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TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Richard Gordon*

At least since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first published its Forty Recommendations, financial institutions in FATF-compliant jurisdictions have been required to implement preventive measures that require FIs to identify customers, establish client profiles, monitor for unusual transactions, review those transactions to see if there was suspicion that they involved the proceeds of crime and, if so, report the transaction to the authorities in the form of a suspicious transaction report (STR). When these requirements were first established, neither financial institutions nor their supervisors/regulators had much experience as to what in a client’s profile and the client’s patterns of transactions might indicate money laundering. However, based on an expanding knowledge of how criminals tend to launder their money, over time financial institutions have developed increasingly effective detection and reporting systems. By studying known examples of laundering, the FATF, FATF-Style Regional Bodies, and national competent authorities (especially financial intelligence units) have identified patterns or indicators of possible money laundering, and made them available to financial institutions as money laundering typologies. In addition, there has been some feedback from financial intelligence units and other competent authorities to financial institutions with respect to their anti-money laundering programs. Using these sources, financial institutions have been able to develop systems to help them

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determine which transactions carry a materially greater risk that laundering is involved.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF adopted the VIII Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. Among these new requirements were that financial institutions also report to authorities if they suspected that a transaction involved the financing of terrorism. However, there was little in the way of known patterns of terrorism financing that financial institutions could use to help identify such transactions. While since that time a number of limited typology studies have been made available by the FATF, no comprehensive study of terrorism financing typologies has yet been published. For this reason, the Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force requested a comprehensive study on past terrorism financing techniques that would add to value to efforts by both financial institutions and governmental authorities in identifying terrorism financing transactions or patterns, also known as typologies.

This preliminary report on prosecutions in the U.S examined 266 instances of prosecutions that involve charges of terrorism, material support of terrorism, or other terrorism-related matters. Of that number, thirty were determined to involve financial institutions. Using only publicly available information, the study found twenty-four where there was sufficient information on financial transactions to see if there were any discernible patterns or typologies for terrorism financing. The study revealed that sixteen of those indicated known typologies of money laundering, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of charitable donations. In only one was there a typology that suggested possible terrorism financing and not laundering. Of the sixteen cases involving suspicious transactions only three appeared to involve criminal proceeds. From these cases, it appears that terrorists often use money laundering techniques to disguise the origins of funds or to prevent competent authorities from tracing payments from end-users to originators, even when the origin is not criminal proceeds. However, because it was not possible to review any STRs (referred to in the U.S. as Suspicious Activity Reports or SARs) that may have been filed by financial institutions with respect to these transactions, it was not possible to determine if financial institutions, in conducting their review of those transactions, had determined that they were suspicious with respect to money laundering or terrorism financing. It was also impossible to know if FinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money laundering or terrorism financing. Such reviews would be most helpful in completing the study.
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I. THE GLOBAL STANDARD AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING

A. Overview

Over the past forty years, anti-money laundering rules have been expanded and refined. The vast majority of the world’s jurisdictions now

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endorse the latest version of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering (FATF 40 Recommendations)³ and accompanying Methodology for Assessment.⁴


Starting in 1990, these global standards have required financial institutions to monitor the transactions of their customers, to examine unusual transactions to determine if they might involve the proceeds of crime and since 2001—the financing of terrorism, and to report any suspicious transactions to special government authorities known as financial intelligence units (FIUs). The FIUs then analyze the reports (known as suspicious transaction reports (STRs)), along with other relevant data, and make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or transactions should be investigated.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in governments greatly intensifying their anti-money laundering activities and prompted an intensified global effort against terrorism financing. In 2002, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank adopted the FATF 40 Recommendations and the eight new Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing (Special Recommendations) as a world standard. They, along with the FATF and various regional anti-money laundering groups known as FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), also began a joint global compliance program by assessing the extent to which individual


4 See FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 73 (2009) [hereinafter METHODOLOGY] (listing the endorsing bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and a number of regional financial interest groups).

5 See generally FATF Plenary Meeting, supra note 3 (detailing the development of the standards over time).

6 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7–8 (Recommendations 11–15 directing financial institutions to be aware of certain types of suspicious transactions).

7 See generally FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2001) [hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS] (proposing recommendations focused on terrorism for addition to the original recommendations).

8 Schott, supra note 3, at VII-3–5.


countries were implementing those standards. Failure to implement the standards adequately can result in a broad application of sanctions or countermeasures, including bans on doing business with financial institutions located within the borders of non-complying jurisdictions. As a result, millions of STRs have been forwarded to FIUs by financial institutions throughout the world, although how many have resulted in further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically available.

The FATF’s 40 Recommendations and the Special Recommendations are designed to “provide an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.” Together they cover, among other things, the criminalization of money laundering and terrorism financing, the freezing and seizing of criminal proceeds and terrorism funds, key preventive measures against laundering and terrorism financing for financial institutions and other institutions subject to preventive measures, FIUs, and

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11 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 2–3 (stating that a uniform system of assessment, including a single assessment methodology, was agreed to by the IMF, the World Bank and the FATF in 2002). IMF assessment reports can be found at Detailed Assessment Reports, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=175 (last updated May 24, 2012). World Bank assessments can be found at Financial Market Integrity – Assessments, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/Y902MD2ZL0 (last visited May 24, 2012). These bodies and each of the eight FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are undertaken with the participation of the IMF and World Bank) use the uniform assessment system. FATF assessments can be found at Mutual Evaluations, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ (last visited May 24, 2012) and those of regional bodies can be found at Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) – Assessments, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm#reports (last visited May 24, 2012).

12 See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (in particular, Recommendation 21 stating: “[f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendation . . . Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures.”). For example, under Title III, Sec. 311(a) of the USA Patriot Act, if a financial institution is operating with a jurisdiction outside of the U.S. and there is concern about that jurisdiction’s money laundering efforts, the Secretary of the Treasury “may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or payable-through account by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution.” USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318Ar(b)(5) (2004)).

13 E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, to author (Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail].

14 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 at 2.
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international cooperation.\textsuperscript{15} The 40 Recommendations have included similar preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft.\textsuperscript{16} In effect, these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and uncovering money laundering between the private and public sector.

