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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1 CIVIL DIVISION 2 3 SYNANON FOUNDATION, INC., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 v. History No. 7189-78 6 STUART BERNSTEIN, ET AL., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Washington, D. C. 10 Wednesday, August 10, 1983 11 The above-entitled action came on for a motions 12 hearing before the Honorable LEONARD BRAMAN, Senior Judge, in Courtroom Number 10, commencing at approximately 9:30 a.m. 13 THIS TRANSCRIPT REPRESENTS THE PRODUCT OF 14 AN OFFICIAL REPORTER, ENGAGED BY THE COURT, WHO HAS PERSONALLY CERTIFIED THAT 15 IT REPRESENTS HER ORIGINAL NOTES AND RECORDS OF TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS OF 16 THE CASE AS RECORDED. 17 APPEARANCES: 18 On behalf of the Plaintiffs: 19 GEOFFREY P. GITNER, Esquire Washington, D. C. 20 PHILIP BOURDETTE, Esquire THOMAS A. WADDEN, Esquire 21 Washington, D. C. Washington, D. C. 22 On behalf of the Defendants: 23 WARREN KAPLAN, Esquire

Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C.

DANIEL SULLIVAN, Esquire

PENGAD CO., BAYONNE, N.J. 07002 . FORM

APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)

JOHN COPE, Esquire Washington, D. C.

COLLISTER JOHNSON, Esquire Washington, D. C.

THOMAS M. LAWLER, Esquire Washington, D. C.

Ms. Brenda Mack, RPR Official Court Reporter

Telephone 727-1766

PROCEEDINGS

(Thereupon, other proceedings were had, which were reported but are not transcribed herein.)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, recalling the matter of Synanon Foundation, Inc. vs. Bernstein, et al., Civil Action No. 7189-78.

THE COURT: We have before us this afternoon, the several motions which, for shorthand purposes, I have previously referred to as the Fleishman Motions.

We have in terms of chronological order, the first motion filed with Bernstein Cushner's Motion to dismiss and for other relief.

But the Court, upon having received yesterday, the Plainttif, that is, Synanon Foundation, Inc. Motion for the appointment of an Examiner, stated at the pretrial hearing that it would be required that a copy of the Motion be served upon the Government.

Since there is now pending in the United States

District Court, the case of the Synanon Church against the

United States and the Fleishman Declaration was originally

filed by the Government, the Defendant in that case, the

Civil Action No. being 82-2303, is there a representative of

the Government present?

MR. WADDEN: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Lawler, I believe, is from the Civil Division of the Department of

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Justice, sitting in the Courtroom.

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler, would you please come forward? Mr. Lawler, were you served with a copy -- step around to the lectern, please, sir.

MR. LAWLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Were you served with a copy of the Synanon's Motion for the Appointment of the Examiner?

MR. LAWLER: Yes, I was, Your Honor.

THE COURT: For purposes of the record, I might state that the Motion is lodged under Rule 28-I of the Local Rules, the Examiner being sought in connection with the deposition, prospective deposition, to be taken of Bette Fleishman.

Mr. Lawler, does the Government have a position which it desires the Court to be aware of in this matter?

MR. LAWLER: Yes, it does, Your Honor.

If I may --

THE COURT: Proceed, sir.

MR. LAWLER: If I may introduce myself to the Court. My name is Thomas M. Lawler, L-A-W-L-E-R. I am a trial attorney with the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and I am lead counsel of record in the tax case pending before Judge Ritchie.

Your Honor, I have with me today for the benefit of the Court, a motion which the United States filed on

July 11. That motion is pending before Judge Ritchie.

Basically, the Motion requires that Synanon produce certain documents which it has heretofore hidden from the public, or with respect to those documents, the United States alleges Synanon destroyed, that a full accounting be made in Judge Ritchie's Courtroom with respect to those destroyed records. Failing that, the United States seeks dismissal of Synanon's complaint in the tax case pending before Judge Ritchie. That Motion is based, in part, upon the affidavit of Bette Fleishman.

This afternoon, the Government finds itself in a peculiar situation, Your Honor. Synanon's reply to our pending motion is not due until tomorrow. I am led to believe that Synanon has lodged with this Court, certain arguments which it intends to make tomorrow in its papers to be filed with Judge Ritchie.

In these peculiar circumstances, the Government is very reluctant to let its position be known at this particular time due to the potential tactics or strategy that we might be revealing prior to the time that Synanon has to reply to our pending motion. We are in a very strange situation this afternoon, Your Honor, indeed.

In any event, we, of course, would oppose any deposition of Bette Fleishman for a variety of reasons. Bette Fleishman has agreed pursuant to immunity having been granted

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to her to testify for the United States in the particular case. That is, to voluntarily travel from where she is located to the Federal District Court here in Washington, D.C.

Bette Fleishman is a long-time resident of Synanon. She was in Synanon for over ten years. One basic concern of Bette Fleishman is that she knows Synanon well and she knows how Synanon conducts its discovery.

Indeed, Bette Flesihman was interviewed in the Arizona criminal case within the last two to three weeks. Mr. Bourdette himself conducted that interview.

THE COURT: Is that a deposition?

MR. LAWLER: Your Honor, it is a -- insofar as I am aware, it is a very peculiar statute which, under the Arizona Criminal Law, certain defendants under certain circumstances are entitled to take interviews of potential prosecution witnesses.

I am told that those interviews are not under oath. I am also told that there is a record of those interviews. I cannot be of further assistance to the Court with respect to what those procedures are.

THE COURT: Was the Government present during the interview?

MR. ALWLER: Not the United States Government.

THE COURT: No, I mean in this case, the State.

MR. LAWELER: My understanding is that the State

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was present. In any event, those interviews are --

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler, before you depart from that, what is the nature of the proceeding in Arizona?

MR. LAWLER: It is my understanding, Your Honor -and I believe Mr. Bourdette could speak with more authority on this particular point. It is my understanding that Mr. Dederich and 12 or 1 others were indicted by the State of Arizona for certain security law violations.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. LAWLER: In any event, pursuant to the peculiarities of those State provisions, Mr. Bourdette and other lawyers for the Defendants conducted interviews of witnesses in Arizona. Among those witnesses were Ms. Fleishman.

