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City of Cleveland v. The Cleveland Illuminating Company, 1980

Transcripts

9-17-1981

Volume 26 (Part 3)

District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

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1		Gaffin - cross
2		recall?
3	A	Yes, that's true.
4	Q	Now, another aspect of the survey work that goes to
5		whether you can rely on a survey, Mr. Gaffin, you
6		stated was that the respondents should not know the
7.		purpose of the interviewing, and the interviewer
8		should not know the purpose either, is that right?
9	A	Yes.
0	Q	Now, were you aware when you did your survey that
1		this trial had begun in Cleveland at the time your
L 2		survey was taken?
L3	A	I knew there had been a previous trial, but I'm not
L 4		sure whether I recall whether I knew that the trial
L 5	• •	had begun.
16		I know when I was contacted, but I don't recall
L7		whether I knew the second trial had begun.
18	Q	Do you know that there are only the two companies in
19		Cleveland, Muny Light and CEI, no other suppliers?
20	A	No, I don't know that for a fact.
21	Q	You're aware that this lawsuit is involving those two
22		parties?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	And perhaps your let me ask you this question:
25		If there was publicity concerning this lawsuit

1		Gaffin - cros	SS
2 ·		{Mr. Murphy rises from	n his chair•}
3	Q	if it was available in the m	edia for people to
4		read about this lawsuit during	the time your survey
5		was going on, isn't it likely t	
6		therefore could reasonably know	
7		your survēy was?	
8		MR. MURPHY:	Objection, your
9		Honor.	
10		THE COURT:	Approach the bench.
11			
12		{The following proces	edings were had at the
13		bench:}	
14		MR. MURPHY:	I have two
15		objections, your Honor.	•
16		The first is the que	stion calls for
17		speculation.	
18			at more serious, that
19		there is substantial publ	icity about this trial.
20		. The jury has been ad	
21		at newspapers, et cetera,	and Ms. Coleman then
2,2		tells them there is subst	
23		the newspapers, and I str	
24		MS. COLEMAN:	Your Honor, I'm
25		talking only about the t	ime of the commencement

1 ,	Gaffin - cross
2 .	of the trial when this survey was done.
3 .	THE COURT: You're getting into
4	areas this is so remote, Ms. Coleman, and
5	you're getting into areas that you shouldn't get
6	getting into.
. 7	Sustain the objection.
. 8	Now , let's get on with it.
9	MS. COLEMAN: My next
10	THE COURT: Sustain the objection.
11	Let's go.
12	MS. COLEMAN: We'll have to come
13	back up here after the next question, so I want
14	to put_it on the record, your Honor.
15	THE COURT: All right, put your
16	next question.
17	MS. COLEMAN: My next question is
18	whether the existence of the second trial going
19	on would be something that he would want to be
20	informed about in determining whether the timing
21	is appropriate.
22	MR. MURPHY: I would object to
. 23	this.
24	THE COURT: Sustained.
25	{End of bench conference.}

1		·	Gaffin	- cross .			
2		THE (OURT:	Zı	ustain	the	objection
3		Let's	s keep it ma	aterial, p	lease.		
4	BY MZ-	COLEMAN:					
5	Q Mr	• Gaffin are	e you concer	rned when	you fra	we ?	our
6	. dr	uestions in t	he survey al	oout wheth	er the	resp	ondent
.7	ha	as any motive	to give yo	u an answe	r other	tha	an his
8	tr	rue opinion?					
9	A No	·					
10	Q Yo	ou have no co	ncern about	whether t	he resp	oond	ent is
11	g:	iving you his	true opini	on or not?	•		
12	А Ш	e have no con	trol.				
13	Q · Wo	ouldn't you w	ant to word	your ques	stionna	ire	in such
14	а	way as to tr	y to avoid	making ind	ducemen	ts f	or your
15	r	espondents to	answer in	a way othe	er than	the	ir
16	t !	rue opinion?					
17	A Y	esi we tried	to encourag	e truthful	l respo	nses	•
18	Q N	ow, under the	e circumstan	ces in wh	ich you	hav	e told
19	. t	he respondent	that the m	atter of I	his swi	tchi	ng is a
20	р	ublic record	wouldn't t	hat be so	me indu	ceme	ent to
21	t	he respondent	to give ar	answer w	hich wo	uld	look
22	g	ood in public	:?				
23		MR.	MURPHY:		0bjecti	on •	
24	•	THE	court:		Approac	h th	ne bench.

Gaffin - cross 1 {The following proceedings were had at the 3 . bench:} Object on the ground 4 MR. MURPHY: of speculation, your Honor. 5 Yes. 6 THE COURT: Ms- Coleman, this is highly speculative and 7 8 it is highly improper. Now, if it is your position that the question 9 in some way conveys to the respondent or to the 10 interviewer the purposes for which the interview 11 is being conducted or seeks to elicit answers: 12 that are suggested in the question, the document 13 speaks for itself, and the question speaks for 14 15 itself. If you want to argue that on closing 16 argument, you're free to do so; but to ask this 17 man an argumentative question in a highly 18 speculative area is very improper. 19 20 Let's proceed. He's supposed to be 21 MS. COLEMAN: an expert, he should have an opinion about his 22 23 questionnaire. Let's proceed. 24 THE COURT: 25 Let's proceed.

1		Gaffin - cross
2		{End of bench conference.}
3		
4	BY MS	S. COLEMAN:
5	Q	Mr. Gaffin, another aspect of presenting your
6		survey information deals with the accuracy of
7		reporting the interviewing information, isn't that
8		right?
9	Α ¬	Transferring the information from the questionnaires
10		to the computer?
11	Q	Well, in the first instance, you want to make sure
12		that the interview is accurately recorded as the
13		interviewer takes down the information?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	And then you want to assure that the information is
16		accurately keypunched and accurately tabulated?
17	Α	Yes.
18	Q	And then you want to make sure that the presentation
19		of the tabulations is right?
20	A	Yeș.
21	, Q	And you want to make sure that your report is
22		accurate?
23	A	Yes•
24	Q	Now, given those standards, I would ask you whether
25		it is not the case that among the 11 industrial

1		Gaffin - cross
2		customers
3 .		{Ms. Coleman steps to the easel.}
4	Q	{Continuing} Well, perhaps that's not necessary, we
5		are talking about such a small number.
6		Among the ll industrial customers whose answers
7		are tabulated, there was one of them who refused to
8		talk to the interviewer at all, but his completed
9		interview was completed in the tabulations.
10	A	That's not true that he refused to talk to the
11		interviewer.
12		It's true that he refused to answer a number of
13		questions or that he answered" "Don't know" to a
14		number of questions, but he did, in fact, complete
15		the interview.
16	Q	He completed the interview even though the interviewer
17		first reported "Refused to Respond"?
18	Α .	I really don't know what the interviewer, of course,
19		reported. I know that was a completed interview, and
20		that one of those that was in the industrial class
21		of customers had responses that were "Don't knows"
22		and "Refused," but the interview was completed.
23	Q	Look at your cluster •5•
24		T don't know how you refer to them, among the

I don't know how you refer to them, among the industrial customers.

1		Gaffin - cross
2		{After an interval.}
3	A ·	Are you talking about in the completed
4		questionnaires?
5	Q .	Supposed to be-
6		{After an interval.}
7	A	I have the questionnaire in front of me for No. 5.
8	Q	No. 5.
9		Would you look down at the answer recorded to
10		Question 3?
11	A	Yes.
12		The Question 3 was:
13		"Our research shows that your company switched
14		from service by the Municipal Electric Light Plant
15		or Muny Light to service by the Cleveland Electric
16		Illuminating Company or CEI. Do you happen to recall
17		why you made that switch?"
18		And the respondent recorded the interviewer
19		recorded this response:
20		"Refused to respond. CEI called once before
21		about this. He's too busy to answer these questions."
22	Q.	And it is a fact on that questionnaire that all the
23		remaining questions are checked off "Don't know"?
24	A	Yes.
25		Dut in that questionnaine the nemaining

But in that questionnaire, the remaining

1		Gaffin - cross
2		questions were asked and answered.
3	Q	How do you know that?
4 .	A	Because I spoke to the supervisor about it.
5	Q	And it's your conclusion that this person was interviewed
6		and not that the interviewer checked off "Don't Know"
-7	-	and signed off?"
8	A	That's correct.
9	Q	Now, in terms of the accuracy of your count, you had
10		some situations, did you not, where the information
11		given to you by the respondent was not what the
12		supervisor expected to get or there were multiple
13		answers to a question like, "Why did you switch?"
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	And how did you proceed when you got these multiple
16		answers or answered that you didn't know what to do
17	·	with?
18	A	Well, when you get a multiple answer on an open-ended
19		question, you record both answers.
20	Q	Do you have them included in
21	A	Both
22	Q	both tabulations?
23	A	Both tabulations, that's right.
24	Q	Was it your decision on how to characterize the
25		answers to the open-ended questions, or did your

1		Gaffin - cross
2		attorneys work with you on that?
3	A	No, that was there was no decision involved.
4		They were categorized in terms of what people
5 ·		actually said.
6		That is, there was no having to create broad
7		categories of response, which is why the responses
8		seemed so specific; they were.
9	Q	Well, there was, for example, one instance where the
LO		respondent mentioned the fact that CEI gave them a
11		special service.
L 2	A	Uh-huh.
L 3	Q	And that does not appear as a reason for switching
14		so someone must have classified it in some other
15		classification.
16	Α	I don't believe that's the case, but I can check it.
17		{The witness examining his papers.}
18	Q	Now, in terms of the tabulations in your report,
19		the tabulations which
20		MR- MURPHY: Your Honor, excuse
21	•	me Mr. Gaffin was checking an assertion that
22		Ms. Coleman had made.
23		MS. COLEMAN: Oh, I'm sorry.
24		{After an interval.}
25	A	I was just checking the tabulations on the open-ended

1		Gaffin - cross
2		questions.
3 .		Can you you could help me if you could tell
4		me which class of respondent?
5	Q	Right. I'm looking for that right now.
6.	-	{After an interval-}
7	Q	Commercial constants.
8	A	Commercial constants?
9	a Q	Yes.
L O	. u	Okay•
L1	A	And which question?
L 2	Q	The question is Question No. 5.
13		The reason for the switch?
14	. A	
15	. Q	Right. Well, there is the largest category is the category
16	A	•
17		for poor service or outages.
18	Q	Right.
19	A	And this is a general category because there were so
20		many responses in that category, there were 79.
21		So if the specific was one that would have
22		fallen into that category, then it might not have
		been reported individually.
23		Whereas, something very specific and individual
24		like "Sent bills to the wrong address and then cut
25		out power" might have been reported; although, in this

1		Gaffin - cross
2	·	case, it looks like that was recorded under "
3		"Inefficient personnel" or "Sent bills to wrong
4	•	address."
5	Q	And when the respondent to I'm sorry, I don't
6		have the number on that when the respondent to
7		one of the commercial constants said, "Chief reason .
8	٠.	was I put in some infra-red equipment and CEI
9		could facilitate it", that was then classified in
LO		some category and not specifically mentioned in
11		your analysis?
12	A	I'm sorry; can you repeat what that respondent said?
13	Q	I put some infra-red equipment in and CEI could
14		facilitate it."
15	A	Well, there's one here that says, "Muny couldn't
16		handle my expansion," I'm not sure if this was
17		that.
18	Q	You don't know how that was classified?
19	A	I'm not sure.
20	Q	Someone had to make a decision to put that in one
21		class or another?
22	A	Yes• '
23	Q	Now, when you gave us your opinions this morning,
24		Mr. Gaffin, concerning why certain customers
25		switched from Muny to CEI, you were basing that, were

1		Gaffin - cross
2		you not, on this survey?
3	Α .	Yes.
4 .	Q ·	And you were basing it, were you not, on the further
. 5		on the sample the completed interviews pardon
6		me you were basing it on the completed interviews
7		that your staff undertook?
8	A	That's correct.
9	Q	And you have no you have not reviewed the evidence
10		or the testimony in this case concerning reasons for
11		switching or concerning the program which provided
12		the wiring to those customers, is that right?
13	A	That's correct, I have not.
14		MS. COLEMAN: Thank you.
15		{After an interval.}
16		THE COURT: Very well, Ms.
17		Coleman, you have concluded within the time.
18		MS. COLEMAN: Two minutes.
19	•	THE COURT: You've got four
20		minutes of unused time.
2,1		MR. MURPHY: If I use that much
22 .		I'll be annoyed at myself, your Honor.
23		{Laughter•}
24		THE COURT: Let's proceed.
1		

REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF IRA GAFFIN

2

22

23

24

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3 BY MR. MURPHY:

bv CEI?"

- Mr. Gaffin, after this lengthy cross-examination, 4 would you tell us, please, whether there was 5 anything in it that causes you to be doubtful of 6 the expert opinion you gave this morning on direct 7 examination that customers switched from Muny Light 8 to CEI service because of the liability and not because of wiring provided by contractors paid for 10 11
- There is no reason for me to change the opinions that 12 13 I gave earlier, no.
- Mr. Gaffin, would you tell us -- briefly, please --14 Q 15 why that is so?
- It's a rare luxury -- in the polling business, we're 16 Α usually dealing with universes very large like 17 registered voters in Ohio, where you have universes 18 of 5 million, and you're doing numbers of interviews 19 that seem very small in relation, like maybe 400 or 20 21 P00.

It's a rare luxury to be able to try to interview an entire universe.

