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City of Cleveland v. The Cleveland Illuminating Company, 1980

**Transcripts** 

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## Volume 19 (Part 2)

District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

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resolve the issue of Bell's alleged monopoly power.

"The Court's failure to do so constituted reversible error."

Later in a footnote the Court goes on to say:

"WTC argues that the failure to instruct on the nature of the regulation was harmless because Bell presented evidence on regulation during trial and discussed the effect of regulation during its closing arguments.

"Moreover, WTC asserts that the District
Court's instruction that liability could not be
found if the jury believed that Bell refused to
interconnect for legitimate telephone reasons
was sufficiently broad to include consideration
of regulation."

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The Court went on to say, "We disagree.

The failure to instruct on the impact of regulations is too central to be harmless error. Bell's presentation of evidence on regulation and instruction during closing arguments cannot in and of itself justify the District Court's failure to provide guidance on the issue, for without specific instructions the jury has no

indication how such evidence was to be used in its deliberations. To hold otherwise would be to abrogate the District Court's duty to instruct the jury accordingly."

Now, if that is the precedent that we are confronted with, and if that is the issue that remains as part of this case, two things are apparent:

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Number one, that the defendant will be permitted to pursue in its defense the introduction of evidence of regulations, including the scope and effect of such regulations to counteract the City's assertions that the Public Utility regulations are ineffective.

In addition, it would appear that the resolution of the position of the parties is left to the jury, and thirdly, the defendant would be entitled to and, from the language of the Court, this Court would be remiss in not giving an appropriate instruction to the jury.

Now I think that pretty much summarizes the Court's concern expressed to counsel early on before the taking of evidence in this case.

Ms. Coleman, are you desirous of addressing the issue, and the Court is desirous of finding

out where the parties stand as to pressing this issue as a part of this case.

As I say, it is immaterial to me if it is

going to remain an issue, because the necessary
guidance has been provided to this Court by the
decisions that I have just alluded to.

I recognize that I am probably not making either side very happy here.

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MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor; on the matter of contentions of the parties; which I understand is the inquiry of the Court at this point; I would of course like to take the opportunity to confirm this with my colleagues; but it was always our position that CEI has the power; both to exclude competition and to control prices.

The twofold test of monopoly power under the Supreme Court cases, and the recognized law --

THE COURT: -- otherwise we wouldn't be here.

MS. COLEMAN: Precisely.

Now, CEI has contended that it has no powers to control prices, and that this Court should rule that as a matter of law.

Although that issue was claimed to be

withdrawn in the last case, it popped up in the closing arguments, and for all we know, it may come up again here, so we followed your line of thinking in that if it is to be an issue, it is one on which evidentiary material in the form of testimony or other appropriate matter is needed.

The opinion which you read from Almeda

Mall evidently depended either on findings or

assumptions with regard to the existence of

competition. State policy, with regard to

competition, and the existence of a natural

monopoly market, and the relationship between

market share and market power, and the ability

or intent to monopolize.

THE COURT: All of the classic elements?

MS. COLEMAN: Right.

For there to be such a finding in this Court, there either has to be a presumption of those things, which we would contend is certainly inappropriate, or findings of fact by the jury after the deliberation of the hearing of this case, and therefore if the defendant is to press this issue, we would agree that we are entitled to put on evidence.

THE COURT:

Well: at this posture

the City is pressing the issue by tendering the evidence that it seeks to elicit through the cross-examination.

MS. COLEMAN: That is correct, in the sense that we are offering evidence to prove the power to control prices, and it is our contention that this evidence goes to that issue.

As I said, that is the posture in which we find ourselves now.

I am not aware that we would take any different view of the matter, but I might take an opportunity to consult with co-counsel on that.

THE COURT: I have no problem with that. I am sorry -- have you concluded?

MS. COLEMAN: Yesa ;unless you have further specific questions.

THE COURT: No. I was just wondering if the defendant was desirous of responding.

MR. LANSDALE: Yes, your Honor.

It is our contention, if your Honor please, that we do not have the power to fix prices or to exclude competition as a matter of law.

I direct your attention to the question of

prices, which is the one before us.

It seems to us that it is very plain and based upon the statutes of Ohio that we do not have the power to fix prices.

The only possibility I can see of a contention to that effect would be whether or not on examining of the statute, and I have not looked at those statutes quite recently, there is any room to claim under the statute that the Commission has not the power with respect to individual prices, that is, the prices to residents as distinguished from prices to business and the like.

In point of fact, it is very plain to us that the Commission has that power.

It is certainly very plain that the Commission does exercise that power.

In point of fact, I can't think of any rate case in my memory, and I have been before the Commission in these things since the -- I hate to say how long ago -- certainly more than two decades ago, and every case I can think of there have been people down there objecting, not necessarily to the overall increase that the company is seeking, but to individual rates or

classès of rates.

Normally we find the City of Cleveland down there representing, purporting to represent the consumers of Cleveland by confining their objections to usually the residential schedules and the small commercial schedules; and similarly large industries are frequently there intervening to object to the rate schedules applicable to them.

But in any event, our position is, if your Honor please, and I am advised in recent years when I have not been in many cases, that the interest of the Commission in the individual rate schedules is such that we are now routinely filing what people like Mr. Bingham call "Cost of Service Studies," which effectively show the cost to each class of customer, the endeavor being, and Mr. Bingham if he testifies on this subject, would testify that irrespective of what the evidence before the Commission is the endeavor of the company is to avoid what I think of as Economic Discrimination, and that is to say that each customer or each class of customer bears their share of the total cost of service, so that we don't have, so that in the economic

sense there are no discriminatory rates between the several classes of customers.

Be that as it may, we submit further that
the skill of the Commission, the intention of
the Commission is to do its duty, whether or not
that particular situation, the individual rates
are looked at as immaterial. That is not for the
Court to inquire into, how well the Commission
performs its duty.

As to how well the Commission performs its duty I suspect that since the Commission is made up of human beings, it is going to differ from year to year, and from personnel on the Commission from time to time with respect to the quality of its staff and a whole lot of other things. And ·I invite your Honor's attention to the very recent case cited by the Second Circuit, and it is called Northeastern Telephone Company against American Telephone and Telegraph Company, cited by the Second Circuit May 22nd of this year: and I don't have the regular citation, but it is the BNA, Antitrust Bulletin No. 1017, in which there was an antitrust case involving, -and this is contained in the defendant's supplemental trial brief.

THE COURT:

I think I read it.

MR. LANSDALE:

This particular case

involved a portion of the local telephone

company in Connecticut, a business which was not

subject to regulation, and the contention was

that the telephone company had an unfair

advantage and control over the market because,

having the major portion of its business

regulated, it could conceal its costs of the

unregulated portion in the regulated area, and

recovering their costs there, so they could

unfairly compete in the non-regulated area by

lower costs, and the District Court went along

with that claim.

Judge Kauffman said that, "Finally,
Northeastern's fear that Southern New England
Telephone will be able to allocate all of the
overhead to the monopoly services rests on the
premise that the attempt of the Public Utility
Commission is either asleep or incompetent.

"Northeastern believes the DPUC is unable
to perform these functions, and the recourse is
to intervene before that body," and it goes on,
"If Federalism means anything, they require that
we do not create an exception to the general

rules of margin cost pricing on the basis of the plaintiff's assertion that the DPUC cannot perform the duties delegated to it by the State."

I submit, your Honor, any contention that this company has the power to fix prices necessarily involves the claim that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio is not performing its duty.

(A) I don't think that this is a question open to this Court's decision, and {B} certainly it is not this utility's impression that the Commission is failing to perform its duties in that respect.

MS. COLEMAN: May I have a brief response?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, as the

Northeastern case refers and as we noticed in the

statement of Judge Kauffman, in that case it

was that the Court of Appeals was unable to

premise a finding upon the bald assertion of

the party, and that goes to the question of

whether one should make a presumption about

this type of issue or whether there ought to be

evidence on it, and we submit that the latter is

the case.

Secondly, I just want to point out as to the recent proceedings of the PUCO, whatever they contain, and whatever the regulations or scrutiny that may be done of an individual rate schedule, it is immaterial to the question here. We are dealing with the issue of CEI's persistent monopoly power from July 1st, 1971 to 1975, and finally we would submit, your Honor, --

THE COURT: Well, on that subject, they have to have monopoly power before they can exercise monopoly power.

MS. COLEMAN: Right. And the question of their possession of monopoly power is also within that procedure, and not what happened last year in a rate case.

Finally, we would submit that on the question of the scope of the evidence that dissertations of a witness or instructions from the Court about the chapter and verse of the Public Utility laws are not material and not germane to the issue; here.

THE COURT: Well, you take issue with the Fifth Circuit just as Mr. Lansdale takes issue with the Fifth Circuit.

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MS. COLEMAN: I refer your Honor
to the case cited in our last supplement, Sounds,
Incorporated vs. American Telephone and Telegraph,
b31 Fed. 2nd, Eighth Circuit, 1980, in which the
Court stated with regard to the defendant's
claim to regulation that regulation by the
local Utilities Commission should exempt it from

The Court stated, "Bell, not the Utility Commission, proposed the rate issue.

"Bell sought diligently to have those rates accepted, and unsuccessfully opposed the intervening plaintiff's predecessor."

The Court went on to say, "Bell, the defendant in that case, was not deprived of the power to exercise its independent business judgment in determining the rates that it would propose."

We would submit that the scope of the evidence here is the key of the extent of the business discretion exercised by CEI, and a foray into the nooks and crannies of Chapter 4905 and 4909 of the Ohio Revised Code, and it is immaterial and would tend to confuse the jury on this issue.

THE COURT:

the antitrust laws.

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The Sixth Circuit

says, at least -- not the Sixth Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit, the jury may be confused if the Court does not instruct.

Mr. Lansdale, are you desirous of distinguishing between the Northeastern case, in which Judge Kauffman says that the matter of law is a presumption of the validity of the act and holdings of the Commission as versus the Mid-Texas Communications case, which says it is a matter that should be presented on the evidence to the jury?

MR. LANSDALE: I approach that — it has been some time since I read that case. My recollection is that that involved the question of a new telephone company attempting to be into a business in a small city outside of Houston, and the Bell Telephone Company excused or attempted to excuse its refusal to interconnect with this little system that was attempting to in effect take over a small community outside of Houston, and excused their refusal for interconnecting with them on the ground that this company could not proceed to serve that small community unless they had some sort of franchise or license from the Texas Commission.

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This did not involve in any way the question that we have here of where the question is the power to control prices.

Now, the question was, did this small company, was Bell excused from interconnecting on the grounds that the Commission might not have issued this franchise?

THE COURT:

Why was access to

the Commission for?

MR. LANSDALE:

Why there was

access to the Commission by the small company.

And, as I remember -- as I remember the question that the jury was permitted to decide was whether there was -- indeed, why the Bell Company had refused to interconnect.

Now, I submit to your Honor -- I submit to your Honor that that is a -- is a totally different question than the one before us, which is basically the power to control prices, and there is no -- there just can be no question about the power, indeed, the duty of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to control the price at which CEI sells its electric energy.

And I want to point out one more point in this respect.

Although the inquiry here this afternoon has been directed towards some alleged discretion on our part to move a rate increase around among -- around schedules. I am at a loss to understand how this is a relevant question even if it were so -- which it is not -- but clearly -- and I find no intentions to the contrary by the plaintiff -- the Commission has the power to determine our revenues, the total amount of revenues that we can receive, the total amount of profit that we can make, or, stated another way, place a limit upon the rate of return at which we may earn.