The interviews started by one Arnette Jamison, accompanied Mr. Bourdette at that particular time. Arnette Jamison is known as a Synanon imperial marine. Ms. Fleishman became reluctant to testify in Ms. Jamison's presence. There was a certain degree of, I am told, a certain degree of difference at that particular point. There are some other instances which have arisen which give Ms. Fleishman some concern. And I think to expose Ms. Fleishman to a deposition in these circumstances would have a killing effect on the United States' ability to fully have her cooperate in the tax case pending before Judge Ritchie.

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Now, I relay those facts to you, among a number of others, based on what counsel for Ms. Fleishman has told me this morning and at other times after that interview.

I believe it is in the best interests of the United States Government that these depositions not occur.

As I say, Ms. Fleishman stands ready to testify if the need arises and if Judge Ritchie finds there to be a need. She, to our knowledge, stands ready to testify in person before the District Court. We would not want to have anything happen to impede her willingness to do that.

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler, in terms of time, are you able to advise this Court as to how soon Ms. Fleishman could testify before the District Court?

MR. LAWLER: As I am sure Your Honor can understand, I am not aware of what Synanon's reply will be tomorrow with respect to the Motion which I would like to tender to the Court, for the Court's benefit.

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

Mr. Bush, would you please take the Motion?

MR. LAWLER: Your Honor, it depends, obviously, on what they say and it depends on how we judge our reply to what they say. So, with that, Your Honor, I cannot give the Court any further guidance.

I might add this: That when Synanon replied to the Government's Pending Motion for Summary Judgment, as I

perhaps think the Court is aware, the Government has a Motion for Summary Judgment pending. Included in its reply were 319 affidavits, many thousands of pages of what they called exhibits. And I don't know what to expect in those circumstances.

THE COURT: I think that your response, Mr. Lawler, has taken into consideration principally, the needs of the, or the circumstances of the litigation. But from Ms. Fleishman's point of view, assuming arguendo, that the Government, that the Government was ready to go forward, and Judge Ritchie was ready to go forward and Synanon was ready to go forward next week, could Ms. Flesihman go forward next week?

MR. LAWLER: Of course, I have not discussed that with Ms. Fleishman or her counsel, but I am led to believe that that could be arranged. I am led to believe that Ms. Fleishman would appear in the District Court to testify on behalf of the United States is that need arose. And, of course, before we would determine and urge Judge Ritchie whether or not that need exists, we would like to have the benefit of Synanon's reply to our Motion relative to Ms. Fleishman's affidavit.

I am not suggesting to the Court that I can absolutely guarantee the fact that Judge Ritchie will order Ms. Fleishman's testimony. I simply don't know what position

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the United States will take on that particular point until we have the benefit of Synanon's papers tomorrow and the benefits, obviously, of studying those papers.

THE COURT: Are there any other representations,
Mr. Lawler, which you desire to put before the Court?

MR. LAWLER: I don't believe so, Your Honor. No,

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler, the Court would be obliged to you if you remained with us until I hear the parties on this particular Motion. I have taken this Motion first in order to accommodate you in particular. So, if you would, please abide with us.

MR. LAWLER: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: Until I hear the parties.

MR. LAWLER: I certainly would, Your Honor.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, excuse me.

THE COURT: Wait a moment. Wait a moment.

I have asked Mr. Lawler to take a seat. I am going to hear everybody but I want Mr. Lawler to take a seat in the meantime.

Mr. Wadden, this is your motion. I will hear you.

I presume you are going to argue it.

MR. WADDEN: It is a motion to --

THE COURT: For an Examiner.

MR. WADDEN: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, may counsel state his name for the record?

MR. WADDEN: Thomas A. Wadden, W-A-D-D-E-N, Jr.

At the outset, Your Honor, I would suggest to the Court that Mr. Lawler's understanding of what took place in Arizona is not consistent with what I understand the facts to be, but he is here to correct them if I am incorrect.

Mr. Bourdette did not ask the Witness Fleishman any questions. He was not present while she was interrogated by two attorneys from Arizona and two other defense attorneys that were involved in the case from California.

Mr. Arnette Johnson did not Ms. Bourdette -- I mean Ms. Fleishman any questions. So, those, that backdrop is incorrect, Judge, unless he has information that I don't have.

Your Honor, we have filed with the Court which you previously described to take the deposition of Ms.

Fleishman. We find ourselves here, Your Honor, in rather unusual circumstances, because Your Honor, the existence of Ms. Fleishman was known to counsel for the defense as early as, I believe it was a deposition to Mr. Simon in 1980, in which Mr. Simon, in his deposition, testified that Ms.

Fleishman was one of the top assistants he had in connection with keeping and maintaining the archives.

Thereafter, Your Honor, there was a sanctioned hearing, as I am sure you are aware, in I believe, November

of 1981, at which point Mr. Kaplan produced no witnesses whatsoever to support his position for sanctions.

Your Honor, when we appeared before you a couple of weeks ago, it was my understanding and I could certainly be wrong, that Mr. Kaplan certainly left me under the impression that Ms. Fleishman, he had made efforts to get Ms. Fleishman to testify, but she was not available. She was under the witness protection program.

I believe in his letter sent to us in response to our letter of July 28, he entered on July 29, in which he suggested he had been incorrect, that we had been incorrect, that was our understanding.

Nevertheless, Your Honor, as we stand here today, as far as I know, Mr. Kaplan has taken none of the normal steps which would have been taken to produce this witness. He has not invoked the rule that is applicable. He has not noticed her deposition. I don't believe, Your Honor, at the time we appeared before the Court last time Mr. Kaplan had talked to her attorney, had attempted to find her. I think he felt that he could ride in on the coattails of the Government and just file this affidavit, which was another step, I might say, in a long procession of steps that had been taken to prevent this case from coming on to trial.

THE COURT: Mr. Wadden, I don't have before me at this precise time, although obviously there is an overlap,

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the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and I intend to hear you fully with respect to that. I suppose if I deny the Motion, that would render academic the Motion for an Examiner.

MR. WADDEN: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Insofar as the the Motion to Dismiss is inextricably tied up with your arguments, I will hear you on that. But bear in mind, that I intend to call that motion up immediately after this one. So, that unless you, your point goes to the Motion for Examiner, I will ask you to defer on the other points.

MR. WADDEN: Your Honor, if we might, as I have respectfully pointed out to the Court, my participation in this case was more or less in connection with the Fleishman problem, or the Fleishman affidavit. And I think Mr. Gitner is in a much better position to actually oppose the Motion to Dismiss than I am, if it if all right with Your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course, Fleishman is perhaps the heart of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Wadden.