In this case, we were able to try to interview five entire universes. So I really -- we had the

1	Gaffin - redirect
2	luxury then of not even having to deal with normal
3	sampling error problems. And I just go back to the
4	data itself which, in my opinion, speaks for itself.
5	MR. MURPHY: I have no further
6	questions, your Honor.
7	- {At this point, there was a loud clap of
8	thunder heard-}
9	. THE COURT: \ I think there's a
10	message from above.
11	{Laughter.}
12	THE COURT: Ms. Coleman, would
13	you like to ask any questions?
14	MS. COLEMAN: No
15	- - -
16	MS. COLEMAN: May we approach the
17	bench, your Honor?
18	THE COURT: Yes.
19	May I release the jury?
20	MS- COLEMAN: I think so-
21	THE COURT: Very well.
22	Ladies and gentlemen, you are free to go.
23	. We won't give you any exhibits since we'll
24	hold those off until 8:30 on Monday morning.
25	Please, over the weekend, keep in mind the

I have two motions,

Gaffin - redirect 1 Court's admonition that you are not to discuss the case with anyone; you are not to view any 3 television broadcasts, listen to any radio broadcasts, or read any newspaper accounts of this trial since you are the sole judges of these facts, without the assistance of anyone else or 8 any other source. Keep an open mind until you've heard all of the evidence in the case, the Court's instruction 10 on the law, and the matter is finally submitted 11 12 to you for your judgment. With that, good night, have a nice weekend; 13 hopefully the weather will be fine during the 14 15 weekend. If your Honor please, 16 MS. COLEMAN: I've unfortunately had time for a second thought, 17 and may we approach the bench before the jury is 18 19 released? 20 Sure. THE COURT: 21 Thank you. MS. COLEMAN: 22 {The following proceedings were had at the 23 24 bench:}

MS. COLEMAN:

your Honor, I thought about to bring them up now before the jury leaves.

First, a motion to strike the direct
testimony on the ground that this survey is shot
through with flaws of all kinds as enumerated by
your Honor in his discussion of the survey
admissibility standards this morning.

THE COURT: Over

Overrule your motion.

MS. COLEMAN: The second is a request that your Honor now gives the jury the cautionary instruction on survey evidence, and that they must consider the specific factors that your Honor --

THE COURT: There is no question that you are entitled to that charge.

I was thinking about that during the course of the cross-examination, and it will be included in the general charge.

MS. COLEMAN: Rather than right now?

might point out that there have been two surveys so far in this case, the City presented one also obviously the charge of your Honor will be balanced.

	"
1	Just an observation, your Honor, not a fight.
2	THE COURT: Good night, ladies
3	and gentlemen.
4	{The jury left the courtroom.}
5	THE COURT: Good night, gentlemen,
6	have a nice weekend, and Ms. Coleman.
7	MR. MURPHY: Thank your your Honor.
8	{Court was adjourned until Monday,
9	September 21, 1981, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.}
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. C75-560

Transcript

Monday, September 21, 1981

KF 228 .C43 1980

•	
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1981, P	:25 0'CLOCK A.M.
LAW CLERK KURDZIEL:	Your Honor, this is
Civil Action No. C75-560, the	City of Cleveland
versus the Cleveland Electric	Illuminating
Company.	·
THE COURT:	Are you prepared to
proceed: Mr. Lansdale?	
MR. LANSDALE:	Yes.
THE COURT:	Very well.
Mr. Norris, the Court wo	ould appreciate if
you would indicate the areas	that you object to
in the Little Report.	
I know that you have des	signated the pages,
but if you would outline for	me what specifically
on the pages you object to:	it would be helpful.
You needn't do that now	
MR NORRIS:	Your Honor, if I
could get the report back in	front of me, and
perhaps I could do that at a	break for you.
THE COURT:	There is no hurry.
mr. NORRIS:	All right.
THE COURT:	Today or tomorrow.
Mr. Lansdale, you may p	roceed.
	THE COURT: proceed: Mr. Lansdale? MR. LANSDALE: THE COURT: Mr. Norris: the Court wo you would indicate the areas in the Little Report. I know that you have des but if you would outline for on the pages you object to: You needn't do that now MR. NORRIS: could get the report back in perhaps I could do that at a THE COURT: MR. NORRIS:

1 {The jury entered the courtroom.} 2 Good morning, ladies THE COURT: 3 and gentlemen. Good morning. 4 THE JURORS: 5 You may proceed. THE COURT: 6 Call John MR. LANSDALE: 7 O'Donnell. 8 9 0 1 O ' D O N N E L L JOHN L. of lawful age, called as a witness on behalf . 2 of the defendant, being first duly sworn, was . 3 examined and testified as follows: . 4 . 5 . 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOHN L. O'DONNELL . 7 . 8 BY MR. LANSDALE: Will you state your name and address, please? . 9 Q 0.9 My name is John L. O'Donnell. I'm Professor of Financial Administration in the 21 22 Graduate School of Business Administration at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. 23. 24 Where do you live? Q I live at 1051 Wolbridge Drive, East Lansing, Michigan. 25 A

O'Donnell - direct

- 2 And will you please outline your educational background,
 3 Professor.
 - Yes. I have a B.A. and an M.A. in Economics at the University of Cambridge. England. and I came over to this country and obtained an M.B.A. and a Doctoral Degree from Indiana University.
 - And will you please give for us your professional experience since the completion of your final education.
 - A I taught two years at Notre Dame, and since that time, and for the past 25 years. I have taught at Michigan State University, and my interests have been in business finance and public utility economics.
 - Q What courses do you teach at the university?
 - A Principally in the graduate school in the area of business finance.
 - Q Are you the author of any learned papers?
 - Yes, sir. I have tried to make my contribution, and my stuff has appeared in the Journal of Finance, the Accounting Review, and the Journal of Business, and various other, what you call in academia as learned journals and there is other places.
 - And I believe that you have told me that you spent some time in a professional capacity abroad. Tell us about

2 that.

13.

A Yes sir. I spent five years as an advisor to the Turkish Government, and the Aid Mission in two separate tours; and my duties encompassed general economic advice and helping to build five new business schools in Turkey.

What professional experience have you had in the field of public utilities and electric utilities?

During the last ten years, in particular, I have been fairly active in our Public Utility Institute.

This is an institute that was formed to promote research and teaching in this area of general public utilities.

I have testified before a dozen or more state commissions on a variety of problems to do with finance and accounting and the organization of public utilities, telephone and electrics principally, and gas companies, and I have helped to organize conferences, including one solely for utility commissioners, that we hold once a year in Washington.

We also publish, edit and publish learned papers and other publications by scholars in the field.

I have also participated in such programs elsewhere

2

O'Donnell - direct

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:.:

Tell me what you did to prepare yourself for the 24 Q 25 testimony specifically.

for about five years, and until recently each year I was active in a conference put on by what is called the Southwest Conference, and that takes place in Georgia Tech in Atlanta, and was designed for public utility exedutives and electric companies in particular and my responsibility was in the area of pricing and economic theory as it applies to public utilities.

Professor O'Donnell, what is the purpose of your testimony; what were you asked to do in this case? The purpose of my testimony today is to take some concepts that have been put together by economists and strip them down to their fighting weight, so they are reasonably intelligible.

These had to do with forms of competition and what economists mean by them, and lay the foundation for me leading up to the principal point, and that is the concept of the natural monopoly, and $\ensuremath{\mathtt{I}}$ conclude that the retail distribution of firm electric power in a metropolitan area such as Cleveland is indeed a classic case of natural monopoly.

O'Donnell - direct

I suppose the preparation fell into two parts.

First, I reviewed a large number of documents

made available to me by learned counsel, which

included Dr. Wein's testimony in the first trial,

Professor Wein's cross and direct testimony in this

trial, and I also read Professor Wein's report on

damages sustained by Muny as a result of alleged

CEI conduct.

I read most of the principal trial memoranda
of the Defendant CEI, and I read an article,
"Antitrust and Electricity Utility Industry,"
and I suppose "Papers" is a better term, by
Joe Pace of the National Economic Research
Associates.

I read a study by Arthur D. Little, "MELP Mismanagement and Findings of Arthur D. Little Research Team, August, 1981."

I read the direct and cross of A. Gerber, and I read a paper headed, "MELP's Growth," by a former president of the company, and I am ashamed to say that his name escapes me.

I read a paper, "Performance in the Electricity

Industry of the Impact of Duplicative Competition"

by Neal Hammell, and I read the direct testimony

1	O'Donnell - direct
2	of Mr. Kemper.
3	These documents gave me a general background of
4	the facts of the case.
5	MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, may we
6	approach the bench?
7	<u> </u>
8	{The following proceedings were had at the
9	bench:}
10	MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, we have
11	heard a recitation of a great deal of material
12	that has not been before the jury at this time,
13	and I object to any opinion of this witness
14	being based on such material.
15	MR. LANSDALE: He hasn't testified
16	that his opinions were based on this material.
17	I asked him what he read to specifically
18	prepare himself for this, and he has got a long
19	list of educational qualifications, and every
20	witness by the plaintiff has gotten on the stand
21	and alluded at length to materials that had
22	been read.
23	What is wrong with that? I am at a loss to
24	know how to answer the claim.
25	MS COLEMAN: We have not referre

MS. COLEMAN: We have not referred

1		0'Donnell - direct
2		to materials which have not been ruled upon to be
3		in evidence or not even been offered yet.
4		MR. LANSDALE: I didn't hear that.
5		Would you read that to me.
6	٠	{Record read by the reporter.}
7		MR. LANSDALE: That is a lot of
8		baloney. Dr. Wein testified at greath lengths.
9		THE COURT: Let's proceed.
LO		Overruled.
ll		{End of bench conference.}
L 2		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
13	BY M	R- LANSDALE:
L 4	Q	Professor O'Donnell, did you also at my request make
L 5		a review of the literature in this area?
16	A	Yes, and that was my second thought of part of my
17		preparation.
18		·I did what I think is a fairly extensive review
19		of what we call the learned literature, what scholars
20		have been thinking in this area, particular as it
21		obtained to natural monopoly, to that concept.
22	Q	Now, Professor, tell me, what is competition as
23		viewed by you as an economist?
24	A	Well, economists take this term "competition", and
25		they break it up into various types of competition.

2

very simple.

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They have invented some technical terms to describe what they mean but, in essence, it's really

They begin with the idea of what they call "perfect competition," sometimes called atomistic, everybody advances on rink-a-dink-dink terms, but essentially what ie means is a situation in which there's a market of many buyers and many sellers.

Perhaps the type of example of this type of competition most widely quoted in technical books , is the idea of the grain market.

You get grain classified into various categories.

not one of whom can affect prices.

It's traded on the world market, and no one producer or seller feels that he can effect prices, and the end result is prices are set by the interaction of the impersonal forces of this market. Now, what other kinds of competition are there? Well, you move from this to a second form of competition that has become known as "imperfect competition."

This is a sort of halfway house, and I think perhaps conforms more realistically to what is

actually taking place in most parts of the market.

In fact, one of my -- two of my former

teachers, a lady by the name of Professor Joan

Robertson, wrote a classic work in this field called,

"Economics of Imperfect Competition", a book I had

to study and know for reasons that were obvious.

In this kind of situation, what we imagine is -or what we see is that producers produce different
products, shoes; but each of these products is
imbued with certain special unique real or imagined
characteristics that differentiate it from other
products.

So the producer does exercise some limited control over the price of his product because the demand for his product won't simply flee if he raises or lowers the price.

This, I think, is the kind of situation that obtains over most of the market.

So that's the second broad group.

Now, let me ask you about <u>natural monopoly</u>. You used that term in your statement as to what you intended to testify here today.

What is "natural monopoly"?

Well I suppose we now move into this third category

of monopoly. "Mono" means one, we've just got one producer, one seller; the opposite, one buyer and one seller. So the language goes on, but the idea is simple enough.

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Now, it would seem that when you look around a market, there are sets of conditions where we find that only one producer serves the market efficiently.

This is particularly true in certain types of industries and like most situations, this discovery in theory followed the facts.

When the first electricity companies and telephone companies came into existence, for example, many producers tried to serve the same market.

It soon became apparent that the idea of having two telephones on their desk for two different companies presented complicated and unnecessary problems; and communities soon found that having two suppliers of electricity running down the same street generated all kinds of difficulties.

There are then situations where competition either imperfect competition or perfect competition as we have described it just won't work either

O'Donnell - direct

because of the characteristics of the producer, unique characteristics of the producer, or the unique characteristics of the market, or a combination of both of them.

Now, in this type of situation, economists evolved the notion — a fellow by the name of Eli, Professor Eli, I think it was John Hopkins, was perhaps the one who claimed the term, but it has a history of its own, of the idea of the natural monopoly.

Well now, you said there were two kinds of natural monopoly.

Directing your attention, first, to the type that you mentioned that depends upon the nature of the market itself, will you describe what that is, and give us an illustration?

There seems to be certain type of markets, for example, the newspapers.

We've seen this emerging, where the size of the market and its characteristics are such that competition dwindles and only one producer materializes.

Newspapers is a case in point.

Yes.

It would seem that the characteristics of the demand for newspapers in the local market is such that the economics of producing newspapers is such that there's a general tendency that we can see all over the country for competition to dwindle, and one newspaper to emerge as the sole producer, the sole servicer of the market.

Similarly, I think in defense expenditures in certain areas, it would seem that because there's only one buyer, the Government, and because of the economics of again, of the producing side of it, there's a tendency in certain areas -- rocket fuel would be a case in point -- for competition to dwindle and only one producer to emerge.

Now, Professor, in such a market, what is the fact

as to whether one must examine the economics of the specific market to determine whether there is natural monopoly conditions in such case?

A I'm sorry, I missed the first part; I'm sorry.

THE COURT:

Read the question

back; please.

{The pending question was read by the reporter.}

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Q If my question isn't clear to you, I will --

A Norsir.

-- I will withdraw it.

II

Please move to the other kind of natural monopoly that you mentioned, the one depending upon the characteristics of the producer as distinguished from the characteristics or economics of the market itself?