And even if it were so, that they either did not have the authority or did not exercise the authority to determine how that was divided up among customer classes, it seems to me not to be material.

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However, I don't wish your Honor to
understand by that argument that I'm in any way
backing away from my contention -- which I admit
there can be no doubt about -- of the power and,
indeed, the duty of the Commission to approve not
alone a rate of return of whatnot, but
specifically to approve specific rate schedules,
which schedules themselves specifically, as we

have heard this morning, specify the rates of individual customer classes.

THE COURT: Ms. Coleman, at this juncture the ball is in your court, and I don't know where we're going with this particular witness, in light of the fact that we have 15 minutes remaining during which time I would like to take testimony, if at all possible.

What are your suggestions?

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{Ms. Coleman and Mr. Norris conferred off the record.}

MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I would propose to continue with this witness on completing the line of questioning that I had begun:

I'm not sure what your Honor has in mind with regard to that, so perhaps you could clarify that for me and then I will know how to proceed.

THE COURT:

Well, I thought that

I indicated that it's my inclination at this

juncture to follow the pronouncements of the

Fifth Circuit depending on whether or not this is

or is not an issue in this case. Irrespective of

who makes it initially, I have no party with it.

The parties have the problem.

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MS. COLEMAN:

Well, it is an issue

in the case, your Honor. There --

THE COURT: .

Very well.

Proceed.

Call in the jury.

Just so I know.

{The jury entered the courtroom and the . following proceedings were had in their hearing and presence.}

\* {The Court and Law Clerk Schmitz conferred off the record.}

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MS. COLEMAN: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM N. BINGHAM {Resumed}

#### BY MS. COLEMAN:

- Q Mr. Bingham, before we broke in the testimony earlier. I was asking you about the generalized formula for rate of return, and I believe we established, did we not, that what you call the return equals revenues minus expenses?
- That's correct.
- And to determine the rate of return, it's the return,

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### Bingham - cross

again expressed as revenues, minus expenses, divided by the rate base.

That is an expression of rate of return?

- A That's correct.
- Now, the rate base is understood to be property used in useful -- in the business of providing electricity plus an allowance for working capital, is that essentially accurate?
- At the time period that we're talking about here, the rate base was the reproduction cost new less depreciation of that property deemed to be used useful in rendering utility service, plus working capital.
- And the meaning of "reproduction cost new", that

  part of the formula which you mentioned means the

  cost that it would take to build that property as of

  the specified date, is that right?

#### {Pause - }

- Reproduce that property at a specified date new?
- Yes: that's what the reproduction cost new part of reproduction cost new less depreciation is-
- And the "less depreciation" part means subtracting some amount which reflects accounting in some way for the wear on that property or -- pardon me -- let me

reformulate that, maybe I can make it easier.

The depreciation is intended to represent the decline in value or usefulness of the property, is that correct?

- In a sense. My recollection of the rule on this was that it was to represent a loss in value resulting from age, obsolescene, wear and tear, lack of utility, and perhaps a couple of other items.
- So that when we say "reproduction cost new less depreciation," it's this assigned value of the property as of a certain date to reproduce it new less an allowance for age, obsolescence and wear and tear?

  A Yes.
  - Now, in fact, of course, the majority of CEI's property used in useful and providing electric power and energy was not purchased new as of the year for that valuation?
- A Most of it had been installed prior to the point in time at which the valuation is made.
- But the PUCO calls for the valuation to be called for at the time the valuation is to be made in terms of meproduction costs new?
- A Definitely.
- Now, the procedure at the PUCO after CEI submitted --

let me rephrase that.

The CEI would provide its analysis of the reproduction costs new less depreciation of its property, is that correct?

A Yes.

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- And would also provide its analysis of the revenues and expenses incurred during the year specified by the PUCO to do that analysis, the test year?
- A That's correct.
- And there would be a review of those calculations at the PUCO and in fact some staff might make their own calculations of those numbers right?
- A Yes.
- Now, having gone through that proceeding, there would be a hearing on the matter, is that correct?
- A Yes.
- And the PUCO would then make findings which would be represented in an order?
- A That's correct.
- The PUCO would then direct CEI to file rates which would recover the amount of revenue that it found CEI was entitled to recover, right?
- A Yes.
- And that's really where you come in to play, is to

decide how to allocate that revenue among the various classes, right?

A Well- by and large, it usually had already been done.

As I testified earlier, at the time we filed the application for a rate increase, then as well we included in the application the rate schedules proposed by the company.

- Now, on the question of allocating the revenue among the various classes, it is true, isn't it, that a variety of rate designs could combine to produce roughly the same total?
- A Surely.

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- Now, CEI selects the rate design that it files with the PUCO and exercises its own judgment based on the calculations and information that it can compile, right?
- A Pretty much does it based on the form and design of the rate that existed before the increase.
- And that form and design of the rate that existed before the increase, somewhere back along the line, if you go back far enough, was put together by the Rate Department of CEI by and large, right?
- A I'm sure we had more input than anyone else, but we weren't the only people with input.

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- And CEI brings its input also to the PUCO in terms of the rate design that it feels is the best choice right?
- A Yes.
- And seeks to have its selection be the one -- its design -- pardon me -- be the one which is implemented, is that correct?
- A Yes. Sometimes, I mean, other people do have input to these things.

It's not something we sit in our little ivory tower and do by ourselves.

- There are people who attend the hearings at the PUCOn for example, and make presentations?
- A The City of Cleveland, for example, has intervened in every rate case that I think I have ever been associated with and, believe me, they tell us what they think ought to be done.
- Q That's right.

Now, when the PUCO issues its order approving a rate increase -- talking just about rate increases, if we may, the order relates to total revenue and total rate of return, does it not?

- A Well, those elements are obviously always included in the order.
- @ Right.

- And they only will comment on what else they think they ought to comment on although those are certainly the two most important.
- Now, when it comes to the question of designing rates
  to determine the contribution to this total amount
  of revenue, CEI takes into account a variety of
  factors, doesn't it?
- A Yes.

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- And one of these that they try to take into account is cost of service to the customer class, is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q CEI made a cost-of-service study by class, which you may call class-wise study, over 30 years ago, isn't that right?
- Well, the last one that was really completed and filed I think probably was about 1948.
- And then there was another one done in 1979, isn't
  that right?
- A One was filed in 1979 wherein they --
- @ Pardon me.
- A -- in what they call the 1979 rate case, it may have been filed in February of 1980.
- Q Right.

Now, CEI had increases and decreases in rates since the 1948 class-wise study and prior to the 1979-'80 class-wise study, right?

- A That's correct.
- And CEI determined what those increases or decreases

  by class of customers should be pretty much by spreading

  them across the board so that each customer class got

  more or less the same percentage increase or the same

  percentage decrease, right?
- A After the 1948 rate case, where that was not the situation, what you say is generally true; that the increases were pretty much spread as an equal percentage to each rate schedule.
- Now, when this cost-of-service study is done, at the time that it is done, you don't determine precisely how much each kilowatt hour to each customer costs, do you?
- A Ohr of course not.
- You don't even do it for each separate rate schedule

  of the twenty odd whatever it may be that you had at

  the time, right?
- A Well, a cost-of-service study -- and, here, I'm referring to what we call a class-wise cost of service study --

- @ Right.
- a -- calculates the total cost of supplying service to -- each rate schedule.

So that if I think -- if I understood your earlier question. I would say yes, we do determine the cost of supplying kilowatt hours to people on, say, the general residential schedule.

- @ Well, there were -- if I recall your testimony
  earlier -- nine different schedules under residential
  sales on the FPC form, right?
- A Yes-

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- And at least some of those -- not all of them -are denominated some form of residential sales
  generation, large residential, there is an apartment
  -- one or two apartment schedules, is that right?
- A One apartment schedule.
- @ One apartment schedule.

Now, it is true, isn't it, that when CEI did its most recent class-wise study, that all of the residential schedules were grouped together, and the cost was assigned on that basis?

- A We only have one residential schedule.
- Q Pardon me?
- A We only have one residential schedule at present.

- 2 Q There is no apartment schedule and no large
  3 residential schedule?
- 4 A That's correct.
- 5 Q And your I assumer were not involved in the 1948
- 6 : study?

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- 7. A Nor I was not.
- Now, in terms of making this cost analysis, there is

  some property that can be identified with specific

  customers, isn't that right?
- 1 A That's correct.
  - Q Or even with specific classes of customers, is that right?
    - A If you wanted to you could always identify some particular piece of property to something to a particular class. I suppose.

This is probably not what you meant; but, for example, if you got a pole line which serves only residential customers, you could obviously say that's loaded residential only.

Now, we tend not to do that. When we allocate property specifically, it tends to be for large customers where you can get a real handle on the particular item of property and doing it specifically gives you a better answer than some allocation

prodedure might give you.

And there are, in fact, two general ways that are used together to find out this cost of service estimate:

One is specific assignment, and the other is an allocation procedure, as you stated, isn't that right?

A Yes.

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- Now, as to the meter outside the individual's house, and perhaps even the loop that comes down only to that meter, those can be assigned to that customer if you were to do that?
- A If you wanted to go to that trouble, you could do it.
- And, in fact, you don't need to because you know how many residential meters you have and how many residential customers you have, so you can take that as a group and say, "That's all residential," right?
- A That kind of thing is generally done by an allocation process frequently by developing what we would call, say, a weighting factor, which might say that the average cost of a meter for a residential customer is one, a large industrial, the relative cost might be 50; and then by using the number of customers and the weighting factor, you can perform an allocation of the meter account.

A similar procedure probably would be used for the wire that you talked about going from the pole to the house:

Rather than to try and do it specifically where in case of residential, you have to go out and inventory or price out by some method six hundred and some odd thousand pieces of wire.

- Q And that's not a very practical way?
- A It just is impractical to do.
- And so what you do is take some sort of an averaging factor which you have to base on the information you have at company headquarters on the costs of those items, is that right?
- A That's right.
- Now, the bulk of the property that CEI uses in providing service is not susceptible allocation to specific customers or specific groups of customers, is it?
- A That's right.

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- And in that large bulk of the property you're referring to the generating stations and to the bulk of the transmission system, for example, right?
- A And quite a bit more:
- Q And quite a bit more.

Even including, for example, the office building of CEI and the kind of expenses that are attendant on running that building, right?

- A Yes, for those office buildings that we own.
- And for those that you rent, you have expenses
  associated --
- A They would be similar to.
- Q Similar.

And so in those instances you use an allocation process, right?

- A Yes.
- And what that essentially is is some kind of judgment about how the cost of these major items ought to be split up among the various customer classes right?
- A It is a matter of informed judgment.
- Q Now --

THE COURT:

Do you think this

would be an opportune time for us to adjourn?

MS- COLEMAN:

Surely, your Honor.

THE COURT:

It's after 4:00

o'clock.

MS. COLEMAN:

I didn't mean to

run over.

THE COURT:

It's all right.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's five after 4:00.

So that you may have an opportunity of reviewing the exhibits of the day, you are free to return to your jury room and free to go on your way to your homes for the dinner hour after 4:30 or whenever you finish viewing those exhibits. I don't think there are too many of them today.

