense

The Interrogation Techniques Requested by Joint Task Force 170 on October 11, 2002 were forwarded by General James T. Hill, Commanding General of the Southern Command to General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation that he believed Categories I and II were "legal and humane." He noted, however, that:

I am uncertain whether all the techniques in the third category are legal under U.S. law, given the absence of judicial interpretation of the US torture statute. I am particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death of the detainee or his family. However, I desire to have as many option as possible at my disposal and therefore request that Department of defense and department of Justice lawyers review the third category of techniques.

On 2 December, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved an Action Memo from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the DOD. His approval permitted the use of counter-resistance techniques at Guantanamo limited to categories I and II and the fourth technique in Category III. Accordingly, the interrogation techniques approved and implemented for Guantanamo on December 2, 2002, were as follows:

---

357 Haynes Memo, supra note 162 (on which Secretary Rumsfeld added a handwritten note that "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?").
358 Id.
359 Mr. Haynes noted that he had discussed the issue with his deputy Douglas Feith and General Myers and that they "[...believe that, as a matter of policy, a blanket approval of Category III techniques is not warranted at this time. Our Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint." Id.
**Category I Techniques:**

1) Yelling at the detainee (Not directly in his ear or at the level it would cause physical pain or hearing problems)

2) Techniques of deception:
   a) Multiple-interrogator techniques
   b) Interrogator-identity. The interviewer may identify himself as a citizen of a foreign nation or as an Interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees.

**Category II Techniques:**

1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made to the OIC, Isolation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by the Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.
4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.
5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
6) The detainee may have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood should not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.
7) The use of 20 hour interrogations.
8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).
9) Switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs.
10) Removal of clothing.
11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc.).
12) Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress.

**Category III Techniques:**

1) Use of mild non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.

---

360 Author's note: This statement seems to imply that isolation may be used for more than a limited category of selected detainees.
Appendix 4

Interrogation Techniques Recommended By the DOD Working Group Report of April 4, 2003

1. Direct: Asking straightforward questions.
2. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention, from detainees. (Privileges above and beyond POW-required privileges).
3. Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for an individual or group.
4. Emotional Hate: Playing on the hate a detainee has for an individual or group.
5. Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee.
6. Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee.
7. Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee.
8. Pride and Ego Up: Boosting the ego of a detainee.
9. Pride and Ego Down: Attacking and insulting the ego of a detainee, not beyond the limits that would apply to a POW.
10. Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility of a detainee.
11. We Know All: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator knows the answer to questions he asks the detainee.
12. Establish Your Identity: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has mistaken the detainee for someone else.
13. Repetition Approach: Continuously repeating the same question to the detainee within interrogation periods of normal duration.
14. File and Dossier: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has a damning and inaccurate file, which must be fixed.
15. Mutt and Jeff: A team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. The harsh interrogator might employ the Pride and Ego Down technique.
16. Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing detainee to answer.
17. Silence: Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort.
18. Change of Scenery Up: Removing the detainee from the standard interrogation setting (generally to a location more pleasant, but no worse).
19: Change of Scenery Down: Removing the Detainee from the standard interrogation setting and placing him in a setting that may be less

See supra note 203.
comfortable; would not constitute a substantial change in environmental quality.

20: Hooding: This technique is questioning the detainee with a blindfold in place. For interrogation purposes, the blindfold is not on other than during interrogation.

21: Mild Physical Contact: Lightly touching a detainee or lightly poking the detainee in a completely non-injurious manner. This also includes softly grabbing of shoulders to get the detainee’s attention or to comfort the detainee.

22: Dietary Manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee; no intended deprivation of food or water; no adverse medical or cultural effect and without intent to deprive subject of food or water, e.g., hot rations to MREs.

23: Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create moderate discomfort (e.g. adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell). Conditions would not be such that they would injure the detainee. Detainee would be accompanied by interrogator at all times.

24: Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee (e.g., reversing sleep cycles from night today.) This technique is NOT sleep deprivation.

25: False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States are interrogating him.

26: Threat of Transfer: Threatening to transfer the subject to a 3rd country that subject is likely to fear would subject him to torture or death. (The threat would not be acted upon nor would the threat include any information beyond the naming of the receiving country).

The following list includes additional techniques that are considered effective by interrogators, some of which have been requested by USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM. They are more aggressive counter-resistance techniques that may be appropriate for detainees who are extremely resistant to the above techniques, and who the interrogators strongly believe have vital information. All of the following techniques indicate the need for technique-specialized training and written procedures to insure the safety of all persons, along with appropriate, specified levels of approval and notification for each technique.

27: Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while still complying with basic standards of treatment.

28: Use of Prolonged Interrogations: The continued use of a series of approaches that extend over a long period of time (e.g., 20 hours per day per interrogation).
29: Forced Grooming: Forcing a detainee to shave hair or beard. (Force applied with intention to avoid injury. Would not use force that would cause serious injury.)

30: Prolonged Standing: Lengthy standing in an abnormal position (non-stress). This has been successful, but should never make the detainee exhausted to the point of weakness or collapse. Not enforced by physical restraints. Not to exceed four hours on a 24-hour period.

31: Sleep deprivation: Keeping the detainee awake for an extended period of time. (Allowing individual to rest briefly and then awakening him repeatedly.) Not to exceed 4 days in succession.

32: Physical Training: Requiring detainees to exercise (perform ordinary physical exercises actions) (e.g. running, jumping jacks); not to exceed 15 minutes in a two-hour period; not more than two cycles, per 24-hour periods), Assists in generating compliance and fatiguing the detainees. No enforced compliance.