O'Donnell - direct

A Yes

As we look at the types of producers for service, what we call public utility markets principally, public utility industry, some of the characteristics are as follows:

Basically, they seem all to have a very high proportion of fixed to variable costs.

Now, fixed costs is a term used by accountants and economists and others to describe a phenomenon that we're all familiar with, and that is to say, if you imagine a firm in production, you can divide its total costs into these two broad categories, fixed and variable.

Now, fixed costs are those costs that over a relevant range of output do not change very much with output.

Your rent stays the same if you're paying rent regardless of whether you produce one unit or 100 units or 1000000 units.

Doctors remain the same.

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Usually management overhead remains the same.

There's a whole array of costs that just don't change.

Well; for a public utility; those costs are inordinately large for a variety of reasons; not the least being that utilities use a large amount of physical capital; the servicing; the costs of that capital is large; the debt costs; and the like; they don't change regardless of what you produce.

Variable costs tend to change as output changes.

Now, when you've got any kind of producer who has a large proportion of fixed costs, it's clear that if you can spread those costs over more output, the cost per unit falls.

For instance, if your fixed costs that don't vary, on a million dollars, if you produce a million units, by definition the fixed cost per unit is a dollar.

But if you have the capacity and the market is there and you can produce two million units, your

fixed costs will go up 50 cents, and your average costs will fall.

So the trick is to spread these costs over as much output as you possibly can.

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Now, this is one characteristic that public utilities have that tends to make it — it contributes to the notion that when you go to the market that your serving and you have a certain amount of fixed costs that have to be covered, we discover that, in many instances, only one producer can serve that market at the lowest possible cost.

- Directing your attention specifically to the distribution of electric energy and its sale at retail, how do you characterize this business in terms of natural monopoly?
- Well, the search of the literature shows what I believe, what I've always thought, that the distribution the retail distribution of electricity is really the classic case of the natural monopoly.

First, and foremost, it has those characteristics

I've just outlined are fixed to variable costs.

It's supplying a service that has to be supplied on demand and not be stored.

O'Donnell - direct

You can't store it up and let it out when you want it; so you have to have a certain minimum capacity to meet these high demands when they occur. So you can't take care of that problem by storing.

There's a sort of umbilical cord that links the producer to the consumer; the telephone company's the same.

You can't readily and easily switch -- you can switch, but it's a lot of expense and trouble.

Once a customer is tied to a producer, you've got these -- this kind of physical connection and relationship.

Fourthly, demand does tend to fluctuate all over the place. There's wide fluctuation in demand between the peak and the load demand.

These characteristics, plus the fact that you need the right of eminent domain, you have to go across other people's property and dig up streets and whatnot in order to serve the market.

The nature of the product. While it's hard to define what a necessity is in a world in which many are starving to death, the fact nevertheless remains in our civilization, the provision of water, communications, light and heat we regard as necessities,

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O'Donnell - direct

something of a public charge with them, we don't just regard them as ordinary commodities.

All these things conspire together to make the provision of these types of services a natural monopoly in the sense that when you examine all the facts, one producer can service that particular market cheaper than two producers, and more conveniently.

Now, Professor, I ask you, with reference to the distribution of electric energy, is there any need, in your judgment, to study the character or the costs of the generation and transmission of electric energy in order to determine whether the distribution is a natural monopoly?

No z sár.

And will you -- is it your opinion then -- what is your opinion as to whether one can isolate the business of the distribution of electric energy from the other portions of the system which delivers the energy to the customer in order to ascertain whether a natural monopoly exists?

Well, it seems to me that the tri-pot division between generation, transmission, and distribution has a logic of its own, it's common to most lines

1 O'Donnell - direct

Q

of business, production, wholesaling, and retailing, and that it's not necessary to study all three in order to study one; there are costs of pecularities to each stage.

Now, what one can say is that what happens at the wholesale level may well determine who survives in that natural monopoly market, but that is not a matter of my concern, it's still a natural monopoly market.

It's my contention that if the full forces of competition are unleashed and they function in a fashion that we normally think of them functioning then there's every indication that one or other or more — if there are more of them — that the producers will be driven out and one will remain.

Will you — that brings up the subject of competition in a natural monopoly market.

Can there be competition in a natural monopoly market?

- It seems to me that there can be competition, as I understand, till somebody gets driven out.
- Q Okay sir.

Will you please describe for us, from an economist's point of view, the character of competition

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O'Donnell - direct

in a natural monopoly market. Is this the normal sort of competition that you see every day in the marketplace?

Well, I think because of the barriers of entry, you need so much capital to get in, and because of all the factors that I listed earlier, competition historically is usually devolved to the very few in this type of market.

Economists have a word for it:

When you no longer have imperfect competition, but you've got few people serving the market, then you've got a thing called dligopoly; it just means you have, say, four or five, or three or four.

Now, under that circumstance, when you've got to that stage and you have all the characteristics that I've listed earlier, which are the characteristics of the distribution of retail electricity, you then get a form of very vicious competition which usually reduces the number of producers to two, a duopoly, duet, two people playing a fiddle, duopoly, two people competing.

And when that situation arises, it is possible for gentlemen's agreements to arise -- or, shall I say, person agreements to arise, in which there is

0.'Donnell - direct

agreement not to compete in certain areas:

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We won't tell the public that your prices are a bit lower than mine. We'll just keep quiet about it. You don't make a noise: I won't make a noise. We'll agree on other matters, either explicitly or tacitly"; and a sort of cat and mouse monopolization can emerge.

Economists have coined that term, "Cat and mouse." That can erupt occasionally into price wars and other types of wars that may ultimately result in one of the competitors being destroyed, or it can result and then be pacified. But it is essentially a situation of instability that will only survive provided the full forces of competition are not unleashed.

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		O'Donnell - direct
2	Q	Well, if the full forces of competition are unleashed,
3	•	what are the exactible consequences?
4	A	They are that the fellow with the longest purse and
5		the sharpest management and the fastest response to
6		the competition in front of him will survive, and
7		the other competitor will go bankrupt or be driven
8		out or acquired or would merge, and we have the one
9		observing the market, the natural monopoly.
.0	Q	Will you describe, Professor, what kind of competition
.1		one would expect when the forces of competition are
.2	,	unleashed in a natural monopoly market that you have
.3		described?
.4	A ·	Perhaps I misunderstood you. It is vicious competition.
.5	a	Vicious?
.6	A	Yes.
.7	a .	And let me ask you this question:
.8		How would you as an economist expect a
.9		competitor in a natural monopoly market to react to
0		a request for assistance in surviving from its
1		competitor?
2	Α.	I would expect him to reject it.
3	æ	Why would you expect him to do that?

One can hardly expect that a competitive situation

for one of the contestants to subscribe to the

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Α

1 O'Donnell - direct survival of his competitor for his own instruction. 3 This is unreasonable conduct. One cannot expect that to occur, for the same 5 reason that one would expect a man to commit suicide for the benefit of his neighbor. I don't think that is a reasonable expectation. MS. COLEMAN: May we approach the bench? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 12 {The following proceedings were had at the 13 bench:} 14 MS. COLEMAN: I move to strike that 15 testimony. The jury is supposed to follow the 16 law, and not what any one witness thinks might 17 be reasonable under the circumstances, and I 18 · object to a speech on the subject of whether any 19 witness thinks that something should or ought not 20 to be done. 21 THE COURT: He is an expert 22 witness. That is what he is brought here for. 23 MS. COLEMAN: He is not brought 24 here to tell the jury the law. 25 What law are you THE COURT:

1 O'Donnell - direct referring to? He is talking about 3 MS. COLEMAN: what someone ought to do or what would reasonably 5 be expected for them to do. Overruled. Let's 6 THE COURT: 7 proceed. 8 {End of bench conference.} 9 10 BY MR. LANSDALE: Now, Professor O'Donnell, have you examined the cost 11 Q of service, the relative cost of service between 12 Muny Light and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating 13 Company or other specific economics of this market? 14 15 No sir. Do you feel that in this case it is necessary or even 16 Q 17 helpful to do that? 18 Not for my purposes, no, sir. It seems clear, when you go down the street, 19 that for servicing the customer, that if you put 20 one line of poles down that street and one company 21 serves that whole street, that the total cost of 22 doing that is going to be lower than if you have two 23 sets of poles and two sets of lines going down that 24

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street.

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                               O'Donnell - direct
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                 It seems to me one doesn't need a degree or
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            much common sense to appreciate that point.
                      MR. LANSDALE:
                                               Thank you.
                                                           No
                 further questions.
                                               You may cross-examine.
                      THE COURT:
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                      MS. COLEMAN:
                                               Thank you.
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                CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. JOHN L: O'DONNELL
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       BY MS. COLEMAN:
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            Professor O'Donnell, you mentioned that you had a
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            Doctoral Degree from Indiana University.
15
                 Would you tell us what that degree is?
16
            Yes Business Administration.
17
            That is not a Ph.D.?
       Q
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            No, that is not correct.
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            You are not, I gather, an engineer?
       Q
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            No .
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            I gathered from listening to your description of your
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            work history that you are essentially -- that you
23
            essentially have been employed in academia since
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            leaving school; is that correct?
25
            That is correct.
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1		0'Donnell - cross
2	Q	You have some consulting or testifying type of
3		assignments here and there?
4	A	I have done consulting and I have had testifying
5		experience, yes.
6	Q	But you have not been employed and working in an
7		electric utility?
8	A	That is correct.
9	Q	Now, you referred us to publications in the Journal
0		of Finance and the Accounting Review and the
1		Journal of Business.
2	A .	Yes•
3	Q	And you also have a couple of articles in the Publi
4		Utilities Fortnightly, which is a general industry
5	-	magazine for utilities?
6	A	That is correct.
7	Q	All of those articles are on some subject relating
8		to the finance of the public utilities or other
9		topics of finance; is that correct?
0	A	The ones that you have mentioned, I believe that is
1		correct.
2	Q	Are you familiar in your experience in the
:3		"publish or perish" profession, Professor, of the
.4		practice where your article must be reviewed by an
25		impartial group of referees?

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1		O'Donnell - cross
2	A -	Yes, ma'am.
3	Q	Have you had any of the articles reviewed by
4		referees?
5	, A	The Journal of Finance, the Chicago Journal of
6		Business, and the Accounting Review, all those are,
7		as I said, in my opening statement, are what we would
8		call learned papers and are refereed generally.
9	Q	Were your articles refereed?
10	A	Yes. That is the only way they got in there.
11	Q	Now, you do not have any publications, I gather,
12		in the areas in which you have testified today; that
13		is, competition and natural monopoly; is that
14		correct?
15	A .	Strictly construed, yes, but, for example, I published
16		an article on competition in the oil industry and
17		its impact on costs for the West, and that appeared
18		in the Michigan Journal of Business, a publication
19		of the University of Michigan; but, no, I think in
20		substance you are correct, that I have not published
21		anything in the antitrust area.
22	Q	And the oil article that you referred to is one
23		entitled "Financing OPEC Oil"?

And that was dealing with the oil industry and not

That is correct.

the electrical industry?

A That is correct.

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- Q Now what courses are you teaching at MSU?
- As I explained in my opening statement, I teach principally in the graduate school, and I teach courses in business finance.

This covers a multitude of sins, but has to do principally with short term, long term, and intermediate term costs of capital and capital budgeting and all those decisions that finance executives have to meet and solve in order to run a corporation.

- Are questions of antitrust and antitrust policy
 part of a finance course?
- A Non ma'am.
- @ Have you introduced those into your curriculum for the finance courses?
- A Only peripherally. I was engaged in an accounting job for United Gas vs. Pennzoil where there was some antimonopoly and competitive implications.

I did used to teach at Indiana University for two years, and I taught business and government relationships, and I did a lot of work at that time in the area of trying to be a lay lawyer

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O'Donnell - cross

discussing anti-monopoly questions, but that was many
years ago, and I have no pretense to familiarity with
that legislation now.

- .Q. That was what -- about 20 years ago?
- A 20 years ago, yes, ma'am.
- And when you were dealing with the Pennzoil spinoff, your particular concern was with the financial aspect of that as opposed to the competition aspect?

 My major interest and assignment was certainly on the financial side, finance and accounting, and that is my major concern, yes, and general economic

My B.A. and my M.A. at the University of Cambridge was taken in economic theory.

theory.

Q I won't ask you how long ago that was.

Since you have been at M.S.U., have you taught any courses in general economics?

A Not at M.S.U.

As I pointed out, in the past five years, each summer I teach in the area of general economics and price theory in this seminar at Georgia Tech.

- And at M.S.U. have you taught utility economics?
- A Non ma'am.
- Q Haveyou taught any courses in regulated industry?

1 O'Donnell - cross I participate each summer for three days in a 3 conference that we put on for the National Association of Railroads and Utility Commissioners, 5 and I cover a variety of subjects there. 6 Are you saying that you speak? Q I am one of the lecturers on the program, and I 7 8 have been for the past ten years, and also at the conference we run at Williamsburg, and also have 9 participated in giving papers to this conference that 10 we run each year in Washington, solely for 11 12 commissioners, regulatory commissioners. Have you taught any courses at MSU on public policy? 13 Q 14 No -A 15 -- concerning regulated utilities or otherwise? Q 16 No -Α Now, you mention testimony that you have given about 17 Q 18 a dozen state commissions. Those were on behalf of electric and gas 19 20 utilities? 21 Electric, gas and telephone. Α And those were all investor-owned electric or gas 22 Q 23 companies; is that correct? 24 Yes; that is correct.

Now, the primary issue of your concern was the cost

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Q

of capital and the rate of return; is that right?

No. I covered, as I said in my direct statement. I covered a variety of topics, accounting topics, and the questioning of financing a Pennzoil spinoff, and more recently, in the last year, the cost of capital dominated by contributions there.