So please, during the recess -- I should say -- adjournment, do not discuss the case either among yourselves or with anyone else, keep in mind that you are to keep an open mind until such time as you have heard all of the testimony in the case, the Court's instruction on the law, and until such time as the matter is submitted to you for your final deliberation and judgment.

With that, you are free to retire to the jury room. See you tomorrow morning at 8:30.

{The jury left the courtroom and the following proceedings were had out of their hearing and presence.}

{The Court and Law Clerk Schmitz conferred off the record.}

THE COURT: . We have the following

exhibits:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 547. CEI memo. Maugans to Loshing, 2/15/72; and PTX-579 which is, again, a CEI memo between the same persons, 2/19/73 Mr. Murphy?

MR. MURPHY:

No objection to those

twox your Honor.

THE COURT: They may be admitted.

The next one is Defendant's Exhibit 1069.

MR. MURPHY:

No objection.

THE COURT:

It may be admitted.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 795, a memo to Bingham, --

MR. MURPHY: No objection.

THE COURT:

-- 8/18/72.

PTX-796, a memo, Bingham, re price of PASNY, 11/1/22.

MR. MURPHY:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Plaintiff's Exhibit

1576, CEI memo, Williams to Bingham, 3/26/73.

MR. MURPHY:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Plaintiff's Exhibits

3121, 3122, and 3123, PUCO tariffs 1973, plus

·	,	קטכיבת
1	PTX-3244, CEI Florm 1, and 3)	20, General Rules and
2	Regulations of the PUCO.	
3	MR. MURPHY:	Your Honor, we are
4	going to interpose an object	ion to the last group
5	you read consistent with the	
6	THE COURT:	3121 and thereafter?
7	MR. MURPHY:	consistent with the
8	position of Mr. Lansdale.	
9	THE COURT:	Overruled; they may be
10	admitted.	•
11	MR. LANSDALE:	Your Honor, may I put
12	something on the record before we adjourn?	
13	I want the record to show that I have handed	
14	Mr. Norris a short time ago three documents from	
15	CEI files:	
16	One of them designated	SEE471, being Five -
17	Year Forecast Corporate Earnings dated May 13, 1971.	
18	A document dated June 15, 1970 called	
19	Preliminary Five-Year Construction Plan	
20	5YCPL70; and	,
21 · .	A document entitled "Fiv	ve-Year Construction
22	Plan" dated September 17, 197	On designated SYCP
23	970, and I wish to state why, out of the goodness	
24	of my heart, I produced three documents when I	
25	was only told to produce two.	·

The reason is --

THE COURT:

That's what the Court

suggested.

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MR. LANSDALE:

The reason is, your

Honor, that we discovered that in the testimony of Mr. Dobler as to the existence of certain items in the Five-Year Construction Plan for 1970, he obviously was referring to something called the "Preliminary Study" and it was omitted from the final study, so we gave both of them to Mr. Norris.

THE COURT:

Thank your gentlemen.

MR. NORRIS:

Let me put on the

record that I have already thanked Mr. Lansdale for that.

THE COURT:

Fine.

Good night, gentlemen.

MR. NORRIS:

Good night, your

Honor.

THE COURT: I have another matter scheduled, so be on your way, expedite your departure, it would be appreciated.

{Court adjourned.}

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. C75-560

Transcript

Tuesday, August 11, 1981

KF 228 .C43 1980

1	TUESDAY, AUGUST 11, 1981, 9:40 D'CLOCK A.M.
2	·
3	LAW CLERK SCHMITZ: City of Cleveland
4	Plaintiff, versus the Cleveland Electric
5	Illuminating Company, Defendant. This is Civil
6	Action No. C75-560.
7	{The following proceedings were had out of
8	the hearing and presence of the jury.}
9	MR. HJELMFELT: Your Honor, I would
10	like to raise the matter of Mr. Goldberg's
11	testimony.
12	THE COURT:. Yes.
13	MR. HJELMFELT: I am wondering if you
14	have had an opportunity to make a ruling.
15	I'm getting problems of scheduling again as
16	far as bringing him back this week.
17	THE COURT: What is the ruling
18	that I have to make?
19	MR. HJELMFELT: Well, the question
20	was raised as to whether his testimony that he put
21	on on voir dire was going to be allowed to be
22	presented to the jury.
23	THE COURT: I thought that I had
24	ruled
25	MR. NORRIS: Yes, I think he did

rule.

MR. LANSDALE: You have ruled except for one item, your Honor please, that is to say, testimony subsequent to the statutory period relating to the City's claim as to unreasonable delay in filing a schedule which we objected to.

Your Honor has ruled, however, on the main thrust of his testimony.

I can --

THE COURT:

Yes, my recollection

was, and I thought that I instructed the jury to

disregard, with the exception of his qualifications,

all of the testimony that he had given to that

point.

My ruling further said that he would be permitted to testify to that portion of his testimony that occurred between 1971 and '75.

I don't know if I ruled on the last aspect.

MR. LANSDALE:

I'll refer your Honor

to --

THE COURT:

MR. LANSDALE:

-- 12-621 and -622

of the record and, when your Honor considers it,

I draw your Honor's attention to Stipulation No.

1	126 which is relevant to the	t consideration.
2	THE COURT:	There is no necessity
3	for me to make a decision ri	ght now. Mr.
4	Goldberg is not here.	,
5	MR. HJELMFELT:	No. It is a question
6	of bringing him back Wednesd	ay or Thursday.
7	THE COURT:	Well, whatever day,
8	and I will rule on it at the	tail end of this
9	thing.	
.0	MR. HJELMFELT:	We were urging that
.1	the latter part was relevant	was due to Mr.
.2	Lansdale's cross-examination	with Mr. Engle
.3	raising the question of why	the City did not seek
.4	the PASNY power in 1977 or 1	978, or did not ask
.5	for a wheeling schedule or s	omething.
.6	THE COURT:	Very well. I will
7	address it.	
. 8	Bring in the jury.	
.9		
	{The jury was seated in	the jury box and
1	the trial continued as follo	ws:}
2	THE COURT:	Good morning, ladies
3	and gentlemen. Please be se	ated.
4	You may proceed. Ms. Co	leman.
l <u> </u>		

	•	13,586
1		CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM N. BINGHAM {Resumed}
2		
3	BY	MZ- COLEMAN:
4	Q	Good morning.
5	A	Good morning.
6	a '	Mr. Bingham, I want to pick up one thing that we had
7		talked about earlier yesterday afternoon.
8		You said CEI has now only one residential schedule.
9		That is not quite right, is it?
10	A	I thought that it was. Which one did I miss?
11	Q	Well, you also have at CEI a residential energy
12		conference schedule and another experimental
13		schedule which a few people enlist in, and there are
14		special conditions, and those are both residential
15		schedules as well?
16	A	Yesi you are correct.
17	Q	Mr. Bingham, the rate schedules that we looked at
18		specifically yesterday arose out of a 1969 application
19		for a rate increase by CEI; is that right?
20	A	Yesi that is correct.
21	Q	And an order was issued by the Public Utilities
22		Commission in I believe July 1970, ruling on that

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In connection with that proceedings, CEI and other. Q

request; is that right?

Yes.

# Bingham - cross

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parties to the proceedings reached an agreement and a stipulation, as it was called, as to the amount of recovery of additional revenue CEI should be entitled to recover provided the Commission made certain

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rulings; is that right?

Yes.

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And the Commission, although it was not bound to do so, Q essentially accepted those stipulations and recommendations reached among the parties; isn't that right?

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I believe that is correct.

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And the amount of that increase that was reaached by agreement, was that the same as CEI's initial request, or higher, or lower?

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It was lower.

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And when there is that kind of a situation, where CEI on its own comes in with a lower request through agreement with other parties or a lower request than

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someone else might file, the PUCO doesn't need a

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protest accepting a lower rather than a higher

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increase, does it?

I don't think CEI went in on their own.

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Q I appreciate that.

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That was a stipulated agreement and included the

## Bingham - cross

City of Cleveland, as I recall, and I have forgotten whether we would have industrial intervening or not, but it was essentially a recommendation of the people who were parties to the stipulation that the Commission accept the recommendation.

They are not compelled to, but they did, and they generally do when all the parties can get together and agree on something, and then generally the Commission accepts it.

- And they did in that case?
- A Yes.
- And the order was filed on July 17, and the schedules that we looked at yesterday showed that the CEI tariffs were then filed -- issued -- pardon me.

  August 4, 1970.

Does "issue" mean filed with the PUCO, Mr. Bingham?

- A I think in that case that is probably what it implies.
- They were filed with the PUCO on August 4 or perhaps at an earlier time and were issued from the PUCO at that point?
- A Well, we issued it, and that is the date that we did it, and it probably corresponds exactly with the date that it was filed with the Public Utilities Commission.

		13,589
1		Bingham - cross
2	Q	Thank you.
3		That date was about two or two and a half weeks
4		after the Commission issued its order; is that correct,
5		given the dates that we have specified?
6	A	Yes•
7	Q	And, in fact, CEI were following up on an order of
8		the Commission approving a rate increase, it issued
9		its tariffs within a matter of a few weeks after that
0		order is entered by the Commission?
1	A	Just as soon as we were able to, if it makes any
2		difference.
3	Q	And generally those go into effect about two weeks
4	•	after they are issued by the company; isn't that right?
5	A	This varies substantially.
6	Q	It depends on how much lead time is required so that
7		the notice goes through the billing cycle; is that
8		right?
9	A	I think in the case that you are talking about, it was
0		a situation where we probably knew that the rates
1		weren't going to become effective until August 14.
2		I am dredging to plumb my memory on this, and in

What I am trying to distinguish is this:

In today's time the clock starts running from the

that case that wasn't a rush.

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time you get the rates approved and filed, so we waste very little time in what you might call turnaround between the Commission's order, the approval by the Commission of the rates, and then our subsequent filing of the rates that they approve, and today we try and cut that down to an absolute minimum.

In the case you are citing, there was a one-month delay between the orders and the effective date of the rates.

I don't precisely recall why, but I am sure we tried as hard as we could to get it as fast as we could.

- Now, the rate increase following that was submitted by CEI in October, the application in October of
- A September or October, I have forgotten which,
- And I believe it was subject to an amendment sometime, some months later, an amended application was put in to the Commission by CEI, is that right?
- A There was an amended application that I think may have been 1972.
- And as a result of that application, there was initially an order by the PUCO in November of 1973 approving approximately &b percent of the requested

1 Bingham - cross 2 revenue increase by CEI, isn't that right? 3 I thought it was 92. Α 4 Q All right, I'll accept that. 5 And the CEI there again tried to get its rate 6 tariffs into place as quickly as it could, is that 7 right? 8 Yes. 9 And, in fact, those took effect in January of 1974, Q L 0 is that right? Ll That is correct. L 2 Now, there was some further ditigation on that Q 13 particular rate after which the CEI was permitted to L 4 recover an even greater increased revenue than it had L 5 been as a result of the first ruling, isn't that L 6 right? L 7 That's right; the Supreme Court of Ohio gave us some **L** 8 more money. L 9 Now, in fact, sir, it has -- it is your opinion that Q 20 up until 1976, the regulatory scheme in Ohio -- at 21 least, as it applied to CEI -- would, if you pulled out 22 all the stops, let you get more money than perhaps 23

If you pulled out all the stops and succeeded;

really you needed, isn't that right?