\textsuperscript{15} The FATF 40 Recommendations are broken down into 4 groups. First is Group A, titled “Legal Systems,” which includes the “scope of the criminal offence of money laundering” and “provisional measures and confiscation.” Id. at 3–4. Second is Group B, titled “Measures to be Taken by Financial Institutions and [certain] Non-Financial Businesses and Professions to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,” which includes prohibition on shell banks, customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client identification and transaction monitoring), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (including internal training and audit programs), other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations), measures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF Recommendations, and regulation and supervision. Id. at 4–10. Third is Group C, titled “Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing,” which includes competent authorities and their powers and resources (including the establishment of a financial intelligence unit) and transparency of legal persons and arrangements. Id. at 10–12. Fourth is Group D, titled “International Co-operation,” which includes international commitment to implement various treaties, mutual legal assistance and extradition, and other forms of co-operation. Id. at 12–14. The IX Special Recommendations include: (1) ratification and implementation of UN instruments; (2) criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; (3) freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; (4) reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism (also required in Recommendation 13); (5) international co-operation, (6) alternative remittance systems; (7) wire transfers; (8) non-profit organizations; and (9) cash couriers. See generally FATF, IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2010) [hereinafter IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS].

\textsuperscript{16} Since 1990, there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow the “preventive measures” provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. See FATF, FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (1990), available at http://www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/Download%20Centre/FATF.pdf; see also FATF, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 1295 (1996), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fatf_40_recommendations.pdf. The current definition of financial institutions includes any person who engages in acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, traveler’s checks, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees and commitments; trading in: money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities, commodity futures trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; and money and currency changing. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65–66. Since 2003, most of the preventive measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain designated non-financial businesses and persons including: casinos (which also includes internet casinos); real estate agents; dealers in precious metals; dealers in precious stones; lawyers; notaries; other independent legal professionals and accountants; and trust and company service providers. Id. at 64.
B. **Financial Sector Role**

1. **Overview**

FATF Recommendations 5 through 13, plus 21 and 22 (and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies financial institutions. Unfortunately these Recommendations are not a model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend.\(^{17}\) However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement:\(^{18}\) financial institutions must (1) establish and maintain customer identity (including beneficial owner and controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2) create and maintain an up-to-date customer profile;\(^ {19}\) (3) monitor transactions to see if they fit with the customer profile of transactions that are legitimate; (4) if not, examine further any such transaction to see if it might represent the proceeds of crime or financing of terrorism, including by examining the source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the FIU, along with a description of why the financial institution believes that the transaction is suspicious. Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 34 (and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system to ensure that the financial institution comply with their preventive measures requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution system.

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18 A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on anti-money laundering and terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF Recommendations based on the regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Hong Kong. Article 5.1(a)–(e) of the Model Regulation outlines CDD as the “(a) identification of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d) maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of customer transactions.” Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being “of sufficient nature and detail . . . to monitor the customer’s transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and detect suspicious transactions.” *Id.*

19 If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with proceeds of crime, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. *Id.*
The financial institution’s role focuses on three basic objectives. The first is to help exclude from the financial system possible criminal and terrorist elements. The FATF 40 and Special IX do this by making financial institutions identify and profile potential—and, periodically, existing—customers to screen out possible criminals and terrorists.20 The second is to make available to law enforcement financial information that can be used in criminal investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. The FATF 40 + Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to maintain records of the identity of all clients and their transactions.21 The third is to identify customers who might be criminals or terrorists so that law enforcement can decide whether to investigate and prosecute such persons. The FATF 40 + Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to monitor customer transactions based on their profiles and report to law enforcement those that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing are involved.

The U.S. largely complies with these requirements through statutory and regulatory measures (although the US does not extend these requirements to all those designated non-financial businesses and persons as defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to financial institutions.22 The E.U. also largely complies through both Directives

20 See infra Part I.B.2, notes 38–48, and accompanying text.
21 See infra Part I.B.2, notes 49–51, and accompanying text.
(essentially instructions to members of the Union) and implementing legislation at the member state level.\textsuperscript{23} The language used to implement the Recommendations is often similar to that found in the Recommendations.\textsuperscript{24}

2. Details

FATF Recommendation 5 requires that financial institutions identify their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer account, which, in the case of legal persons and other legal arrangements such as trusts, includes taking “reasonable measures” to identify the physical persons who own or control the legal person.\textsuperscript{25} Recommendation 12 extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial businesses and persons (known as DNFBPs; for purposes of this Report the term “financial institution” should be read to include DNFBPs), which include casinos (which often deal with cash that can be exchanged for chips and vice versa, providing laundering opportunities), real estate agents (in part because real estate is often of high value, it is often used as an investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious metals (included for similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of precious metals can be easily transferred), lawyers, notaries, and persons who assist in the setting up of trusts and companies (these are often professionals who assist launderers in hiding assets).\textsuperscript{26} Although neither the Recommendation itself nor the Methodology uses the term “client profile,” Recommendation 5 requires that the financial institutions determine the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship of a potential—and periodically, of a

\textsuperscript{23} Sorcher, \textit{supra} note 2 at 408–10 (discussing the various Directives already applied and the structure of the proposed “Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive”).

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Compare} FATF 40 \textit{RECOMMENDATIONS, supra} note 2, at 5 (Recommendation 5 describing the measures to be taken in performing customer due diligence), \textit{with Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, art. 5 (U.K.)} (adopting language almost identical to FATF Recommendation 5 in describing the measures to be taken for customer due diligence). Furthermore, in the course of their assessment work for the IMF and the World Bank, researchers have reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the U.K. and often found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This may be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies with the standard.

\textsuperscript{25} FATF 40 \textit{RECOMMENDATIONS, supra} note 2, at 5–6 (Recommendation 5 requiring customer due-diligence and record-keeping). The Methodology allows an exception from this latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. \textit{METHODOLOGY, supra} note 4, at 17–18.

\textsuperscript{26} FATF 40 \textit{RECOMMENDATIONS, supra} note 2, at 7. Recommendation 22 requires that the principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad. \textit{Id.} at 9.
current—client and a “knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”

This serves two purposes. If a financial institution cannot establish a potential client’s identity and profile, it must terminate the business relationship. Second, the financial institution can measure future transactions of accepted clients against this baseline of normal or typical transactions. Specifically, financial institutions must “obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship . . . [and] conduct ongoing customer due diligence on the business relationship,” and undertake a “scrutiny of transactions under taken throughout the course of th[e] relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, its business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.” If the financial institution cannot comply, the financial institution should terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction. Second, the client profile allows the financial institutions to monitor client transactions to see if they are unusual compared with the profile.

A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption of an optional risk-based approach for certain preventive measures. According to the Financial Action Task Force, the adoption of risk sensitivity “involve[s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified . . ..” This risk-based program, which apparently does not apply to terrorism financing, contrasts with the previous program, in which each of the FATF Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of relative risk levels.