MR. WADDEN: Your Honor, it seems to me that we are in a situation which is -- Judge, I don't want to get into good, bad faith or indifferent faith of Mr. Lawler. It seems to me that is for Judge Ritchie to consider. But we have a situation where I am informed on information and belief, Your Honor, that the Government was in possession of the testimony in one form or another of Ms. Fleishman in either late

April or early May of this year. The Government waited until July 8 to even reduce that in writing so it could be thrown at us on July 11 in the form of their Motion.

Motion because I know that you will see the type of Motion it is. And as far as I am concerned, Your Honor, it was a Motion really to do nothing but to attempt to poison Judge Ritchie's mind. I have never in all my years of practice seen a Motion such as the one that has been handed to you with some pride by Mr. Lawler.

The Judge closed discovery, Your Honor. And so, having closed discovery they came up with this form of Motion, most of which is to produce information, not to produce documents. In the process of asking to get this information, they lay out their theory of the case with all the details and all the inferences that they drew from it.

Your Honor, we are prepared in a good faith effort to take the examination of Ms. Fleishman. Ordinarily, I think Your Honor would agree that it would be up to Mr. Kaplan to proceed to take that. In view of the facts, Your Honor, that some of the persons involved in the transactions described have in good faith invoked their right against privilege -- and I might say, Your Honor, I think in good faith in view of the matters that have gone on before and are presently going on -- I think, Your Honor, in this case,

along with another gentleman, Mr. Lawler, and another gentleman who didn't see fit to show up, so he has invited Mr. Goodwin, are conducting a joint civil and criminal investigation. And this is an attempt in the civil investigation to get the defendants to come in, or get the prospective defendants to come in, Mr. Bourdette and the others, and take a position on these documents. And no matter whether they answer truthfully or not, Your Honor, they are going to be indicted for perjury and that is just the position the Government wants to put them in.

So, Your Honor, I say with all sincerity that the invocation of the privilege in this case was not taken lightly. And there may come a time, Your Honor, where we will be in a position to fully testify on this matter, but we cannot do it at this time because it is a peril to Mr. Bourdette and the others.

Your Honor, we, as I say are prepared to go forward with this deposition. We filed a notice. That seems to me, basically all there is to say about it, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wadden.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, the Defendants Bernstein and Cushern do not oppose the Motion for appointment of an Examiner. But I think that an analysis of that Motion in light of the realities of the situation suggest that the granting of that Motion is putting formal -- the substance

and the likely results in no further elimination of the issues before this Court.

Counsel for Plaintiff, when it files its opposition to our original Motion to Dismiss a couple of weeks ago --

THE COURT: Why is that so, Mr. Kaplan, if Ms.

Fleishman is served?

MR. KAPLAN: There are two --

THE COURT: And she deposes beforehand?

MR. KAPLAN: There are two big if's. One if is if she is served.

THE COURT: What do we have to lose by seeing if , she can be served.

MR. KAPLAN: We have nothing to lose by that -- Judge, I am saying I don't oppose the Motion.

THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Kaplan. What is the other big if?

MR. KAPLAN: Well, the other big if is whether she is willing to testify. And counsel for Plaintiff has told us at pages 14 through 17 of their original opposition of our Motion to Dismiss that there is no reason to think that Ms. Fleishman would be willing to testify.

In fact, it would be ludicrous to think that she would testify without being granted immunity in our case.

They told us that. They said --

THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Kaplan the Court can hardly

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look to the Plaintiff to champion and protect Ms. Fleishman's rights.

MR. KAPLAN: Well, Your Honor, I have no objection to, as I say, to the Motion. But I just want to point out to the Court that I believe that this is not done with the expectation that we are going to get any further evidence this way through Ms. Fleishman unless with one — with one big unless — unless the Government would be willing to immunize her for her testimony given in this case, which they might very well do if asked, if asked to do so by the Court. They have already done that, of course, in the tax case proceedings.

And it would be a simple matter, I would think, to extend that immunity to this case.

And I would think that, I have reason to believe with my conversation with Ms. Fleishman's lawyer a few days ago, which he averted to a few days ago in chambers' conference, that Ms. Fleishman would not testify unless she was given that immunity. That her attorney would advise her not to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination unless that immunity were extended to this case, just as Plaintiff correctly designed when they filed their original opposition.

Now, it occurs to me in thinking about this further,

Judge, that it might make sense from everyone's point of

view -- the point of view of this Court, these litigants,

the Government, the tax case and Ms. Fleishman -- if Ms. Fleishman's deposition, perhaps videotaped in Arizona, and that deposition could be used jointly in both cases, that would solve the immunity problem. It would solve the problem of Ms. Fleishman having to travel to Washington. It would solve the problem of having, making her testify twice and I think it would protect everyone's interests.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kaplan.

MR. COPE: Your Honor, I don't desire to be heard further on the matter.

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON: The same response, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Wadden, is there rebuttal?

MR. WADDEN: A rejoinder rahter than a rebuttal, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I would like to hear Synanon's response to Mr. Kaplan's suggestion.

MR. WADDEN: Your Honor, it seems to me the issues in the Federal case are considerably broader, of greater scope, and are pointed in directions other than the limited issues in this case. And I don't think, Your Honor, that we should get involved in that type of deposition unless --

THE COURT: Could you spell that out? I fail to see off hand, how in regard to the Motion here and the Motion in the Government's case -- I have not read the Motion, but

it is being described to me -- and Mr. Lawler's representation as to what the Motion seeks to accomplish and why it is being filed is virtually identical to the substance of the instant Motion.

Now, I know in regard to the litigation at large, the Government's, the case in the District Court, is basically different, although some of the issues are the same. But with regard to our two motions, wherein do they raise different subject matters?

MR. WADDEN: Well, Judge, they may not raise different subject matters, but they raise the issue, the broad issue might well be the same. But we, in this case, have to answer for the failure to produce documents which are ordered or have been ordered to be produced by the Court as pertains to the issues in this case.

The issues they are raising go into various cases up and down the rainbow. And they basically, if Your Honor will look at that motion, they just basically make these broad allegations.

Now, we don't want to get into a deposition in this case, Your Honor, in which we are wearing two hats. The Government says, well, that applies to the broad issue we have here on the A,B,C case or what they did in this case, or what they did in this case, a minute. We are here only in connection with the documents

that are involved in the Bernstein case.