If you succeeded.

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		——————————————————————————————————————
1		Bingham - cross
2		I think the regulatory scheme would have given us a
3		very perhaps a slightly more than adequate rate
4		return.
5	Q	Mr. Bingham, you recall, I'm sure, having to testify
6		on this subject at earlier times prior to this trial,
7		is that right?
8	. <b>A</b>	Yes. I do.
9	Q	And
0		{After an interval.}
1	Q	Well, let's come back to that, perhaps we're getting a
2		little ahead of ourselves.
.3		Let's return for a moment, Mr. Bingham, to the
4		question of the cost-of-service study by class, if and
5		when that is submitted to the PUCO, that is, allotting
6		the cost of CEI's facilities among the various classes,
7		is a process of allocation primarily of making
8		judgments and estimates as to how that allocation should
9		take place, is that right?
0	A	Yes; well, there is a great deal of judgment involved.
1	Q	Now, one of the greatest costs that has to be

Cost of generating facilities, let me be specific?

A You mean -- you're referring to the investment in property?

allocated is cost of generation, is it not?

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- Bingham cross
- 2 & Right.
- 3 A That is one of the very largest.
- And, in fact, production -- the cost of production

  plant has increased over the time period that you have

  been the Chief Rate Engineer at CEI from approximately
  - 4D percent of plant in '65 to almost 6D percent of
- plant in 1980, isn't that about right?
  - A Yes.

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- Now, in dealing with costs such as production plant
  or any other costs, there are many methods from which
  you might choose to make the allocations among the
  classes, isn't that right?
  - A Yes.
  - Now, when some new facilities need to be installed because there is a new development or there is increased demand, it is not your practice, is it, to assign the cost of those new facilities to that group which is creating the new need, is that right?
  - A You're talking about a group say, like a new residential allotment?
  - Q No. I didn't mean to define it that way.
  - A I mean, such as.
  - Q Such as or such as a shopping -- a ring of shopping centers has been developed over a --

1		Bingham - cross
2	A	A shopping center like Randall Mall.
3	'Q	And if you have to install new generating equipment
4		as a result of increased demand, you do not assign
5		the new cost of the generating equipment to that
6		group of customers, do you?
7	A	No•
8		Of course, as a practical matter, you could never
9		say that, "This was installed because of that,"
L O		anyway.
[]		The timing isn't the generation is already
L2		there when hopefully is already there when the
L3		customer shows up; so you can't quite say that;
L 4		"This kilowatt is for that."
L 5		But, yes, we have to add generation, new
16		capacity, in order to handle new loads in general.
17		And we do not assign the costs of the new generation
18		to the new load.
19	Q	Rather, when you go to the question of what cost of
20		service is, you take an average figure based on all
21		the costs of whatever group of facilities you're
22		looking at, is that right?
23	A	Yes, including the transmission and even local
24		distribution.

Now, by the way, on generating facilities, the cost of

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adding new generating capacity today is higher than the average cost of the capacity that's already there isn't it?

- Yes; that's true of everything, perhaps more so of generation, but new poles cost many times the average cost of existing poles.
- Now, any cost-of-service study class-wise, if you did it, is really indicative of how to design the rates for a particular class, is that right?
- A That's our opinion.

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MR. LANSDALE: May I have that question read if your Honor please?

THE COURT: Read the question backaplease.

{The last question was read by the reporter.}

I thought I had heard you say it is "only" indicative.

But it's a general guide as to whether the total revenues obtained from that class of customer are reasonable or unreasonable in comparison with the revenues obtained from other classes relative to their costs.

It's not a final -- it's not a definitive document where you can say, "This is the answer."

And you really -- you couldn't do that because this

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cost of service is necessarily imprecise because you're having to make estimates and judgments and allocations

along the way as you're doing it?

But you would be wrong if you did. And, historically, we have run into people who say, "That's what you should do down to the second or third decimal place." I think it's wrong.

- We're using a lot of language here, and let me make sure that we understand what it is when you say you could do it if you wanted to , you could use the cost of service as the sole guide if you wanted to, but you don't?
- You could follow it blindly if you wished. Α
- Q And CEI, in fact, uses another criteria in doing the rate design for each of the classes, right?
- A Yes.
- Q Recently, for example, one of the concepts which you used is the idea that there should be summer rates and winter rates rather than a single rate schedule throughout the year?
- Α Yes; we implemented that in 1976, I quess.
- There are also other factors of business judgment Q which enter into the decision making, aren't there?
- Yes.

T		Bingham - cross
2	Q	And part of the business judgment in determining what
3		rates CEI proposes for retail service is competition
4		from other electric suppliers?
· 5	A	Only to a very limited degree.
6	Q	You do consider competition from other electric
7		suppliers in designing the rates, don't you?
8	<b>A</b>	Well, I think only to a modest degree.
9		Our experience has been that basically, that
10	•	except in the cases of a say a energy expensive
11		manufacturing processes, things like air reduction,
12		that is, the making of oxygen, the use of electric
13		furnaces, such as Union Carbide has, aluminum
14		production, of which we have none, in those instances,
15		the cost of electricity is really probably the major
16		element of that industry's costs; that's why we have
17		no aluminum here.
18	Q	Mr. Bingham, you do consider competition
19		THE COURT: Had you finished?
20		Just a moment.
21		Have you finished your answer?
22		THE WITNESS: I was going to add
23		just a little bit more, I'm sorry.
24	· A	{Continuing} An example of where we would take it into
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account specifically would be I think the situation

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where we have with Jones & Laughlin.

They have two electric furnaces here in their Cleveland plant. They have electric furnaces in some of their other plants, too, I think they have some in Pittsburgh. And if we are able, we would like it to be more economical for J&L to operate the electric furnaces here in Cleveland than to operate the electric furnaces in Pittsburgh if they only need one.

There, we do try to stay fairly sensitive to what we think are the relative costs between here and the other places of doing it.

I quess I'm finished.

- Mr. Bingham, you do consider competition from other electric suppliers in designing rates for very large industrial customers, don't you?
- I think that's what I just said.
- And competition has an effect on -- competition in Q designing the rate has an effect on the company's rate of return, doesn't it?
  - I'm not sure I know what you mean when you say "competition in designing the rate."

The major factor that would be concerned, I think, would be what is the total amount of revenue we get.

The design of the rate would be of secondary importance.

Well, the cumulative effect of including competition in your calculation of projected rates is that perhaps your earnings are slightly less or lower than what you might otherwise get, isn't that right? I can't recall any instance where, even though we may have thought about it, we actually had to or did reduce the level of revenues from electric service because of competition from another electric utility.

It was much more common for that to occur in our competition with the gas utility.

- Q But gas was not the only utility was it?
- A It was the toughest competition we had.
- Mr. Bingham, do you recall a proceeding in 1976 where you testified on matters related to the ones you are discussing today?
- A Yes-

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And at pages 10,330-10,331, you were asked in that proceeding the following questions and answers:

"Does competition with other electric suppliers ever enter into your consideration in designing rates?

"A Yes, it does."

And then there was colloquy among counsel, and then you were asked the question:

"Q How?

"A We have over the years faced continual competition with gas companies, very strongly in our little steam-heating business; and pretty much in all markets, home appliance markets and various industrial heat-treating operations, and many of which can be done either gas or electric, and the impact of this I think has probably been pretty much across the board.

"We haven't tried to design a residential schedule specifically to fight the gas company or some other schedule.

"It is a general overall impact, and in essence perhaps results in our earning a slightly or somewhat lower return than we might otherwise be entitled to."

Nows furthers Mr. Binghams --

MR. LANSDALE: ... I object, if your Honor please.

THE COURT: Approach the bench.

{The following proceedings were had at the bench.}

1	Bingham - cros	<i>,</i> s
2	MR. LANSDALE:	Is this supposed to
3	be impeachment?	
4	I object.	
5	MZ- COLEMAN:	I haven't gotten to
6	the part	·
<b>7</b>	MR. LANSDALE:	I can't hear you.
8	MZ- COLEMAN:	I haven't gotten to
9	the part which is	
10	THE COURT:	Why do we read the
11	material that is not relevan	t?
12	MS. COLEMAN:	Well, it's because
13	the question goes back to th	e beginning, your
14	Honor.	
15	THE COURT:	That's not the way
16	you do it.	
17	You can't go back and r	ead the transcript
18	all the way back and get in	all the testimony
19.	that	
20 .	MZ. COLEMAN:	My understanding
21	pardon me my understandin	g was I had to begin
22	with the question, and that'	s how I began.
2,3	THE COURT:	Let's proceed.
24	MR. LANSDALE:	I object. I object
25	to the suggested impeachment	•

Bingham - cross 2 I don't know what THE COURT: the rest of it is. Let's proceed. MR. LANSDALE: Are you authorizing her to read it? THE COURT: I don't know what it says. I don't know if it is consistent or inconsistent. 10 MR. LANSDALE: My point, your Honor, 11 please, is, she asked the witness about 12 competitive considerations; and then she says; 13 "Didn't you testify so and so in another 14 proceeding?" 15 The suggestion is that it's an impeachment, 16 and what she's reading is almost verbatim with 17 what he said, and I object to the suggestion 18 implicit in doing this, that this is an 19 impeachment thing. 20 She said she hadn't gotten to it. 21 THE COURT: Well, may I see it? 22 May I see what comes afterwards? 23 {Ms. Coleman leaves the bench.} 24 {Mr. Murphy steps to the bench and hands a 25

transcript to Mr. Lansdale.}

{Ms. Coleman returns to the bench with a page of transcript and hands it to the Court, and the Court reads silently.}

MS. COLEMAN: I've got a different transcript, Jack.

This is the problem, it's nested in something else. We get the question asked in the last proceeding, which can only be understood by what came before.

I think perhaps what I should have done is returned to the last fall transcript rather than the NRC.

{The Court continuing to read silently.}

MR. LANSDALE: You remember that

you made --

MS. COLEMAN: I said --

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MR. LANSDALE: —— you made a few suggestions that this produced a lower rate of return, and this is not accurate.

It says here "return," it doesn't say
"rate of return."

MS. COLEMAN: All right.

{Law Clerk Schmitz brings a volume of the transcript from the last trial to the bench and

1	Bingham - cross	, S
2	reads it silently with Mr. La	ansdale.}
3	MR. LANSDALE:	That's in another
4	case.	
5	MS. COLEMAN:	That's in this case,
6	last fall.	
7	MR. LANSDALE:	That's what?
8	MS. COLEMAN:	That's in this case
9	last fall.	•
10	MR. LANSDALE:	Oh, all right.
11	MS- COLEMAN:	One is nested inside
12	the other.	
13	MR- LANSDALE:	I don't know, what are
14	we going to do with this?	
15	MS - COLEMAN:	I don't know; I think
16	this is up to his Honor.	·
17	THE COURT:	Well, we're talking
18	about a 1976 hearing at page	es 10.330 and 10.331.
19 .	Now, I can do one of tw	o things:
20	I can order that testin	nony stricken and
21	instruct the jury not to con	nsider it because there
22	were no inconsistencies in t	the statements, and
23	then you can pick it up from	n there.
24	MR. LANZDALE:	Or you can just let
25	it go.	