27 Id. at 5.
28 Id. at 9. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with shell banks and “guard against” establishing relations with those that do. Id.
29 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17.
30 Id. at 19. It should also consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the Financial Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
32 GUIDANCE ON RBA, supra note 31, at 2. According to the FATF, the new focus on risk allows financial institutions and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly how. Id. During the years when the FATF was considering the adoption of a risk based-approach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF delegates from a law enforcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory background,
determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis, depending
on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction.\footnote{FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 19. The Methodology goes on to provide certain examples of higher risk categories. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. Recommendation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family members or close associates, which are termed politically-exposed persons. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 22. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have risk management systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to take reasonable measures to establish the “source of wealth and source of funds” and to “conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.” In other words, if a customer is a politically exposed person the financial institution and certain others must always take measures to establish the source of funds. Recommendation 6 was added in 2003 to address a perceived public backlash against developed country banks that had laundered the proceeds of developed country dictators. Id. at 5–6.}

Recommendation 10 requires that financial institutions maintain
customer records, including identification and transaction records sufficient
to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for evidence in a
prosecution, and that these records be maintained for at least five years and
be available for inspection by competent authorities.\footnote{Id. at 7. FATF Recommendation 10 also suggests that financial institutions keep and maintain client account records, and that they “must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.” Id. Competent authorities are defined as “all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors.” METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 62. An FIU is a financial intelligence unit. Id. at 66.}

Special Recommendation VII provides more detail with respect to wire transfers.\footnote{See IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3 (recommending that countries take actions to enhance their security and gain meaningful originator information for wire transfers).}
This, along with Recommendation 5, allows investigative and prosecutorial authorities to “follow the money” of criminal suspects.\(^{37}\)

Recommendation 11 requires that “[f]inancial institutions pay special attention to complex, unusual large and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.”\(^{38}\) Financial institutions must examine, “as far as possible,” the background and purpose of such transactions, and establish their findings in writing.\(^{39}\) This requirement is separate from Recommendation 5’s requirement for ongoing customer due diligence with respect to “scrutiny of transactions.”\(^{40}\) Recommendation 13 requires that a financial institution report promptly to the governmental FIU if it “suspects” or has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.\(^{41}\) The Methodology describes this as filing a STR.\(^{42}\) Key to the subject of this Report, Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions to file reports if they suspect terrorism financing.\(^{43}\)

Most jurisdictions provide a template or form for filing STRs (or, in the U.S., Suspicious Activity Reports: SARs). The U.S. form requires, in addition to financial institutions, client, and transaction identification information that a box be checked to characterize the suspicious activity. Options include “structuring/money laundering” and “terrorism financing,” as well as various boxes relating to fraud, embezzlement, and identity

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\(^{37}\) FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 4–5 (proposing identification requirements that will allow institutions and governments to more easily trace accounts). The U.S. has put in place similar rules. FFIEC Manual, supra note 45, at 31, 118–22, 261–64 (detailing identification procedures for different types of customers in order to ensure accounts and transactions are traceable).

\(^{38}\) FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 7.

\(^{39}\) Id. at 5, 7 (Recommendations 5 and 10 listing necessary information to be kept on file and how files should be managed).

\(^{40}\) Id. at 5; see also Methodology, supra note 4, at 25 (“A financial institution should be required by law or regulation to report to the FIU (a suspicious transaction report–STR) when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.”).

\(^{41}\) Methodology, supra note 4, at 25.

\(^{42}\) Id.

\(^{43}\) Special Recommendations, supra note 7, at 2. Recommendation 21 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP pay “special attention” to business relationships and transactions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (or average) attention). FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 2, at 9. This Recommendation raises the costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Recommendations as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the Recommendations, especially as determined by assessment reports. Id.
Also required is a narrative description of the suspected violation, including what is unusual, irregular, and suspicious about the reported transaction.\(^4^5\)

It is these Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that create the system requiring financial institutions to monitor customer transactions based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing might be involved. Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop internal policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering programs, including compliance management arrangements, internal training, and audit capacities.\(^4^6\) Recommendation 16 extends most of these requirements to the same designated non-financial businesses and persons as found in Recommendation 12, although not all.\(^4^7\)

An essential aspect of this part of the preventive measures system should be emphasized. Financial institutions must design and implement their own systems.\(^4^8\) While the five-part requirement describes what these


\(^4^5\) Id. Part V.

\(^4^6\) FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.

\(^4^7\) Id. at 8. Recommendation 14 protects financial institutions from any liability for filing suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from revealing that such reports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. rules comply with these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.18–19 (2006) (describing the types of transactions that require reporting, including funds derived from illegal activity or transactions that have no business or apparent lawful purpose).

\(^4^8\) See, e.g., FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (Recommendation 5 stating: “[f]inancial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures . . . but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 5 (Recommendation 6 stating that financial systems should “[h]ave appropriate risk management systems. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 8 stating: “financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 9 stating: “[a] financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with [customer due diligence requirements] in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.”) (emphasis added); id. at 7 (Recommendation 10 stating: “records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.”) (emphasis added); id. (“Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions. . . . The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities and auditors.”) (emphasis added); id. at 8 (Recommendation 13 stating: “[i]f a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing it should be required to report promptly its suspicions. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. (“[f]inancial institutions should develop program[s] against money laundering and terrorist financing . . . [including] the development
systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any detail as to how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions are not told how to implement those requirements. An exception to this is Recommendation 25, which requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions and others subject to preventive measures, “in particular in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.”

Neither compliance reports nor sanctions reported by supervisory authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance systems. Financial institutions also do not publicize exactly how they implement these requirements. Clearly, monitoring of transactions to determine if they vary from the expected client profile is the first key. Such monitoring appears to be based first, as required by Recommendation 11, on whether a transaction (or series of transactions) differs in magnitude from that normally expected of the client, based on the client’s profile. Further scrutiny of the transaction can determine if something else appears unusual, such as an unusual transferor or transferee.

One aspect of successful transaction analysis is link analysis, a technique used to find associations within data that might have relevance to the particular research question. Link analysis explores associations within collections of data. Increasing the number of data sets available increases the number and types of links that can be identified. There are a number of different types of data sets that could be helpful in money laundering or terrorism financing link analysis. First, personal and financial data (including personal and businesses names, addresses, phone numbers, of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management arrangements...”) (emphasis added).

49 Id. at 10.
50 See id. (Recommendation 25 stating only that guidelines should be established, not what those guidelines should be).
51 An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preventive measures is a desire for protecting proprietary information in the context of competitive concerns, something researchers have learned from numerous interviews conducted with compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S., Hong Kong, The British Virgin Islands, and the Philippines over the past five years. See Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF): Case Study, PRICWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/lu/en/anti-money-laundering/case.jhtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing almost no detail on a preventive measures system recommended by an outside consultant).
52 Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69.
53 FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/CBFITFS_Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS]; see also Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69. Much of the information in the following two paragraphs of text has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 13.
names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, deposits, funds transfers) would link people and businesses through their financial transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a relationship with company B and person C.

