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MR. CARMODY: For those of you I have not met, my name is Chi Carmody. I am an associate professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario and also the Canadian National Director of the Canada-United States Law Institute. I am very pleased to be here today and to have an opportunity to chair this session on the Current Status of North American Trade. In this session, we are going to be taking a look at what the current status of trade is. We have with us today an extremely distinguished panel of trade law and investment practitioners. On my far left is Jean Anderson. Jean is a partner at Weil Gotshal in Washington, D.C. She is an international trade strategist and litigator at that firm and has worked in the trade field for over two decades. She joined Weil in 1989, has a Bachelors of the Arts from Northwestern University in Chicago, and her Juris Doctor from Georgetown. She has served with great distinction as council for Canada in a number of matters, and she has also been a terrific resource for me personally in a couple of matters that I was looking into. I am very happy to have Jean here with us today.
Following Jean, we will hear from Dick Cunningham, or Richard O. Cunningham as he is formally known. Dick is with Steptoe & Johnson, LLP\(^5\) in Washington D.C. and a senior international trade partner at that firm. He is known I guess informally as one of the Deans of the Washington Trade Law Bar.\(^6\) He has had a very distinguished career. But almost as important as that, he has shepherded a number of leading trade litigators through the process of their early formative years, such luminaries as Charlene Barshefsky,\(^7\) Sue Esserman,\(^8\) and many others onto positions of great prominence. And he continues to contribute to international law and international trade in so very many ways currently serving as counsel for a wide range of individuals and interests including I believe most recently the government of Korea.\(^9\)

On my right we have with us today one of the leading investment lawyers in Canada. J. Michael Robinson is a graduate of The University of Western Ontario and also of the University of Toronto Law School\(^10\) where I believe, if I am not mistaken, he was in the same law school class as Paul Martin, Jr.,\(^11\) am I correct?

MR. ROBINSON: Paul Martin, Bill Graham,\(^12\) and Ed Roberts.\(^13\) All very distinguished; not me.

MR. CARMODY: Michael is with the firm of Fasken, Martineau, Du-Moulin, LLP\(^14\) where he specializes in domestic and international trade and


\(^9\) See Steptoe & Johnson, Professionals, Richard O. Cunningham, supra note 5 (noting that Cunningham advised the Korean Government in their free trade agreement negotiations).

\(^10\) See The University of Western Ontario, Faculty and Staff, https://www.law.uwo.ca/lawsys/pages/contents.asp?contentName=Instructors&contentFileName=jrobin69 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).


\(^12\) See Graham Fraser, U.S. Relations Main Concern, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 17, 2002, at A6 (discussing Bill Graham’s role as Canada’s minister of foreign affairs).

project finance including investment and a wide range of other internationally related issues. I should also point out that we are very fortunate that both Dick and Michael give of their very limited time to be members of our executive board here at the Institute, and I know that we have often called on their expertise to provide us with insight, guidance, and something of a vision for the future. So we look forward to hearing from everybody today, and I'd like to invite to the podium Jean to start us off.

UNITED STATES SPEAKER

M. Jean Anderson*

MS. ANDERSON: Well, good morning everybody. I am going to address briefly three issues that I think are going to be with us for a long time between the United States and Canada. And so you will have a choice of subjects when you enter the fray and the discussion period. The first is the reopening of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The second is trade enforcement measures to address climate change. And the third is some new developments involving Chapter 19 of NAFTA.

Starting with the reopening or maybe even renegotiation of NAFTA. As I am sure you know, this became an issue last summer at the time of the Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania primaries in the United States Presidential

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16 See Editorial, Trade and Climate, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at WK9 (discussing that trade-related enforcement measures “must include commitments” to protect the environment).

17 See Steven Chase, MPs Told U.S. Aims to Erode NAFTA Power, GLOBE AND MAIL, March 9, 2005, at B5 (noting that the possible negotiation of NAFTA is partly motivated by the dispute concerning Chapter 19).
Election when NAFTA took a significant beating from voters and heavily unionized states that had lost manufacturing jobs, although parenthetically I would say I do not think they had lost those manufacturing jobs because of NAFTA but rather because of technological change, competition from other countries and so forth. But in any event, NAFTA took a beating. Hillary Clinton faulted NAFTA, and I think it was apparent that anybody who didn't find NAFTA wanting might well lose the election. So Barack Obama said he would reopen NAFTA, at least as to the labor and environment side agreements. And the upshot is this, we have a President who by all lights seems to believe strongly in internationalism and trade liberalization. In fact, he has also committed to fairness and economic opportunity for the middle class, and not just the middle class, and even more committed to consensus and to getting some major initiatives such as health care through the United States Congress. So in that context, he has committed to reopening what is, I think by most objective assessments, a highly successful free trade agreement that is still open and recently integrated North America. Of course, when that happened in Canada and Mexico, a number of alarms were set off, and officials were sent to work devising lists of what


21 See Jim Tankersley, NAFTA Foes Dems’ Words Turn into Action, CHI. TRIB., March 25, 2008, at C1 (noting that the 2008 election partly depends on voters who believe that changing NAFTA will help produce more manufacturing jobs in the United States).

22 See Gordon Laxer, Bitten by the Deal that Once Fed Us, GLOBE AND MAIL, June 23, 2008, at A15 (noting that Obama wants to discuss NAFTA with Canada, with a focus on environment and labor issues).

23 See generally Editorial, Reviving an Economic Engine: Can Barack Obama clear up his mixed party’s signals and get trade liberalization moving?, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at A16 (explaining that Obama’s goal of liberalization and international may be either helped or hindered by his pick for United States trade representative).


they would demand if the United States wanted to be in NAFTA. So the question is, will NAFTA be reopened? The talk about it has sort of died down, but the question is still on the table. I think it will be reopened. My guess is that President Obama keeps his political promises, so I think that there will be some reopening, at least to attempt to conform the labor and environment side agreements more closely to the deal of free trade agreements that was reached last May between the United States Congress and the Executive Branch. Under that deal, on the environmental side, free trade agreements were to include a list of multilateral environmental agreements that the parties adhere to. On the labor side, free trade agreements were to incorporate certain internationally recognized labor principles, including things like the freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. On the labor side, the deal couldn't say we must include international labor agreements or ILO agreements and so forth because the United States hasn't signed on to a number of those, so the deal was to incorporate the principles but not the agreements. And then once these principles or agreements were incorporated as standards that the countries adhere to, the obligation is to effectively enforce those principles or agreements. And the alleged viola-

28 See id.
29 See Steve Chamovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, And American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 257, 258 (1994) (noting that the parties were to adhere to high levels of environmental protection and enforcement of environmental procedures).
30 See NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL, LABOR, AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES, H.R. Doc. No. 02-933, at 23 (2001) [hereinafter DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES] (noting that freedom of association is a key principle under the labor trade agreement).
31 See id.
32 See generally JOHN MURPHY, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND LABOR RIGHTS: TOWARD A BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS (2009), http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/erqnisaoftvnltufb cw5h5i5g7vp7duap3verhkmv05watsasfowtvebd3gs7utasgheo2kczzea4f7rfgtdwob/IPB7TradeandLabor.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (asserting that the United States was concerned about the labor principles of the trade agreements).
tion must affect trader investment between the parties. If you look at those concepts against the existing NAFTA side agreements, they are not so far apart.

The major change is that labor and environment principles under this Congress administration deal are to be subject to the same dispute settlement provisions as other obligations with the same procedures, remedies, and sanctions including withdrawal of free trade agreement benefits. The United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement is sort of the state of the art for the United States, and that agreement arguably goes even further. It requires significant change in Peru's forestry laws to deal with the illegal logging of tropical woods and wildlife protection in addition to incorporating international labor standards and multilateral environmental agreements, and subjecting all of it to dispute settlement.

