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Social Inclusion in a Context of Global Migration - Introduction

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This issue of *Societies Without Borders (SWB)* examines the pressing issue of social inclusion in a larger context of global international migration. In 2015, there were an estimated 244 million international migrants, or 3 percent of the world’s population (UN DESA 2016), representing a 41 percent increase in the number of international migrants over the prior 15 years, as people move from southern to northern countries, from poorer to richer countries, and from less secure to more secure countries. The social integration of those left in the wake of global migrations is perhaps the leading and most consequential public policy and human rights challenge in our world today. The process of migrating may place an individual in a vulnerable state, and once the individual migrant reaches one’s destination, there may still be much negotiation, because the migrant may be in a compromised position with respect to citizenship and working papers, language ability, relevant skill sets, social networks, and acceptance by the receiving country.

Symptomatic of this, recent laws passed in Western Europe – such as the outlawing of minarets through a national referendum in Switzerland and the outlawing of full-face veils in certain public spaces in France, Belgium, Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands – seeking assimilation of newcomers into the majority culture may, in effect, cause Muslim citizens to feel excluded and rejected. And in the United States, recent initiatives such as Executive Order 13769 often referred to as the Muslim travel ban, or policies that have criminalized some forms of international migration and led to the separation of children from their parents, together point to a restricted view on migration. Compounding these forms of social exclusion and rejection, immigrants are overwhelmingly also visible minorities, so the visible marker of being from a non-majority, racial-ethnic group may erroneously convey immigrant status and/or non-legal immigrant status, often associated stigma, even to those in the second generation or later, who are likely to be citizens (Bass 2014).

Focusing on ‘migratory status,’ the United Nations views international migrants and refugees as ‘vulnerable’ and has resolved to treat their social inclusion as a human right and an explicit point of analysis within the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda (UN IOM 2018). Within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), social inclusion is defined as being a participant in a society’s political, economic and societal processes. The degree to which individuals and groups face involuntary exclusion from society’s political, economic and societal processes may affect their human security. By focusing on social inclusion as it affects those who migrate, we can shed light on points of vulnerability and opportunity for migrants’ social integration. Using four empirical studies, this special issue describes and profiles social inclusion for international migrants and those of immigrant descent. Social inclusion and exclusion measures are written into policy, and they play themselves out in the social experiences and structural realities of international migrants as well as those who oppose them in the majority population of receiving countries. Together, these papers explore civic engagement, socio-economic and cultural incorporation, and the relative openness of attitudes toward immigrants from three vantage points: 1) the majority population, 2) the foreign-born and/or immigrant descent population and 3) public policy agendas that shape immigrant integration. These papers collectively bring empirical findings and high-quality data sources gathered on three continents to bear on the topic of social inclusion of immigrant individuals.
The first paper in this issue, “Immigrant Voices: How do patterns of expressive forms of civic engagement differ across immigrant generation?” by Renee Stepler and Hiromi Ishizawa, includes the vantage points of the majority population (i.e., those in the third or later generations) as well as first-generation and second-generation individuals. This research examines two understudied types of expressive civic engagement across first generation, second generation, and third generation or later individuals, including: 1) boycotting or buycotted a company’s products in the last year, and 2) contacting an official to express an opinion in the last year. While most studies focus on electoral participation, this study adds to our understanding of currently understudied forms of civic engagement. Using Current Population Survey data and regression analysis, they find that first generation individuals are 44 percent less likely to report that they boycotted or buycotted in the last year, while second generation individuals are actually 14 percent more likely to report this type of civic engagement, compared to the larger US population arriving three generations or more ago, all else being equal. And compared to White individuals, Blacks, Asians and Hispanics are one-third to one-half as likely to report they participated in either one of these expressive civic engagement activities. It is striking, too, that when generation is controlled for, there is an increase for second generation individuals making their expressive civic engagement participation rates on par with those who are third generation and later. Overall, the research of Stepler and Ishizawa provides evidence of lower levels of social integration in the first generation in the US context as measured by these two markers of expressive civic engagement. Adding to this, they find considerable assimilation in the second generation; levels of expressive civic engagement in the second generation are on par with those in the larger US population.