Secondly, Your Honor, nothing has changed since you discussed this as a rather novel suggestion about two weeks ago. We have somewhat, I should say, a new suggestion, Your Honor, rather than novel. We have the problem of who is going to pass upon the materiality and relevancy of the questions that are asked. You are Judge Ritchie in connection with the deposition.

THE COURT: Under the Federal Rules and our rules, if a problem arises, it is the Court in the form where the depositions are being conducted.

MR. WADDEN: Well, -- in other words, he is going to wear two hats, one for you and one for Judge Ritchie?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. WADDEN: Well, Judge, why can't we -- if I may respectfully say to the Court -- why can't we proceed to see if this lady is willing to give us a deposition under your court order in connection with the issues in this case?

The Government, I understand, has been paying for lawyers in this case. I have yet to figure out -- I have made the inquiry of Mr. Lawler and I have not gotten an answer. Indo not understand that she is under the Witness Protection Program. And I see no reason if she is a witness to the truth, Judge, why she can't tell the truth in your Courtroom as well as she can tell it in any other Courtroom?

THE COURT: Why should Synanon have the opportunity to depose her in this proceeding, an opportunity to depose her in the District Court proceeding, all prior to the hearing? Why shouldn't it be enough if Synanon has one opportunity to depose her?

MR. WADDEN: Judge, if you feel that you can pass on this motion without the -- we came forward and asked for a deposition as an officer of the Court, Judge, because Your Honor said, and I think very rightfully so, Your Honor was concerned with the administration of justice. And when Mr. Kaplan didn't come forward as I thought I would and say, "Well, we will take her deposition under 28-I," we felt an obligation as officers of the Court to suggest this.

We don't think we need her deposition to dispose of this motion. We think her declaration or whatever it stands for in Federal Court, does not comply with the necessary form it has to be in to be of use in this case.

So, Judge, if we are in a, if you are in a position, of feeling we are trying to take two bites of the apples, we don't want two bites.

THE COURT: I have not, I have not case any expressions regarding motivation of intent. I am merely examining the practical effects. And I realize that, and as I reflect when we get to the motion, I have great difficulty -- I have told Mr. Kaplan this before in the,

stages conferences in this case -- I have a great deal of difficulty with a proposition that I should dismiss on the basis of a declaration, without the party making the declaration being cross examined. But we will get to that in due course. Do you have any other remarks that you wish to make, Mr. Wadden?

MR. WADDEN: I have some others but I don't think they would be appropriate, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lawler?

Mr. Lawler, the case before, the case in the District Court is a civil case; is it not?

MR. LAWLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I would presume that subject to the declaration of the Court, the right to pursue a deposition of a perspective witness is fully enjoined just as it over here. Indeed, our rules are shaped on the Federal rules.

MR. LAWLER: Indeed, Your Honor. But if I might state, it is my anticipation that we would object to any deposition of Bette Fleishman.

THE COURT: And could you help me on that?

MR. LAWLER: Yes, Your Honor. In the event -- this has come up in one other instance that Synanon wished to take. We objected to that as well. Judge Ritchie allowed it. Limiting it in certain ways, particularly with respect to the time limitations. That particular time, Judge Ritchie asked

the parties -- and this is my recollection of that hearing -- whether or not we wanted him to preside over that deposition.

To the extent that Judge Ritchie, to the extent that Synanon would request a deposition from Judge Ritchie of Ms. Fleishman, we would oppose it. However, in the event he was inclined to allow it, we would seek a certain protective order as we would then deem to be appropriate under the circumstances.

And, again, I wish the Court to understand I am dealing without having the benefit of Synanon's reply to my Motion.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. LAWLER: I am not indicating to the Court what in fact, I will do. I will simply have to judge the circumstances as they may turn out to be. But it is my expectation that I would object to any deposition of Ms. Fleishman for reasons I would far rather, with all due respect to this Court, articulate to Judge Ritchie at that particular time.

I am mindful of what I will call the problem that confront this Court with respect to Ms. Fleishman, but I believe my duty is to serve the best interests of the United States in the tax case.

We would certainly oppose any joint deposition of

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Ms. Fleishman. It would be our expectation that if Synanon properly raises a question of facts, there will be substantial questions of credibility, and we would far rather have Judge Ritchie in person, to judge Ms. Fleishman's credibility as opposed to those that Synanon, those witnesses that Synanon might produce.

> Mr. Wadden? THE COURT:

MR. WADDEN: Judge, this is the whole problem with dealing with Mr. Lawler and that part of the Justice Department. They want special handling. They want Judge Ritchie to be present. They didn't say one word to Judge Ritchie about this, Ms. Fleishman in April, when they were up here discussing more discovery, and there was an extensive little conversation which took place betwen the Judge and the Government and everybody else. Not one word did they say when we said we wanted to take the deposition of this agent. They sat quiet, although I believe at that time, they knew of the existence of Ms. Fleishman.

They wait until now, and they say, "If we are going to get to the truth, by God, we are going to get it with Judge Ritchie sitting up there playing policeman."

Either this witness is a witness to the truth in this Courtroom or this witness has no need to be in this proceeding at all. And I have not heard one thing that suggests that this witness can't be produced to testify on

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the issues in this case truthfully without the benefits of any guidance from the Government.

And, Your Honor, if you do see fit to order this deposition be taken, I hope the Government counsel understands that you don't expect him to interfere in any way whatsoever with this lady giving testimony.

THE COURT: Mr. Wadden, are you able to tell us whether in the filing tomorrow will seek the deposition of Ms. Fleishman?

Judge, I have to talk to my brains MR. WADDEN: here, if you will excuse me a moment?

> THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAWLER: Shall I be seated, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may, Mr. Lawler.

(Pause.)

Judge, I guess I am supposed to stand MR. WADDEN: up here and tell you we are asking for it. I was, they are drawing the papers and I am not, so they say that they are asking for it.

One thing I don't think, Judge, has been made clear to you at that point. Is at the time that they went out and used the immunity statutes to secure the testimony of Ms. Fleishman, the Judge had already closed discovery down. That is why you have this --

THE COURT: It was stayed, as I understand it,

pending disposition of the cross motions for summary judgment.

MR. WADDEN: Yes. And so they went and what they did, Judge -- let's look at it -- they went out, and they took the immunity statutes. They went to the Chief Judge, they got immunity and they compelled testimony, if that is what you want to call it, while discovery was stayed, which does not sound to me like cricket, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wadden.