So where is this going to take us? I personally hope that if and when the labor and environment side agreements get incorporated into the body of NAFTA and perhaps strengthened to match this deal I just described, I hope that they do not completely throw out aspects of the dispute settlement system that is in the current side agreements. Those side agreements have come in for great criticism, partly on the ground that they were not subject to the same dispute settlement provisions as other obligations under NAFTA, but you can look at it another way. The dispute settlement systems in the labor and environment side agreements, generally they provide for studies, complaint studies, along a fairly elaborate process for the offending country to come up with an action plan to resolve whatever failure of enforcement was alleged and found. And in the end, if they do not do it, there are monetary penalties. And if they don't pay those, eventually there's a limited right to

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34 See generally DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES, supra note 30.
35 See generally id.
38 See id. (noting that the agreement will "eventually eliminate all trade barriers to commerce among the participating countries in manner similar to" NAFTA).
39 See generally id.
40 See Jonathan Riskind, Obama Says He Wants To Renegotiate NAFTA, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2008, at A5 (contending that Obama wants to renegotiate NAFTA partly because it does not have enforceable labor agreements and environmental agreements).
42 See id. (discussing that there could be monetary sanctions for failure to enforce the side
withdraw FTA benefits. Well, that may not be effective if what you want to do is say that country is not enforcing its labor or environment principles the way we do, and that gives them an advantage, and so we have to take trade action against them. If you want that kind of approach, then the settlement provisions do not do that. But what the existing dispute settlement provisions did do or currently do is actually create a system where the goal is "let's get everybody into compliance." It was a much more cooperative approach designed to be sure that what was going on within NAFTA was actually over time going to enhance the enforcement of labor and environmental standards. So I hope that we don't sort of throw that baby out with the bath water in incorporating the side agreements into NAFTA.

The next and crucial question of course is what else might be up for renegotiation if NAFTA is reopened for the sake of incorporating labor and environment? One possibility is change to Chapter 11, perhaps to provide that foreign interests have no greater rights than domestic parties, but I will leave that to Michael Robinson.

MR. ROBINSON: Heresy, heresy.

MS. ANDERSON: There is certainly been some talk about changes in intellectual property. I do not know what else. I think that gets opened beyond dealing with labor and the environment. It is sort of everything is up for grabs, and I am hopeful and actually think that it is not likely to happen. But we will wait and see.

The second issue on which we will also have to wait and see is climate change in trade. Of course, climate change and how to deal with it is one of the overriding global policy issues that the world's going to be dealing with for decades. And it is such a complex issue; I would not pretend to be able

agreements).

43 See generally Tim Shorrock, *Bill Would Force U.S. To Quit NAFTA Unless Standards Met*, J. OF COM., Mar. 6, 1997, at 3A (noting that the United States may be forced to withdraw from NAFTA if its trade deficit with other NAFTA parties is excessive).


45 See generally id.

46 See generally id.


to talk to you about climate change as such. The key points about dealing with climate change, though, from a trade perspective I will try to address. And to give you just a little bit of background in case you don't follow climate change issues. The major approaches to dealing with carbon emissions are cap and trade systems, carbon pacts, or various forms of regulation on emissions. In the United States, cap and trade is the current administration's choice, although there will be a lot of Republican pushback on the ground that it is nothing but a huge tax on business. So there is no agreement right now in the United States even though there is a push for cap and trade.

There is also as far as I can tell, and someone in the audience may be able to correct me on this, there is no agreement within Canada on the approach Canada should take. Although I understand the Canadian Environmental Minister Prentice apparently proposed an integrated cap and trade system between the United States and Canada that reportedly received a fairly tepid response from the Obama Administration who I suspect think that trying to do an integrated cap and trade system is premature and that the United States first has to get something going in the United States Congress and really make progress domestically.

Some people think that if various countries develop their own cap and trade systems, it should not be hard to link them later on. Well, if there is no agreement yet within the United States or within Canada, there certainly is


52 See id.

53 See generally id.

54 See generally Lorrie Goldstein, One Blunder on Climate Was Enough, TORONTO SUN, May 4, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.thestar.com/article/598053 (noting that while there is no agreement reached, there have been talks about implementing a cap-and-trade system in Canada).


56 See id.

57 See id. (noting that President Obama's plan may be premature).

58 See id.

not total agreement in the rest of the developed world or even the whole carbon-emitting world. But there is a growing consensus that the only way to resolve the global warming issue, assuming it still can be resolved, is by achieving an agreement obligating all of the major emitting countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by specified amounts. That would include the United States, all of Canada, Mexico, all of Europe, major Latin American countries, and major Asian countries including China and India.

There may be also, as part of that agreement, ways to incentivize clean energy using trade mechanisms to some extent; for example, by negotiating the equivalent of an international technology agreement for emission control technology and equipment, and provisions for assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the requirements of emissions control.

As you surely have read, there is a meeting scheduled for December of this year in Copenhagen that is hopefully going to come up with a successor to Kyoto, and there are preparatory meetings going on in Bonn right now. But in Washington there is a sense that the United States has been on the wrong side of this issue for way too long; that global warming is accelerating at alarming speed, and it is high tide for the United States to exercise some political leadership, or at least get into position to do so. Consequently, President Obama's budget outlined a cap and trade plan. And on the Hill, there is an accelerated calendar for legislation to deal with climate change. The express goal is to pass a bill this year. There is some hope

60 See generally Goldstein, supra note 54 (providing background information on the lack of agreements with respect to combating climate change).
61 See Michael Richardson, Action on Warming Needs Climate for Cooperation, CARBERRA TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A11 (noting that Obama wants to bring together the major emitting countries).
62 See id. (providing a list of countries).
63 See generally id.
64 See generally id.
66 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id. (noting an “ambition gap” between the United States and the European Union).
71 See Editorial, A Second Wind Is Needed on Climate and Energy Bill, OREGONIAN, Sept 8, 2009 (discussing Congressional efforts to pass an energy bill).
that that might happen by 2010, although even that is probably unrealistic. In any event, for such a huge issue, the legislative timetable is going to be compressed.

In that legislative process there are two issues that directly affect trade and investment. One of them has to do with competitiveness concerns, particularly by energy intensive industries, which are usually identified as iron and steel, aluminum, cement, glass, paper and pulp and basic chemicals. The question is, if those industries like others are subjected to emissions control requirements by a cap and trade system, for example, will there be what is called leakage? That is, will investment and jobs move to the lower emission control countries, thus reducing or leaking the effects of emission control regimes? The other issue is whether and to what extent border measures might be used to compensate for the failure of some countries to impose emission control measures of the same stringency as the United States.

Now, both of these trade issues I think matter or could matter greatly to Canada-United States trade. Taking the competitiveness proposals, for example, which are usually in the form of proposals to give allowances under the cap and trade system or exemptions. To the extent that the United States, for example, was more generous than Canada to energy intensive industries, production might shift from Canada to the United States. And that might be especially true in some integrated industries where shifting the amount of production is fairly simple. As to the border measures, those are usually not thought of as something that would hit Canada; they are thought of as ways to deal with China. China is always the focus.

I am sure many of you read in the last couple of weeks the little brouhaha in the press when United States Energy Secretary Steven Chu in testimony

72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Rebecca Urban, Emissions Trading May Start an Exodus, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, July 5, 2008, at F33 (discussing the competitiveness concerns of other countries).
75 See id.
76 See Peter Jean, Unions, Business Fear for Jobs, HERALD SUN, July 5, 2008, at 6 (noting that jobs may go to countries that have less stringent emissions requirements).
78 See Mike Boyer, Cap and Trade: Price and Control, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 26, 2009 (discussing the allowances for cap-and-trade systems).
79 See Nicole Mordant, U.S. Winning Race for Green Investment, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 17, 2009, at B3 (explaining how Canada’s renewable energy companies are competing for investment from the United States).
80 See id.
before Congress suggested that the United States should consider import duties on products from countries that don't impose costs on carbon.\textsuperscript{82} The Chinese response was swift and quite definite.\textsuperscript{83} The first response from one of their climate negotiators was that consumers should pay the cost, meaning that if the United States were going to import those products from China, the United States would have to pay the carbon cost.\textsuperscript{84} And the Senior Environmental Negotiator from China then underscored that instead all this should be done in a global negotiation, and there should not be border measures that are just disguised protection.\textsuperscript{85}

Anyway, these battles are going to go on. And there is going to be major lobbying on both in the United States Congress over the next few years.\textsuperscript{86} The good news is that last week a bill was introduced by Congressmen Waxman and Markey.\textsuperscript{87} It is called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,\textsuperscript{88} which would provide for rebates to energy intensive industries.\textsuperscript{89} And if that is not sufficient to ensure that they don't lose competitiveness because of a cap and trade system, the bill authorizes the President to establish a border adjustment program under which foreign producers and/or importers would have to pay for and hold special allowances to cover the carbon in the products they imported to the United States.\textsuperscript{90} In other words, it is a compensatory border tax.\textsuperscript{91} That said, this bill looks pretty moderate. The administration would have until 2017 to figure out if any of these United States industries that fear for their competitiveness had been harmed by imports from countries that weren't imposing costs on carbon, and there would be another couple of years for the administration to decide what they ought to do about it.\textsuperscript{92} It creates a lot of time and certainly is probably intended to create some negotiating leverage in the meantime to achieve and implement a global agreement. Now, I am always skeptical of thinking that a provision in legislation is okay because it won't ever be used because they almost always

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item 83 See id. (discussing China's response).
\item 84 See generally id.
\item 85 See generally id.
\item 86 See Julie H. Davis, \textit{Lobbying for Concessions Congress Feels Heat}, \textsc{Star Ledger}, May 12, 2009 (noting an increase in lobbying).
\item 88 See id.
\item 89 See id.
\item 90 See id.
\item 91 See generally H.R. 2998, 111th Cong. (2009); see also S.1733, 111th Cong. (2009) (both bills noting the creation of a border adjustment program).
\item 92 See generally Markey, supra note 87 (providing background information on the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009).
\end{thebibliography}
are eventually used. That said, this bill is a lot more moderate than it might have been.