But I think it is fair to say that I have done
a lot more than just the cost of capital, and I
also have acted as a consultant not for testifying,
but I acted as a consultant, for example, in the
Bell Telepone Company on the general economics of
providing a price index system for automatic
adjustment clauses for their rates, and the
commission in Michigan is accepting it, and it is
in force, so in addition to testifying, I should
add that there is a variety of other subjects that
I have been consulted on.

When you testified before the State Utility

Commission concerning an issue concerning the cost

of capital, have the commissions awarded or

identified the cost of capital for the utilities

consistent with your recommendation?

A Let me think a moment.

Most of the cases have taken place in the last

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year, and a lot haven't been settled yet.

They have been within I percent, for example, the ruling in Michigan, as I recall, I recommended 17 percent, and they came out with 16.

I am quoting from memory. The answer is that

they rarely have the wisdom to come out precisely with the recommendation I make, but usually they come within 1 or 1-1/2 percent, and I am satisfied. When you make a study of the cosct of capital for the purposes of testifying in the State Commission, do you study the efficiency of the use of capital for your clients, the utilities?

I am not sure I really understand your question.

Tell me what you mean by the efficiency and the use of capital, please, and then perhaps I can respond.

Well, is it a consideration that when you testified on the cost of capital, how the capital is used by your client, and how efficiently it is used?

The closest I come to that is the capital structure of the capital -- is it reasonable, but are the capital budgeting decisions of the management intelligent, and are they the best that could be made with all the benefits of hindsight?-- now, that is not my assignment.

1 O'Donnell - cross 2 Now, in the course of your studies, either abroad or Q 3 in this country, did you take courses in advanced 4 calculus? 5 No. 6 Function theory? 7 No -8 Econometrics? Yes -- pardon me. I haven't taken courses. I took 10 three courses a number of years ago at Michigan 11 State in calculus to brush up on what I learned, 12 but econometrics is not my field, and I have no 13 pretense to be an econometrician, and I do not 14 present myself as such. 15 Are you versed in advanced statistics? 16 I know enough to get by, but there are liars 17 and statisticians, and so I became a full 18 professor because I could defend myself. 19 You submitted to us a list of books and articles. 20 Isn't it true that to fully understand at least 21 five of the articles on the list, you have to be 22 conversant with advanced calculus and advanced 23 statistics? 24 You are absolutely right, and that is why I consult 25 with my colleagues when I come up against things of

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O'Donnell - cross

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that order that I don't follow, and I did that, and I might add that those articles seem to be rather purile in the sense that they didn't say a great deal, but that is my judgment on the basis of the advice that I sought.

One of my colleagues is from MIT, and he has a Ph.D. in statistics, and we have him in the department specifically as a research person since we all can't be clever at everything, and when I run up against problems of this order. I consult with him and other of my colleagues, and those are my conclusions on the basis of consulting with them.

But you are right that at least five of those articles are of that order.

And when you make your evaluation of those articles, are you basing it on the part that is written in English that you can't understand, or are you basing it upon something which someone told you on a mathematical formula that occurred in the remainder of the article?

It is a combination.

In all these articles they come up with a summary, and it is a combination of the two.

When were you asked to testify in this case?

A long time ago. I can't remember. I would have to consult my records, but I think -- but I believe I may have -- it may have been February of this year, as I recall.

I really can't remember. I would have to go back.

Q Was it this year?

<u></u>

- A I believe it was this year. There were so many postponements, and I am so busy that my retrieval system doesn't work too well. I believe it was this year, but I may have been wrong. It may have been earlier.
- 14 Q When did you form your opinion that the City of

 15 Cléveland is a natural monopoly?
 - First let me begin by saying that I began with that prejudice to begin with since my entire training has taught me that the retail distribution of electricity is a natural monopoly.

When somebody asks me, "Do you think that

East Lansing is a natural monopoly market for the distribution of electricity," or telephone or water service, my knee jerk reaction is "Yes" because my entire -- and common sense leads me in that direction.

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O'Donnell - cross

2 My subsequent review of the literature confirmed 3 5 6 7 8

what my education had already taught me and what my common sense observation led me to believe; namely, with what I regard as minor variances, the great body of economists are still of this opinion, that the retail distribution of firm electric power is a natural monopoly.

- When was your education in Cambridge? Q
- 1948 to 1951, I believe. A
- And then you began with this conclusion, and you. Q looked around to see what else you could say about this subject?

I began with the conclusion remembering that we students of this subject received our education so many years ago, and I tried to keep it current.

What I did was review this literature with -specific references to this point.

My job in the Public Utility Institute is reviewing manuscripts all the time of scholars in the field.

I have 15 on my desk at the moment, and therefore I have a good opportunity to continually review what is being done in this area of competition and elsewhere, so I was not entirely

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Maybe I didn't make myself clear. I understand how

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Q

My question is, who picked out the testimony and

you picked out the books and articles.

other information that you studied?

A Well, it came from two sources. One was by counsel, and he said, "You ought to read this," and then I asked for the documents. There are a lot of things I didn't mention because I have forgotten, and a lot of stuff I read that was outside of my field, so I asked for certain things, and he supplied others, so it was a joint process.

- Q Did you review any -- may I call them "contemporaneous documents"? Did you review any memoranda from the CEI company arising at the time of the actions which are the subject of this litigation?
- A Non I didn't.
- Q Your focus then was on the testimony; is that right?
- 18 A Yes.

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- 19 Q And some reports or compilations of opinions that you
 20 looked at?
 - A Yes. I asked for those things that I thought were pertinent in filling me in on the general background of natural monopoly.

I am not really interested in who threw the first stone. I was just addressing the question of

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O'Donnell - cross

2 natural monopoly.

- Now, you referred a minute ago to the list of books and articles which you provided, and my question is, have you selected those at the top -- I gather that means that there are some you didn't include? Is that how I understand it?
- 8 There is a welter of literature in this field. Yes. 9 and most is repetitive, and most of which it seems to 10 me, well, are just repetitive, so I just, from the 11 bundle I looked at I just selected those that it 12 seemed to me to be the better articles, that they 13 had more meat in them, and they say more, and they 14 express pretty much what everybody else is saying. 15 And you consider those the authority on which you Q 16 relied for your testimony today?

17 A In part, yes.

In other words, what I was interested in was, are there any of my learned colleagues who can put up a good argument that the retail distribution of electric power is not a natural monopoly, and my conclusions were no. I don't see anything that persuaded me to change my mind on this question, so essentially I was looking for a good argument that would persuade me that the -- that my initial

1		O'Donnell - cross
2		thinkings was wrong, and I couldn't find it.
3	Q	And therefore the ones on the list are those which
4		are consistent with your initial thinking on it?
5	A	I am not sure that a lot of those on the list
6		address the questions directly, as I would like,
7		but, yes. Let's say I agree with them, or they
8 .		agree with me, whatever way you want to put it.
9	Q	When did you read those books and articles?
10	A	Right up to and during the period that Mr. Lansdale
11		asked me, about a week ago, to provide that list.
12	Q	Have you ever previously been asked to give your
13		professional opinion on the existence of natural
14		monopoly in any location?
15	A	No ma'am.
16	Q	Turning to your discussion of the natural monopoly:
17		Dr. O'Donnell, you mentioned public utilities in the
18		same breath as natural monopoly, and I want to ask
19		you whether all natural monopolies are public
20		utilities?
21	A	No-
22	. Q	And are you are all public utilities natural
23		monopolies?
24	A	No•

The definition of natural monopoly relates to a firm

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in a market, does it not?

3 A Yes.

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Q It does not relate to the market alone?

A That is correct.

You have got to have a market to sell a product; so it is rather like, which is more important, my left or my right leg when I am on a walk; so you are right. And when we are referring to a firm, we are talking about the entire single company with independent management, and we are talking about its physical assets as well as its employees and cash and management; is that right?

I believe that is correct, yes, an artificial person in contemplation of the law, I think is the way the lawyers put it.

And we are not speaking in terms of a simple machine or something like that?

A That is correct.

Now, in terms of a definition of a natural monopoly that assumes a situation in which the single firm is operating as efficiently as possible, given the state of the art and prevailing knowledge at the time; isn't that right?

25 A Yes.

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O'Donnell - cross

that assumption to be produced.

If the single firm is now operating as efficiently as possible, it may be that two firms both may provide the service in the market at a lower total cost than the single firm operating efficiently?

No, that is not what I had in mind.

I had in mind that it is possible to have a natural market where the regulatory process is not working too well, and you have one producer whose costs are not as low as they ought to be, so you have got a natural monopoly with producing services in a market whose costs are perhaps 5 percent higher than they ought to be, but it is a situation which, even if opened up to competition, there is not enough margin to justify a second one coming in or saying it depends upon the relative efficiency.

Now, you introduced the idea of a regulatory agency when speaking of efficiency.

The efficiency of the firm in the first instance is up to the firm and managers, is it not?

Yes; that is correct.

And if it has been determined to have some regulation over that firm, it may or may not be that the regulation gets involved in directing the operation

- Q In other words, a certain technology is assumed in terms of a natural monopoly?
- A Correct.
- And it may well be that if the technology changes that one may not have a natural monopoly any longer?
- A That is possible, and by the same token, if

 technology or circumstances change, that which

 normally was competition, a competition situation,

 may become a natural monopoly. It is conceivable,

 ves.
- So that this is a concept which is not enduring though at all times, but the subject -- but it is subject to dhange of what is current in terms of technology and in terms of type of operations permitted by the technology?
- A Yes. I think that is a fair statement.

It could change, and that is why we should reexamine these situations.

- In addition to the assumption about technology, there is -- isn't there an assumption that the firm, the single firm, has the least cost when it is being operated as efficiently as possible; is that correct?
- A That is an assumption, yes, but of course it is not necessary for a natural monopoly to exist for

that assumption to be produced.

- If the single firm is now operating as efficiently as possible, it may be that two firms both may provide the service in the market at a lower total cost than the single firm operating efficiently?
- A Nor that is not what I had in mind.

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I had in mind that it is possible to have a natural market where the regulatory process is not working too well, and you have one producer whose costs are not as low as they ought to be, so you have got a natural monopoly with producing services in a market whose costs are perhaps 5 percent higher than they ought to be, but it is a situation which, even if opened up to competition, there is not enough margin to justify a second one coming in or saying it depends upon the relative efficiency.

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And if it has been determined to have some regulation over that firm, it may or may not be that the regulation gets involved in directing the operation

1 O'Donnell - cross 2 of the firm; is that correct? 3 A It is my view that they shouldn't. Q They should not? 5 Α Yes. They ought to leave it to the managers to determine Q 7 the efficiency of the firm? Α I think there are certain broad parameters to a 9 regulation concept to achieve, but when the regulator 10 usurps the management's function, he becomes 11 responsible for what happens, and I wouldn't want to 12 be in that position, to have the responsibility 13 without the profit is sort of foolish, sort of a 14 foolish position to be in. 15 So, out of charity for the regulators, you don't think 16 that they ought to confine their concerns, and that 17 they should not get involved in the managerial 18 aspects; is that correct? '-19 'It is not so much charity. I think it is good 20 . economics. 21 My advice to the regulator is to regulate, but 22 don't try to replace the management of the company. 23 and if you do , you are going to be in serious trouble. 24 And, in fact, commissions have found that generally 25

regulators do not get involved in the questions of

1		O'Donnell - cross
2		the management of a company; isn't that correct?
3	A .	I am not sure on that point. I wouldn't quite agree
4		with you.
5	Q	Well, to go back to your initial comment, if a firm
6		is not operating at the optimum efficiency, that is
7		probably attributable to the management of the firm
8		and not to the regulatory process?
9	A	It may be a bit of both.
10	a	You wouldn't know of the particular circumstances
11		unless you looked at it?
12	A	Exactly.
13		For example, it may well be that the regulator
14		steps in and says that it is not appropriate for you
15		to build a certain power plant, and the management
16		may well say that on the basis of our experience we
17		ought to have it, and the power plant isn't built,
18		and as a result ten years later production costs
19		are higher than they ought to be, and who is
20		responsible?
21	Q	Do we agree then that the natural monopoly theory
22		assumes that a single firm is operating at optimum
23		at its best efficiency?
24		MR. LANSDALE: Objection.
25		THE COURT: Approach the bench.

1	0'Donnell - cross	
2	{The following proceedings were had at the	
3	bench:}	
4	MR. LANSDALE: This is highly	
5	repetitious. The witness testified to the	
6	answer two or three times, and he expressed his	
7	views to all aspects, and I object to the	
8	suggestion or the attempt by counsel to	
9	summarize the testimony that preceded, and I	
10	object to the question.	
11	MS. COLEMAN: After we have gone	
12.	through a number of subordinate issues, I think	
13	it is important to come back to the point of	
14	departure.	
15	THE COURT: A certain amount of	
16	repetition is permitted on cross-examination.	
17	Overruled. Let's proceed.	
18	{End of bench conference.}	
19	·	
20	THE COURT: Read the question.	
21	{Pending question was read by the reporter	
22	as follows:	
23	"Q Do we agree then that the natural	
24	monopoly theory assumes that a single firm is	
25	openating at optimum at its best efficiency?"	٦.

A

O'Donnell - cross

I don't think this is an essential assumption, but it frequently is made, and if it is convenient for the discussion to make it, then I am happy to make it.

I said that I had -- that it was conceivable to me that you could have a monopoly market in which a single producer is not producing at entirely the lowest cost and still there is only one producer.

In fact, that is the great criticism that
economists level against regulated natural monopolies,
that they are not functioning as efficiently as they
could or state that they ought to be.

I am having difficulty with the question. I am not trying to be evasive. But it doesn't seem to me to be essential to the main line of thinking. That is my point. That is all the point I wanted to make.

Clearly there are limits to how inefficient you can be in a competitive situation.