MR. LAWLER: May I be heard on that point, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Lawler.

MR. LAWLER: Of course, we will be fully prepared to address those issues before Judge Ritchie at the appropriate time. I don't wish to leave this Court with any notion that the Government acted improperly in any way, but those matters I am simply not going to address here. I don't think they are relevant to the issues before this Court.

However, as the need arises, they will be addressed before Judge Ritchie.

THE COURT: I dare say they will have to be.

MR. LAWLER: I understand that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Fleishman's declaration is obviously central to the pending motion before this Court. I have a motion filed by our plaintiff under Rule 28 which seeks to

take the deposition of Ms. Fleishman. There is no opposition to that motion and the Court is of the view that the Motion is well taken. The deposition should be permitted. However, the terms and circumstances for the taking of that Motion [sic] are matters --

MR. KAPLAN: Deposition.

THE COURT: -- are matters that the Court must interest itself in.

MR. KAPLAN: Does Your Honor mean deposition?

THE COURT: I meant deposition. What did I say?

MR. KAPLAN: Motion.

THE COURT: I meant the deposition. The Court must interest itself in the terms and conditions of the deposition. The Court has that power under the Rules, and can frame and shape its Order, in order to see that justice is done. The Court is of the view that successive depositions would not serve in the interests of justice.

Scanning the Government's Motion and the supporting memorandum, I see that there is a Table of Contents. And looking at the various parts of the Table of Contents, those dealing with the facts as distinguished from the legal presentation, I fail to see any subject matter or division of subject matter that has not been the subject of discovery in this case and the subject of briefings in this case.

The court, accordingly, is of the view that while

grant the Motion, in issuing its order, the Court wishes to have the benefit of how Judge Ritchie will treat the deposition which will be sought in that case. It may be that a joint deposition is not feasible, although that is not, is not clear to me at the present time. But our defendants have, up to this point, indicated to the Court, that they would be willing to have the Motion decided by the testimony taken of Ms. Fleishman in the District Court.

I am not sure that I am entirely satisfied with that. I mention only to indicate that there are various factors around which the Court can shape the taking of Ms. Fleishman's deposition.

If, for any reason, Ms. Fleishman's deposition is not taken in that Court, I want the record to show that as the matter now stands before this Court, I propose to permit the deposition to go forward, unless the Defendant's Motion is withdrawn.

While that Motion is before the Court, I remain profoundly concerned about the integrity of these, of this proceeding. And I am not inclined, subject to hearing argument on the Motion to Dismiss, to invoke that drastic sanction on the declaration, or the declaration that has been filed here.

Having enunciated my position, and having stated

that I will grant the motion, I will defer framing the Order, at least for some period of time, until the dust settles in the District Court.

Mr. Wadden?

MR. WADDEN: Your Honor, I understand and appreciate everything the Court has said. One of our concerns, of course, Your Honor, is not to lose a trial date we have with this Court if the Court --

THE COURT: That is why I conducted the pretrial hearings.

MR. WADDEN: -- orders us to trial. Judge, you may not be able to do that at this time but you do have some general framework in which, you know, you know the District Court as well as I do, Judge, this may drift on over until October or November.

THE COURT: I don't know that -- I have been impressed by the fact that Judge Ritchie, insofar as I have to view the manner in which he handles cases, is quite expeditious.

MR. WADDEN: Does Your Honor have any general time that we are going to wait for that Court to act? Or does Your Honor want to take another look at it, say, a week from now?

THE COURT: I don't want to draw any hard and fast time parameters, Mr. Wadden. I don't intend to defer this

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matter in an open-ended way and for the indefinite future. I want to see how things unfold. I want to give myself maximum flexibility, and I have every reason to believe that the matter will be handled expeditiously in that Court. And, Mr. Lawler, I trust that the Government is

going to handle the matter expeditiously.

MR. LAWLER: As best we can, Your Honor. I can only impress upon this Court the fact that we don't what the nature of the animal we are dealing with, and we won't know that until tomorrow.

THE COURT: I understand that. But within -- taking those matters into consideration, when the Government decides what is the best response, I would expect the Government to proceed promptly and expeditiously.

MR. LAWLER: To the extent, that is possible, we certainly would attempt to do that, Your Honor. We intended to do that.

MR. WADDEN: My only point, Your Honor, was we do want the Court to realize we do have the trial date in mind, and we hope we are not going to lose the trial date.

THE COURT: You have made that clear to the Court, Mr. Wadden. If there is nothing further, the Court will excuse Mr. Lawler.

MR. KAPLAN: Just one thing, Your Honor. Your Honor, in connection with the motion that we are just

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finishing up with, I would respectfully suggest and request of the Court that in connection with framing the order for the taking of Ms. Fleishman's deposition and in communicating with Judge Ritchie concerning the scheduling of proceedings in this case, that in order for the deposition, the scheduled deposition of Ms. Fleishman not to be an exercise in futility, it would seem to be essential for her to receive immunity, and Judge Ritchie is in a position to do that.

Judge Ritchie is in a position to grant immunity that would extend to this case and the Government is in a position, if it wishes to, to request that of Judge Ritchie. So, I would respectfully ask the Court to request either the Government or Judge Ritche to confer that immunity so that we could accomplish something by that deposition.

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler?

MR. LAWLER: Your Honor, I am a civil lawyer and most unschooled in immunity matters. I know of no instance when, at least the tax division of the Justice Department granted immunity in a tax case involving two private civil litigants. I cannot see how that can be done. But I speak from an abundance of inexperience. I just cannot imagine it could be accomplished and I am certainly am not prepared to address that question.

THE COURT: Well, I will state at the present time

that the Motion which has been filed, the main Motion, that is, does it seems to me, go to the heart of the integrity, of any litigation, and it is something that should be thoroughly ventilated. And it seems to me that it would be a miscarriage for anyone, much less the Government to withhold any measures that would assist the Court in ultimately reaching a fair and just conclusion.

Now, I know the Government has this litigation, and that is its first allegiance. But I don't think that the matter which interests this Court is, in substance, basically different than the matter which interests the District Court. And I would hope that there would be an enlightened consideration of this matter to the end that justice may be promoted.

I would also hope that -- and I will ask the reporter to transcribe this portion of the proceedings so that it can be available in the event that Judge Ritchie wishes to inform himself as to what transpired this afternoon.