I see I am just about out of time. So I want to just come back with the question of, how does any of this affect Canada? And I will leave Chapter 19 and see if we have time for it later. These border measure issues in the climate change context, as I said, should not really be thought of as targeting Canada because it is very likely, it seems to me, that Canada and the United States are going to end up with similar, if not identical, targets for reducing emissions, and some kind of compatible systems for accomplishing that. But nonetheless, I think there may be issues that will arise down the road. It might again be the question, for not just Canada but every country: are they enforcing their own emissions control regulations or systems? And would that kind of issue be subject to dispute settlement? Would it fall, for example, within the NAFTA environmental agreement? I do not know the answers to those questions, but I think that they could come up.

In addition, if the United States were, for example, to impose a border tax on Chinese products, one effect of that might be to divert Chinese exports to every country but the United States. So in a situation like that, Canada like some other countries could suffer from being sideswiped by the unilateral action the United States was taking.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: That has never happened before.

MS. ANDERSON: No. Of course not. And I add a very important point. You know, although there is a lot of lobbying going on saying that border taxes and so on would be incomplete, World Trade Organization [WTO] consistent. I think that is an incorrect analysis. I think they are very likely to be WTO inconsistent. And I think it is important for in the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen, they need to continue to think about ensuring that whatever climate agreement is reached takes into account international trade principles. They already did that to some extent in Kyoto, and I think it is likely to continue. And so that may solve the problem. And if there needs to be any back-up trade measure, perhaps over the next five or ten

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94 See Nayan Chanda, Talk of Borders just Fogs the Issue, STRAITS TIMES, May 26, 2009 (discussed the proposed tax on Chinese exports).
95 See generally id. (providing background information on the proposed tax on Chinese exports).
96 See generally Daniel M. Price, Free Trade, Green Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A29 (providing background information on border taxes and the World Trade Organization).
97 See Gary Sampson, Kyoto Pact Must Be Consistent with Trade Laws, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 18, 1998 (explaining that Kyoto agreement should “minimize adverse impact on international trade”).
years, there will have to be some flexibility developed in the WTO to deal with globally-agreed ways to deal with climate change issues through trade.

UNITED STATES SPEAKER

Richard O. Cunningham *

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Good morning. As Chi Carmody promised you a few minutes ago, I am Mick Jagger. Actually I am not, but I do like to tell people whenever I can that all of the principles that I find useful in my international trade practices are principles that I learned from the Rolling Stones. Perhaps the most fundamental is the principle that Canada's always lived by in international trade which the United States has never understood, and that principle is, cue the Vienna Boys Choir here, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you find you get what you need."98

Barack Obama ran as the 'Candidate of Change,' in initial caps.99 And Canada needs to think about what that's going to mean for the United States' trade policy because when Obama said change, he meant it, and he meant it in all sorts of very fundamental ways. And trade isn't fully formulated in this administration, but it is clear this change is going to really come in United States trade policy.100 A month or so ago the Administration put out a very short piece entitled "The Administration's Trade Agenda: Making Trade

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98 ROLLING STONES, YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT (Decca Records/ABKCO 1969).


100 See Steven Greenhouse, Tire Tariffs are Cheered by Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at B1 (discussing Obama’s trade policy).
Work for America's Families." That itself is a radical difference from the Bush Administration. All of those documents as I recall were entitled Making Trade Work for Halliburton. It is going to be a while, probably four to six months before this administration begins to address trade policy specifically in any comprehensive way. But you can already begin to see the changes taking shape. And what is significant for Canada I would suggest is that the new administration's approach to trade will not only differ sharply from the previous administration, but also differ sharply from the path that Canada has been on in recent years in trade.

Let me begin with trade liberalization. Canada has pressed hard to bring the Doha round to an early conclusion. At the same time, it has conducted a very active program of free trade agreement negotiations with a whole raft of countries. Some were brought to conclusion, some struggling to get to the conclusion, and some particularly ambitious as trade agreements with Europe, lots of luck, you are just starting. But in both of these respects, multilateral and bilateral, the Bush Administration pursued a policy very similar to what Canada pursued. It is already clear that the new administration will have a completely different approach on both levels.

Let us continue by focusing on Doha. Canada and the Bush Administration are on the same wavelength. Pursue Doha as it is currently constructed, try to bridge the gaps that remain at the end of 2008, and try to move forward this year if possible, next year at the latest, to a Doha agreement. The Obama Administration is sharply diverging from that. The Obama Administration, I will tell you, does not accept the fundamental architecture of the Doha development agenda. There is not enough market access for American companies and for American farmers. What they see,
and I think what any observer rightly sees, is a basic dilemma in the Doha Round. The Doha Round was constructed as a development agenda. The developing world quite logically took this as, "hey, it is time for us to catch up, you are going to give us things, and we do not have to give you much of any significance at all." But that cannot work for countries that have to submit Doha agreements to their congresses or parliaments to get ratification. If they do not bring back the goods, it is not going to get ratified. And particularly in a time when for developed country exporters in general and United States exporters in particular, both agricultural and NAMA, Non-Agricultural Manufacturing Goods, the growing markets are in the developing world, and the barriers that need to be reduced are in the developing world. We have always succeeded in a whole bunch of rounds in reducing developed world, developed country barriers. That is where the gains have to be for the United States. The Doha Round is set up in a way that it is not going to lead to that. And therefore, the Obama Administration has sent signals out that it is going to pause and reassess Doha and trade in general. No details yet except it's clear they are going to insist on a more ambitious agenda of trade opening. And there are a couple of reasons for this that you need to understand. Concretely and immediately, the administration believes, I think correctly, that the current Congress, a Congress that is much more skeptical of both globalization and trade agreements, would be likely to reject a Doha agreement that is anything like what's now on the table in the Doha round. And it is not just the Congress. Big organizations like the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation have said this round just doesn't have it for the United States; we cannot take what is on the table or anything close to it.

113 See id. (discussing the dilemma in the Doha talks).
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See generally Hardev Kaur, New Hope Next Week for Development Promised, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009 (discussing generally the issues in involved in completing the Doha agreement since they are many countries participating).
117 See generally id.
120 See Tangled, supra note 111.
122 See id.
123 See Alvin Foo, U.S. Has Trade Policy on Backburner, STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009 (noting that Congress may be more skeptical because of the economic crisis).
125 See Letter from American Business Coalition members to WTO Trade Ministers, Trade
So Congress would probably reject this. And you all remember what happened to the League of Nations. I think the worst result for Doha would be an agreement and then United States rejects it. That's catastrophe for the WTO. There is a broader reason that is related to this administration's fundamental view of the world economy of the current economic crisis that we are in, and it has to do with the great imbalances. Yes, we have had a financial crisis, a housing collapse, which triggered all this. But the great imbalances are what has really lead to the economic crisis that we have here: the imbalance between the surplus countries which have massive trade surpluses now, most notably China, but also countries like Germany and Japan. And the deficit countries, particularly the United States, that are running massive deficits which have had to be fueled by consumption levels inflated by borrowing, and that is where we get to the crisis that we have now.

I would recommend to any of you to read the series of articles that Martin Wolf is writing in the Financial Times on this issue. It is very perceptive, and it coincides with the thought at Treasury and at State, Congress yet doesn't have much of a way of thoughts because they are only just getting people in place, but that the United States needs to move toward becoming a relatively more export-focused economy. China and the surplus countries need to focus on becoming more domestic demand driven. And that has a corollary in trade, which is that for the deficit countries, a Doha Round that opens up market access in the markets that are growing around the world, the developing countries, is critical toward resolving the great imbalances of the real problem with trade in the economy today in the world.


127 See Foo, supra note 123.


129 See generally id.

130 See id.


132 See generally id.

133 See Greg Ng, Singapore-China Top Meeting to Discuss Common Challenges, STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009.