If the one who is there is too inefficient, and the gap between the cost of that one and what they ought to be, according to your theory, are too great, others might come in, and the total costs to serve the market might in fact be lower; is that correct?

Now, for the purposes of your conclusion offered in

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O'Donnell - cross

your direct examination this morning, did you make this assumption of optimal efficiency or not?

No, because it seemed to me in the present situation, that where you have got two companies competing head on in the 35-mile area, this is a very inefficient way to do it.

In fact, one company that served in the 35-mile area had accumulated a deficit and was virtually bankrupt in 1971, and that indicates that.

I think the optimum situation here would be for one or the other to get out, and for one company to serve the area.

- When you talk about -- when you are referring to a 35-mile area, what are you talking about?
- A The area on one of those maps that I studied in which

 Muny Light and CEI are competing directly.
- Q Is that the subject that you studied?
- A I looked at the map as part of my general preparation.
- Q And counsel informed you what the map was?
 - Yes. They showed me what the areas were, and I read it in Professor Wein's testimony, the references to yellow lines and blue lines, so I asked the obvious question. "What is the yellow line and what is the

1		0'Donnell - cross
2		blue line," and I was told that it demonstrated that
3		since 1935 Muny Light has expanded one quarter of a
- 4		mile beyond the area that it had in 1931, and these
5		were the overlapping years.
6	Q	That is not something you have come here prepared to
7		speak about?
8	A	Not really, no. I am not an expert on geographic
. 9	•	boundaries in this issue.
10	Q	or on the definition of markets in terms of
11		geographic markets?
12	. A	No. I think the market has been defined by the
13		Court, and therefore not the subject that I need to
,14		address.
15	Q ·	On the question again of the requisites of natural
16		monopoly, a definition of natural monopoly assumes
17		that certain input prices for those things which must
18		be combined to create the product or the service
19		involved; isn't that right?
20	A	Well, I don't see that it is just relative to
21		natural monopoly.
22		What you are looking when you are looking at
2,3		prices. I suppose part is looking at costs and the
24		determination of those prices, yes.

And the costs of the inputs?

25

Q

1	O'Donnell - cross

² A Yes.

- Those goods are materials which must be used to produce the product; and is it necessary to make a certain assumption about the relative costs of the input in order to say something about natural monopoly?
- 8 A Not really, no. I fail to see why that is true.
 - Q You have on your bibliography an article by Mr.
 William J. Baumol on the producer cost tests for natural monopoly?
- 12 A Yes.
 - And Professor Baumol is from Princeton and New York

 State Universities, and he states, "Prices are taken
 to be constant because an industry may be a natural
 monopoly at one set of input prices and not another."
 - A That is correct; and the problem he is addressing is somewhat different than I am addressing here.

I don't see this as a multi-product problem.

This is retail sales of electricity.

That article that you have mentioned it seems to me was highly imaginative and an interesting exercise and interesting reading, but it really didn't enlighten me very much as to the problem at hand.

Q Well, again, this was one of those articles that was

O'Donnell - cross

filled with a variety of equations and higher

calculus?

A That is right.

And the article dealt, did it not, with identifying whether an actual monopoly exists in both the single firm product, single-product firm -- pardon me, and in the multi-product firm context?

Yes, but it is — the principal thrust was the idea of taking multiple products and trying to see under certain assumptions what the outcome would be; whether the natural monopoly would hold, and I would agree with that, and in the process of doing that, if you have multiple products, you have multiple prices, and then you get interested in multiple inputs, and he calls them multiple supplies, and I agree, but I didn't find that too helpful to answer the question as to whether or not the retail distribution of firm electric power is a natural monopoly, and I don't recall that Professor Baumol ever came to — and I don't recall anybody else building that up.

Q You must have had a variety of input to come out with firm electric power?

A Yes.

@ And what would those include?

1		O'Donnell - cross					
2	A .	Land, labor, and capital.					
3	Q	To produce the firm electric power you need also					
4		certain materials, do you not?					
5	A	Yes. Economists usually include that under land:					
6		that is right.					
-7	- Q	Under land you include coal; is that right?					
8	A	Yes.					
9	Q	Now, given the fact that you have to have multiple					
10		input to come out with the product of firm electric					
11		power, then the relative costs of those inputs are					
12		important to determine whether you have natural					
13		monopoly for firm electric power; is that correct?					
14	A	No. It will determine who survives.					
15	.:	If your inputs are heavily subsidized, you can					
16		acquire them on terms that I can't, and you and I are					
17		in head-to-head competition, and then if that factor					
18		alone, and everything else being equal, then I think					
19		you are going to put me out of business.					
20		There is no question about that, and a natural					
21		monopoly will emerge; namely, one producer will be					
22		left.					
23	·Q	Well, assume a situation					
24		MR. LANSDALE: Objection.					
25		. THE COURT: Let the doctor finish.					

Thank you. I am

finished.

THE WITNESS:

BY MS. COLEMAN:

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Assume a situation where over time the relative costs of land, labor, and capital change with respect to each other; in other words, in an earlier period the capital is relatively less expensive than the labor, and in a later period the economic conditions are such that the labor is relatively less expensive and the capital moreso.

Is it not the case that you may have a natural monopoly during the earlier period because of the relative costs of the input, while in this latter period you may no longer have a natural monopoly?

No. I don't think this follows at all.

Under normal circumstances, changing labor costs and changing capital costs, and everything affects everything equally in a competitive market if those resources are bought in a competitive market, so if I am in business and you are in business, and as my labor cost rises yours will rise, too, since we both buy in the same area.

Now, if that happens -- to go back to my original example that at some point in time you have

the edge on me by being able to have some resource at a cut rate that I can't get, then, indeed, if that is a phenomenon of only one moment in time, if you exercise the power that you now have to eliminate me, you may be well able to force me out until conditions change.

- The question I am asking you does not deal with the costs of labor of two firms at the same time.
- A Yes.

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- One would assume generally that the increase in labor cost will affect all in terms of operating in the market more or less equally, depending on the wage structure or whatever?
- A Correct.
- My question to you deals with the circumstances

 dealing only with the input prices relative to each

 other for any of the firms involved in making that

 product.

It is true, is it not, that we have seen a situation in which the cost of some input increased at a greater rate than the cost of another input for the production of electricity?

A It seems to me there are two parts to that.

The second part -- have costs escalated, and at

O'Donnell - cross

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differential rates, and the answer is yes, but I don't understand the first part of your question. That first part is lost on me. I am sorry.

- Well, so we both understand, yes, costs have escalated.
- Yes. Α
- And yes, they have escalated at differential rates.
- Yes.
- And capital costs have increased at a relatively high Q rate compared to the escalation in labor costs.
- Over what time period? Α
- Over the past 20 years. Q
- I don't have the figures in front of me, but I do Α know that it is true for the last five years.

I can't recall whether it is true for all 20. Subject to that, I would agree with you.

- And surely within the past eight years the costs of fuel have increased at a greater rate than the costs of labor?
- Yes, I believe that is correct. A
 - And as we look at the comparative costs for a firm in the industry, and at that time CEI, we find, do we not, that the relative proportions of expense for power production has increased over the past 20 years

O'Donnell - cross

2	relative to other expenses of the production of
3	electricity?

I don't know, but I would suspect that is true, and
I haven't looked at these numbers, so I don't know
what -- but what you say seems to be consistent with
what is general throughout the industry, but I don't
know specifically in this case.

So that we have a basis for discussion, will you accept, subject to check, the following figures:

That in 1960, CEI's power production expense and its transmission expense and I am speaking here of the operation and maintenance expense, together summed up to 59.1 percent of operations and maintenance expenses.

16 A Excuse me.

Ø

And at that time the distribution and customer accounts costs summed to 20.8 percent of the total cost.

By 1970, will you accept, subject to check, that CEI's power production expense and transmission expenses summed to 70.2 percent of operating costs and the distribution and customer accounts, 15 percent of such costs?

1	O'Donnell - cross				
2	bench?				
3	THE COURT: Yes.				
4	- 				
5	{The following proceedings were had at the				
6	bench:}				
7	MR. LANSDALE: I come up to object				
8	on the ground of clarity.				
9	I don't know whether you are talking total				
10	costs or talking about capital costs included.				
11	MS. COLEMAN: No. operations.				
12	MR. LANSDALE: The first one seems				
13	to-say that the generation and transmission costs				
14	and operations and maintenance costs were 59.1				
15	percent of all operations and maintenance costs.				
16	MS. COLEMAN: Right.				
17	MR. LANSDALE: The last thing said				
18	that power production costs was 70 percent of all				
19	operating costs, and these are different things,				
20	and I request that you have some clarity about				
21	what costs are involved in this. That is my				
22	purpose.				
23	{End of bench conference.}				
24					

2 BY MS - COLEMAN:

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Professor, counsel has suggested that perhaps I
misspoke in the last set of numbers.

For your clarification, we are speaking of operations and maintenance expenses of the utility and comparing the percent which power production and transmission operations and maintenance are sometimes referred to as O&M, as that bears to the whole O&M, as compared to distribution and customer accounts in the percentage of total 0%M; and for 1970 I asked you to accept, subject to check, that power production and transmission were 70.2 percent of total 0%Ma while distribution and customer accounts were 15 percent of 0&M, and also I asked you to accept, subject to check, that 1975 power production and transmission expense as a percent of 0%M was 75.3 percent, and distribution and customer accounts, 6.4 percent, and that approximately the same percentages obtained last year, in 1980.

Will you accept those figures subject to check?

Now, as you look at those figures, you say, do you not, that power production and transmission is expense that has increased, so that it is a much

1 O'Donnell - cross 2 greater proportion of the total operations and 3 maintenance expense now than it was 20 years ago? 4 70 percent versus 85 percent -- that is 15 percent A 5 more. 6 For 1960? Q I am sorry. I went back to 1970. I see. You are 7 8 going back to 1959. 9 It has gone from about 59 percent in 1960 to 85 10 in 1975, I agree, yes. 11 And therefore the relative proportion of those Q 12 expenses has changed over time? 13 Yes. 14 And when II asked you questions concerning the 15 relative proportions changing, I am referring to that 16 phenomenon as well as the fact that in terms of the 17 plant generation, of the plant, as a percentage of 18 plant, that that has been an ever increasing percent 19 of total plant and the distribution has declined. 20 Are you familiar with that phenomenon? 21 Yes. 22 My question is under the circumstances where the Q. 23 relative costs of the inputs have changed, might it 24 not be the case that you would have a natural monopoly

under one set of circumstances and not under the other?

1 O'Donnell - cross 2 I don't think son no. Α 3 I would say it is still a situation in which one producer could serve the market better than two, and 5 with less inconvenience. 6 Let's talk for the moment about what market you are 7 referring to. 8 What is the market where there is a natural monopoly 9 here according to your opinion? 0 Well, in this instance it is the City of Cleveland. A 1 Have you examined the question of natural monopoly Q 2 with regard to the entire CEI service area? 3 The entire area -- no. Α . 4 The entire service area, meaning outside of the . 5 City of Cleveland? -- no. I have no occasion to look 6 at that. 17 Are you aware that the CEI company services around Q 8 100 towns and cities in this area? L 9 Yes. 20 And is it your opinion that there is a natural 21 monopoly in each one of those? 22 MR. LANSDALE: Objection. 23 Sustained. THE COURT: 24 Professor, which firm in the Cleveland market is a 25 natural monopolist?

A Whoever the survivor will be. I am not sure that I fully understand the question.

Would you run that by me again.

- Q Are you unable to say which firm is the natural monopolist?
- A Well, at the present time they were both striving natural monopolists.

A natural monopoly is a condition achieved when all competition has been beaten out, so I see this situation as part of a cat and mouse process the cat and mouse process that I described earlier, in which the final result has not yet materialized, but it would be my contention that if competition would cut loose and allowed to run its natural course, that one or the other of those combatants will have to leave the market, and the survivor will then be the natural monopolist.

I don't know which is going to survive.

- But the theory of natural monopoly tells you that one
 would survive?
- A Yes. The general economic theory would say the one that survives is {a} the most efficient one and {b} the one that can have the longest purse.

It is not enough just to be more efficient.

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you have got to be able to command the resources to do the job.

And having in mind those general principles and other reading that you have done, you are not in a position to say today which one is the natural monopoly; is that correct?

If we mean the natural monopoly is the survivor, I don't know who would survive if the plugs were pulled and the competition opened wide.

On the one instance we have an entity that could have the public purse behind it and has all the field of government behind it and if aggressively managed could perhaps and should perhaps have achived many things considered by the Arthur D. Little report, the management report; but on the other hand we have a very aggressive and efficient, I believe, investor-owned utility, and where the battle would be resolved, I don't know, but I am very confident that if the cat-and-mouse competition emerged and was allowed to open up into the open competition, that only one would survive in the end, and I don't know which one it would be. Have you studied the efficiency of the CEI company?

- And your studies of the Muny company is based on the Arthur D. Little report?
- A That and what I have seen in the press.
- And have you undertaken to investigate the facts if any underlying the Arthur D. Little report?
- A No. I don't mind who survives. I am not here to address the question as to which is more efficient.

I think there are certain facts that speak to this issue that I find persuasive that lead me to believe that the Muny Company should have done certain things at strategic moments, but that is hindsight, and looking back over the years and saying, "You should have done this or that."

It is irrelevant, because it is what happens in the future that counts, but I am not here to address that question.

I am not an engineer, and I am not interested in that issue as to which one will survive.

I guess what you are saying is that certainly you could not, based on your reading of those articles, predict when there will be only one in the market?

A No, I don't know.

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One could choose to capitulate the following day. Who can tell how they are going to react if

they were confronted with that type of situation.

Are you aware that the Muny Light and the CEI

Company had been in competition in the City of

Cleveland for around 70 years?

As I read that document by the former president of the company, yes, but it is a competition that has waxed and waned, and it seems to me that it has gone through a kind of ebb and flow that economic theory usually suggests.