1	Bingham - cross
2	THE COURT: I'm perfectly content
3	to let it go, unless counsel is going to suggest
4	that
5	MR. LANSDALE: There are no
6	inconsistencies there.
7	THE COURT: There certainly isn't
8	any inconsistency that I can see in the two
9	answers.
10	MS. COLEMAN: As far as we've gone,
11	there is not.
12	But I should have referred to this hearing
13	rather than the NRC; that's probably where I got
14	off the track.
15	THE COURT: Well, all right.
16	I'm going to let you proceed on that one
17	but I'm going to have this one stricken and tell
18	them to disregard it because there are no
19	inconsistencies.
20	Let's proceed.
21	MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, this
22	answer was part of the other answer. I think
23	that can only create
24	THE COURT: This is not the
25	hearing that you prefaced your question with.

his answer today.

1 Bingham - cross 2 If the inconsistency exists at all, it 3 exists in the previous trial testimony. MS. COLEMAN: 5 Honor. But this is all part of the question that was asked and, you're right, I should have 8 referred to the previous trial testimony. The problem is, one is nested to the other, 10 and this is part of the question. 11 THE COURT: If you're going to 12 use a document to impeach him, I don't understand 13 "one is nested in the other"? 14 How is one nested in the other? 1.5 MS. COLEMAN: 16 trial, the '76 testimony was read as part of the 17 question, and then this question was asked, "Is 18 it your testimony --" 19 THE COURT: 20 that, because you have given me page 2905 of 21 something, and I don't know what comes before, I 22 don't know what comes after. 23 24 25

That's right, your In that, in the prior Well, I don't know

So unless I have the context of the entire testimony so that I can see how it evolves in the testimony, it would have to be read from the last

1	Bingham - cross
2	trial testimony, the questions and answers.
3	MS. COLEMAN: That's right.
4	That's what I was doing, my reference was
5	wrong.
6	THE COURT: Non you weren'th you
7	were reading from here, from the transcript of
8	the 1976 hearing, as I understand it.
9	MS. COLEMAN: May I get the
10	previous trial testimony pages, and I'll show
11	you I'll explain it to you.
12	MR. LANSDALE: Is it suggested that
13	he was inconsistent in the last case; are you
14	suggesting that this impeaches him?
15	MS. COLEMAN: Only the very last
16	part there.
17	{Mr. Lansdale reading silently.}
18	THE COURT: I can't tell anything
19	from that.
20	We have to read it in context.
21	fMs. Coleman leaves the bench momentarily and
22	returns with two pages of transcript from the
23	previous trial.}
24	MS- COLEMAN: Your Honor, I'm
25	giving you the two previous pages.

1	Bingham - cross
2	{The Court reading silently.}
3	THE COURT: Well, that's still
4	not bring me back starting at page 2900,
5	where we can pick it up.
6	I can't get the context of this. Obviously
7	we're right in the middle of the cross-examination.
8	Get me let's go back to at least 2900.
9	or bring the entire transcript up.
10	{Ms. Coleman leaves the bench momentarily and
11	returns with several more pages of the transcript
12	from the previous trial, and the Court commences
13	reading silently.}
14	MR. LANSDALE: What page are you
15	starting with?
16	THE COURT: 2900.
17	{After an interval.}
18	THE COURT: Well, we will start
19	on page 2902, where it gets into the issue
20	confronting us here.
21	At page 15 or line 15, and the question
22	is:
23	"Now, in determining what rate it would
24	propose to retail service, did CEI consider
25	competition from other electric energy suppliers?

"A Not really.

"Q Would the same be true if I limited the question to large industrial customers?

"A Let me see if I understand that question.

"Would we be concerned about competition from other suppliers for large industrial customers?

"Q Would you take that into consideration in designing rates?

"A Not directly.

"I can't say that I ever compared one of my proposed large industrial rates against that of any other company."

So far, we are consistent.

But did you consider competition from other sources when proposing rates for large industrial customers?

"A Well, there may have been provisions in the large industrial schedule.

"As a matter of fact, there is a provision in the large industrial schedule that imposes certain additional conditions.

"If the customer is generating a portion of

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# Bingham - cross

his own power and is operating in parallel with
the company, then I suppose that you would say
that that is a separation of someone else's
generating. I am not sure that it has anything
to do with competition."

So far, he is consistent.

To you recall testifying in another proceeding in May of 1976, in Silver Springs, Maryland?

"A Yes.

And referring to page 10,329 of the transcript of those proceedings, and I will ask you if you recall this question and this answer:

morning about when you designed rates, whether you took competition into consideration, and I believe you referred possibly to the case of very large industrial customers; do I summarize roughly your testimony?

"'A Yes.

"'Q In giving that answer, were you thinking of competition only between electrical energy suppliers?

1	Bingham - cross
2	"'A Yes.'
3	"Do you agree with those answers?
4	"A Well, there might be cases where we
5	would yes.
6	ໆຂ Nown does the consideration of
7	competition in proposing or designing rates for
8	large customers have an impact on the company's
9	rate of return?
10	™A No•
11	"Q Do you recall in the same
12	proceeding, page 10,330 to 10,331, the following
13	questions and answers:
14	"'Q Does competition with other
15	electric suppliers ever enter into your
16	consideration in designing rates?"
17	Nows I don't know if that is an
18	incorrection of the transcript, it shows
19	"electric suppliers", "suppliers" is scratched
20	out and "energy" inserted, I don't know, is that
21	a correction of the
22	MS. COLEMAN: It's a correction
23	of
24	THE COURT: of the transcript?
25	MS. COLEMAN: of his description.

your Honor.

{The Court reading silently.}

THE COURT: "A Yes."

And let's go back because this is critical here.

"Q Do you recall in the same proceeding, page 10,330 to 10,331, the following questions and answers:

"'Q Does competition with other electric suppliers ever enter into your consideration in designing rates?."

"'A Yes, it does.'"

And then there was colloquy among counsel, ad then:

"'Q How?

continual competition with gas companies, very strongly in our little steam-heating business, but also in the electric business; and pretty much in all markets, home appliance markets and various industrial heat-treating operations, and many of which can be done either gas or electric, and the impact of this I think has probably been pretty much across the board.

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"'We haven't tried to design a residential schedule specifically to fight the gas company or some other schedule.'"

So far, he's consistent.

He goes on at line 10, page 2905:

"'It is in a general overall impact, and in essence perhaps results in our earning a slightly or somewhat lower return than we might otherwise be entitled to.'

"Now, is it your testimony that the only competition that impacted rates was with the gas company?

That was the primary one, and what you are really talking about there is that up until 1976, the regulatory scheme in Ohio, at least as it applied to CEI, wouldn't -- if you pulled out all the stops, perhaps it would let you get more money than you really needed.

"It was the competition that kept us below that rate of return, but I think generally we felt that we got an adequate rate of return."

That's where --

MR. LANSDALE: It seems to me that is exactly what he's testified to here.

1	Bingham - cross
2	THE COURT: Yes-
. <b>3</b>	Where do you claim an inconsistency appears?
4	MS. COLEMAN: The inconsistency
5	relates to two questions.
6	MR. LANSDALE: I can't hear your
7	I'm sorry.
8	MS. COLEMAN: The inconsistency
9 .	relates to two questions:
10	One is as to whether gas was the only
11	competition; and since he states here that it is
12	the primary one, it implies that there was other
13	competition as well.
14	We also come back to the portion I didn't
15	read earlier because of the problem of context:
16	and that is he earlier testified that he could
17	get more money than he really needed from the
18	PUCO if he pulled out all the stops.
19	THE COURT: He already testified
20	to that.
21	MR. LANSDALE: He testified to that.
22	THE COURT: You asked him the
23	specific question.
24	MR. LANSDALE: Moreover, he's already
25	testified about the J&L electric rates and whatnot,

		. 15,620
1	Bingham - cr	ross
2	where he's competitive wit	th Pittsburgh.
3	I just don't understa	and
4	THE COURT:	I will sustain the
5	objection.	
6	I think the best thir	ng to do is just let i
7	go and ask him another que	estion.
8	MS. COLEMAN:	All right.
9	I will proceed to so	mething else.
.0	{End of bench confere	ence.}
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1	Bingham - cross		
2	·	THE COURT:	You may proceed,
3	M:	s. Coleman.	
4		MZ. COLEMAN:	Thank your your
5	Но	onor.	
6	BA WZ . COTE	1AN :	
7	@ Mr. Bi	ngham, you agree, don	n't you, that it was
8	compet	ition that kept CEI b	pelow the rate of return
9	that C	EI may have gotten ou	ut of the PUCO if it
10	pulled	out all of the stops	5?
11	A Yes.	I think I already sai	ld that.
12		MZ. COLEMAN:	Pardon me. May I
13	а	oproach the bench?	
14		THE COURT:	Yes-
15			<del>-</del>
16		{The following pr	roceedings were had at the
17	b	ench:}	·
18		MS. COLEMAN:	Your Honor, I should
19	h	ave brought this out	before, but would you read,
20	р	lease: Stipulation 7	B -
21		MR. LANSDALE:	No objection.
22		MZ- COLEMAN:	Thank you.
23		{End of bench co	nference.}
24		THE COURT'S	Ladies and gentlemen
25	0	f the jury, Stipulat	ion 78 reads as follows:

#### Bingham - cross 1 "CEI with the approval of the PUCO sets 2 uniform rates by customer classification 3 throughout its service area." 4 Thank your your MS. COLEMAN: 5 Honor. 6 BY MS. COLEMAN: 7 Mr. Bingham, CEI could charge different rates in Q 8 different parts of its service area? 9 Yes. A . 0 So CEI has chosen to have uniform rates; is that Q .1 right? . 2 That has been our policy for many years. . 3 Α Now, it would be possible to determine a cost of Q . 4 service for a customer who lives in the City of . 5 Cleveland as opposed to the cost of service for a . 6 customer who lives outside of the City of Cleveland? .7 Not only possible, but it has been done. . 8 And it was done in 1944? Q . 9 It was done for what we refer to as the 1944 rate 0 9 A case, and the work was probably done in 1945-1946. 21 And then another one was done in what you referred to 22 Q I think, as the 1979 rate case? 23 I think that was the one. It would have been heard 24

in the spring of 1980.

- And the 1944 study and the 1977-1980 study were the only two you know of that ever got finished and filed with the Commission; is that right?
- A Did you say "1944"?
- Q Yes.

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: 3

A You are getting a little bit mixed up.

The 1944 rate case was an appeal from an ordinance passed by the City of Cleveland that was not acceptable to the company.

Under those conditions we appealed the ordinance to the Public Utilities Commission, and they have the jurisdiction to settle it.

The customers covered by that rate ordinance were those on the residential schedule and general commercial schedule in the City of Cleveland, and at that time an allocation or a cost-of-service study was made that separated out those two rate schedules in the City of Cleveland from all of the rest of the system.

In what we referred to as the 1948 rate case: this was a proposal by the company to increase rates for the large commercial and large industrial -- or whatever they were called at that time -- and schedules only.

#### Bingham - cross

There was no increase for residential, general commercial, and perhaps the miscellaneous.

Our industrial customers took great exception to this proposal of the company, and at that time we did a class-wise cost-of-service study for use in that rate case.

Then in I guess we have referred to it as the 1979 rate case, heard in the spring of 1980, the company did a territorial allocation separating the City of Cleveland, all classes. I believe, from the system.