134 See id.

135 See Tangled, supra note 111.
Let me turn now to free trade agreements. As we noted, Canada and the Bush Administration both pursued free trade agreements. There was little difference. You pursued economically interesting free trade agreements, and we, except for Korea, pursued free trade agreements without Bilateral Investment Treaties [BITs] like Bahrain, Columbia, which are not so much economic as geopolitical focus. Obama personally and his administration in general, is much more skeptical of free trade agreements. And in particular, they think multilateralism is the way to liberalize trade. But more particularly, they are skeptical of trade agreements with countries that are lower in economic development than the United States. They buy into the proposition that opening up our market to lower wage rate countries carries a risk for American industries that are vulnerable to import competition, and we have to be very cautious about that.

We do not have trade promotion authority. There is no intent to seek trade promotion authority in the near future for this administration. So here, again, the United States and Canada are going to be on different paths. And there is one exception in the free trade agreement and the regional trade agreement area that Canada needs to be aware of and needs to think about how it participates in this.

The United States has a real problem in the Pacific. Ten years ago our great scheme in the Pacific was that trade liberalization and economic integration were going to proceed in a way that the United States had a major role and was going to be conducted by APEC. A funny thing happened; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the ball, and ran with it. ASEAN now has a number of interlocking trade agreements in the Pacific, has trade agreements with China, trade agreements with India, and the

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137 Id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
147 See id.
148 See Derwin Pereira, Hitch a Ride From the Dynamos China and India, STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005.
149 See id.
United States has very little influence in ASEAN. The United States needs to find a way to get back into the ball game. They have a plan to take what is called the P4, a collection of juggernaut countries, Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei, the global trade leaders, and use that to wedge their way back in by expanding into other countries. They are going to need to do more. They are going to need to have a better plan; a more expansive plan that is going to have to involve Korea, but it also should involve Canada because Canada is a Pacific country in exactly the same sense that United States is a Pacific country. For Canada, in the east we think of strategically about getting into that game and what role you should be playing in that game. So what are we going to be doing if we are not going to be negotiating a lot of trade agreements here in the United States? And we are not, if you listen to the new trade representative's confirmation testimony. If you look at the Administration's trade agenda, "Making Trade Work for American Families," you see that what they have planned to do is focus on enforcement of our current rights under existing trade agreements. There is supposed to be trumpets when I say that, like a clarion call to battle.

MR. ROBINSON: Lawyer's battles.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: There are reasons for that. That buys time, for one thing, to get trade policy together. It also is a way, if they do it properly, to begin rebuilding the consensus for trade liberalization because if they are doing this right, and focusing on enforcement of trade agreement rights that led to the demolition of market access barriers, the result will be good. That is trade expanding, and it takes attention away from the import restriction approach to trade that is so near and dear to the hearts of so many in the Congress. It is also great in this administration because it is a contrast with

150 See id.
151 See generally id.
152 See Kay Martin, US Role in Finance Talks a 'First Step' to Trade Deal, DOMINION POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at 5.
153 Id.
154 See id.
156 See id.
158 See generally id.
159 See id.
162 See generally Anthony Faiola & Glenn Kessler, Trade Barriers Toughen with Global
the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration only brought five WTO cases, the previous administration brought eleven. This administration has plans to be much more active. It is also a subset of that worldview about redressing the imbalances, to get the United States more access to foreign markets. And as I say, it accommodates congressional pressure. And I might add Congress is clearly picking up the ball, and there is always a danger of going down this route because Congress will pick up the ball. There is something in the hopper called the Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, which would establish Super 301, which would make it more difficult for the United States Trade Representative’s Office to turn down cases that are brought to them. It would appoint a congressional trade enforcement czar; there is a terrible idea if you ever heard one, because you do not want Congress politicizing this. Politicizing this turns it inward toward import protection. Indeed if you read that bill, there is a lot of import protection stuff in there reversing some of the trade decisions that have brought more balance to anti-dumping enforcement, reversing the WTO zeroing decisions, or close to reversing them, things like that. Canada needs to watch this.

There is going to be activity enforcement, and Canada needs to watch this. Every year the United States Trade Representatives Office comes out with something called the National Trade Estimate. It is a wonderful thing.
to read for people who think, gee, we are the good guys in trade, we do not do anything wrong. And you read there, and there are about eight pages of things that make you the evilest villain in world trade, and indeed there are eight-and-a-half pages on Canada's scurrilous practices. The Ways and Means Committee has written a letter to the Administration with very specific things that ought to be done to enforce United States law and our agreements against these national trade estimate problems,\textsuperscript{174} and they particularly single out problems from specific countries. Now, the good news for you is that Canada is not the "baddest" of the bad boys. Everybody knows who the "baddest" of the bad boys is. Would anybody like to take a guess?

MR. CARMODY: China.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Give that man a prize. China.\textsuperscript{175} But Canada's tied for second with the European Union and Korea with four specific things that Congress wants the United States government to take action against through either WTO actions or some other means.\textsuperscript{176} Those are; another case on dairy product matters,\textsuperscript{177} a Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] case,\textsuperscript{178} possible Special 301 action for failure to protect United States firms' intellectual properties,\textsuperscript{179} a case against subsidies to aircraft development by Bombardier,\textsuperscript{180} my apologies Mr. Desjardins, and of course all sorts of bilateral WTO actions on lumber.\textsuperscript{181}

Let me close, however, on that note. I truly believe, as Jeanie does,\textsuperscript{182} I think, that this is not an administration whose philosophy is protectionist, nor is it nationalist in the sense that the Bush Administration viewed most international issues as problems to be addressed by the United States in a "my way or the highway" method. But Barack Obama is a man who sees today's


\textsuperscript{175} See generally Rick Barrett & Thomas Content, Trade Ruling Against China May Open Doors, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1 (discussing the trade ruling against China).


\textsuperscript{179} See Barrett & Content, supra note 175.

\textsuperscript{180} See Nicola Clark, Five-Year Dispute on Aircraft Claims Loses Its Urgency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at B5.


world as one where we're increasingly dealing with problems that are global in scope and need multilateral, not unilateral, solutions.\textsuperscript{183} Moreover, he is a believer in trade liberalization, particularly on a multilateral basis.\textsuperscript{184} You have only to look at his appointments. You have a free trade former mayor of Dallas as the United States Trade Representative and as the Secretary of Commerce,\textsuperscript{185} the Agency that is traditionally the spear-carrier for industries seeking protection,\textsuperscript{186} and in particular, that everybody looks to go bash China.\textsuperscript{187} You have the former Governor of Washington, a free-trader of Chinese descent.\textsuperscript{188} The steel industry must have torn its hair out when they saw that.\textsuperscript{189}

There are of course, I think, two reasons to be watchful of the position this administration takes. First, as I said, it is going to be under continual pressure from Congress to push it toward more protectionism, less globalization.\textsuperscript{190} So far there are some pretty good indications the administration will resist that.\textsuperscript{191} You saw one in the economic package that they put forward where the Congress said we want a Buy America program on all manufactured goods, all steel, everything.\textsuperscript{192} And the Administration insisted that be changed, not in the best way, which would have been to eliminate it, but at least to make it inapplicable to anyone who is a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] procurement code, the WTO procurement code, or has a bilateral agreement on procurement with the United States.\textsuperscript{193} You guys are okay. And let us hope that that is a sign of things to come. The second reason to be watchful, and in my mind, the more important reason, is that trade per se is pretty far down the Administration's list of priorities.\textsuperscript{194} And what that means is that trade issues are going to be focused on in the early months of this administration, maybe all throughout the first year as, quote, "that trade issue we have to deal with as an impediment to our valiant effort to address the much more important social environmental eco-

\textsuperscript{184} See \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{186} See generally \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{187} See generally \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{188} See \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{189} See generally \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{190} See Irwin Stelzer, \textit{Barack a Buck Away}, \textit{Courier Mail}, Feb. 28, 2009, at 63.
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{193} See \textit{id}.
nomic issue of X." It could be global warming as we talked about a moment ago. It could be food product safety. It could be auto trade-in deals that are subsidized by the government. Then the danger of course, is the impetus to implement the higher priority social or economic policy might affect how they come out on the trade aspects. So be optimistic, and there's good reason for that. However, also be watchful in Canada because there's good reason for that, too.