Next, descriptive links can be established with databases that describe the type of business activities normally conducted by the persons within the link. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and other information such as that which is found in business directories like Dunn and Bradstreet. Links can also be made to data that include money laundering or terrorism financing indicators, such as law enforcement data, case files, or STRs, can also be made.

Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can help determine if a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or suspicious. For example, if person A has a terrorism-related record or has made past suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise suspicion that payments might be related to terrorism financing. This suspicion could be raised further if person A owns or controls company B and company B itself has no known business, and if B itself is located in a jurisdiction where terrorism is known to be active. If C has a record as a terrorist or terrorist organization, a stronger suspicion might be raised that the payments were made to finance terrorism. Obviously, the greater the amount of relevant data and data types, the more extensive will be the link analysis. However, financial institutions and DNFBPs are restricted in their access to some useful data sets.

Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also described as data mining and the use of red flags.\(^{54}\) Such “red flags” or “indicators” are based on laundering or terrorism financing typologies. Such typologies are those typically provided by the FATF or local competent authorities (sometimes, they result from international financial institutions’ own FIU efforts). Without such typologies it is difficult for financial institutions to know if a transaction or series of transaction is, in fact, an indicator of laundering or terrorism financing.

Some financial institutions contract out some of their customer identification and client monitoring programs to third-party service providers. A review of some of their programs provides some insight into services offered. For example, some firms assist in customer identification and profiling by providing a risk-screening service to check individual or entity names against a comprehensive data set.\(^ {55}\) Firms can also supply


transaction monitoring services. One firm “monitors and detects” suspicious transactions “across all business lines” using “a fully integrated dynamic and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine [which] detects suspicious activities.” This is accomplished using “risk modeling” and “risk-based algorithms” to “analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and efficiently.” Presumably, they use link analysis combined with red-flag analysis to help determine which transactions warrant the filing of a report.

C. Public Sector Role

Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system—to ensure private sector compliance with its preventive measures requirements—and the criminal investigation and prosecution system for state law enforcement authorities. The public sector’s role focuses on three basic objectives. The first objective is to ensure the private sector’s compliance with their preventive measure responsibilities. Essentially, governmental authorities must supervise and regulate financial institutions to ensure compliance. This must include both guidance and examination functions, including the potential application of sanctions. The second objective is to ensure that STRs lead to the investigation of appropriate cases of suspected crime and terrorism. Essentially, a FIU receives and analyzes these reports along with other key information. It then decides which should be further investigated, and it forwards them to the appropriate government agency (typically the police). The FIU then decides, sometimes in consultation with state prosecutors, whether and how to go forward.

Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions “in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.” The Methodology goes further by


57 ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®, supra note 56.

58 Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the FATF Recommendations; 26 through 32 are under “C. Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent authorities, Their Powers and Resources.” FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–11.

59 Id. at 10.
stating that authorities should provide a description of money-laundering and terrorism-financing techniques and methods and any additional measures to ensure that the systems are implemented by financial institutions. This includes information on current techniques, methods and trends (typologies), examples of actual money laundering cases; and case-by-case feedback, including if an STR was found to relate to a legitimate transaction.

In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures, Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions be subject to adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of the preventive measures, while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the imposition of sanctions. Recommendation 26 requires that countries establish an FIU to serve as a national center for the receipt, analysis, and

60 METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 33.

The methods used for laundering money and the financing of terrorism are in constant evolution. As the international financial sector implements the FATF standards, criminals must find alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities. The FATF identifies new threats and researches money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF Typologies reports describe and explain their nature, thus increasing global awareness and allowing for earlier detection.

Id.
62 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–10. Recommendation 24 extends this requirement to designated non-financial businesses and persons. Id. at 10.
63 Id. at 9, 11. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004) (addressing “financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1980) (requiring recordkeeping of financial transactions). The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders, against financial institutions and casinos. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1414–15 (2007).

Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering number of fines on banks for failing to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been hit with a $30 million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with a $30 million fine for its record-keeping failures. And the Department of Justice has brought criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank out of business.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
64 FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. The line between what some countries formally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and other law enforcement agencies is often blurry. This Report refers to the financial intelligence unit using a function-

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dissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. It further states that the FIU should have timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and law-enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STRs. Recommendation 10 states that competent authorities (including FIUs) should have access to records kept by financial institutions and DNFBPs. Finally, Recommendation 40 states that countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the widest possible range of international cooperation to their foreign counterparts, including information relating to money laundering, provided that controls and safeguards are in place to ensure that information exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with obligations concerning privacy and data protection. The Methodology further states that FIUs should be authorized to allow foreign intelligence units to search their own databases, including law enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality safeguards limiting the use of the data. This is the only substantive Recommendation relating to FIUs.

See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. For example, FinCEN has access to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s TECS II system, the FBI’s National Criminal Information Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information and NDIC Systems, the U.S. Secret Service database, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. It also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s list of Specially Designated Nationals, the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File, and the State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to commercial database services from organizations such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of “Politically Exposed Persons.” FinCEN also maintains its own database of investigations and queries conducted through FinCEN’s systems. FinCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 53, at 9–10.

FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.

Id. at 13–14.

See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The draft methodology included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of financial intelligence units, including most of those described in infra notes and accompanying text. However, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an informal association of financial intelligence units, objected to the spelling out in such detail of the purposes and activities of FIUs because of the difficulty of finding consensus on such a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevertheless, the representatives largely concurred that the criteria in the methodology described an effective financial intelligence unit. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 38 (2002). The U.S. largely complies with these re-
Dividing the task of determining suspicious and really suspicious transactions between the private sector and public FIUs usually begins with the receipt of an STR, after which the FIU engages in a two-part analysis. In the first part, known as “tactical analysis,” the FIU looks for additional information on the persons and transactions involved or other elements involved in a particular case to provide the basis for further analysis.\(^{70}\) A key element of such tactical analysis is link analysis, which has been discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically have available various types of data, including those publicly available databases to which the private sector has access. An FIU can also have access to nonpublic databases such as tax records, police records, immigration and customs records, vehicle registries, and supervisory findings, as well as investigation reports for ongoing investigations, criminal records (which are nonpublic in many countries), currency transaction reports, currency and monetary instrument reports, and related-party data (same address or telephone number, known associates, etc.).\(^{71}\)

Following tactical link analysis, the FIU typically undertakes operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical information to formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of the suspect to produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It uses:

> [A]ll sources of information available to the FIU to produce activity patterns, new targets, relationships among the subject and his or her accomplices, investigative leads, criminal profiles, and—where possible—indications of possible future behavior. One of the techniques of operational analysis used in some FIUs is financial profiling.\(^{72}\)

Based on such analysis, the FIU may or may not disseminate a report for further investigation.\(^{73}\) In recommending an SAR for further investigation, FIUs may include a description of what they had learned from these different types of analysis. This is often called “actionable intelligence” that can assist law enforcement in conducting a further investigation.