MR. LAWLER: I appreciate that, Your Honor. If I may express a concern to this Court expressed to me by Ms. Fleishman? And it is exactly that as a result of cooperation with the United States, she would be dragged into other civil litigation.

Now, I fully understand the problems confronting

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this Court, but I merely wish the Court, with all due respect, to have some understanding of the peculiar position 2 we find ourselves in with respect to dealing with Ms. 3 Fleishman. THE COURT: That is why, Mr. Lawler -- if I may 5 interject, I don't want Ms. Fleishman, if I can avoid it, to 6 have to run a gauntlet. 7 MR. LAWLER: I appreciate that, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Of successive examinations. 9 MR. LAWLER: I appreciate that fact. I do believe, 10 as I perceive the issues before this Court and Mr. Kaplan's 11 and Judge Ritchie and our Motion, I do believe they are 12 different. I do believe they are different. 13 THE COURT: How so? 14 MR. LAWLER: As I understand what is involved --15 THE COURT: Factually, I mean, from the standpoint 16 of examining a witness. 17 MR. LAWLER: I understand that, Your Honor. 18 difference that I see is that there is an allegation here 19 that documents subpoenaed before this Court had been 20 destroyed, altered or hidden. The allegations of the 21 Government before Judge Ritchie are far broader, pertaining 22 to a number of, of different lawsuits, at least those law-23 suits that we articulate in our Motion.

So, I am suggesting to this Court that the issues

before the Court, the Federal District Court in our case, are somewhat broader than those issues are here.

THE COURT: But the material that was assertedly withheld, concealed, and/or destroyed, was it not the same material? That is the material going to allegedly the violence, and the material going to financial aggrandizement.

MR. LAWLER: Your Honor, it is our allegation in Federal District Court that these materials were, in fact, destroyed, hidden, or otherwise not produced.

Please understand that I had enough to deal with Judge Ritchie's Court to know exactly what it is that allegedly was withheld here. But, as I perceive the issues, we are involved in a broader inquiry than is before this Court.

THE COURT: If we distinguish, if we look at the matter from the standpoint of Ms. Fleishman and what questions will be addressed to her and what precise manner, is there a difference between the examination that would take place here and the examination that would take place in the District Court?

MR. LAWLER: With all due respect, Your Honor,

I believe that documents were destroyed in other litigation:

The ABC litigation, for example, a litigation involving

Attorney Morantz. This, I might add, is contained in our

pending motion. So, the inquiry would extend into those

other lawsuits.

THE COURT: Is it the same material?

MR. LAWLER: I suffer from having a lack of understanding what it is that was allegedly to have been destroyed.

THE COURT: Well, the incident that you have recited in your table of contents, were they the stuff out of which the so-called violence issue is made?

MR. LAWLER: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, in any event, is there anything further, Mr. Lawler?

MR. LAWLER: No, Your Honor.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, before we let Mr. Lawler go, one of the arguments that has just been made by Synanon in its Motion to Strike the Fleishman Affidavit is a question raised as to whether in fact, it is the affidavit of Ms. Fleishman. I think that Mr. Lawler can shed some light on that.

THE COURT: Mr. Lawler?

MR. LAWLER: I believe that the affidavit we filed in Federal District Court, a copy of which apparently Mr. Kaplan has, is Ms. Fleishman's affidavit.

THE COURT: Were you personally involved?

MR. LAWLER: I did not. I was not there when she signed it. However, I was involved in the content of that

particular affidavit, yes. THE COURT: In other words, the interviews based 2 upon which the declaration was reduced to writing? The 3 declaration is a writing which reflects the interviews which 4 you attended? 5 MR. LAWLER: Your Honor, if I may --6 THE COURT: I am merely asking you is that what 7 you were trying to say to the Court? 8 MR. LAWLER: Yes, Your Honor. I hope Your Honor 9 has some understanding of the fact that I am a bit reluctant 10 to get into the merits of what is pending before Judge 11 Ritchie absent --12 THE COURT: I understand that. 13 MR. LAWLER: And I am attempting to convey that 14 to the Court to the extent that I can. 15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lawler. You are 16 excused. 17 MR. LAWLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 May I have one inquiry for the Court? 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. LAWLER: When will a transcript of these 21 proceedings be available? 22 THE COURT: I assume that counsel will wish copies 23 also? 24 MR. KAPLAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Wadden? 2 MR. WADDEN: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: And Mr. Kaplan? 4 MR. KAPLAN: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Cope? MR. COPE: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson? 7 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Ms. Mack? 9 THE COURT REPORTER: How soon do you want it? 10 THE COURT: Well, as soon as possible. Gentlemen, 11 do you want it on a daily copy basis? 12 MR. KAPLAN: That is fine, Your Honor. 13 On a daily copy basis? THE COURT: 14 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lawler. 16 MR. LAWLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 Your Honor, there is one thing, if MR. WADDEN: 18 I may address the Court, Your Honor? It seems to me that 19 the issue in this case, is whether the documents, the absence 20 of which are subject to this complaint were in existence on 21 the day they were called for by the Court; not whether they 22 were destroyed before or how they were destroyed or whether 23 they were in existence at the time they came under the 24

Court's process.

Also, Your Honor, in connection with, as I understand it, the case for --

THE COURT: That comes, that deals with the Motion to Dismiss, as I understand it, Mr. Wadden. That was a Motion for an Examination.

MR. WADDEN: If we took her deposition, we would be going to those documents and that material which was not produced before Your Honor and depositions for an explanation for her statements about it. We would not be ranging all over the field about what happened in 1979, what happened in 1980, what happened in 1981, what happened in 1976. We would have a limited focus of the questions that would be asked her, and that is what we have addressed —

THE COURT: It is Mr. Kaplan's position, if I understand it correctly, that there were outstanding discovery questions emanating from this case, when according to the Fleishman declaration, the program to destroy and conceal took place. So, the materials may have desired, may have been called for in multiple cases, but if I understand it, one of those cases was this case. Am I correct; Mr. Kaplan?

MR. KAPLAN: Essentially, yes, Your Honor. Ms. Fleishman tells us that she became involved in the program of destroying and concealing evidence in February, 1980, and that that lasted for approximately six months, until August

of 1980.

During that period from between February and August, 1980, there was an abundant discovery in this case. Specifically, in March at the end of March, 1980, we filed our first request for production of documents in which we requested hundreds of tapes; and the answer we got a month later, the response, saying most of it can't be found.