CANADIAN SPEAKER

J. Michael Robinson*

MR. ROBINSON: Obviously we are saving questions until after presentations. I do not do PowerPoint, but what I am going to do, and one of the nice students is going to do it for me, is pass out some speaking notes so that when I go too long and don't finish what I am supposed to say, you at least have some of it written down. And they also leave a little column down the side for you to scribble your questions. Now you have to have a pen and be able to write, not just type. I know that is a throwback. So while that is being passed around, I will do my little Trivial Pursuit item. I do not do jokes because I do them all badly, but here is one that you can get some mileage out of at cocktail parties and other places; did you know that you are right now in what was part of Canada? After a thing called the French and Indian Wars (Canadians have called it something else, The Battle of the Plains of

196 See id.
199 See O'Toole, supra note 194.

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Abraham) England took over the rest of Canada, the British government enlarged Canada, and it went all the way South to the Mississippi. South included Cleveland, Ohio and Detroit, Michigan, all the way to Mississippi.\(^{200}\) That was the province or the colony of Canada, right where we are sitting here. And then we had this unpleasantness where you decided that you were being taxed too badly and decided to become independent.\(^{201}\) And then of course the border went back up to the Great Lakes.\(^{202}\) But for some decades this was Canada. Okay. That is my Trivial Pursuit note, and the speaking notes have gone around. The reason I do not do PowerPoint is that I am a Luddite, and I do it wrong anyway. This is something you can take away.

I am going to focus on the investment side. When the description of this session came around, I was very relieved to find that the word "investment" was also included because I said, "oh my goodness, I have to go on a panel with Jeanie and Dick and talk about trade? I will be just done like dinner." So I thought investment is worth talking about. And this is fairly specific; it's pretty well related to Chapter 11 only.

Let me say one thing, though. If you have not already thought of this question, ask this question of Richard and Jeanie in the question period: "Why is, as I believe it is, the Senate qualification to the Buy America provision in the stimulus bill\(^{203}\) just smoke and mirrors?" Because the provinces and states and municipalities which are going to get the money are not bound by either the World Trade Organization (WTO) Procurement Code or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) respecting procurement.\(^{204}\) So ask them that and see what they say. That is as far as I will trench on their area.

Okay. Everybody seems to hate Chapter 11 in Canada,\(^{205}\) that is my Part A here. Part B is going to be our new national security provision that we have taken in our investment control statute.\(^{206}\) To start out, nationalists say

\(^{200}\) See generally Rob Love, History Should Sometimes Just be History, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 27, 2009, at A15 (providing background information on the Battle of the Plains of Abraham).

\(^{201}\) See generally id.

\(^{202}\) See generally id.

\(^{203}\) See David Sanger, Senate Agrees to Dilute 'Buy America' Provisions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A22.


\(^{205}\) See Drew Fagan, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and U.S. Blackmail, GLOBE AND MAIL, May 8, 2002, at B11 (noting that Chapter 11 is the "most mischaracterized component" of NAFTA).

Chapter 11 trenches too much on environmental and health protections. The leading nationalist organization is called the Council or Company of Canadians; it is led by a very fiery and articulate, and not always entirely truthful in my view, lady named Maude Barlow. Now, Maude has gone off to head a new United Nations (UN) organization on water resources management for the whole world, and of course one of her big themes is, "Hidden in NAFTA is that fact that the Americans can grab all our water," which of course is nonsense. Anyway, so that is an unhappy group.

Second, unsuccessful claimants. There is a case that I teach, a NAFTA and trade law sort of thing up at Western. In that class I make all the students read, Loewen v. U.S. Mr. Loewen was a Canadian operator and owner of funeral homes that was expanding like mad, and he bought one in Mississippi, and he got himself in a bit of trouble. There was an action against him saying that he underpaid by about thirty million USD. And by the time the jury had finished with him, he was ordered to pay $400 million USD in punitive damages as well as another $150 million for whatever it was, the small amount that had been in dispute. It went to Chapter 11. The panel actually used the words to describe the jury verdict and the whole judicial system in Mississippi as a "disgrace" and "a miscarriage of justice." However, there was a little technical problem. Mr. Loewen, when he was desperately trying to reconstruct his company, did a reorganization that turned his head corporation into a United States corporation. The tribunal said there was no continuity of citizenship: The case was then an American suing the United States. You were not one when you started; too bad; you are now so you are out, no jurisdiction. And besides, you did not go to the Supreme Court of the United States against this jury verdict. You

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207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See id.
211 See id.
212 See Western Ontario School of Law, Michael Robinson, https://www.law.uwo.ca/lawsys/pages/contents.asp?contentName=Instructors&contentFileName=jrobin69 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
214 Id. at *2.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See The Loewen Group Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S.A, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)98/3.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
only tried to go to the Court of Appeal of Mississippi and found that, if you did that, you had to post a bond equal to 150 percent of the award against you.\textsuperscript{222} And he was a little short; he did not have a loose three-quarters of a billion around to post the bond. Anyway, people like Ray Loewen are very unhappy.

Now the Canadian public, what do they think about this? Well, they do not understand it.\textsuperscript{223} It is a bit complicated; it does not get a lot of press. But when it does, some people, including yours truly in a recent thing I wrote for the National Post\textsuperscript{224} at their request, realized that foreigners under Chapter 11, namely Mexicans and Americans, get much better protection for property rights than Canadians do because of our equivalent to your Bill of Rights\textsuperscript{225} called the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.\textsuperscript{226} It is fairly new, and it only protects personal rights.\textsuperscript{227} It does not protect corporations; it does not protect commercial or business rights.

So, as we find in the unhappy list, Canadian provinces are unhappy with Chapter 11,\textsuperscript{228} until they realize how it really works.\textsuperscript{229} In December 2008, Danny Williams, a rather fiery and outspoken critic of the federal government\textsuperscript{230} and Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador,\textsuperscript{231} got very cross at a big pulp and paper company called AbitibiBowater,\textsuperscript{232} which had just closed a mill. So he put through in the legislature in one day a bill expropriating all the assets of AbitibiBowater in Newfoundland, all the ones that were of any value.\textsuperscript{233} The bill says no party may sue the government or any agent etcetera, of the government as a result of anything done under this statute.\textsuperscript{234} Compensation may be paid if the Governor in Consul, read Premier, decides that he will pay some, and he will decide and how much and it will not be

\textsuperscript{222} See id.
\textsuperscript{223} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{224} See generally Canada United Law Institute, at Executive Committee, http://cusli.org/about/executive.html (providing background information on Michael Robinson).
\textsuperscript{225} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{227} See id.
\textsuperscript{229} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{230} See Bill Dymond, Newfoundland Hurts Itself with Abitibi Seizure, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 9, 2009, at B2 (discussing Danny Williams’s agenda).
\textsuperscript{231} See id.
\textsuperscript{232} See id.
\textsuperscript{233} See id.
\textsuperscript{234} See id.
reviewable. Since NAFTA is an agreement among countries, who responds to the inevitable claim if AbitibiBowater, A, survives; and, B, cannot settle some reasonable compensation with Newfoundland? Who pays? Canada pays. People say, well, Danny Williams cannot do that. Surely there is something wrong there. Well, if AbitibiBowater were a Canadian, the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament would govern, and it would have no claim under the Charter for an illegal expropriation because the Parliament is supreme. So Canada pays. Then does Canada just send a bill to Newfoundland saying please give me this money back? Well, there is another little problem in Canada. There is a case called the Labor Conventions Case which was decided by the English Privy Council, then in the final court of appeal in Canada, in the 1930s which said, the federal government can sign these international agreements, but if and to the extent that they effect exclusive provincial rights, then the provinces have to approve as well. That case has never been overruled by the Canadian Supreme Court; nor has it been challenged because neither the province nor the federal government wants to run the risk of something bad happening. So we did the usual Canadian thing; we just kind of ignored it, and assumed that the provinces will be somehow bought off and will not object to the fact that they never signed NAFTA, and they have never passed bills approving it.

So Mr. Williams may be able to say, "Well, you signed that thing, I did not. You defend my expropriation, my indefensible expropriation under Chapter 11, and then you pay, and do not come to me for the money back." I gave him that, in effect, free legal advice in my comment in the National Post.

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235 See Dymond, supra note 230.
236 See id.
237 See generally id.
239 See generally id.
241 See id. at 27.
242 See generally GREGORY S. MAHLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM: CANADA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 45 (1987) (providing background information on the Labor Conventions case).
243 See generally id.
Okay. So there are all the reasons why nobody likes Chapter 11. What is wrong with it? It is too new; there is not enough jurisprudence on it. Many important terms are undefined like "measures tantamount to expropriation." What does "tantamount" mean? All the dictionaries seem to say "equivalent." But then why did they not say "equivalent?" Well, "tantamount" seemed like a nice word; however, it is not defined.