Now, in between, other people have done cost-of-service studies; the City has --

- I will ask you again, Mr. Bingham, isn't it true that the 1944 study and the 1979 study were the only two that you know of that CEI did which were ever finished?
- A I just testified that we did one in 1948. It was submitted in the rate case.
- Q It was a territorial study.
- A As a class-wise --

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- My question goes to the study as between the City of Cleveland and others.
- A I didn't hear the word "territorial" in the question.

They would have been probably the only ones that

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1		Bingham - cros	SS .
2		we completed and filed.	
3		Other people have done it, t	though.
4	Q	It is CEI's belief that there is	very little
5		difference in the cost of service	e for a customer
6		within the City of Cleveland and	a customer outside
7		of the City of Cleveland?	
8	A	That is correct, it is.	
9	Q	And that is your opinion; is that	t right?
10	A	It is my opinion, and it was devo	eloped from the cost
11		studies that have been done.	
12		MZ. COLEMAN.	MayyI request a
13		bench conference, please?	·
14		THE COURT:	Yes.
15			
16		{The following proceed	ings were had at the
17		bench:}	
18		MS. COLEMAN:	If your Honor please
19		we would request that Stipu	lation 77 be read.
20		MR. LANSDALE:	I have no objection.
21		THE COURT:	0kay•
22		{End of bench conferer	nce.}
23	,	THE COURT:	Ladies and gentlemen
24		of the jury, Stipulation No	o. 77 reads as follows:
25		"Approximately 30 per	cent of CEI's revenues
		•	

1		Bingham - cross
2		come from sales made within the City of
3		Cleveland."
4	BY M	S. COLEMAN:
5	Q	The technique of doing the allocation study by
6		region, which you just described, in 1944 and 1979,
7		is much the same as the techniques that would have
8		been used in a class-wise study; isn't that right?
9	A	They frequently are the same.
.0		On the other hand, they are frequently there
.1		frequently are shortcuts that you can take that you
. 2		can't do in a class-wise study.
L3	Q	We were in one of the less-talked-about allocation
L <b>4</b>		studies or the estimating study?
L 5	A	Yes•
L6	Q	And in many cases in the most recent studies that
L 7		you have done, the allocation factor that is used to
18		divide costs between the City and the outside is
19		around 30 percent, which also includes contributions
20		for total energy sales; is that right?
21	A	There is no such thing as the allocation factor.
22	Q	Yes: there were several different ones?
23	A	There are hundreds I may have exaggerated there
24		are over 50, I am sure, and it depends on the class

of property that you are talking about.

#### Bingham - cross

For example, a system would be 11 KV undeground conduit and cable, and the vast majority of that, I believe, is located in the City of Cleveland, so its allocation factor for that kind of property would be very, very high, much higher than 30 percent.

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There are other kinds of property, for example, until recently, anyway, the 13 KV overhead distribution system, and relatively little of that is in the City of Cleveland, and in that area it would have a very low allocation factor, so these things range all over.

\*Now if you want to get up to the top say to the power plant, you would be near 30 percent.

Kilowatt hours -- kilowatts don't necessarily always match revenue percent by percent, but they are not going to be greatly different, either.

- Q In the City the ll KV conduit underground was used primarily to serve industrial customers?
- A Yes. It is primarily a service for the downtown of Cleveland.
- Q Let me expand my question to ask you that that service was for primarily commercial and industrial customers?
- A No. I guess I have to decline that. The service was

1	Bingham ·	-	cross

to most of the substations on the east side of Cleveland and out the Lake Shore, which would probably be out to, say, around East 120th Street, and that would be mostly in the 11 KV system.

I would agree that there is probably more commercial and industrial on it than is typical in other areas.

- Q . That conduit was laid in some time ago?
- 10 A Most of it.
- And it is underground and consideration of the

  density of the population and the difficulty of

  building overhead; isn't that right?
- 14 A Yes.

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- There are differences, aren't there, in the amount of
  electricity used for typical residential customers in
  the City of Cleveland and the typical residential
  customers outside of the City of Cleveland?
- 19 A Yes.
- The residential customers inside the City of

  Cleveland use less, on average, than the residential

  customers outside of the City of Cleveland?
- 23 A That is correct.
- 24 And there were probably two reasons for this; and one 25 is that the houses are, on average, smaller in the

### 1 Bingham - cross city; and the other is that the houses are older and 2 probably have less demand for electric energy than 3 the newer developments outside the city; is that 4 5 right? Yes, houses and apartments, dwelling units, really. 6 We spoke a minute ago concerning the question of 7 8 density. One aspect of the cost at the level of the 9 distribution is the density, is it not? 10 11 Yes. Incidentally, the denser the load, the lower 12 13 the unit cost. Density can be measured in terms of the number of 14 Q electric customers per mile or kilowatt hour per 15 mile -- pardon me -- let me rephrase that: 16 Density in general parlance is people per square 17 18 mile of territory, isn't it? There are really two major considerations: 19 One would be customers per square mile, and the 20 other would be kilowatts per square mile. 21 The land area of the City of Cleveland is about 76 22 23 \_square miles? I think we usually say 75, but you are probably 24 A

more accurate than I am.

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                              Bingham - cross
           And CEI has about 100 -- had, in 1979, about 184,000
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     Q
           customers in the City of Cleveland; right?
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           In 1979?
     Α
5
           In 1979.
     Q
6
           It sounds right.
           So that the density of customers per square mile in
      Q
           the City of Cleveland was about 2,480 customers per
· 8
9
           square mile?
10
           What was that number again?
11
           2,483.
      Q
           Yes.
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      A
           Now, the CEI service is an area of 1,700 square miles?
13
      Q
14
           Roughly.
           And the total customers in the CEI service area is
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      Q
           about 708-000 customers in 1979?
16
17
           It sounds right.
           So that the density in the service area incidentally
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      Q
           is only 417 customers per square mile; right?
19
           I will accept that, subject to check.
20
           Now, since the general statistics about the service
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      Q
           area include the City of Cleveland, if you wanted to
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           find out the density of the area outside of the
23
           City of Cleveland, you would have to subtract the
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land area of the City of Cleveland from the land

May I approach the

1		Bingham - cross
2		area of the service area, 1,700 minus 76, which is
3		l <sub>a</sub> 624 square miles?
4	A	0kay∙
5	Q	And if you wanted to get the number of customers
6		outside of the City of Cleveland in the service area
7		you subtract the City of Cleveland's customers from
8		the service area customers; right?
9	Α	Yes.
10	Q	And will you accept that that is approximately
11		519,000 customers?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	So that the density outside the City of Cleveland is
14		about 320 customers per square mile?
15 .	A	I will accept that.
16	Q	And if we compare that 320 outside the City to the
17		2,400 customers per square mile in the City, we find
18		in the City that the density is about eight times as
19		great as outside; isn't that right?
20	A	That is the way it works out.
21	Q	And given this difference in density cost, the cost
22		to service within the City ought to be lower on the
23		density criteria alone?
24	A	All other things being equal, yes.
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MR. LANSDALE:

#### Bingham - cross

bench?

THE COURT:

Yes.

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(The following proceedings were had at the bench:}

I want to interpose MR. LANSDALE: " an objection to this entire line of questioning. I must confess that I am wondering. I have been wondering for the last hour what we are going into this for, and I object on the grounds of relevance and on the grounds of redundancy, and I object to continuing detailed examination into the matters which are totally irrelevant to this case.

 I am having difficulty THE COURT: following it myself. Maybe you can tell us. I don't know.

Your Honor, we are MS. COLEMAN: talking about an antitrust case where the question is competition and what actions CEI took and it considers in rate-making and related issues, and they are very germane.

You have been talking, THE COURT: but you really haven't said anything. All you have

1	Bingham - cross
2	done is generalize.
3	Tell me where it is material? I mean, it is
4	one thing to say that, "I think it is material,"
5	but tell me where and how. I don't know. That
6	is why I am asking, does it go to the issue of
7	ability to fix rates?
. 8	MS. COLEMAN: No. The questions
9	I am now asking go to their ability to charge a
10	different rate in the City of Cleveland.
11	THE COURT: So what?
12	MS- COLEMAN: which goes to the
13	question of how CEI could compete against Muny
14	Light.
15	THE COURT: I think you asked that
16	in one single question, and he answered, "Yes."
17	MR. LANSDALE: He already testified
18	to that.
19	THE COURT: I think you asked
20	him the question, "Can CEI set different rates
21	for the City of Cleveland than it does outside
22	of the City of Cleveland," and the answer was,
23	"Yes."
24	MR. LANSDALE: I will stipulate
25	that we charged that lower rate, but not if I am

1 Bingham - cross 2 going to be subjected to hour upon hour of this 3 kind of stuff. I don't think it is MS: COLEMAN: 5 going to be hour upon hour. MR. LANSDALE: It seems like it. Maybe it is minute after minute. 8 I think it would be MS - COLEMAN: 9 helpful to have the facts in the record which 10 indicate and support that ability. 11 THE COURT: -Why? 12 MS. COLEMAN: If you can stipulate 13 the conclusion --14 THE COURT: It is now 10:30, or 15 a quarter of 11:00, and we have been in this 16 ever since we started this morning, since we 17 began at twenty after 9:00, but if we could have 18 stipulated it in one sentence -- and he answered 19 the question, he answered, "Yes." 20 I can't escape the MR. LANSDALE: 21 feeling I have been getting that this is some 22 attempt to secure information relative to our 23 natural legal monopoly and affirmative defense. 24 and if son it is anticipatory of something that 25 we have the burden of proof on, and it is not

1 Bingham - cross 2 relevant now anyway. 3 I don't know what we THE COURT: are going, where we are going with it, frankly. 5 Assuming for the sake of argument that CEI can set different rates within the City than it can set outside of the City, and in fact the rate could be lower in the City, and what does that prove? 10 It proves that CEI MS. COLEMAN: 11 had open to it the opportunity to take that approach to competition other than the one it did take. 12 13 THE COURT: What difference does 14 that make? 15 We are here to determine whether or not they 16 engaged in predatory and unreasonable conduct. 17 I think we are getting into academic areas. 18 I am appreciative of the fact that you have made 19 all these mathematical computations to which the 20 witness concedes, but what does it prove? It 21 doesn't prove anything. 22 If you are desirous of getting into the record the fact that CEI can set different rates 23 24 within the City and without the City and the 25 rates can be lower within the City --

#### Bingham - cross

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MR. LANSDALE: Yes. The statute provides that we can approve rates without any affirmative order of the Commission, but the witness has already testified that we can set different rates.

THE COURT: I have the feeling, counsel, that I have permitted this on both sides.

We have stipulations -- I don't know, maybe counsel have overlooked the purpose of the stipulations.

The purpose is to eliminate the necessity of putting on evidence, actual evidence that develops the conclusions of the stipulations.

The purpose of stipulations is to reduce a protracted trial, and I have permitted both sides to introduce evidence that parallels the stipulation, but this is a redundant procedure, and that is why we are going so long in trying this thing.

Why don't you see if you can work out a stipulation, and we will take a break, and then we will go on to something else.