THE COURT: All right. So much for the Motion for Examiner. As I have stated, I will defer framing of the Order until the circumstances clarify themselves.

It would appear to me that Mr. Kaplan, Mr. Cope and Mr. Johnson, clearly I am not able to consider granting the Motion at this time. The disposition of this Motion will be dependent upon a number of things, and one of those may well be the Fleishman Deposition, assuming that she can be served and the deposition can be had. So, is there any objection to the Court deferring that Motion?

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor -- excuse me, Mr. Kaplan.
MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I would not object to

that. It would seem logical.

THE COURT: It would seem that there are some matters that are, that were raised in the recent filing.

That is yesterday's filing that go to the sufficiency issue of the Fleishman declaration on its face which the Court might hear. But that was served yesterday and I don't know

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whether the Defendants are prepared to go forward on that.

MR. KAPLAN: We are prepared.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, just briefly.

Your Honor, clearly we have absolutely no objection to and see the great need for the Fleishman deposition, going forward. Our concern, of course, is that will happen is what has been speculated upon. And that is, without a grant of immunity, Ms. Fleishman will decline to testify with respect to these items. Then we are left where, essentially, we are today.

My client's position, Your Honor, is this: dismisal under Rule 37 is not, and indeed in the many cases where it has been ordered previously under similar circumstances is not dependent on the veracity or degree of veracity of the Fleishman affidavits.

Dismissal under Rule 37 is, arises when the parties in the case, the defendants have need for information which is derived of them --

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, I must interrupt you, I don't believe that the main motion of Mr. Kaplan purports to travel under Rule 37.

MR. KAPLAN: It does, Your Honor. If I understand it, what it does is it involves the power of the Court to protect itself against obstruction.

MR. JOHNSON: May I respond to that, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JOHNSON: There are two issues raised by the Fleishman affidavit, if I may say so. One is the information issue. That is what we, the defendants, are entitled to in present our defenses in this case. The other is the fraud on the Court issue. Has there been a perversion of the processes which would invoke dismissal because of that fact?

What I am speaking to is the first issue. There is information which has allegedly been destroyed that is vital to the presentation of our defenses relating to violence, relating to self-aggrandizement, relating to the specific tapes with regard to the Boston House.

THE COURT: Was there an order outstanding that required protection, Mr. Kaplan?

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, the order, the May 1981 order of Judge Fauntleroy required the defendants, required the plaintiffs, rather -- excuse me -- to produce all of the tapes which we had requested in our original March, 1981 request for production of documents in excess of 200 or 300 tapes. Those tapes --

THE COURT: Was that the order that was vacated subsequently?

MR. KAPLAN: Yes, that order was subsequently vacated in May, 1981, in the spring of 1981 by Judge

Fauntleroy based upon what now appears to have been the perjured testimony of Mr. Simon, and which Mr. Simon got on the witness stand and testified at great length that nothing had ever been erased, nothing destroyed, nothing concealed.

And based on that testimony, Judge --

THE COURT: Now, you get into the Hazel-Atlas

Fraud (punc.) In other words, the theory is that a fraud
was perpetrated upon the Court and the Court, having been
taken in by the fraud, vacated the order?

MR. KAPLAN: Yes, Your Honor. May I just respond to the Court's statement a moment ago, that we weren't proceeding under Rule 37. In part, we proceeding under Rule 37, and I say that for this reason. Rule 37-A provides that a false or evasive answer to an interrogatory is the equivalent to not answering at all. Rule 37-D provides that in the event of violation of Court Order or in the event of a failure of a party to answer interrogatories, the sanctions of Rule 37 --

THE COURT: Do you have any cases that say that an evasive answer triggers the sanction of dismissal? In any event, gentlemen, it seems to me that the colloquy is an exercise in futility.

Mr Johnson. You inadvertently took the lectern, Mr. Kaplan.

MR. JOHNSON: How in the world can I agree with

your position without crediting Fleishman?

MR. JOHNSON: That is what I was trying to explain, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.

MR. JOHNSON: The order that I am talking about -I am not diminishing or disagreeing with Mr. Kaplan's
argument -- is that there is an order from this Court that
issued just several weeks ago requiring Synanon officials to
respond to depositions with respect to the Fleishman
affidavit.

The response to that from counsel was that all of the individuals who were asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege, that is information which was required to be presented to this Court, which the individuals are asserting their Fifth Amendment privileges on, which they are entitled to do so, there are consequences, however, that flow from that. And I want to impress upon the Court that every State Court decision, every state that has addressed this issue in a situation where relevant and material information is declined to be provided by plaintiffs in a civil case which is relevant to the defense of a defendant, where they do that on the Fifth Amendment privilege, there is dismissal. Every case.

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, I am familiar with those cases, and I don't believe that they are opposites for this

reason: Those cases deal with refusal avunucio to produce discovery on the invocation of a privilege, usually the Fifth Amendment.

In this case, materials had been produced. The defendant's position is that not all of them had been produced but that begs the argument in the sense that it rests upon Fleishman.

Now, it is true that there was an invocation of the privilege, but the invocation of that privilege didn't withhold documents, if the plaintiffs are right. If the plaintiff is right, the plaintiff produced all the documents. It is Fleishman that has the sting.

What the plaintiff's agents have done is to invoke the privilege in regards to responding to Fleishman, but that has not been with regard to basic discovery. That has been with regard to the inquiry to ascertain whether there has been a basic withholding in discovery.

So, I don't see those cases as being opposite to what I have before me. I don't think there is any way that I can get to the root of the problem, and I don't see that there is any way that I can get to the line of cases that you are talking about without Fleishman, without crediting Fleishman.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, the Court has made up its mind on that matter, and I just wanted to leave one

thought. The information that was sought pursuant to the Court's order of a couple of weeks ago was with regard to whether or not there was a destruction of this evidence. The individuals asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege. That information, whether or not there was a destruction, is relevant to and can be used by the defendant in the case before us, and inferences can be drawn from the jury, and I think there is many cases to that effect.

Now, the fact that they have declined to provide us with that information -- I am not talking about documents. I am talking about that information -- is a delineation under the Fifth Amendment, which brings us pursuant to the Court order, which brings us right into the cases that I am talking about. And that is my concern right now. I think we are there with respect to that.