What is "fair and equitable treatment?" There is a lot of international law on that, but it is undefined. What is "full protection and security?" Again undefined. Are there any appeals available from determinations by arbitral tribunals under Chapter 11? No. Can they be challenged? Yes, as unregistrable under whatever arbitration rules were used, be they International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID] or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] rules. And there is one case in which a British Columbia judge said transparency is not an obligation recognized by either Chapter 11 or international law. Therefore, the tribunal's finding that Mexico was not transparent in its actions that resulted in the claim is not in compliance with the terms of reference, the terms of the arbitration, and therefore I won't register it. However, there was an expropriation. So everybody said, "Oh my God, thank goodness, at
least he said that there was a "bad act" of expropriation that the tribunal did find, and so that case just stood as a comment by a court on potential limitations on enforcement of arbitral awards. But there are certainly no appeal rights. There is no *stare decisis* applicable to Chapter 11 awards. NAFTA clearly said that in Article 1136. Provinces and states are exempt from certain provisions. Claims based on changes to taxation can be blocked by a political decision.

I have to wave around for you such a political decision. It is one page. That nice little letter with the coat of arms of Canada, that went to Mr. Gottlieb, et al. on his claim against the government of Canada for changing the income trust taxation laws. "This is to inform you that in accordance with Article 2103 (6) of NAFTA, a determination has been made by the appropriate competent authorities." Who are the appropriate competent authorities? The ministers, the elected ministers or cabinet members, who determine that the matters at issue are not expropriations. And that section of the agreement says that politicians can decide whether they are expropriations or not. Therefore, the measure at issue, namely changes in the tax law, cannot be the object of any claim under Article 1110. So that is a problem with Chapter 11.

So why do we keep Chapter 11? Well, there are over 2,400 bilateral investment treaties worldwide encouraging and protecting foreign investors, said in the article that I just read in November of 2008 that he counted 2,600 BITs, of which around 1,700 are in force, including NAFTA, the Energy

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255 See generally id.
256 See NAFTA Arbitration under the UNICITRAL, *supra* note 251.
257 See *id*.
258 See *id*.
259 See *id*.
260 See *id*.
262 *Id*.
263 See generally *id*.
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Charter,\textsuperscript{267} the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement,\textsuperscript{268} et cetera. He also said he thinks it is a good argument that investment protection is now part of international law because states have demonstrated that by signing 2,600 of these things show that they think investors should be protected.\textsuperscript{269} And what do these BITs look like? They look like Chapter 11.\textsuperscript{270} Why do they look like Chapter 11? Because they are based on the United States model, bilateral investment treaty, the current one being I think 2004,\textsuperscript{271} but the first one came out in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{272} So the rest of the world recognizes it. And why would Canada in any renegotiation of NAFTA want to antagonize its principal trading partner and investor, the United States, by saying we would like to water down Chapter 11 because we do not like the fact that claims are being made against us? That does not sound like good trade policy. So let us examine the facts.

I did a little box score there on Page 2,\textsuperscript{273} which shows that there have been very few cases actually brought.\textsuperscript{274} The interesting thing is that there are thirteen cases pending against Canada,\textsuperscript{275} only three against the United States.\textsuperscript{276} That scared me enough that I actually went and printed out these claims so that I could read them. I did not print them all because in one claim against Canada, the defense by Canada, is 400 pages.\textsuperscript{277} Anyway, it seems to be fairly small beer in terms of what is actually happening in the world of investment claims.

Can it be improved? Some say, let us have a permanent arbitral tribunal.\textsuperscript{278} Richard may answer this question in the question period. I think there are a lot of United States lawyers and constitutional experts who say that is unconstitutional because you cannot have a foreign judge making decisions

\textsuperscript{267} See id.
\textsuperscript{268} See id.
\textsuperscript{269} See Chambers and Partners, supra note 265.
\textsuperscript{270} See generally Malik, supra note 266.
\textsuperscript{272} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{274} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{275} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{276} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{277} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{278} See generally Chapter 11 NAFTA Table, supra note 273.
about the rights of United States persons. Others say, 'well, let us have an appeal tribunal like at the WTO for anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases.' Well, that becomes the same issue as the previous suggestion. Although I still do not understand why the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and all these BITs are not challenged as unconstitutional also if that's a valid argument, and I am sure Richard and Jean can tell us.

Some say scrap it, and let us have the WTO try and do what it was supposed to do a long time ago, and put in investor protection. Well, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] tried that in the 1990s, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Drafts of it circulated all around; they were supposed to be secret, but Jim McIlroy managed to get me copies. I have a whole shelf full of these drafts of the MAI, and it flopped because there was not enough multi-national acceptance. So if the OECD could not do it in the 1990s, how is the WTO going to do it now when we cannot even get the Doha round done? What does Canada do about it if President Obama says let us renegotiate it? I am not going to talk about that because Jeanie has covered that very well. However, I would just follow up a little bit on what Jean said, that if you open the Pandora's box to renegotiate any part of NAFTA, does not everything else go on the table? And would the United States be interested in having Canada now try to withdraw from its proportionality obligations under the famous Article 605(a) of NAFTA which in effect guarantees the United States that Canada will not sell its oil and gas to anybody else but the United States? (I am sure you will want to know the details of that, but I can prove that that's how it works).

So my conclusion on this is simply look at the box score. It is not that big a problem. Work with it as we have done since 1992. Do not fool around with it for various reasons, just carry on with it. And I think that is what will happen. I do not think anybody is going to touch it if we get into any renegotiating of NAFTA. And of course Richard, if the decision had been in a renegotiation a provision were inserted to say your rights can be no higher than

279 See id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
they are for the citizens of the country in which the claim arose, then that is
great for Canada because business interests have no rights under our char-
ter. If Parliament says you are expropriated and you are a corporation, too
bad. You are expropriated, go elsewhere.

The last item, it is the new Canadian national security investment block-
ing powers which came into effect only last month. And this is our version
of the United States National Security provision.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Like Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States.

MR. ROBINSON: Like Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, except so far we have no rules and regulations. All we know is that
the cabinet of Canada can block a foreign investment and even unwind it.
It is retroactive. And whether it is control or not, minority interests are
covered if it is found to be or could be injurious to National Security. So
we are all waiting for the regulations to come out. You can feel a little bit
better because the only investment that is ever been blocked under the In-
vestment Canada Act - and this National Security thing is just going to be
an amendment addition to the Investment Canada Act - is the purchase in
2008 by Alliance of the United States of a company called McDonald Det-
weiler. Somebody may remember that it is the successor to Spar Aero-
space. Spar Aerospace produces the Canadarm, which is the only good
advertising they ever got. Every time they are up there in the space station,
they have to have this Canadarm reach out and turn the screws and whatever,
and it says “Canada” on the side. Well, anyway, McDonald Detweiler
makes this wonderful sky spy satellite stuff and everybody sort of panicked
that this was going to go to the United States, and that was the only one that's

287 See generally Charles Lewis, The Treaty No One Could Read, WASH. POST, June 27,
1993, at C1 (providing background information on the North American Free Trade Act and
the business interests that are involved).
288 See Mark Katz, Canada’s New Foreign Investment Review Standard Raises Concerns,
&articleid=918 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (providing information on the Investment Canada
Act).
289 See id.
290 See Treas.gov, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
291 See Katz, supra note 288.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See generally id.
296 See U.S. Firm Buys Canadarm Builder, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 9, 2008, at B05.
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 See generally id.
ever been blocked. However, who is the main target? Two days ago, the Financial Post had an article titled, China Buys More Oil Sands. Now if Canada's regulations extend National Security to include economic security and energy, is this going to mean that China should go away? The subheading is 'Now Owns 50 Percent of Proposed Mine.' Now we can get into the question period.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF M. JEAN ANDERSON, RICHARD O. CUNNINGHAM, AND J. MICHAEL ROBINSON

MR. CARMODY: We have about fifteen minutes for some questions.

MR. MOORE: I want to follow up on the oil sands comment and 605(a) that Michael talked about and Richard alluded to before. If you assume that there is a tighter fuel and oil import standard coming in the United States led by the California AB 32 status, but adopted widely by at least eleven western states, then it is possible that Canada cannot ship the oil sands products, bitumen, and slightly upgraded residuals into the United States; they just won't be able to meet that quality standard. There has been a proposal recently to put another pipeline in from Fort McMurray out to Port Hardy and ship unprocessed bitumen out to China. Does that confluence of forces put Alberta, and by reference, Canada, in jeopardy with regard to their NAFTA obligations? And how could or would they be able to meet an attractive deal with China? And I will just go one step further. Two years ago China acquired a majority of interest in at least Canadian oil sand companies.

MR. ROBINSON: And more two days ago.