Another important function of the FIU is strategic analysis, or the development of relevant knowledge on laundering or terrorism-financing techniques. Examples include the identification of evolving criminal patterns in a particular group or the provision of broad insights into

\(^{70}\) See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-5–6 (describing the analytical role of FIUs); see also IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 57–58 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, FIUs].

\(^{71}\) Verhelst e-mail, supra note 13.

\(^{72}\) IMF, FIUs, supra note 70, at 60.

\(^{73}\) Id. at 61.
emerging patterns of criminality, including transactions particular to a given group, ideology or geographic location.\textsuperscript{74} The FIU can then use these for its own operational analysis of STRs through linking as well as to develop guidelines, typologies etc. for use by financial institutions.\textsuperscript{75} This generally follows the system used by FinCEN in the U.S.\textsuperscript{76}

II. DETECTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING

A. Overview

As discussed above, the FATF adopted the Special Recommendations in November, 2001, after the previous month’s terrorist attacks against the U.S. However, that the financing of terrorism should be so closely tied to anti-money laundering was by no means completely obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the original FATF 40 made no reference to it. Anti-money laundering laws were designed to stop criminals from taking criminal proceeds and running them through the financial system in a series of transactions to hide their criminal origins and/or actual ownership. On the other hand, terrorism financing need not involve criminal origins but only a particular type of criminal destination: terrorism.

Of course, there were some obvious connections. As discussed above, identifying the financial institution’s clients was a key aspect of anti-money laundering preventive measures. These measures could also be used to identify whether the client was a terrorist, provided of course that the financial institution or the authorities knew who the terrorists were. This proved to be a valuable avenue for combating terrorism-financing measures. Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had passed resolutions requiring all states to freeze accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and had set up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.\textsuperscript{77} The Committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials associated with these organizations, as submitted by members. Subsequent

\textsuperscript{74} See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3 (discussing definitions of FIUs that emphasis specificity to each nation’s needs and characteristics); see also IMF, FIUs, supra note 70, at 59–60 (noting that unusual transactions develop the basis for further investigation by the financial intelligence units).

\textsuperscript{75} IMF, FIUs, supra note 70, at 60.

\textsuperscript{76} See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 126–36 (discussing record keeping rules for the banking, securities, insurance, and money services business sectors to combat money laundering and requirements to report unusual, suspicious transactions).

resolutions strengthened this original commitment. Resolution 1373—passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks—extended the requirement of states to freeze accounts to terrorists other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The General Assembly had also adopted a Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Financing, although it did not go into force until April, 2002. The convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as defined in the convention] as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.

Assuming that someone could come up with a list of possible terrorists, financial institutions could compare that list to their account holders to see if there was a match, much as they could now do with known criminals. However, as discussed above, the new anti-terrorism financing regime required financial institutions to profile clients and monitor transactions to see if they might have some involvement in the financing of terrorism, and to report those cases as well. When the FATF first published its 40 Recommendations, financial institutions in most FATF member countries were in the process of implementing a client identification system.


81 Id. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and:

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Id. art 2(1)(b). The treaties listed in the Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to nuclear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, and terrorist bombings. Id. Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, Annex, U.N. Doc A/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998) (attatching the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings for adoption by the General Assembly). With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the terrorists must be nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took place. See Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 80, art. 3; see also G.A. Res. 164, supra note 81, annex, art. 2.
profiling-, monitoring-, and STR-reporting system for criminal proceeds reflecting the system required by the FATF 40. But when the system was extended to terrorism financing, neither financial institutions nor their supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had not originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at least financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as well as considerable typology guidance from competent authorities, the FATF, and FSRBs.

B. Terrorism Typologies/Indicators/Red Flags

As discussed above, financial institutions implement their STR-reporting requirements by, among other things, identifying clients (including determining exactly who they really are), creating client profiles, monitoring client transactions with respect to those profiles to identify large or unusual transactions, performing link analysis, and comparing transactions to known typologies of money laundering and terrorism to see if any red flags are raised.

Such typologies are provided by domestic competent authorities, as well as by the FATF or FSRBs. But what are those terrorism typologies, indicators and red flags?

Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendations, the FATF Secretariat published *Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing*, stating that that “[i]t should be acknowledged…that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect terrorist financing as such.”82 While there was mention of charities as being of special concern, there was no attempt to tie these to any special type of charity, or to charities sending payments to locations known to have terrorism concerns. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S.’s *Staff Report on Terrorist Financing*, published two years after the adoption of the Special IV, concluded that:

[Financial institutions] can be most useful in the fight against terrorist financing by collecting accurate information about their customers and providing this information . . . to aid in terrorism investigations. . . . However, the requirement that financial institutions file SARs does not work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for there is a fundamental distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing.

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82 FATF, *GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING* 3 (2002).
Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect the one but not the other.\textsuperscript{83}

In its sixth report, the U.N. Security Council’s Monitoring Team was not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures in deterring terrorism financing, in part because of lack of guidance. “The volume of suspicious transaction reports has increased tremendously, though the procedure suffers from a lack of guidance as to what to look for. . . . Only a small proportion of the reports are related to terrorist financing and hardly any have been associated with Al-Qaida.”\textsuperscript{84}

Early in 2008, the FATF released its most comprehensive report to date on terrorist financing.\textsuperscript{85} The Report stated that “[d]espite the challenge in developing generic indicators of terrorist financing activity financial institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about a transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious transaction report.”\textsuperscript{86} However, the cases and examples dealt almost entirely with individuals or organizations identified as having terrorism connections rather than through terrorism financing indicators (including “media coverage of account holder’s activities,”\textsuperscript{87} presumably when the media reveals that someone may be connected to terrorism in some way). The only uniquely terrorism financing indicators noted in the Report were charity and relief organizations sending to or receiving funds from “locations of specific concern.”