The second paper in this issue, “Determinants of Open Attitudes towards Foreign Nationals in Japan,” by Shigemi Ohtsuki, models what predicts open attitudes toward foreign nationals in Japan using two samples, bringing in the perspectives of the Japanese majority population and the foreign national minority population. Overall, Ohtsuki finds that there is a social inclusion gap that needs to be bridged in Japanese society. While Ohtsuki’s analysis finds evidence for a majority, or 66 percent, of immigrants supporting the most positive attitude of “integrated coexistence” (i.e., tabunka-kyosei in Japanese), just 20 percent of Japanese people support integrated coexistence, and a plurality, 34 percent, support exclusionary coexistence. From the Japanese majority sample, Ohtsuki’s multivariate findings indicate that integrated coexistence is associated with being younger, having some English-speaking ability, having some interactions with immigrants, and having ethnically homogenous neighborhood interactions. There is a gap in Japanese society, because the orientations of foreign national minorities are more open and oriented to integrated coexistence, while the orientations of the Japanese majority population are overwhelmingly more closed. However, Ohtsuki explains that social policies seeking coexistence in society need not focus on immigrants but instead should focus and highlight inclusiveness and a higher quality of life for all as fellow human beings.

The third paper in this issue, Daniel Herda’s “Comparing Ignorance: Imagined Immigration and the Exclusion of Migrants in the US and Western Europe,” uses a sample of 2,363 from the 2011 Transatlantic Trends Immigration Survey, which brings in the perspectives of citizens from six countries including the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Herda first profiles citizens’ perceptions of and actual immigrant population sizes in each country, and finds substantial to incredibly large misperceptions about the actual number of immigrants in their country. In the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, the perceived number is over twice the actual number of immigrants, while in Spain the perceived number is 66 percent
higher than the actual number of immigrants. In each country, this paper documents an over-estimate of the illegal status of immigrants. Then, taking both perceived immigrant population size and perceived legal status of the immigrant population as focal variables in multiple regression analyses. Herda finds that the magnitude of the misperception about the legal status of immigrants is strongly associated with the willingness to exclude immigrants in all countries but Spain, while misperceptions about the size of the immigrant population figures weakly into holding exclusionary attitudes across these countries. Moreover, Herda contends that there is a indeed a relationship between having a misperception that immigrants hold a mostly illegal status and expressing anti-immigrant attitudes. The misperception of mostly illegal status is associated with social exclusionist attitudes.

In the fourth article, “Radical Right-Wing Parties in Western Europe and their Populist Appeal,” Peter Doerschler and Pamela Jackson consider how public policy agendas shape immigrant integration and social inclusion. They use data from 13 Western European countries gathered by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the European Social Survey, Multiculturalism Policy Index, and Parliaments and Governments Database to consider what drives electoral support for far-right parties. Extending current models of voter preference (see Inglehart and Norris 2016), they include two new focal measures relating to personal grievances for the ethnic majority: 1) whether they sense being in a group that is discriminated against, and 2) whether they fear walking alone at night. Doerschler and Jackson find that both of these focal variables are positively associated with voting for a far-right party, and this is in addition to previously established explanatory factors. The ethnic majority’s personal grievances are associated with voting for a far-right populist party. When testing for relationships between the focal variables and feeling an affinity to a right-wing populist group, their findings are mixed. With these mixed findings, Doerschler and Jackson explain how it is that majority citizens feel marginalized socially and economically, and therefore, may identify with the rhetoric of far-right party leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France who refers to the forgotten ones, or to Austria’s far-right presidential candidate Norbert Hofer who won 46 percent of the vote in 2016. Finally, Doerschler and Jackson highlight the utility of including these two measures of personal grievance to current models to understand increased popularity of far-right political agendas that have brought about greater restrictiveness on immigration in the Western European Union countries in their study.

Altogether, this special issue provides several vantage points from which to understand what helps and what hinders the social inclusion of international migrants in a receiving country.
References