8.

As I understand it, in the early years the municipal authority was very aggressive and grew rapidly and expanded rapidly up until about 1930, and then it seemed to have languished at a the critical moment when they had an opportunity to float bonds, and they had a duty to do certain things, but they elected not to, and as I follow through -- and then there was a period of calm in which really there were attempts not to transgress on each other.

Those are the impressions that I got from reading the documents that I referred to and they make a lot of sense because I think it conforms to the kind of behavior that economic theory would indicate under the circumstances because as I read Hamilton's monograph on this subject, what he surveyed.

when he surveyed the situation where there is
municipally-owned and investor-owned electricity, it
would seem to be, from my reading, that once again
this type of situation is pretty common, this ebb
and flow of competition, and depending upon the
personalities involved.

- Q Did you read any other history of the competition between CEI besides that?
 - A I read -- no. I guess that is it.

There was a lot of reference to it in the testimony of course in the various places as I recall and also there was another document that I read something about this.

- Q That is when Mr. Lindseth was the President?
- A What was the name? Sorry.
- @ Lindseth?

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- A That is the name, Lindseth. That is right. That is correct.
- And he was the President and an employee since 1917 of the CEI Company?
- A That is correct.
- Now Professor O'Donnell I want to ask you what is
 the product here in which there is a natural
 monopoly?

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- 2 A Electric power.
- 3 Q And when you are examining the question of cost of
- 4 electric power, you need to know, don't you, do you
- 5 not; the total cost going into producing that
- 6 electric power?
- 7. A Yes.
 - Q And one must focus then not on questions as to cost
- 9 of coal and the cost of capital related to generation?
 - A If I were intending on finding out what it cost to
 - produce a kilowatt hour, yes.
 - Q Well, in terms of the question of what the lowest
 - cost is to produce the kilowatt hour, one must
 - consider the cost of generation and transmission as
 - well as distribution, must you not?
 - A That is right.
- 17 Q Now, in terms of electricity, retail firm power, do
 - you recognize that that in turn is directed up into
- a number of products; or is that a product itself?
 - A Well, we divide it up into commercial power, and
- 21 power for private homes, and residential, commercial,
- and street lighting, yes.
- 23 Q Each has a different group of customers with different
- 24 needs and demands?
- 25 A Correct.

1	O'Donnell - cross		
2		MS- COLEMAN: Your Honor, I am about	
3		to change and go to another subject. Maybe this	
4		would be a good time for the morning break.	
5		THE COURT: Yes. We will take	
6		our morning break at this time. Remember the	
7		admonition that the Court has previously given	
8		you•	
9		{Recess taken•}	
10		THE COURT: Please be seated.	
11	·	Bring in the jury.	
12		{The jury was seated in the jury box.}	
13		THE COURT: You may proceed,	
14		Ms. Coleman.	
15	BY M	S. COLEMAN:	
16	a	Professor, isn't it likely that the survival of	
17		competition for the distribution of retail firm	
18		power would be the company which had attained the	
19		lowest cost power?	
20	A	All other things remaining the same, yes.	
21	Q	And that is related to the cost of generation, is it	
22		not?	
23	Α	In part, yes.	
24	Q	So that even if the distribution function is such	
25		that one company can provide distribution more	

O'Donnell - cross

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cheaply than two; in terms of the survival in a market for retail firm power sales, the one which has the lowest total cost will be the survivor?

That sounds to be reasonable, the one that has the lowest cost of distribution.

When you say "total cost," you are saying that we are looking at the distribution system.

If you and I are serving the same market, and
I believe we went through this earlier, that you can
get a significant element of your costs -- let me
restate that.

You can get a significant part of your raw materials, or whatever it is that you need to produce at a lower price than I can, for some reason, and other things being equal, you will drive me out of business.

- And that is true regardless of the fact that whether our costs of distribution, the trucks that we drive along the route, are the same?
- That is right. Your costs would be lower for the fact that we have outlined, yes, and you will become the natural monopolist, the end result of what economic theory forecasts will be achieved. We now have one supplier, if you will, in that retail market.

- And that supplier would depend upon the total cost of the product which is distributed and not just on the dost of distribution?
- A I am having trouble with that. I am sorry.

MR. LANSDALE:

Objection.

- Q If the product --
- A May I make my position clear.

If your costs of distribution are lower than mine --

- Q Yes.
- A -- you will survive, and I will go to the wall.
- Even if that distribution costs is a whole lot more
 than it costs you for the same product?
- A Well, would you rephrase your question?
- Say we are in the dairy business.
- A In what?
- Q In the dairy business.
- A The dairy business, yes.
- And we each deliver milk to the doors of houses, as is hardly done any more, but supposing that is the case, and the distribution is the cost of trucks and the fuel --
- A And the milk-
- Q -- and the cost of milk -- well, the cost of milk is

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O'Donnell - cross

not related to the cost of the truck, is it?

- A No-
- 8 But the cost of the delivered product relates both to the cost of the truck and the cost of the milk?
- A Correct.
- And if that were an actual natural monopoly market in order to assess the lowest product cost one must look at both the cost of the milk and the cost of the truck?
- A Right.
- And similarly in terms of electrical power, in terms of the electrical power industry, if our product is retail power, to determine what the lowest cost to serve would be, you look at the cost of the commodity, the power, as well as the cost of the system used to get it there, the distribution system?
- A Correct.
- Q -- as well as the transmission system, which comes from the generation?
- A The cost per kilowatt hour that a customer will be charged will be the total costs of that kilowatt hour, yes.
- And the question of the total costs relates to all of those functions producing the power?

		71.7.10
1		O'Donnell - cross
2	A	Right, if I understand you properly, yes.
3	a	Now, I don't know that you specifically did give us
4		a definition of that monopoly.
5		How you define that?
6	A	It is a situation in which the supply of a good or a
7 .		service can be rendered at the lowest possible cost
8		by one supplier.
9	Q	And you recited to us six criteria which you took
10		into account in concluding that the distribution
11		and sales of electric power and retail was a natural
12		monopoly?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	One of those was that it is a necessity, if I recall
15		correctly; is that correct?
16	A ,	Yes. I prefaced that what I did was review the
17		literature on this subject, and I gave you the
18		summation on the thinking on this area which I concur
19		with, and one of those reasons that is advanced to
20		distinguish a natural monopoly is that the product is
21		viewed in some sense as being a special necessity
2 Ž		charged with a public purpose.
23	Q	Are these the criteria that you think should be
24		used here, or is this just what the literature says?
25	_	and the state of the state and

Both. I think the delivery of fresh water and

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1		O'Donnell - cross
2		sewage and electric light and telephones are of a
3		peculiar nature and charged with certain social
4		importance.
5	Q	Well, we have, do we not, a number of necessities
6		which are not natural monopolies?
7	A	Absolutely.
8	Q	Such as food?
9	. A	That is correct. The concept that most economists use
LO		as to what is and what is not charged with the public
L1	•	purpose is vague, I agree with that, no question
L2		about it.
L3	Q	And another one of your criteria was the need for
14		the use of public land?
15	A	No. I said the power of eminent domain.
16	Q	That is something conferred by the state?
17	A	I am not a lawyer, but I think that is correct.
18	Q	Well, assuming that it is, then it is something
19		which comes into the economic process, and it is not
20		there in and of itself?
21	A	That is correct. It is a special right that the
22		supplier has to be given in order to perform his
23	-	function.
24	Q	Well, as an economist in terms of economic theory,
25		you would consider, certainly, that it is possible

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O'Donnell - cross

for someone to provide a service which involves

taking up space on the sidewalk and obtaining the

right to do so through negotiations with the owners

of the sidewalk?

- 6 A Yesi that is possible.
- But that is a cumbersome way to do so, and therefore

 for a particular situation, a right to a more

 expeditious process is conferred on certain public

 bodies, and on utilities like the CEI company; right?
- 11 A Correct.
- And therefore the need for the use of property which
 doesn't belong to you is not something that
 necessarily is inherent in the idea of a public
 utility -- pardon me -- the right of eminent domain
 is not inherent in the idea of a public utility?

 A It is peculiar to it.

If I wanted to sell shoes, I think I would have a very different problem in setting up a retail store than if I decided as a third person to come into and complete delivery of electricity for the residents of the City of Cleveland.

Now, I would have to have, among other things, in the latter case, I would have to have the City agree that, among other things, I was going to have

Finish your answer.

1	•	0'Donnell - cross
2		the right to put lines across people's land and big
3		trenches, and so forth, that would invade their
4		pricacy, and demand the use of their property.
5	Q	Are you aware that in the City of Cleveland both the
6	•	Muny Light Company and the CEI Company may exercise
7		its right of eminent domain?
8	A	I assume they have to, since they were natural
9	•	monopolists and in that market, and they would have
10		to have that right as a public utility to be able to
11		perform the functions that they perform, yes.
12	Q	So that right doesn't necessarily indicate to us that
13		only one person has the right?
14	A	Correct; but I would submit that the more entities
15		that you have having that right, the more confused
1,6		the situation becomes, and the more likelihood of
17		public disruption and a jungle of telegraph poles
18		all over the place and a network of redundant wires-
19		and so forth, and all of this would be a public
20		inconvenience in my book. I wouldn't want it in my
21		community, and I think there are many people
22	Q	Well
23		MR. LANSDALE: Please, let the:
24		witness finish.

THE COURT:

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∸	0'Donnell -	cross

- A {Continuing} I think the fact that all over the country the retail distribution of electricity is regarded as a natural monopoly, and it does not attest to public stupidity. There is good reason there is great common sense among the common people, and then, what you are doing —
- Just so we understand why we are on this the

 decision wheter to have the wires of more than one

 company or to give more than one company eminent

 domain is probably decided in whatever state or

 city requires of the policy decisions to be made?
 - A Absolutely.

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- Now, you refer to another aspect that you think is

 important in your discussion of natural monopoly,

 that there must be a link between the producer and

 the consumer; is that right?
 - A Yesi a physical link.
- 20 A physical link; and that is true in your estimation as to other industries which are also natural monopolies?
- 22 A Of those that we call public utilities. It is not
 23 universal. I mean, you can say there is not a
 24 physical link between a satellite and a customer,
 25 but it certainly is true of telephones and electric

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O'Donnell - cross

distribution and gas companies, and it is true of sewage and water.

- Q In terms of telephones --
- A I find that it is hard to find a public utility where it is not true.

I think it is a generally correct statement.

We have now at this time in the telephone industry,
we now have competition and more than one service
provided in terms of long-distance calls. There is,
for example, MCI?

That is correct, but I think the situation there is different.

I don't have two telephone companies in East
Lansing offering two different telephone lines and
two different telephones.

I think the situation that you have just described of competition in telecommunications goes largely to the use of attachment to an existing pipeline system, but there is no move on the part of MCI to replace Bell Telephone's wiring.

There is a move on to use Bell's system, and to establish some alternative systems by microwave, due to a move in technology which is -- which goes to our earlier point, that technology might change

O'Donnell - cross

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It is possible, yes.

situations, as indeed it does, but I don't see this in the type of situation being true for the retail distribution of electric power.

For example, if you were to tell me that there was a special gadget that you could put in my house and beam in electric light and power without the need of being attached to any one company and without the right of having telephone poles and wires down the road, and so forth, and power lines, and this might have a radical effect on the way electricity is delivered to the private home.

I am not disputing that point, but that is not the situation, and those are not the facts. We have to deal with the technology as it exists.

- Well, you are unable to predict whether there will be only one company left in the market; is that correct?
- That is correct.
 - So it may well be in the coming period over which time there are two competitors in the market that the technology will change such as the characteristics of the market changes?

1		O'Donnel	ll - cross	
2		approach the bench?		
. 3		THE COURT:	Overruled.	
4	Q	Now, another characteristic	c that you refer to was th	ıe
5		situation of the demand, ar	nd I gather thatn you have	2
6		in mind the technical diff:	iculties of storing	
7	- -	electricity and the need to	o have it readily	,
8		attainable?		
9	A	And the question of having	peak capacity. You have	
10		to have sufficient capacity	y to take care of the peak	k
11		as well as the low demand,	so it is a fluctuation in	n
12		the demand and the size, a	nd you can't store it; tha	at
13		is right.		
14	Q	There has been developed_a	t this point, at least, o	ne
15		method, and that is throug	h the pump storage approa	ch i
16		right?	·	
17	A	That is right.	•	
18	Q	And there are under develo	pment there is a metho	d of
19		storage in the nature of f		
20		gigantic battery?	,	
21	A	That is news to me. I was	; not aware of that.	
22	Q	Now, you also referred to,	, as a consideration in yo	ur
23		conclusion, the high ratio	of fixed costs to variab	le
24		costs in the electric indu		
25	٨	, ·		

Yes.

- Q There is a high rate of fixed costs to variable costs in a whole number of industries?
- A Yes.
- @ Steel?
- A Yes.
- And other industries producing durable goods?
- A Yes.
- And therefore that characteristic alone is not indicative of whether there are or will be only one competitor serving a particular market?
- A No. I think the criteria is that you have got to have a situation where it can be shown that one competitor will serve the market cheapest where the competition is unworkable in the long pull.
- And the high ratio of fixed to variable costs is not dispositive in that question at all?
- A Would you repeat that.
- Q The high ratio of fixed to variable costs is not dispositive of whether you have a natural monopoly?
- A Nor but I think it is a very significant part of the story.
- Given the fact that all of your six criteria have to be interacting with each other to come to this conclusion, how do you weigh them and what weight do

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O'Donnell - cross

you give to each in concluding that any particular industry is a natural monopoly?

I am not sure I try to weigh each one individually.

That isn't necessary.

The key question before the house is this:

If you have a number of customers to serve with a distribution system, is it cheaper to serve them with one system or a duplicative system, and I think the evidence is persuasive on all of those six counts that the total costs of the single system will be lower.