While there has so far been relatively little guidance to financial institutions as to indicators or typologies of greater risk of terrorism financing, they are still required to implement Special IV, VI, and VII. Anecdotal evidence gathered largely from informal interviews with compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S. has indicated that at least some financial institutions have implemented “defensive” systems based largely on whether a client or potential client is a charity that makes payments to charities based in terrorism “hot spots;” this includes not accepting the charity as a client or filing STRs after a charity makes any

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[83] JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG, & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52–54 (2004).
\item[85] See generally FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008) (exploring issues of terrorist requirements for fund, how terrorists raise and move fund, and the international response to terrorist financing).
\item[86] Id. at 29.
\item[87] Id. at 31.
\end{footnotesize}
large transaction. If true, this would not only raise costs to financial institutions, but would also reduce financial services to needy clients. It would also suggest that financial institutions’ STRs included at least a high number of false positives (and perhaps a high number of false negatives), which would raise costs to FIUs and law enforcement without improving capacity to deter or prevent terrorism financing.

III. STUDY TO IDENTIFY TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS

A. Overview

This preliminary study on terrorism-related prosecutions in the U.S. was completed by Professor Richard Gordon of the Case Western Reserve University, with assistance from students at Case Western. It is to be used in the completion of a final report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern University and the Honorable Susan Eckert of Brown University, which will include cases from other jurisdictions, additional analytical discussion, and bibliographical material.

The objective of the U.S. study is to identify red flags or indicators of terrorism that financial institutions can use in implementing their duties to monitor client transactions and report those that raise a suspicion of terrorism financing. The study research methodology included five steps:

1. We selected terrorism cases that were successfully prosecuted.
2. We examined those cases to determine which involved a transaction through a regulated financial institution, and we collected the relevant client identification, profiling, and transaction data.
3. We examined the data to identify any possible indicators of terrorism financing.
4. We determined if any SARs were filed by financial institutions with respect to those transactions. We reviewed the SARs to see why they were filed, including by examining the SAR narrative to determine what, if any, additional information the reporting institution had uncovered.
5. Finally, we determined if FinCEN had referred the SAR for further investigation.

While it was relatively easy to complete steps 1 and 2, difficulties arose with completing the other steps. In particular, with respect to step 3 it proved difficult to acquire actual records of most of the identified transactions and impossible to acquire client identifying and profiling information, although in a number of cases it proved possible to acquire sufficient descriptive information to make some tentative conclusions about possible indicators. With respect to step 4, while research was continuing,
FinCEN proposed a new regulation (which became final in December 2010) that changed previous law, which had permitted a financial institution to release an SAR, provided that it did not “tip off” persons involved in the suspicious transaction. (This would have been an impossibility in the cases we were reviewing because all the persons had already been prosecuted.) The new regulation made step 5 in our methodology impossible to implement.

As a result, the findings of this study are more tentative than was expected at the outset. However, the study suggests some alternatives that might be pursued that could help rectify the deficiencies in the current study that arose due to the inability to implement steps 4 and 5.

B. Steps 1 & 2: Terrorism Case Selection, Identification of those Involving Financial Transactions and Collection of Transaction Records

In December, 2008, Jeffrey Breinholt\(^88\) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) provided the project with a list of 230 U.S. cases that he, in consultation with and other DOJ officials had identified as involving a prosecution in which the U.S. alleged that the defendants(s) may have been involved in supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity.\(^89\) This list did not include the 9/11 case, which had been reviewed extensively by the U.S. 9/11 Commission and which did not turn up any apparent terrorism-financing indicators. This list was supplemented in October, 2010 with an additional thirty-three cases to bring the list up-to-date.

By reviewing DOJ press releases, news stories, and published court opinions, researchers identified forty-seven cases as possibly involving terrorism financing. Each involved either deposit-taking institutions or money-transfer agents. Researchers then collected and reviewed relevant court documents that were either published or made available free of charge through the Internet. These often included pleadings and motions, including bills of indictment and requests for warrants, freezing orders, material witness orders, and supporting affidavits. On rare occasions, some evidence submitted during the trial was also located and reviewed. Of considerable help to locating such materials is The Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA), which maintains a website that includes many publicly available documents on terrorism-related criminal and civil

\(^88\) Mr. Breinholt has been Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section and Coordinator, Terrorist Financing Task Force of the U.S. Department of Justice.

\(^89\) In many of the prosecutions, charges were not brought for either terrorism or material support, but in all instances charges were brought for some other offence, including: making false statements; immigration fraud; money laundering (including structuring or operation or use of unlicensed MSBs); threats other than terrorist threats; hoaxes; and air violence. Material witness orders that involved no criminal charge were also included.
cases.\textsuperscript{90} From the group of forty-seven, researchers identified thirty that might involve both terrorism financing and a regulated financial institution. For these cases, researchers attempted to collect and examine documents and evidence not published or available for free on the internet.

Researchers first attempted to obtain copies of client identification, profiling information, and transaction records from the banks and transfer agents in question. However, these reporting persons refused to share such records, citing the expense involved in collecting and providing us with such information and the concern that doing so might breach FinCEN’s SAR confidentiality rules.\textsuperscript{91} They made this later point even though we did not mention SARs themselves and even though no law or regulation made reference to the confidentiality of information that may have given rise to the filing of an SAR.

Failing in this attempt, researchers then turned to records made available as evidence in prosecution of the terrorism cases. In theory, all publicly available case documents, including all evidence submitted for trial, can be obtained in two ways: (1) in hard copy from the relevant court (mostly for cases that are older than ten years); or (2) through the online federal court filing and retrieval system known as PACER. However, in many cases the number of pages of documents filed from beginning to end run to the tens of thousands. The court keeps a docket of filings for each case, but the docket entries themselves rarely identify exactly what kind of evidence, if any, is included in the filing. As a result, it becomes necessary to individually examine documents to identify those that relate to financial transactions. For documents filed with the court in hard copy, this requires physically visiting the court, requesting documents from the court clerk, and reviewing them on-site. For most relevant documents filed through PACER, this requires downloading each page at a cost of $0.10 per page.

After attempting and failing to identify relevant documents by reviewing court dockets filed on PACER, researchers contacted via e-mail and telephone\textsuperscript{92} those DOJ personnel who prosecuted each case for assistance identifying relevant documents. Follow-up e-mails and telephone calls were made where appropriate. Prosecutors had to divert their time from other pressing work to assist researchers with work that would not (at


\textsuperscript{91} Given the nature of the refusals given by the first few approached, researchers gave up without pursuing the rest, deeming any additional efforts to be pointless.

\textsuperscript{92} Each e-mail described the nature and purpose of the project, summarized the available details of the case, and requested any information regarding financial transactions, especially PACER document numbers.
least directly) assist in the prosecution of cases, current or future.\textsuperscript{93} Not surprisingly, in many instances prosecutors were not able to respond to requests for assistance.\textsuperscript{94} In many instances, prosecutors informed us that for various reasons (including decisions not to charge defendants with crimes requiring financial transaction evidence or the entrance of guilty pleas to such crimes prior to the introduction of evidence) no relevant documents were admitted into evidence, and therefore they could not be shared with researchers. As a result, only in a few cases have prosecutors been able to share with researchers actual documentary evidence of financial transactions. In those instances, however, thousands of pages representing tens of thousands of transactions have been provided.