{End of bench conference.}

1 Bingham - cross Ladies and gentlemen, THE COURT: perhaps this is an opportune time to take our morning break. Remember the admonitions herebofore given. We will see you in a little bit. {Recess taken.} 7 THE COURT: What have we accomplished during the recess? 9 MS. COLEMAN: If your Honor please, we have a stipulation which we have reached --10 perhaps we should approach the bench. 11 12 13 IThe following proceedings were had at the 14 bench:} 15 MS. COLEMAN: This deals with one 16 feature of the matter that is being discussed 17 here, and I will read the stipulation that was 18 reached into the record: 19 "At all times relevant to this case the 20 defendant CEI had the legal right if it elected 21 to charge lower rates to customers within the City of Cleveland than to customers outside the 22 23 City of Cleveland." 24 The change represents MR. LANSDALE: 25 the difference of what was suggested to me and what

1 Bingham - cross 2 I was willing to agree to. Is this the stipulation? 3 THE COURT: MS. COLEMAN: Yes. 5 All right. I will THE COURT: read it. What else? That is all. Then I MS. COLEMAN: 8 will proceed with other matters. MR- LANSDALE : I think it may be. pertinent to tell you that the reason I objected 10 to the use of the language "could have" is 11 because of the ambiguity in it, that I didn't know 12 what the plaintiff's claim, whether the plaintiff 13 would claim that the economics would have dictated 14 15 it, and now, when I recognize in the question that they did indeed intend that, and I am not 16 17 prepared to make a stipulation in that respect. Well, I can understand 18 THE COURT: 19 why -If the thrust is to show that you "could have" 20 and the economics of it -- I mean, if you have 21 22 established a rate in the city lower than the 23 City's rate to its customers, that could have been 24 a charge of predatory action, if the economics 25 didn't warrant setting it down that low.

1	Bingham - cross
2	Okay, let's move this along.
3	I still don't see the purpose of this, but
4	let's move it.
5	MR. LANSDALE: I don't, either.
6	{End of bench conference.}
7	
8	{The jury was reseated in the jury box and
9	the trial continued as follows:}
10	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen
11	of the jury, in an effort to move the case along,
12	counsel have entered into a stipulation, which I
13	shall for the record identify as a stipulation
14	of 8-11-81, as follows:
15	"At all times relevant to this case the
16	defendant CEI had the legal right if it elected
17	to charge lower rates to customers within the
18	City of Cleveland than to customers outside the
19	City of Cleveland."
20	MS. COLEMAN: Thank your your Honor.
21	BY MS. COLEMAN:
22	
23	taken into account in designing rates.
24	After you designed them, they must be filed and
25	approved by the PUCO; is that correct?

- 1 Bingham - cross 2 Generally speaking, yes. 3 Q In the case of rate schedules reflective of rate increases, that is the case? 5 · Yes. 6 And you can't charge a customer a higher rate than Q 7 is on file without a full filing of approval? No-9 Nor can you charge a lower rate without filing an Q 10 approval? 11 My recollection -- I am not sure about "approval," --12 but my recollection is they had to accept it for 13 filing, and that is what the statute said. 14 But you would have to file it if you were charging Q 15 a lower rate? 16 Yes. 17 Q Now, we spoke yesterday about the CEI rules and 18 regulations which in part define the terms and 19 conditions of service; is that right? 20 Yes. 21 And other terms and conditions of service were set Q 22 forth in the rate schedules themselves for the
- For the individual rate schedules, yes. 25

individual class of customers; right?

23

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Now, the terms and conditions of service are also Q

1		Bingham - cross
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3		filed with the PUCO, aren't they?
	A	They both are filed with the PUCO.
4	· Q	And the terms and conditions of service in those
5		filings are applied uniformly throughout CEI's
6		service area?
7	A	Generally speaking, yes.
8	Q	You can't change the filed terms and conditions unless
9		you go down and file new ones?
10	A	That is right.
11	Q	And you could if you wished file new terms and
12		conditions as applied only to customers within the
13		City of Cleveland, as opposed to all oustomers
14		throughout the area; right?
15		MR. LANSDALE: I object, if your
16		Honor please.
17		THE COURT: Approach the bench.
18	٠	
19		{The following proceedings were had at the
20		bench:}
21		MR. LANSDALE: I believe that we
22		have established in the last case that whether or
23		not in the so-called Muny Displacement Program
24		where they violated the provision of tariffs as
25		to which we doubt admit that we did but the

to which we don't admit that we did, but the

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# Bingham - cross

question whether or not we did is irrelevant to this case and irrelevant in any antitrust case, and it seems to me that we are getting -- that this question is designed to suggest the contrary, and I object to going into this aspect of it at all.

THE COURT:

Ms. Coleman.

MS - COLEMAN:

The question which I

am asking Mr. Bingham, those questions are drawn from the law related to required filings, and we would submit, your Honor, that those laws as to what is required to be filed are material here, particularly in light of the fact that the PUCO has since the last time issued an order on this question, responding to a 1976 application by the company for a tariff -- pardon me -- a filed schedule or term and condition of service. that would permit it to provide allowances in the competitive areas, and the PUCO ruled that that was not an appropriate schedule to be filed by the CEI.

We can make that order available to your Honor. We have some stipulations concerning the applicable Ohio statutes, and they are stipulations

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**L7** 

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#### Bingham - cross

80 through 82, and two additional stipulations relating to other filing requirements, and two -relating to the order, and we can make all that available to your Honor.

THE COURT:

this period.

For what purpose?

MS. COLEMAN:

The order of the PUCO provides the necessary foundation which you called for at the last trial for referring to the statute as being relevant to CEI's conduct during

THE COURT: `` That was a 1976 order. How is that pertinent to what occurred between July 1, 1971, and 1975?

MS. COLEMAN: We can argue they came to this conclusion. Nows they could have come to this conclusion earlier.

I am not changing my THE COURT: ruling from the previous case as it relates to this purpose. You may proffer into the record what you intend this evidence to be beyond that what you have already said, but to me it just appears that it just fortifies my previous decision. mamely, whether or not that activitivities engaged in by CEI during the actionable period

# Bingham - cross

constitutes a violation of State law was within the jurisdiction of the PUCO.

They took jurisdiction, and they decided it, and unfortunately they decided it in 1975, so it is not material to this case, and whether they would have under the same or similar circumstances made the same ruling back in 1971, '72, '73, I don't know, but I am not going to conjecture on it.

MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, we will proffer the order to which I referred and the statutes, and I will do that in a written form.

THE COURT: Just do it right now.

MS. COLEMAN: Well, I want to give you the order.

THE COURT: We are not going to start proffering in written form. Proffers are made at the time that the testimony is tendered, and they are not made days afterwards, so any proffer that you are desirous of making, you are free to make it, or you can argue to the Court of Appeals. It is a question of law anyway. It is not a question of evidence.

MS. COLEMAN: Let me return and get

1	Bingham - cross
2	the order and the other related materials.
3	THE COURT: All right.
4	{After an interval-}
5	MS. COLEMAN: If your Honor please,
6	this is a proffer concerning the order of the
7	PUCO that I related to you.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	{Above-mentioned order handed to the Court.}
10	MR. LANSDALE: Is this the date it
11	was issued. April 14. 1981?
12	MS. COLEMAN: That is my
13	understanding.
14	THE COURT: That is an order in
15	Case No. 76467ELATA, issued by the Public
16	Utilities Commission of Ohio on 4-14-81.
17	MS. COLEMAN: This order is
18	submitted in response to the Court's request at
19	the last trial that we lay a foundation for the
20	reading of the Stipulations 80 through 82, and we
21	would proffer those stipulations as well at this
22	time.
23	In addition to that, I have reference to
24	Sections 4905
2 <del>.</del> 5	THE COURT: Just a moment. I want

#### Bingham - cross

2

to read the Stipulations 80 through 82.

3

fAfter an interval.}

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MR. LANSDALE: I would object to the reading of the Stipulations; moreover, I point out with respect to the order tendered of April 14, 1981, that this order was issued, and the hearing representing it entertained under the new statute which permits the Commission to consider in advance provisions not to increase under the law as it existed under the time -the relevant period in this case.

The law required for the application for rate change was not for an increase, and the Commission had to accept it for filing and fix its effective date; so that the suggestion that they even might have, let alone probably would have issued the same order, I submit is wrong as a matter of law.

If your Honor please, MS. COLEMAN: I feel I have to respond to that. I don't think the question is whether the Commission might have taken up this matter on its own motion at the time of the application for rate increase, at the time it was presented to it in the relevant period.

The question is whether or not this program

# 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 L 4 L 5 L 6 L 7 8 19 20 21 2 23

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#### Bingham - cross

should have been filed with the Utilities

Commission, and in support of that we would refer
to Ohio Revised Code 4905.30 and 4905.31.

I don't have the copies of the statute with me, but I have prepared Stipulations of the facts that set forth the substance of those two laws, and I would include that in my proffer as well, your Honor. That is these two items {indicating}.

MR. LANSDALE: What is -- a suggested stipulation?

MS. COLEMAN: Yes, but it is moot now, but it is a paraphrase of the laws that I am referring to.

MR. LANSDALE: 4905-30 and 4905-31?

MS. COLEMAN: Yes.

MR. LANSDALE: Well, here is .30.

It happens to be dated 1954, but it is still the relevant law during the period.

My question is "So what?"

From time to time anybody could go down to the Commission and file a complaint about anything and the Commission could hold a hearing and change it.

We are prepared to show, as a matter of fact,

# 1 Bingham - cross

. 8

that many things that are done with respect to individual customers and promotions and the like that are customarily — that customarily have not been filed, but I submit it is all irrelevant. It is an antitrust case, and it is not properly before the PUCO, and under the antitrust laws we are entitled to meet competition, and if meeting competition involves a change in the rates, and we did this unlawfully, insofar as the Commission is concerned, it doesn't affect our right under the antitrust laws to do so, and I think that is well established.

MS. COLEMAN: We have cited the authorities that we believe support the proposition and evidence that a defendant in an antitrust case is willing to violate State law to pursue its monopolization plan goes to the predatory nature of the conduct, and that is in our brief.

THE COURT: Well, I am not at that juncture at this point.