Well, a number of these have nothing to do with the costs.

"Is it a necessity." that doesn't haveto do with the costs?

- A All right. I agree.
- Now, you did not mention a factor which is mentioned in some of your authorities, and that is a situation in which they are addressing marginal costs?
 - Well. I did really. It is just that these terms

 "marginal costs" and "average costs" and so forth;

 when I said that fixed, high fixed costs is part of

 the picture, this includes that as you expand production

 over some relevant range, you are decreasing average

'Donnell	_	cross
	'Donnell	'Donnell -

- costs and I explained that when I talked about
 fixed costs.
- And the standard kind of way in which that is

 depicted graphically is in terms of the number of

 units and unit costs and dollars per unit, and you

 indicated a curve something like this {drawing on
- 8 the easel}?

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9 A Yes, going down to the left.

As you produce more; the average costs per

unit falls; because you are spreading the fixed

costs over a larger number of units; that is correct.

- Now, it is a fact, isn't it, that these days the
 marginal costs, the costs of those additional
 units, is higher than the average cost in the
 electric power industry?
- 17 A We are talking about now about which costs? -
 18 I can see that -- well, we will probably be -- yes -
 19 additional incremental units of capital, for example.

The added units you have on board are costing; say, 16 percent, whereas the one that you have got on board, you got cheaper, and, yes, I can see that possibility.

24 Q The added units of capital today may be may well be higher than the average costs of unit capital?

A Yes.

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- And the costs of capital, as you said, is a highly significant factor in this whole cost?
- A Yesi correct.
- So it may well be that the curve is coming up this way {indicating} because the added costs are greater than the average costs now?
- A You can deposit any set of circumstances of that order, and if the assumptions are correct, that will happen, but that doesn't go to the issue.

The issue is still whether one producer, even under those circumstances, is the most economical way to serve a market.

Baumol, one of the authorities I quote, makes
this point very significantly, and I agree that this
is a significant issue; not just that you have
falling average costs, but the more significant
thing is that you have situations in which one
producer, all things considered, can serve the
market cheaper than two.

By the way is this your view now as regards the generation and transmission of electricity, that there is no longer a natural monopoly?

MR. LANSDALE:

Objection.

1 O'Donnell - cross Approach the bench. 2 THE COURT: 3 (The following proceedings were had at the bench: } Read the question. 6 THE COURT: 7 {Question read.} This is not an MR. LANSDALE: 8 issue in this case, and the witness has not 9 testified to that. It is beyond the scope of the 10 direct, and it is dragging in an issue that has 11 no relevance here, and I object to interrogating 12 13 this witness about it. MS. COLEMAN: The issue is 14 mentioned in the witness's summary of his 15 testimony, as was given to us, your Honor, and the 16 17 relevance that has been established by the testimony that shows that those portions of the 18 electric production are important to determining 19 20 the total costs. I don't remember any MR. LANSDALE: 21 statement in the written statement given to your 22 but if it is in there, it doesn't make any 23 difference. He hasn't testified about it, and 24

this introduces confusion, and it is not in our

1		O'Donnell - cross
2		opinion relevant to the indication, and the
3		witness has not testified about it. I object.
4		THE COURT: Sustained. Let's
5		proceed.
6		{End of bench conference.}
7		
8	BY MS	S. COLEMAN:
9	<u>,</u> a	Nows Dr. O'Donnells among the articles in the book that
. 0		you studied, besides the terms provided to you by
.1		counsel, was there a study of the actual costs of
.2		producing and delivering retail power in Cleveland?
.3	A	No •
. 4	Q	And you have done
. 5	A	Let me go back. Excuse me. Let me think a moment.
. 6		I am sorry. I was thinking of your last question
. 7		I wanted to be sure that I am answering the question.
. 8		Would you give that to me again.
. 9		THE COURT: Read the question.
20		{Question read by the reporter.}
21	A	The answer is no.
2 2	Q	And isn't it the case that a number of the authorities
23		which you cite in your bibliography state that no
2 4		emperical study has been done to prove generally

that in the electric industry any portion of it is a

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natural monopoly?

3 A Some of the authorities have said that there is a
4 fellow by the name of Primo who is now a resident on
5 our campus from the University of Illinois, who
6 argues for certain sized utilities, he feels that
7 retail distribution is not a natural monopoly.

In other words, everything I read, to the best of my recollection, with that one exception, most authorities who address this are either of the opinion that the retail distribution of electricity is a natural monopoly or they remain askance, and they don't express an opinion, and they express a general feeling, but outside of Primo, I could find no one who said it wasn't.

- You have an article by Caldwell Daniels, III on your list.
- 18 A You will have to refresh my recollection. You will
 19 have to tell me what it is about.
 - Q It is about -- it is an antitrust bulletin, the spring of '&L.

He stated that there is simply no empirical evidence which indicates that any firm now recognized as a natural monopoly operates under conditions with the hypothesis of traditional theory.

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1		O'Donnell - cross
2	A	Yes. I believe that is right.
3	Q	You cited by the way, the Primo article in your
4		bibliography?
5	A	I can't remember. I probably did. I know I read it
6		and I have it here, and it was part of my review.
7	Q	You had also on your bibliography a book entitled,
8		"Regulated Industries by Mitchell and
9	•	Kleindorfer"?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	And an article in that book by Walter Schultz, Mr.
· 12		Schultz stated:
13		"Unfortunately it has never been demonstrated
14		empirically which parts of the electric sector are
15		indeed natural monopolies.
16		"Further, even if it is scaled in duplication,
17		it may be no more wasteful than the efficiency of
18		the monopoly."
19	Α	That is right.
20		In other words, I don't take that as a definitive
21		opinion.
2.2	Q	The reason a number of people are saying it may
23		not or may not be is that they have no empirical
24		studies that have been done as those authorities

indicated; right?

A

I think it would be more correct to say that it is extremely difficult to conduct meaningful empircal studies of this type of problem, and that is why not many are being done.

It is awfully difficult to make comparisons.

It is like trying to compare the appropriateness or efficiency of public power versus private power, and it is like two men looking from prison bars, and one sees mud and the other sees stars, and I strongly suspect that ideological underpinnings rather than objective economics governs the situation, because it is very, very difficult to make those types of comparisons.

The statisticians seem to come out with almost any conclusion that their ideological underpinnings lead them to-

My friends in the aerodynamic department tell

me that a bumble bee cannot fly. Well, I have seen

it fly, so I know it flies, and when I walk into any

situation of this type that we see with electricity

retail distribution and look at the facts surrounding

the contesting that goes on between, say, the two

contestants in this case, and I look at what is

involved, and I find the arguments persuasive that

natural monopoly, which is common throughout the country and predominant in this case in a retail distribution of electricity is correct.

- Q This is a theory that is correct, even though the bee flies?
- A No. I think it is correct. The theory is correct: that is right. It seems to me obvious that as most of us, as most of our studies show, it is -- it is of use, and the number of customers that you have got on the line, and the amount of power that they take determines the advantages you get from the economies of scale, and if you are going to serve li000 customers over whatever, it seems to be clear then that one system will be cheaper than two.
 - Are you referring to the studies that you have done?

 A No. I am saying by common observation -- I am saying that it is difficult to conduct statistical studies of costs that will definitively show one thing or the other.

It seems very difficult to do because of getting companies of comparable size, but when faced with that kind of situation, I think a certain amount of common sense has to intervene.

Q Particularly if you don't know the statistical methods

that would be required to adjust for all the variables?

A If you can't adjust for all the variables.

Q

- Now, we have one entry on one of your articles by

 Leland-Newburgh, which was an attempt to look at

 distribution costs and comparative efficiency, and

 that authority stated, did he not, that the results

 of this work raised some questions about natural

 monopoly theory?
- Yes. It raises some questions. It is equally true that there are other articles, and one in the Public Utility Fortnightly, that is emphatic in the distribution at retail that it is a natural monopoly, and the article you are quoting speaks to the industry in general and not to a specific part of it.

In other words, it may well be that certain parts of an industry through technological change are no longer as easily defined as a natural monopoly as they were before, and that is not the question I am addressing.

I am addressing -- and my research of this topic was specifically to the retail distribution of electricity.

Is it not the case that two of the authorities on your

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bibliography, the article by Baumol and the article by Richard Schnalensee in a note on economies of scale and natural monopoly in the distribution of public utility service, both indicate a rather rigorous mathematical study must be performed to determine whether natural monopoly in fact exists? That is correct.

- And Professor Baumol states, among other things,
 "We would have to know the entire cost curve and perform the mathematical tests?"
- A That is a statement like saying good is good.

The point is that knowledge is not perfect. We rarely if ever know all these curves and will never know them.

At some point in time we have to work with the information that we have, so I don't quarrel that if we had perfect information we might know what we are doing, and that it is correct, but we will never have perfect information, and we will never know all those curves; therefore, that becomes an exercise of intellectual interest but not very productive.

Well, there is plenty of information around about individual utility systems, is there not?

There is a lot of information, but if the problem

that you are addressing would lend itself to the type of statistical test that you seem to have in $\min_{\tau} I$ am puzzled why it has not been done.

Q Well, you haven't done it, at any rate?

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- A I think it is an impossibility in the terms in which you see it.
- And the statistical test which Professor Baumol and Professor Schnalensee have required have been deeply relevant, have they not?
 - I think they are suggesting certain approaches to
 the problem that might work, and in that sense they
 are representative. I don't know that there is
 anything particularly new in the technique of such,
 and I don't see -- I come back to my original point:

I don't see that it solves any problems or takes us anywhere.

If ultimately what they are suggesting can be done persuasively, and if they produce the evidence that they say might exist, then I will change my mind, but in the absence of that evidence, and those facts, with all that available, I think the main body of economists like myself will hold that the distribution of retail electricity is a natural monopoly, and it stands that way.

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- And that is based on assumptions and received wisdom rather than any study of the particular costs and total costs in the market?
 - No. I don't think it is in the absence. There is nothing wrong with received wisdom, by the way.

The question suggests that there is something wrong with wisdom, and at my age it is a point that I get more dedicated to with every year that passes. There is nothing wrong with that.

The point is that cost studies have been done and let me put it this way:

If I understand it; in the trial some evidence will be produced on the questions of costs as they pertain to the system; and it is very costly business to do this; and we rarely have the money to do it; and perhaps that evidence will come out in this trial; but all the evidence that I know of empirical and theoretical and observed conduct of what happens and observed practice around the country convinces me that it is a natural monopoly.

- Part of the observations were the existence of single suppliers in a number of markets.
- A Virtually all the markets, except from the Hamilton study, if my memory is right, about 49; and of those,

where there are dual suppliers, largely it is the result of historical accident.

I think a good case can be made that it is not direct competition, a situation in which a city is divided in half, and you say to the municipal authority, "You take one half and we will take the other, and we stay out of each others hair."

That is not head-on competition, or say a situation where, "We will agree not to tell the public about a differential in price," and so forth, and we all play the game. That is not competition.

So it seems to me that if the competitive model for two suppliers works as well as it ought to the situations wouldn't exist in this form.

- Q You yourself have not studied that question, I guess?
- A Which question now?
- Well, when I asked the question -- and perhaps you can respond to it, and I will ask you this question:

Have you done any studies of how you came to be in the various markets where electricity, where in most instances there was only one supplier?

- A No. What I have done is read other people's work.
- So you don't know what actions of the single supplier led to the single supplier domination of that market?

A No. That is incorrect.

I know of various cases that I have read, and the history of the industry, and I have read that, but what I am saying is that I have not personally gone out and conducted a study of my own to decide why it is in East Lansing that we only have one telephone company or one sewage authority or one water authority or one electric company supplying us with power.

- You spoke about types of competition, and I want to ask you if it is not the fact that you believe that competition is preferable because it results in the lowest price and maximum output of the competition of goods and services most preferred by consumers?
- A Yes.

Q

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В

- Now, if you know, do you have an opinion about natural monopoly without doing this study -- let me ask you whether you also have an opinion about this situation where there is in the market two suppliers, and when there are in the market two suppliers, the differences in cost are the differences between this lowest cost line and the dotted line?
- A In other words, the dotted line is the higher cost supplier. Are you now talking about total long-run average cost?

```
O'Donnell - cross
 1
      Q
           Right.
 2
           Total long-run average cost?
      Q
           Right.
           So in the long pull that is the position that would
 5
           emerge, all cases taken into account?
 6
           Right.
      Q
 7
           So the objective would be to produce the ideal
 8
           at that lowest point, and the incremental costs
 9
           will cut at that lowest point?
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11
      Q
           Right.
                My question is, when you have two suppliers in
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           the market, and their costs together are at the level
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           of the datted line.
14
           Excuse me. I missed that statement, "Before the
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      A
           dotted line."
16
           When you have two suppliers in the market.
      Q
17
           Yes.
18
      Α
           -- and their costs of production are at the level of
19
           the dotted line --
20
21
           They are both identical.
           -- can you tell without a study how much higher their
22
      Q
           costs are than what it would be if only one supplied
23.
24
           the market?
            I am trying to understand the question.
```

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Α

for serving the whole market. If you and I are both in the market, we both need a minimum amount of plant and equipment to go on, and it is evident to me, if I cut my costs and take over your market share, I go to the low point on my cost curve.

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That is the natural monopoly market situation.

You have got an inconsistency in your assumption, if

I understand you correctly.

- Q You recognize that there is a situation where there are two firms operating in a market?
- A Yes.
- And I want you to assume with me that type of situation where there are two firms operating. Can you do that?
- A Yes.
 - And assume with me that the total cost of both of those firms when they are both operating in the market is at this higher level.

Perhaps I should draw a total cost curve if the other curve is giving you problems {indicating}.