33: Face slap/Stomach slap: A quick glancing slap to the fleshy part of the cheek or stomach. These techniques are used strictly as shock measures and do not cause pain or injury. They are only effective if used once or twice together. After the second time on a detainee, it will lose the shock effect. Limited to two slaps per application; no more than two applications per interrogation.

34: Removal of Clothing: Potential removal of all clothing; removal to be done by military police if not agree to by the subject. Creating a feeling of helplessness and dependence. This technique must be monitored to ensure the environmental conditions are such that this technique does not injure the detainee.

35: Increasing Anxiety by Use of Aversions: Introducing factors that of themselves create anxiety but do not create terror or mental trauma (e.g., simple presence of dog without directly threatening action). This technique requires the commander to develop specific and detailed safeguards to insure the detainee’s safety.

Appendix 5

Interrogation Techniques Approved By Secretary Rumsfeld on April 16, 2003

A. Direct: Asking straightforward questions.
B. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention, from detainees. (Privileges above and beyond POW-required privileges). Caution: Other nations that believe that detainees are
entitled to POW protections may consider that provision and retention of religious items (e.g. the Koran) are protected under international law. Although the provisions of the Geneva Convention are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.

C. Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for an individual or group.

D. Emotional Hate: Playing on the hate a detainee has for an individual or group.

E. Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee.

F. Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee.

G. Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee.

H. Pride and Ego Up: Boosting the ego of a detainee.

I. Pride and Ego Down: Attacking and insulting the ego of a detainee, not beyond the limits that would apply to a POW. Caution: Article 17 of Geneva III provides, "Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Other nations that believe that detainees are entitled to POW protections may consider this technique inconsistent with the provisions of Geneva. Although the provisions of Geneva are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.

J. Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility of a detainee.

K. We Know All: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator knows the answer to questions he asks the detainee.

L. Establish Your Identity: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has mistaken the detainee for someone else.

M. Repetition Approach: Continuously repeating the same question to the detainee within interrogation periods of normal duration.

N. File and Dossier: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator has a damning and inaccurate file, which must be fixed.

O. Mutt and Jeff: A team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. The harsh interrogator might employ the Pride and Ego Down technique. Caution: Other nations that believe that POW protections apply to may consider this technique as inconsistent with Geneva III, Article 13 which provides that POWs must be protected against acts of intimidation.

---


363 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, at art. 34.

364 Id. at art. 17.
Although the provisions of Geneva are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.

P. Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing detainee to answer.

Q. Silence: Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort.

R. Change of Scenery Up: Removing the detainee from the standard interrogation setting (generally to a location more pleasant, but no worse).

S. Change of Scenery Down: Removing the Detainee from the standard interrogation setting and placing him in a setting that may be less comfortable; would not constitute a substantial change in environmental quality.

T: Dietary Manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee; no intended deprivation of food or water; no adverse medical or cultural effect and without intent to deprive subject of food or water, e.g., hot rations to MREs.

U: Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create moderate discomfort (e.g. adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell). Conditions would not be such that they would injure the detainee. Detainee would be accompanied by interrogator at all times. [Caution: Based on court cases in other countries, some nations may view application of this technique in certain circumstances to be inhumane. Consideration of these views should be given prior to use of this technique.

V: Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee (e.g. reversing sleep cycles from night today.) This technique is NOT sleep deprivation.

W: False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States are interrogating him

The following list includes additional techniques that are considered effective by interrogators, some of which have been requested by USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM. They are more aggressive counter-resistance techniques that may be appropriate for detainees who are extremely resistant to the above techniques, and who the interrogators strongly believe have vital information. All of the following techniques indicate the need for technique-specialized training and written procedures to insure the safety of all persons, along with appropriate, specified levels of approval and notification for each technique.

X: Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while still complying with basic standards of treatment. [Caution: The use of isolation as an interrogation technique requires detailed implementation
instructions, including specific guidelines regarding the length of isolation, medical and psychological review, and approval for extensions of the length of isolation by the appropriate level in the chain of command. This technique is not known to have been generally used for interrogation purposes for longer than 30 days. Those nations that believe detainees are subject to POW protections may view use of this technique as inconsistent with the requirements of Geneva III, Article 13 which provides that POWs must be protected against acts of intimidation; Article 14 which provides that POWs are entitled to respect for their person; Article 34 which prohibits coercion and article 126 which ensures access to basic standards of treatment. Although the provisions of Geneva are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of this technique.

The Rumsfeld Memorandum also included a section entitled “General Safeguards.” It provided that:

Application of these interrogation techniques is subject to the following general safeguards: (i) limited to use only at strategic interrogation facilities; (ii) there is a good basis to believe that the detainee possesses critical intelligence; (iii) the detainee is medically and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in combination); (iv) interrogators are specifically trained for the techniques; (v) a specific interrogation plan (including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel) has been developed; (vi) there is appropriate supervision; and (vii) there is appropriate specified senior approval for use with any specific detainee (after conducting the foregoing and receiving legal advice).

The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a detainee with the least intrusive method, always applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Operating instructions must be developed based on command policies to insure uniform, careful and safe application of any interrogations of detainees.

Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account numerous, often interlocking factors such as a detainee’s current and past performance in both detention and interrogation, a detainee’s emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses, an assessment of possible approaches that may work on a certain detainee in an effort to gain the trust of the detainee, strengths and weaknesses of interrogators, and augmentation by other personnel for a certain detainee based on other factors.

Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detainee’s emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close
cooperation with the units detaining the individuals. The policies established by the detaining units that pertain to searching, silencing and segregating also play a role in interrogation of a detainee. Detainee interrogation involves developing a plan tailored to an individual and approved by senior interrogators. Strict adherence to policies/standard operating procedures governing the administration of interrogation techniques and oversight is essential.