MR. MOORE: And so the upshot of that was that at least in one board conversation at an unnamed Canadian company in Alberta, they referred to the policy for the company and indicated that the company directive would

302 See generally id.
304 See Robert Collier, California Standards Could Crimp Canada Oil Boom, S. F. CHRON., June 6, 2007, at A12 (noting that the low carbon-emissions standards may have an adverse impact on Canada's oil production).
305 See Evelyn Iritani, A New Player in the Sandbox, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at C1 (discussing the new pipeline that comes from Fort McMurray).
306 See generally id.
be to send more unprocessed bitumen to China; before it had been just sent into upgraders in Wyoming. Can you tackle that a little bit? Just because it seems to me it is fraught with legal and trade or economic implications.

MR. ROBINSON: I can answer that, I think. The short answer is “no.” 605(a) says we have to sell it to you if you want it. If the United States starts to say we do not want it because it is dirty, then we are not in breach of 605(a). What 605(a) says is, on a rolling three-year average, the amount of energy shipped to the United States cannot be reduced over the amount of energy that Canada uses or exports to third parties. So that is in effect a guarantee that if the United States wants it, they can have it. Now, if Canada wants to produce a heck of a lot more, fine, or use less, you can change the proportion. But remember 605(a) went in at a time when the policy of the United States government was ‘let us become self-sufficient in energy; let us take that stuff out of Texas and out of the Gulf of Mexico and everywhere else in the United States, and Canada thought ‘that means border tariffs on Canadian oil and gas.’ We do not want that; we want to be able to ship that stuff.’ So the horse trade was okay; we will agree no border tariffs, no border measures at all on energy, free back and forth or south; however, you have to give us this proportionality undertaking. So Canada said, well, that is fine. That is where it is going to end up going anyway, to the United States, so that was the horse trade.

Now, the United States policy seems to be a bit different. The United States wants to deal only with safe and secure suppliers. And who is that? That is Alberta. Does that answer the question? The legal answer is no. If they block exports, if they could then they cannot use the proportionality undertaking in their favor. We only have to sell it if they ask for it.

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308 See generally Nathan Vanderklippe, TransCanada Pushing Ahead with Pipeline Expansion, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 4, 2009, at B3 (discussing Alberta’s plans to send more unprocessed bitumen outside of Canada).


310 See generally id.

311 See generally id.

312 See generally id.

313 See generally id.

314 See id.


MR. CUNNINGHAM: And if it were an actual export agreement to ban exports by Canada, you would have WTO problems. 317

MR. ROBINSON: Right. But if it just says your oil is dirty, well, has not the Congress already passed a law that says the United States government, in particular the military, cannot buy oil from the oil sands?

MR. KERGIN: No. Not yet.

MR. ROBINSON: Not yet?

MR. KERGIN: But it may come back again.318

MR. CARMODY: Let us get some more questions.

MS. TODGHAM-CHERNIAK: As a follow-up with one of your comments with Mick Jagger, in the March 2009 Lexpert magazine, which is Canada's equivalent to the New York Lawyer,319 I actually picked a different tune, Pink Floyd's The Wall,320 and that each new regulation is another brick in the wall, and that under Bush, you did not want bad people and bad things to get in. Now, you know, with the new regulations, the protectionism might be that you do not want jobs to get out, that there is going to be a higher wall, a thicker wall on that protectionism and the Buy American provisions.321 My understanding is that with the provisions for the Buy America, is that it still applies to Canada.322 The obligation is that the actions will be consistent with trade obligations. And when we look at softwood lumber, you can say that something is consistent with trade obligations, and then you can fight about it later, but there still could be a period of three years where there is protectionism where Canadian steel and Canadian equipment and machinery might not be able to –

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Well, I suppose as a practical matter you might be right, which I wanted to preface my answer by saying "Teacher, leave those kids alone."323 But at any rate, we cannot have a provision. Canada and the United States are both signatories to the procurement agreement.324 We cannot have a procurement provision that discriminates at federal levels from procurement against you.325 Yes, if we did it, you would be able to go to the WTO, and it might take a couple more years. I agree with that, that is

317 See generally id.
322 See id.
323 See id.
324 See BARCLAYS CAPITAL, supra note 321.
325 See generally id.
the problem we have in anything. If you want two hours on problems with
the WTO dispute settlement, I can do that. That would be –

MS. ANDERSON: And only two hours.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: The United States tactic in this is always to say
we are going to implement fully and completely, but it is like the old cocaine
blues song, the doctor said it would kill me, but he did not say when. See BOB DYLAN, Cocaine Blues, on GASLIGHT TAPES (Columbia Records 1962).
And the United States says they will implement, but they did not say when and
they did not say how. But at any rate, I do not think that the United States is
going to do that at the federal level. See generally Ian Austen, To the North, Grumbling over Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B9 (discussing the provision at the federal level).

I do think as Michael said, that there
will be problems at the state level. There will be state procurements where
Canada will not have it. See Steven Chase & Josh Wingrove, Obama Underplays Buy American Provision, GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 11, 2009, at A4. There is an interesting question about federal
funding of state procurement and how that will interface, and that has yet to
be worked out. But I think in actual federal procurement, I do not think the
federal government is going to discriminate against Canadian producers; I
really do not. And no matter what the pressure of the oil industry, no matter
what the pressure of the steel industry or whatever, that is not going to work.
The steel industry, you know, is dealing with this in another way. See Christina Spencer, Steel Union Boss Backs Protection, TORONTO SUN, Feb. 2, 2009,
At any rate, my other point is that the United
States industries are already convinced enough that the United States gov
ernment is serious about not discriminating against foreign suppliers in pro-

MR. ROBINSON: You already own most of the steel companies in Can
ada. See generally Daniel Leblanc, Chinese Group Warns of Trade Backlash, GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 12, 2009, at B9 (discussing the issues that may arise in the anti-dumping cases).

MR. CUNNINGHAM: There are a few left.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, they are owned by Indians.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: To some extent that is been dealt with by policy
decisions in these big global steel companies with United States as their big
gest market. They will hamper their other subsidiaries in other countries by
bringing cases against them. At any rate, my other point is that the United
States industries are already convinced enough that the United States gov
ernment is serious about not discriminating against foreign suppliers in pro-

326 See BOB DYLAN, Cocaine Blues, on GASLIGHT TAPES (Columbia Records 1962).
327 See generally Ian Austen, To the North, Grumbling over Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B9 (discussing the provision at the federal level).
330 See generally Daniel Leblanc, Chinese Group Warns of Trade Backlash, GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 12, 2009, at B9 (discussing the issues that may arise in the anti-dumping cases).
331 See Boyd Erman, Algoma Joins Ranks of Firms Foreign Owed, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 16, 2007, at A1 (discussing the rapid expansion of Indian owed steel companies in Canada).
332 See id.
333 See generally id.
currency; that they are looking to other methods of protections in other cases.\textsuperscript{334}

MS. IRISH: Maureen Irish from Windsor. Just a quick question following up on government procurement. If some of the funding winds up in peace re-deals, public or private, whatever, how far does the government procurement obligation go? Is not there a difficulty –

MR. CUNNINGHAM: You cannot discriminate the use of federal money.\textsuperscript{335} You have to segregate the private money out, then you have to have essentially separate from the other private money to avoid the non-discrimination provisions.\textsuperscript{336} Do you agree with that, Jean?

MS. ANDERSON: [Indicating agreement].

MR. ROBINSON: But, Richard, I have to ask this, if the federal money is handed to Illinois, does the string stay attached when Illinois then says, you know, we're going to build a highway, and by the way we do not want any Canadians bidding on these contracts? Does the federal strings still say, 'wait a minute, you cannot do that?' Or when Washington handed the money to Illinois, did the string get cut? It is a tricky question.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: I can teach that round or I can teach it flat. My guess is that there is probably a WTO discrimination issue somewhere if there is discrimination by the state government.\textsuperscript{337}

MR. ROBINSON: Well, there was a report in the press in Toronto.\textsuperscript{338}

MS. ANDERSON: And Steptoe & Johnson's address is –

MR. ROBINSON: Right, exactly. There was a report in the press in Toronto a couple of weeks ago about a chap who supplies wastewater treatment equipment, and he apparently sounded out somebody in Illinois and was told 'no, we are not taking any bids from Canada, go away.'\textsuperscript{339} And this is a company that supplies a great deal of equipment.\textsuperscript{340} Now, here is the real problem: that company also has operations in the United States, it has a footprint in the United States.\textsuperscript{341} So what it is going to do is make the stuff in the United States and close the Canadian plant. Or at least lose a bunch of Canadian jobs. And that is the whiplash that people have picked up on.


\textsuperscript{335} See Ian Austin, \textit{To the North, Grumbling Trade}, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B3.

\textsuperscript{336} See generally id.


\textsuperscript{338} See Antonella Artuso, \textit{Open Pipe Creates a Legal Stink}, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 20, 2009, at 3 (discussing the legal issues of the wastewater treatment equipment).