Of those thirty cases, researchers found sufficient financial information to draw conclusions in twenty-four. A description of these cases, and of the relevant information obtained with respect to financial transactions are included in the Annex.

C. \textit{Step 3: Analysis of Transactions for Indicators}

As discussed above, in order to determine if a transaction is suspicious it is necessary for the financial institution to identify and profile the client, to monitor the client’s transactions, and to examine transactions. However, in the initial review of the thirty cases for evidence of suspicious transactions, it was not possible to consult client identification and profiling information. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of instances it was possible to take educated guesses, based on publicly available information concerning the client in question, to determine if payments would fit an assumed client profile as being legitimate. This is because most transactions fall into three types: (1) those that are too small to be consequential; (2) those that are consequential but that appear to be between individuals or entities with no obvious legitimate connection that would render the transaction suspicious; and (3) those that appear to be between individuals or entities with a legitimate reason to make the transaction.

\textsuperscript{93} Case Western Reserve University researchers discussed this matter with a number of prosecutors. Some noted that while the results of our research project might help future financial institution compliance officers and/or investigators in identifying terrorism financing suspects, the results would be unlikely to help those who ultimately \textit{prosecuted} those cases. Some also suggested that they believed that, from their experience, there were no “terrorism indicators,” and that the project was unlikely to be of any assistance to law enforcement.

\textsuperscript{94} In a few instances prosecutors had left the DOJ for private practice. In these cases they did respond to e-mail inquiries but were unable to assist in finding relevant documents.
Step 4: Review any SARs Filed

As discussed above, part of a reporting institution’s preventive measures obligation is to examine any unusual transaction to determine if there is an actual suspicion that it concerns terrorism financing. Because the methods by which reporting persons implement these requirements are expensive and proprietary, they are understandably reticent to share any details. We sought instead to obtain copies of any SARs filed so that we could examine the narratives and determine if link analysis, reference to any publicly available information on the clients, or typologies might have played a role in uncovering relevant indicator information. We were not successful.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 states that “[t]he global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing is a policy priority for the U.S. and its partners, working bilaterally and multilaterally through the U.N., the U.N. Security Council and its committees…and other multilateral fora.” 95 Under § 5318(g) of the USA Patriot Act, 96 a financial institution and its agents are prohibited from notifying any person who is the subject of an SAR either that an SAR was filed or of the circumstances surrounding the filing. Congress apparently included this provision in order to prevent the tipping off of launderers and terrorists, which could spoil any current or future investigation. There was, however, no prohibition on release of information that an SAR had been filed or of the SAR itself that applied to government authorities. The implementing regulations essentially restated the statutory language. 97 Also, courts had held that SARs were not strictly confidential and that disclosure of an SAR in a case where the subject of the report has already been convicted will not compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation, or provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection. 98 This was clearly the situation with respect to the cases we were investigating.

Based on such policy, law, and precedent, researchers requested copies from the DOJ of any SARs filed with respect to the thirty cases that we had identified, but with any information concerning innocent persons redacted. Officials at the DOJ were sympathetic and prepared to release

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redacted SARs to researchers, but then FinCEN issued a new regulation that prohibits private or public sector persons from revealing if an SAR was filed, or any contents of that SAR, to anyone in any circumstances. While there appears to be no statutory authority for such a regulation (and therefore that it may be ultra vires, the statute may therefore be invalid), its issuance prevented DOJ from releasing any redacted SARs to researchers.

Because we were unable to review the SARs, it was impossible for researchers to obtain the information necessary to determine if financial institutions had in fact used their knowledge of customer information, customer transactions, and link analysis, typologies, etc. to conclude that a transaction was suspicious. It also made it impossible for researchers to determine if FinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money laundering or terrorism financing.

E. Response to New Regulation Preventing Implementation of Step 4

While the new Regulation prevents both public and private sectors from revealing if SARs have been filed or the contents of those SARs, it also made clear that “[w]ith respect to the SAR confidentiality provisions only, institutions may disclose underlying facts, transactions, and documents for any purpose, provided that no person involved in the transaction is notified and none of the underlying information reveals the existence of an SAR.” For this reason, financial institutions should no longer be concerned with SAR confidentiality issues, and they should only be concerned about the costs of releasing identification, profiling, and transaction documents. Financial institutions may, however, continue to be reticent about releasing any link analysis that might lead a reviewer to believe that an SAR had, in fact, been filed.

In order to encourage reporting persons to release identification, profiling and transaction data with respect to the identified cases, researchers have approached a number of financial institutions and requested that they create a committee to assist the Counterterrorism Task Force in identifying terrorism financing methodologies (CACTF). The Committee would encourage reporting persons in question to release the relevant documents, and it would provide technical assistance where needed. We expect CACTF to be up and running by End May, 2011.


100 Id. (citations omitted).
F. New Step 5: Review Documents released by Reporting Persons

Researchers are working with the initial members of CACTF to plan a workshop sometime in the fall of 2011 to review any released documents. The workshop will include AML/CFT compliance officers from member banks. It is hoped that this conference will help deepen our understanding of the nature of the cases identified in this Report.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Based on assumptions concerning client identification and profiles, researchers examined transactions to determine if there was anything unusual in those transactions that would raise a suspicion of terrorism financing. In doing so, we did not indicate instances where a person was identifiable as a terrorist or terrorist organization, in that this was not an “indicator” but a fact.

In the twenty-four cases where sufficient financial information was available to draw a conclusion, fourteen indicated instances of classic money laundering typologies, including placement, layering, integration, or an unlicensed money service business. Only three of these cases involved criminal proceeds, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of charitable donations to terrorists which could have, in effect, constituted theft of legitimate donations. In eight cases there was no suspicious transaction of any kind (other than a party to a transaction was a known terrorist), although in two of these, criminal proceeds were involved. Only one indicated a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator for terrorism financing.

Terrorist financers appear to be using classic money laundering typologies regardless of whether they are trying to launder the proceeds of crime. It appears that they do so either to hide the origins of the funds or the recipient of the funds without leaving a directly traceable transaction between origin and recipient. In other words, they are acting in a fashion similar to that of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, who used classic structuring transactions to hide that he was making payments to prostitutes.101

Therefore, simply by using standard anti-money laundering typologies financial institutions should have been able to identify fourteen of the twenty-four instances of terrorism financing as being suspicious, though not on their face to raise suspicion of terrorism financing. What we can tell from examining the cases is that it might have been possible for the

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101 See generally Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?, supra note 1 (explaining how SARs exposed governor Eliot Spitzer’s political scandal involving money laundering and prostitution).
reporting institution to have discovered terrorism connections during the examination process, or for FinCEN to have done so when receiving the SAR. However, because researchers did not have access to this information it is impossible to determine at this time.