- A Okay.
- Assume a situation where the total cost is at a higher level than if one serves.
- A Yes.
- And this is a natural monopoly market.
- A Yes.
- My question is, can you tell without a study how much greater the costs are?
- A No. I am sorry. I misunderstood your question.
 - No I can't tell unless I have got some figures.

 And it may well be that if one did have the figures

 and one did do the study, that the cost of producing

O'Donnell - cross 1 at this higher price level, when added to the cost of 2 regulation, might be outweighed from what people 3 perceived is the benefit of having two in the market; 4 is that correct? 5 You will have to go over that slowly again, please. 6 7 I am sorry. Well, our hypothetical assumes, and your theory of 8 Q natural monopoly assumes that when there are two-9 they are operating at a lower cost level? 10 Right. 11 You can't tell me how much higher without figures? 12 That is right. I don't need the end result of what 13 I am interested in. I am saying, pull out the plugs 14 and let me fight it out. I don't need to know. 15 And you don't know? 16 17 And I don't know. And in this situation, when we are interested in total 18 costs, we are talking about the total social costs 19 and not merely the cost of the firm? 20 If you wish to include those in, yes. 21 Α And maybe that the costs imposed by having two firms 22 in the market is outweighed by the value that the 23 people assigned to having two firms in the market 24

and the competition thereby?

How do they measure the value? You mean that the costs of regulation -- let me see.

Do you mean the costs of regulating one firm will outweigh the higher costs of having two firms there; is that the thrust of which you are saying?

My question is this:

There are some incremental -- some amount of costs between these two lines {indicating}?

A Correct.

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- And it is your theory that there is a higher cost when there are two competitors?
- A Right, but two systems are more costly than one.

There is something like 25 substations in the

35 miles where you are competing, and there has been
some testimony, and I think it was Mr. Kemper's, that
I read, that he said, "All but three could be
served by existing substations that CFI has now.

If that is correct, then that is duplication, and it seems to me if you did it that way with the excess substations, you would save money.

Professor, my question is this:

Do you as an economist recognize that values may be assigned to goods of whatever kind or type?

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<u> </u>	A Monniert	C1 0 3 -

2 A Assigned?

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- 3 Q Yes. That one can speak of the value of this cup
- 4 ` findicating} or the value of this podium?
- 5 A Well, you can speak of it, but I am not sure.

If you are telling me that that is the price

7 determined in the market, then it has meaning, but

if you tell me you have assigned a price of \$1,000

to the podium, it is not of consequence to me.

10 Q Well, in terms of all the considerations that go

into making adjustments, some value must be assigned,

at least a relative value?

13 A I wouldn't proceed that way. I think you can add up

the cost of regulation and add up what you pay if

that is the point.

If I want to know what regulation costs, I can assign a cost to it, and if these regulatory proceedings drag on for six months, we can add up the costs of the witnesses that are involved, and if that is what you mean, I would agree with you, that we go to market and find out what things cost, and then we say,

"That is what they cost."

Is this the context that you have in mind?

Q You would compute a cost for regulation?

25 A Yes.

1		O'Donnell - cross
2	Q	And one might have regulations associated with the
3	•	one firm's situation, and that involved certain costs
4		which were capable of being computed?
5	A	Yes•
6	Q	If you have a two-firm situation, then, according
7	٠	to your theory, that involves certain additional
8		costs?
9	A	You have got now both the regulation and the cost
10		of the two systems.
11	Q	Assume that you have the regulation in both instances,
12		then operating in this level of the two firms, you have
13		the cost of operating with two firms, and you have the
1_4		cost of regulation?
15	A	Right.
16	Q	My question to you is, may not be the case that
17		the total of those costs, the cost of regulation and
18		whatever this amount of cost is, is less than the
19		value of the competition between the two companies
20		operating at this level?
21	A	No. I think that is absolute nonsense.
22		It seems to me that you have just proved that
23		the two costs are higher plus regulations, and an

I can't see how one can come to the conclusion

additional cost.

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1		0'Donnell - cross
2		that it would be lower in the fashion that you have
3		described.
4	Q	Well, we have many instances, do we not, Professor,
5 ·		of things which are a social cost which only lately
6		have been evolved into dollars and cents value; isn't
7		that true, as the cost of air pollution?
8	A	There is a whole history behind that as a result of a
9		book called "Welfare Economics," and the answer is
10		it has been known since 1920, and if you mean that
11		it has become now politically known, the answer is
12		yes, but academically it has been recognized for
13		many years.
1,4		THE COURT: Perhaps this would
15	•	be an opportune time for us to take our recess.
16		Ladies and gentlemen, keep in mind the
17		Court's admonition. We will see you at 1:30.
18		{Luncheon recess had.}
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22,		

1	MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1981, 1:40 O'CLOCK P.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: Please be seated.
4	Bring in the jury.
5	{The jury entered the courtroom and the
6	following proceedings were had in their hearing
7	and presence.}
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9	•
10	JOHN L. O'DONNELL
11	resumed the stand and testified further as
12	follows:
13	
14	THE COURT: You may proceed,
15	Ms. Coleman.
16	MS. COLEMAN: Thank your your
17	Honor.
18	
19	CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JOHN L. O'DONNELL
20	•
21	BY MZ. COLEMAN:
22	Q Dr. O'Donnell, you had told us this morning that you
2 3	could walk out into the street and you could see if
2 4	there were four lines rather than one line, that
2 5	there was extensive duplication there.
ì	

Are you really able to tell what is duplication?

- A I'm sorry; am I really able to tell?
- Q Tell what equipment is excess duplication?
- A I had somebody point it out to men yes.
- Q Are you an engineer?
- 'A No ma'am.
- Q Are you familiar with system planning?
 - A No.

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Q Isn't it a fact that in the engineering industry, it is customary to have redundance in duplication in a given system so that there is a backup facility in case of a failure of the first?

A I find the question of redundancy contradictory.

If you mean that most systems are engineered in order to provide excess or capacity in the event of failure, yes, I'm aware of that. I'm aware that in generating capacity, you usually have a certain percentage of excess capacity for when you have a plant down for repairing, and so forth, I'm well aware of that.

But in the discussions that I had with the people that took me around and showed me physically these facilities, we discussed questions of that order, and it is my conclusion that duplication

		17,424
1		0'Donnell - cross
2		exists.
3	Q	And that is not based on your own study or your own
4		knowledge as an engineer or a systems planner since
5		you have not studied and you have no engineering
6		knowledge?
7	A	I have done the study and since I have gone out

- ne out and seen it, and I have asked the, I think, elementary questions that are reasonable for a person to ask, but I am not an engineer.
- You testified this morning that under the natural Q monopoly theory, if competition is unrestrained, one. will then have one competitor surviving?
- Yes, ma'am. Α
- And my question to you is: Q

When you do have unrestrained competition, did you have in mind free of laws, antitrust laws?

No . Α

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- What restraints did you have in mind? Q
- The kind of restraints that I have in mind are any agreements that limit competitive activity that one would normally expect to find in a free market.
- Are you aware during the past 20 years in this market of any agreement to limit competitive activity?

17,425

O'Donnell - cross

- A I know of no specific agreement; I cannot recall one.
- Dr. O'Donnell, are you familiar with the history of rates charged for electric power in this community, in the City of Cleveland?
- A In general, to the extent that, from the history I have read and the history of the corporation, that, in general, I believe MELP has been in the habit of fixing its rates about 5 percent lower than CEI's.

But I have not pursued the rate pattern, distribution of rates, or the subject in any detail beyond that.

- Taking as an assumption that the Muny rates have been lower than CEI rates by 5 percent, perhaps as much as 15 percent, I would like to ask you if CEI is the firm which remains at an unknown time, what will be the effect on rates in the City of Cleveland?
- A No idea.

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- @ Will they go up, or will they go down?
- A It may well be with exploding costs that they will go up at I would expect them to go up at a lower rate than otherwise would have been the case.

· Maybe they will go down: I don't know.

There is one thing I am sure of is that the costs of distribution when there is one system will

be lower than if there is two.

business?

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How those savings are shared, how they're distributed, and what the outcome is, I don't know; it would be foolish to predict.

- If there is only one company left, what do you

 suppose would happen to the distribution facilities

 belonging to that company which is no longer in
 - A I would assume they would be first acquired and paid for by the acquiring firm, and then I assume the acquiring firm would proceed to plan the distribution system more-rationally than it is at the present time; that is to say, by eliminating over time the
 - 8 But during the initial period at least, all that duplication, as you call it, will exist in place?
 - A Rome wasn't built in a day, not even by Mussolini, so I assume it will take time.
- 20 Q And there is no distribution system which is built
 21 all at one time except perhaps in a new city like
 22 Brazilia?
- 23 A I would imagine that's a true statement.

duplication that exists.

24 Q So that for any system, whether it is the only 25 competitor in town or one of two, its system

reflects the changes over time of putting in new distribution systems, perhaps a higher voltage, new distribution lines to serve customer loads which are developing in unforeseen places?

- A I would imagine distribution systems developed, yes.
- 7 · Q Do you consider price competition a form of gunrestrained competition?
- 9 A I consider it a part of competition, but I'm not sure
 10 what you mean by -- yes.

I'm not sure entirely in my mind what is implied in your context of the word "unconstrained".

Q "That was your term.

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- A Then the answer is yes.
- And do you believe there is a value for consumers in having the ability to choose between two competitors as applied to a particular product?
 - There is a value in using the word in a philosophical sense in everything, but it may be a costly value.

The question in economics is typically whether the cost of the choice escapes the benefits. But there is value in it; I see a philosophical connotation to your words.

If customers like paying more for things than otherwise they would have to pay because they are

17,428

O'Donnell - cross

philosophically attached to some notion, it is their privilege.

But what they should be aware of is that they're paying for it or somebody is going to pay for it.

I have no objection to you giving me a dime for a nickel all day if you wish to do so if it gives you some kind of philosophical pleasure.

- Q Is competition just a philosophical matter, --
- A No.

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- Q -- or is it recognized by economists as an actual value?
- A It has actual value because competition, when it exists, as we all know, has a tendency to drive prices down to the minimum cost and for the maximum output.

The problem is that in a natural monopoly

market, competition of this character does not exist.

You know that to be the case with regard to the City

of Cleveland?

A That is my conclusion.

A company that's been running an accumulated loss of \$35 million and has the kind of history that Muny has tells me something that cannot be denied.

@ Based on what you've read?

		•
1		O'Donnell - cross
2	A	That's night.
3	Q	Which does not include the documents produced during
4	•	the time during the historical time that is under
5		study here?
6	, A	I've had the benefit of yes; the answer is "Yes."
7		I haven't read I'm sure I have not read
8		everything that has ever been written or published
9		by this problem.
LO		MS. COLEMAN: I have no further
L1		questions, your Honor,
L 2		THE COURT: Redirect?
L 3		MR. LANSDALE: No questions, your
L 4		Honor.
L 5		THE COURT: Thank you.
L 6		You may step down, Professor.
L 7		THE WITNESS: Thank you sir.
. 8		THE COURT: Please remove the
. 9		microphone.
20		
21		THE COURT: . Call your next
22		witness.
23		MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we call
2 4		Ken Jackman.

J. JACKMAN₇ KENNETH 1 of lawful age, called as a witness on behalf 2 of the defendant, being first duly sworn, was 3 examined and testified as follows: 4 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KENNETH J. JACKMAN 6 7 BY MR. MURPHY: 8 Would you state your name, please, sir? 9 Q Kenneth John Jackman. 0 What is your address, please? 1 What is your home address? 2 5434 Berkshire, that's in North Olmsted. 3 Α Are you presently employed. Mr. Jackman? Q 4 5 A I'm partially employed. By whom? Q 6 7 By SIFCO industries. In what capacity are you partially employed? Q 8 At this moment, I am an odd job man, if you'd like Α 9 to put it that way. Any project that they require 0 help on they call me. 1 Did you formerly work for SIFCO on a full-time 2 Q basis? 3 Α Yes, I am.

When did you working on a part-time basis?.

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Jackman - direct

A In February of '78.

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- @ Was that on the occasion of your formal retirement
 from the company?
- A Yes, that was following my retirement in September,
- Q How long did you work for SIFCO, please?
- A Well, I worked for SIFCO in Canada from 1950 to 1959.

Then I came down here at their invitation in '59, and I worked for them entirely or on their behalf because I worked overseas until I retired in '77.

- Would you start in '59 and work towards your retirement and tell us what duties you had at SIFCO from time to time?
- A Well, when I came back down here in '59, I was here for two or three months; and then I went down to Argentina to set up the initial stages of a forge plant to support the blossoming automotive business in Argentina.

I came back at Christmas in '59,-- '60, and then I was plant engineer at two plants which we had then, one at East 72nd Street, and the other now at East 64th Street.

Then I was instrumental in laying out and setting

Jackman - direct

- 2 up a forge plant in India. I was there from '63
- 3 to '67 on a technical assistance basis as plant
- 4 engineer, et cetera, et cetera, for Bark Forge.
 - Q Did you return to Cleveland in 1967?
 - A Yes.

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- Q And you became plant engineer at that time?
- A Well, yes, I resumed my plant engineer duties at that
- g time.
 - Q Did you continue in that position until your retirement?
- l A Yes.
 - @ Mr. Jackman, am I correct that "SIFCO" is really
 - __just a shorthand version for --
 - A Steel Improvement and Forge Company.
 - @ Thank you. ____
 - And it is located where, please?
 - A That's on East 64th Street.
 - @ Mr. Jackman, I would like to ask you, please, what
 - is SIFCO's business?
 - A SIFCO is in the forging business.
 - We manufacture forgings for all kinds of
- vehicles, on the road, off the road, aircraft,
- tanks, weaponry, and aircraft, of course.
 - Q Mr. Jackman, let me draw your attention, please,
 - to early 1972, if I might.