\textsuperscript{339} See id.

\textsuperscript{340} See id.

\textsuperscript{341} See id.

MR. ROBINSON: Yeah, it is scary.

MR. CARMODY: I am going to use the Chair's prerogative to ask one question of our panel. And particularly Jean, you tantalized the audience with a subject that you said you might talk about, and then had to take off the agenda because you had no time to do so. We have at least one former Chapter 19 panelist in the audience, and I would like to know what it is that you foresee coming out of potential changes to Chapter 19. Many of you will be aware that Chapter 19 is that provision of the NAFTA that deals with the binational review of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.\\footnote{See \textit{SEAN MURPHY, 2 UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW} 175 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (2006).} Jean?

MS. ANDERSON: Well, I think they are two pretty important things. Many of you may know that since Lumber Three in the early 1990s,\\footnote{See generally Daniel N. Adams, \textit{Comment, Back to the Basics: The Predestined Failure of NAFTA under Chapter 19 and Its Lessons for the Design Of International Trade Regimes}, 22 \textit{EMORY INT'L L. REV.} 205 (2008) (discussing, in general, the lumber disputes).} since the United States government has taken the absolutely outrageous and untenable position –

MR. ROBINSON: Says counsel for Canada.

MS. ANDERSON: No, as United States negotiator for Chapter 19, absolutely outrageous and untenable position, that if you go to a NAFTA panel to challenge the agency decision in an original dumping or countervail investigation and you win at the NAFTA panel so that the panel declares the original determination in the case to be invalid, the United States has been saying well, you do not get your money back. You only get your money back from the date the panel decision is final.\\footnote{See generally id.} Well, you know, you usually don't get to just collect duties or taxes.\\footnote{See generally id.}

MR. CUNNINGHAM: It is worse than that. If you only get your money back on imports entered after the dates.\\footnote{See generally id.}

MS. ANDERSON: Right.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: So they can continue to –

MR. CAMERON: Thank God we have the judiciary.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

MS. ANDERSON: Yeah. Well, obviously if you instead go to a United States court to challenge an agency decision in an original AD or CVD inves-
tigation and the same thing happens though, the order is declared invalid, obviously you get back all your cash deposits.\footnote{348} So this is just an absolutely outrageous position.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: May I just interject that that precise decision with the WTO context was argued ten days ago in Geneva.\footnote{349} This is what the appellate body of the panel had rejected, the United States view, that retrospection turns on date of entry and, therefore, you cannot go back to previous entries and get your money back,\footnote{350} although they put some other limitations on it.\footnote{351} There is a decision that will be due out on the WTO context within another six weeks that will be really interesting.\footnote{352}

MR. ROBINSON: But, Dick, does not the WTO say that there is no retroactivity to their orders, however NAFTA is silent on this issue.\footnote{353}

MR. CUNNINGHAM: But the question is: What is retroactive? I think everybody would say, okay, from the date of the decision of the binational panel or the WTO, you cannot go back and ask for reliquidation of duties that were paid that have already been liquidated. But the question is are we going to keep unliquidating duties on previous entries; that is the main issue. And the question becomes, is that retroactive? The United States says yes, the rest of the world says no.\footnote{354}

MS. ANDERSON: The rest of us say no.

MR. ROBINSON: And as Jean knows as counsel for Canada, when we settled Lumber Four, the compromise was, you Americans can keep only one billion of the illegal duties, you will give Canada back the other four billion.\footnote{355}

MS. ANDERSON: But let me get to the point about Chapter 19. That is the United States’ outrageous position since the early 1990s, and it is been used really to pressure Canada into settling lumber cases among other things.\footnote{356} So what has happened is that in softwood lumber before the Softwood Lumber Agreement in 2006\footnote{357} was reached, there was of course litiga-


\footnote{349} See generally id. at 393.

\footnote{350} See generally id.

\footnote{351} See generally id.

\footnote{352} See Cannon, supra note 348.

\footnote{353} See generally id.

\footnote{354} See generally id.

\footnote{355} See generally Sydney M. Cone, Canadian Softwood Lumber and “Free Trade” under NAFTA, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 840 (2007) (providing background information on the lumber dispute).

\footnote{356} See generally Adams, supra note 344.

tion in United States courts challenging the United States refusal to refund duties all the way back to the beginning.\textsuperscript{358} In other words, trying to get a United States court to say "no, a panel decision has full effect under United States law." And, in fact, we succeeded hugely on that issue. Unfortunately the court decision came out the day after the Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006, was entered into.\textsuperscript{359} So it eventually was, while the opinion is still out there for whatever persuasive value it has, the judgment had to be vacated.\textsuperscript{360} And there was no judgment that could be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, so that you might have gotten a Federal Circuit decision hopefully upholding this court decision.

So what happened after that is that it seems that the United States, in order to look like it was acting consistently, took exactly the same position in the case against Canadian wheat and when the order was declared invalid through the NAFTA panel review.\textsuperscript{361} And the United States refused to refund duties on entries before the date of that panel decision.\textsuperscript{362} So we have taken that case again to the Court of International Trade CIT, essentially the same set of issues.\textsuperscript{363} We won.\textsuperscript{364} Again, the CIT said no, NAFTA panel review occurs under United States law the way United States law implementing the NAFTA is set up.\textsuperscript{365} As a matter of United States law, the United States has to refund all the duties in those circumstances. The United States since then has basically asked for reconsideration on every kind of silly jurisdictional argument they could come up with, and so we are still awaiting a final decision from the Court of International Trade, but when that decision comes, assuming we win, it will be the beginning of putting this issue to rest.\textsuperscript{366} Then we will see if it gets appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: I would also point out one other thing, if we were ever going to get around to changing Chapter 19, or if we could ever do it by way of a really aggressive decision within Chapter 19. The thing that I find most offensive about the practice is the way the first of the two criteria were extraordinarily challenging.\textsuperscript{367} The second one is the decision is wrong and it

\textsuperscript{358} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{359} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{361} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{362} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{363} See id. (discussing the duties of entries case that was taken to the Court of International Trade).
\textsuperscript{364} See id.
\textsuperscript{365} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{366} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{367} See generally Adams, supra note 344 (providing background information on the dis-
is so wrong that it fundamentally undermines the whole process of Chapter 19. I have no problem with that. The first one is you can challenge bias.

That has become such an abused, nasty, outrageous process, that there came a point where you could not get panelists because no panelist would go on and subject her or himself to the possibility that all of a sudden the United States, once in a while Canada, but mostly the United States, was going to come in and say you have no ethics, you are biased, this is a fraud. Nobody would do it. It is a crazy, malicious, nasty, mean proceeding and ought to be taken out of the process.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, we should ask Jim for a comment. Were you challenged, Jim, extraordinarily challenged, A, and, B, you said I do not want to be on the panel anymore, on the roster?

MR. McILROY: Technically it was not an extraordinary challenge, it was a behind-the-scenes lynching. But it accomplished its objective, which was to get trade practitioners off those darn panels because they were snooping into the affairs of officials, and they understood where the bodies were buried. And so now you have academics that can opine on what is happening, but they do not know where the bodies are buried. And Canada, basically, we bailed out of Chapter 19, and we are going back to court because the idea was you had to get out of court because the judges did not know anything and they wanted the practitioners to look at it because they knew. But once the practitioners were driven out of the process, now we are back in court.

MR. ROBINSON: Or the WTO, Jim, would you find?

MR. McILROY: Yes. Yes, I think so.

MR. ROBINSON: Jean, do you tell them to —

MS. ANDERSON: I think there is a little bit of the same trend that is likely to happen in the United States, that assuming this CIT decision comes out and so on, I think people will tend to, there is more confidence in the Court system dealing with these things now than there used to be, and I think there will be more cases where Canadian respondents do not want to go to a panel. You know, that may be okay. The reason Chapter 19 should not happen because somebody was wrongly accused of things when they were serving in the panel. I mean, that is outrageous. But, it may not be so terrible for parties in both countries to say well, our courts do a good job of this, as long as the courts are doing a good job. When Chapter 19 was negotiated,

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368 See generally id.
369 See generally id.
370 See Weil Gotshal, supra note 360.
371 See generally id.
it took so long to get decisions out of the United States courts that that was one of the main reasons for having a Chapter 19.\footnote{See Adams, \textit{supra} note 344.}

MR. CARMODY: I would like to go on with this very, very interesting discussion on trade in North America, but our schedule this morning is very tightly packed. I noticed that we have gone five minutes over the time limit for the session this morning. I would like to extend a very warm hand of thanks to all of our panelists.

MR. CARMODY: I would invite you to take a BlackBerry moment to refresh yourselves before we begin again at 10:45.