The one case indicating a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator for terrorism financing involved repeat purchases from a military equipment store. To determine if this should raise a suspicion of terrorism finance, it would be necessary to see if such purchases are, in fact, sufficiently unusual to distinguish them in a meaningful way from non-terrorism related purchases. This could perhaps be done by comparing them with other purchases from similar stores. Researchers will attempt to locate such information for the final Report.

### SUMMARY TABLE

**DATA, TYPE OF TRANSACTION(S), SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case #</th>
<th>Data Available</th>
<th>Type of Transaction(s)</th>
<th>Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]? If yes, type Proceeds of crime [PC]?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Detailed information on wire and check transactions.</td>
<td>Multiple significant wire transfers among charities with bank accounts in various jurisdictions; final withdrawal of cash transferred to terrorist organization. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Layering, integration. PC: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Single significant wire transfer from a personal bank account in the US to a personal bank account in Canada. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Placement, layering. PC: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No description.</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Cash deposits to personal bank account followed by a series of small denominated checks paid to a business unrelated to the payor. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>Yes. ML: Placement, layering, possible integration. PC: No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Case # | Data Available | Type of Transaction(s) | Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]? If yes, type Proceeds of crime [PC]?
|-------|----------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5     | General description only. | Large wire transfers from personal accounts in one jurisdiction to multiple accounts in another. No obvious legitimate connection. | Yes.  
ML: Placement, layering and/or unlicensed MSB.  
PC: No. |
| 6     | Detailed information on wire and check transactions. | Wire and check transfers from company account controlled by one person in one jurisdiction to a personal account controlled by the same person in another jurisdiction. | ST: No.  
PC No. |
| 7     | General description only. | Significant cash deposits and wire transfers from various personal accounts to a single person’s account, followed by transfers to a charity in another jurisdiction, followed by further transfers to multiple accounts in other jurisdictions. No obvious legitimate connection. | ST: Yes.  
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration, and/or unlicensed MSB.  
PC: No. |
| 8     | General description only. | Wire or check transactions from one charity to numerous accounts of unknown control, receipt of a very large amount from a foreign account of unknown control to a charity. No obvious legitimate connection. | ST: Yes.  
ML: Possible placement (depending on nature of deposits), layering.  
PC: Diversion of charitable donations. |
| 9     | General description only. | Significant cross border wire transaction from company in one jurisdiction with possible ownership/control held by possible terrorists to numerous accounts in other jurisdictions of unknown control. No obvious legitimate connection. | ST: Yes.  
ML: Possible placement (depending on nature of deposits), layering.  
PC: No. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case #</th>
<th>Data Available</th>
<th>Type of Transaction(s)</th>
<th>Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]? If yes, type Proceeds of crime [PC]?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Cash deposits, large international wire transfers from personal bank accounts under false name to money transfer companies with unknown account names/owner or controller. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed MSB. PC: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Large number of cash deposits under different business names at various banks to a single account at one business with no obvious business connection, large wire transfers from that business to different bank accounts in other jurisdictions. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed MSB. PC: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Numerous deposits made to various individual accounts, then transferred to single accounts in different jurisdiction, then checks paid to individuals in a third jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Placement, layering, possible integration. PC: Diversion of charitable donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Detailed information.</td>
<td>Small amounts sent via wire transfers from a bank account in one jurisdiction to various individual bank accounts in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case #</td>
<td>Data Available</td>
<td>Type of Transaction(s)</td>
<td>Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Some detailed information on wire and check transactions, some actual transaction records.</td>
<td>Large international wire transfers from various charitable and personal accounts in one jurisdiction to personal accounts in another jurisdiction (some in the name of the same individual) in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection in all cases.</td>
<td>ST: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Small MSB wire transfers by a person in one jurisdiction to a person in another jurisdiction.</td>
<td>ST: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Large bank transfers from accounts in one jurisdiction to multiple accounts held by one person at multiple banks in another jurisdiction. Large numbers of transfers from one personal bank account in that jurisdiction to many different recipient accounts in the same jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Direct bank transfers from a charity in one jurisdiction to two charities in another jurisdiction.</td>
<td>ST: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Detailed information.</td>
<td>Large transfers from a number of individual bank accounts in one country to a number of individual bank accounts in other countries. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case #</td>
<td>Data Available</td>
<td>Type of Transaction(s)</td>
<td>Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Wire transfers from personal accounts in one jurisdiction to the personal accounts of the same individual in other jurisdictions. Large wire transfers from one personal account in the US to the personal account of an unconnected individual in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection?</td>
<td>ST: Possible. ML: Large transfers to unrelated person may not fit client profile raising suspicion of layering. PC: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Some detailed information.</td>
<td>Large wire transfers from company account in one jurisdiction to account in another. Because a sting operation, unknown if recipient account was profiled by bank.</td>
<td>ST: Unknown. PC: Presumed no.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Size and origin of MSB wire transfers unknown.</td>
<td>ST: Unknown. PC: Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check transactions including payment records.</td>
<td>Small deposits to charity bank account in one jurisdiction, wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank accounts in another jurisdiction, then wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank accounts in various additional jurisdictions, then cash withdrawn. No obvious legitimate connection.</td>
<td>ST: Yes. ML: Layering, integration. PC: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Deposits.</td>
<td>ST: No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case #</td>
<td>Data Available</td>
<td>Type of Transaction(s)</td>
<td>Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]? If yes, type Proceeds of crime [PC]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>General description only.</td>
<td>Cross border payments of unknown type, single small cross border wire transfer.</td>
<td>ST: Unknown.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 27     | General description only. | Small number of small MSB wire transfers from one jurisdiction to several individuals in multiple jurisdictions. | ST: No.                  
|        |                    |                                                                                        | ST: No.                  |
| 28     | General description only. | Fraudulent credit card application, credit card payments.                                | ST: No.                  
|        |                    |                                                                                        | PC: Yes.                 |
| 29     | General description only. | Debit card payments to a designated terrorist organization and to high-tech military equipment companies; medium sized cross-border wire transfer to an unknown person. | ST: Possible.                
|        |                    |                                                                                        | TF: Repeat purchases from military equipment store?                  
|        |                    |                                                                                        | PC: No.                  |
| 30     | General description only. | Medium-sized cross border wire transfer.                                               | ST: No.                  
|        |                    |                                                                                        | PC: No.                  |