I agree that getting to the bottom of the Fleishman affidavit is --

THE COURT: You are talking about obstructing the defendants from creating an inference or presenting an inference to the jury which the jury may or may, may or may not draw. It is up to the jury.

MR. JOHNSON: They always may or may not draw it, yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JOHNSON: But it is a piece of evidence that is

important to us. That is --

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THE COURT: It is, it seems to me to be a fragile reed to hang a dismissal on where an issue is involved where the matter involved is, I think, peripheral. I am not sure that the jury can't know that the Fifth Amendment has been invoked.

MR. JOHNSON: We will probably have to deal with that question.

THE COURT: Right. And the jury, query whether the jury can draw any inferences out of that. But I am not to dismiss this case on the basis of that circumstance, Mr. Johnson. If I find that there has been destruction of documents, the plaintiff is going to have to do a lot of arguing to persuade me to withhold that sanction. I am not saying that the plaintiff won't be successful but my disposition will be to give that very, very serious consideration.

MR. JOHNSON: We believe, Your Honor, that --THE COURT: Yes, I am not going to dismiss the cases on that basis, Mr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON: I understand that.

THE COURT: Mr. Kaplan, you want to take a crack at it, too?

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I would like to, I would like to do this. I suggested a few moments ago that in view

of Your Honor's inclination to attempt to get the deposition of Bette Fleishman, that perhaps it was premature to argue the Motion to Dismiss this afternoon. And other things being equal, that would certainly, that would certainly seem logical. But other things are not equal.

And one of the things that is not equal is we have a trial date just about one month from now. And as we get closer to that trial date, we are going to be, everyone is going to be, perhaps even the Court is going to be just by the momentum of the thing, locked into the motion of there having to have to be a trial.

We are also not going to be very likely, not in my view, not going to be successful in trying to get the deposition of Ms. Fleishman either because she won't be found or because she won't testify --

THE COURT: Then I am going to have to decide what to do in those circumstances. But, Mr. Kaplan, if you are pressing the Court for a ruling on the motion now, I am ready to deny it. If that is the alternative that's placed before me, I will deny the motion straightaway based upon the Fleishman declaration.

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I am not, I am certainly not going to place before you the alternative of waiting or definitively passing upon and, therefore, denying the motion.

If those are the only alternatives which the Court is willing

toconsider then, of course, I have nothing further to say at this time.

But, if the Court would consider another alternative which is the granting of the Motion at this time, I would like to have an opportunity to try to persuade the Court why that alternative is appropriate at this stage.

THE COURT: I assume that that is the alternative that is described in your reply memorandum?

MR. KAPLAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I am not persuaded by that, Mr. Kaplan. I don't think that you can treat the declaration as evidence. I am not going to treat it as evidence. I think there has got to be cross examination. And before that occurs, I don't believe this rises to the dignity of a, of an evidentiary predicate for the invocation of the drastic remedy of dismissal.

As I mentioned before, I view the Fleishman declaration and the Motion as in the nature of newly discovered evidence. And in the sense that Judge Fauntleroy made a disposition, a ruling, now we have come in, and you have come in proffering new evidence.

Now, it seems to me axiomatic that the party who has gained the favorable ruling has a right to test the proffered new evidence. And I intend to give the plaintiff that opportunity before I bring down the curtain on this

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MR. KAPLAN: Very well.

THE COURT: Mr. Cope?

MR. COPE: Your Honor, if I may be heard to just simply say that I totally concur in the Court's suggestion that we defer argument on the Motion to Dismiss. And I do so after having spent three days with the Court in the pretrial and am confident that the figure that perhaps Mr. Kaplan alluded to, that it simply would get lost in the shuffle, will not be allowed to occur.

And based upon my understanding that the Court plans to monitor the amount of time that we would devote to trying to work out something with Judge Ritchie, that is certainly fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. On the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike which was filed yesterday, which I stated was really in substance a supplemental opposition to the original opposition, I don't know whether based upon the Court's remarks -- Mr. Gitner, are you taking this motion?

MR. GITNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Whether based upon the Court's remarks as to the importance of having something more than the declaration, whether the motion is viable or whether you wish to present it at the present time.

MR. GITNER: I don't think there is any need, Your Honor. I will make only one observation that was raised at our motion. And it seems that in this proceeding, there has been occasion when, if something is said enough times, either the parties themselves start to believe it, or the record is so muddled that it seems to become a fact. And that is the point that Judge Fauntleroy never ever ruled, as Mr. Kaplan keeps saying it did.

Judge Fauntleroy never ruled that Synanon failed to refuse to respond to discovery. If one looks at the

THE COURT: I know the point you are making. Your point is that the order was, did it not accurately reflect --

transcript of Judge Fauntleroy's initial hearings on April --

MR. GITNER: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What was said. I am adverting to that, Mr. Gitner.

MR. GITNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Kaplan?

MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor, may I just clarify? Am I correct in now understanding that the Court is going to communicate with Judge Ritchie to determine what future --

THE COURT: I intended to send a written communication to Judge Ritchie which would seek edification on procedural aspects and the timing aspects. It would not go to substance.

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MR. WADDEN: That is agreeable with us, Your Honor. THE COURT: Bernstein and Cushern have filed a 2 motion for additional discovery. 3 MR. GITNER: Your Honor --THE COURT: Yes? 5 MR. GITNER: Before we respond --6 THE COURT: Do you wish to, are you going to speak 7 to that motion? 8 MR. GITNER: The only thing I was going to ask 9 Your Honor, in light of everything else that occurred, if 10 we be allowed to have five minutes, to have a recess to 11 discuss our response to that motion? 12 THE COURT: Yes, I think that is appropriate. 13 MR. GITNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: We will stand in fifteen minute recess. 15 (Thereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 16 (Thereupon, other proceedings were had which were 17 taken, but are not transcribed herein.) 18 (Thereupon, the proceedings in the above-entitled 19 action were concluded for the day at approximately 4:30 p.m.) 20 21 22 23

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Brenda Mack, an Official Court Reporter for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I reported, by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had and testimony adduced, upon the hearing in the case of SYNANON FOUNDATION, INC. v. STUART BERNSTEIN, ET AL, Civil Action No. 7189-78, in said Court, on the 10th day of August, 1983.

I further certify that the foregoing 53 pages constitute the official transcript of excerpt of said proceedings, as taken from my machine shorthan dnotes.

In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my name, this the 12th day of August, 1983.

Official Court Reporter