What I am saying, it is the conduct that you complain of that is a matter -- no, no -- the conduct that you claim in the charge was

Bingham - cross 1 contrary to Ohio Statute is a matter which is 2 within the adjudication and authority of the 3 Public Utilities Commission, and this Court cannot as a matter of law impose upon the 5 Commission's jurisdiction and determine in this case what the Public Utility Commission of Ohio 7 had to determine in any action brought in front 8 9 of them. I think that to be MS. COLEMAN: 10 your ruling, and I am submitting these materials 11 as a proffer in response to that. 12 THE COURT: Fine. Very good. 13 Here is your book back. 14 MS. COLEMAN: Did you get the 15 order? -- fine. 16 The stipulation does THE COURT: 17 not become a part of the record unless counsel 18 agrees to the accuracy of the stipulation, and 19 in that event the question of whether it should 20 or should not be read is interposed, and then it 21 would become a part of the record, but I don't 22 23 know --

24

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MR. LANSDALE:

the record, but I don't

If counsel wishes to
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                            Bingham - cross
 2
               have these stipulations as part of the proofer,
 3
               I will take a look at them during the recess.
                                          That is my intention.
                    MS. COLEMAN:
 5
                                          It is -- on the
                    MR. LANSDALE:
               surface it looks okay, but I want to examine it.
 7
                    THE COURT: Okay.
                    {End of bench conference-}
 9
10
                                      You May proceed,
                    THE COURT:
11
               Ms. Coleman:
12
                   MS. COLEMAN:
                                    Thank your your
               Honor.
13
14
      BY MS. COLEMAN:
           Mr. Bingham, turning to another subject, if we may,
15
      Q
16
           please, there has been some testimony on a few
17
           occasions in this trial concerning the CEI's contract
18
           with the Union Carbide Company.
19
               Do you recall that?
20
           Yes.
           And you have been identified as the person who is
21
      Q
22
           familiar with the relationship between CEI and the
           Union Carbide Company; is that right?
23
24
           Yes, I am familiar with it.
```

Now, when we looked yesterday at the set of schedules,

1		Bingham - cross
2		we looked at the line, "Other - Contracts," under
3		"Industrial"?
4	<b>A</b>	That is right.
5	Q	And one of the I don't want to say "schedule,"
6		but one of the groupings or classifications under
7		which sales are made by CEI to retail customers; right
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	And one of those contracts is CEI's contract with the
10		Union Carbide Company?
11	A	That is correct. It would have been about 80 percent
12		of that line.
13	Q	In fact, CEI has had a contract with the Union Carbide
14		Company as early as 1949; is that right?
15	A	Probably long before that. I suspect that we had
16		some kind of a contract with Union Carbide as long as
17		they have been there.
18	Q	Under that contract, and its successive amendments,
19		from time to time there have been agreements between
20		the two companies to supply start-up power, off-peak
21		power, and emergency power, and interruptible
22		off-peak power; is that right?
23	A	There was start-up power.

I don't recall whether it was -- whether it was specifically off-peak power. I think it may have been

24

1		Bingham - cross
2		interruptible, and off-peak. I could be wrong.
3	Q	And there was a provision for emergency power in the
4		contract developed?
5	A	There was a provision that Union Carbide would sell
6		emergency power to CEI.
7	Q	For the purposes of these interchanges, the 138 KV
. 8		transmission that line was completed between CEI
9		and Union Carbide; is that right?
10	A	Yes•
11	Q	And the capacity was 100 megawatts, if you recall?
12	A	I am not sure of the line's capacity.
13		. The transformer that we hung on it initially ${ t r}$ I
14		think, was somewhat less than that. I could be wrong
15	Q	After the time that the Union Carbide contract was in
16		effect with CEI, up through 1972. Union Carbide
17		generated some of its own power?
18	A	All right. You are referring to the things that we
19		classified as an interconnection contract between the
20		two.
21	Q	There was such a contract?
22	A	And that would have been in effect, I believe, from
23		1949 through almost the end of 1972.
24	Q	And at that time Union Carbide had its own generating

facilities?

		•
1		Bingham - cross
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	And in December, 1972, CEI purchased that generating
4		plant, didn't it?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And the plant at that time consisted of four 40-megawatt
7		units, two of which were 23 years old, and two of which
8		were 19 years old?
9	A	Actually they were something over 40 megawatts each.
L O	Q	Am I correct about the age of the units?
11	A	Two were installed in 1948 or '49, and two additional
12		were installed in 1992.
13	Q	Now, the price which CEI paid was more than Union
14		Carbide's depreciated book value for those units
15		wasn't it?
16	A	I don't know-
17	Q	Are you aware that Union Carbide Company reported
18		making a profit of \$3.9 million after taxes on that
19		sale?
20	A	Nor I am not.
21	Q	Let me refer you to an exhibit.
22		MS. COLEMAN: Mrs. Richards, would
23		you get that for me.
24		{After an interval.}
25	Q	Mr. Bingham, would you accept that this is a cover and

1 Bingham - cross	
2 pages from the Union Carbide annual repo	ort for 1972?
3 A Yes.	
4 Q And if you would turn to page well w	ve have no page
5 numbers.	
6 A About the fourth page.	
7 @ About the fourth page under "Extraordir	nary Items."
8 MR. LANSDALE: Object	t•
9 THE COURT: Approx	ach the bench.
.0	
.1 {The following proceedings wer	re had at the
.2 bench:}	·
.3 MR. LANSDALE: I obje	ect to this, if
your Honor please. This is obvious	sly hearsay
material, and we know nothing abou	t Union
Carbide's accounting methods, which	h could have
had a major effect upon what it sh	ows on the
books insofar as profit; and it do	es not have
the necessary relevance to the que	stion.
Any testimony about what Unio	n Carbide
21 profited, we should have somebody	that knows what
the basis is, and he has to come o	n the stand and
testify, and I object to this.	
24 MS. COLEMAN: I bel	lieve if we look
at the Rules of Evidence we will f	find this is

1	Bingham - cross
2	the hearsay exception to the type of public
3	report, and we can rely on that as a fact in
4	this case.
5	It is, if nothing else, under 808.23, under
6	Rule 808.23, is an exception for information
7	that ought to be considered reliable.
8	THE COURT: Apart from the
9	procedural aspect, what is the purpose of it?
10	MS. COLEMAN: The purpose, your
11	Honor, goes to show that in
12	MR. LANSDALE: It is 803, and which
13	paragraph?
14	MS. COLEMAN: I think it is 23.
15	The very last one. Maybe it is 24, the other
16	exceptions.
17	MR. LANSDALE: Well, this is a
18	catchall that puts it into the Court's discretion
19	to let in almost anything it wants to.
20	MS. COLEMAN: I think there may have
21	been something specific, if I may borrow your book.
22	I would submit this also falls within the
23	exception, Exception 17 to the hearsay rule.
24	I will give this to you, "Market quotations,
25	tabulations, and lists, and directories generally

# Bingham - cross 1 relied upon." I think it has more reliability than 3 directories that are specifically reference. Well, getting back to THE COURT: 5 my original question, what is the purpose of the 6 testimony, apart from the procedural aspect of it? The purpose of the MS. COLEMAN: testimony is to show that CEI was willing to pay 10 a premium in order to eliminate competition. 11 How is it that they THE COURT: 12 didn't know about it? They didn't know about 13 any profit that may have been made by Union 14 Carbide. 15 As I understand it, your question was 16 something like this, that they purchased a 17 generation system of Union Carbide in 1972, and 18 that Union Carbide made \$3.3 million profit, 19 20 and he said --My question was 21 MS. COLEMAN: 22 3.9. -- and he said "No." THE COURT: 23 I was wondering at MS. COLEMAN: 24

his answer, given his knowledge of the

#### Bingham - cross

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circumstances, whether he didn't know the precise number?

THE COURT: Well, the fact that he made \$3.9 million is presently before the jury from a financial report, but he disclaimed any knowledge of what profit if any was made or loss.

MS. COLEMAN: He hasn't done that. He might, but he has not.

MR. LANSDALE: Let me point this

out: We have a footnote that says, "Some kinds

of non-recurring profit result from sales of

businesses and other property, including 3.9

million or 6 cents per share for the sale of

the power station," and how do we know it is this

power station, and number two, how do we know

what their mode of accounting was.

They may have had fast write-offs, and they may have it written down to nothing, because of the fast depreciation.

It is absolutely -- even if it were relevant, a relevant question, it falls far short, and to say that it is reliable for the purposes for which you are offering it, I submit, is

1		Bingham - cross
2		totally wrong.
3		THE COURT: I will sustain the
4		objection.
5	•	{End of bench conference.}
6		· 
7		THE COURT: I will sustain the
8		objection. The jury will disregard the last
9		answer.
10	BY M	S. COLEMAN:
11	Q	Mr. Bingham, the amount which CEI did pay for that
12		plant would be reflected, wouldn't it, in the
13		difference in the value of the Ashtabula plant as
14		reported in the FPC Form No. 1 in 1972 before the
15		acquisition, and in 1973, after the acquisition?
16	A	That, and all other changes, additions or retirements,
17		that the Ashtabula Station would be reflected.
18	Q	When CEI makes a purchase of that nature, they
19		consider it part of its property, the power plant
20		property?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	And the Union Carbide purchase was preceded by three
23	٠	weeks, was it not, by a new contract with Union
24		Carbide for interruptible power; is that correct?
25	A	I recall there was an agreement signed on December 4,

Bingham - cross 1 which, to my recollection, tells me was the purchase 2 3 agreement. My recollection of the interruptible contract -- it was effective December 28, as I recall, and maybe 5 it was signed on December 4, effective February 28, but there were two more contracts involved in the 7 8 whole transaction. --which were the two contracts that were part of the 9 Q same transaction, weren't they? 10 Yes. There were at least three contracts. 11 Α The contracts were the interruptible power contracts 1.2 Q and the contract for the sale of the plant, and you 13 14 recall there was one other? 15 Yes. A 16 What was that? It covered the sales of auxiliary service systems. 17 18 water and air. That interruptible contract was then one of the three 19 Q which CEI had in effect in 1973, is that correct? 20 Three or four or five, depending on how you define 21 22 them. I think there were four pure interruptible, and 23

I believe Air Products might have been -- I have

forgotten when they quit on interruptible.

24

1	•	Bingham - cross
2	Q	There were contracts with Jones & Laughlin and
3		Detrex Company?
4	A	Yesi and I think Air Products.
5	Q	And those customers were all served on individual
6		contracts?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	And those would be under the class of service
9		contracts on the FPC Form No. 1 that we looked at
LO -		yesterday?
.1	A	I believe so.
L2	Q	And in all of those cases the rates applicable was
L3		the product of negotiations between the customers and
L 4		the CEI company?
L 5	A	Ýes•
16	Q	There being an effort in doing that to fit the
17		particular needs of the customers; is that right?
18	A	That and how much we felt we could get out of them.
19	Q	Now, under the Union Carbide contract, the terms of
20		that contract entered into around December 4, 1972,
21		were in fact much more favorable than the Detrex or
22		Jones & Laughlin interruptible contract, wasn't it?
23	A	I am not sure I would say "much more favorable."
24	•	I guess I would certainly agree that they were
2.5		more favorable from the standpoint of Union Carbide.

1		' Bingham - cross
2	Q	In the case of Union Carbide, in the case of that
3		agreement, there was a guaranteed level of billing
4		demand for the first two and a half years of the
5		contract, billing demand rates?
6	A	Yes. I believe the rate was fixed for the first
7		two and a half years.
8	Q	And then it increased to the next two and a half
9		years to a five-year contract?
10	<b>A</b>	That is my recollection.
11	, <b>Q</b>	The total cost of energy which Union Carbide was
12		buying under that interruptible contract was in
13		effect less than the average price that the whole
14		group of contract customers were paying, wasn't it?
15	A	Oh, of course, they were far and away the largest
16		customer in the group.
17	Q	And because of that, and because of the nature of
18		the rate included in that contract, they would
19		they were paying substantially less than the
20		average; is that right?
21	A	I don't recall the relative rates. I would have to
22		check those.
23	Q	We could go through the service numbers, Mr. Bingham
24		I wonder if perhaps we could shortcut through
25		that.

that.

If you would accept that for 100 kilowatts of interruptible demand used in 1973, and assuming that Union Carbide is buying power- 80 percent of the total hours and months, that their average bill would come out to 5.22 mills per kilowatt hour?

- I would be happy to check it over the luncheon recess. Α
- All right; and we would compare that in terms of Q seeing what is higher and what is lower and look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 3224, the FPC list, and look at. the average revenue for all contracts which was 7.8 mills per kilowatt hour.

MS. COLEMAN: It is 3244. Ms.

Richards.

{After an interval-}

- Your figure was 5.22 mills? A
- Q Right.
- That is the one I am going to check.
- Okay.

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4

-- and, yes, there is -- this is less than 7.8 mills, A so it is a meaningless comparison.

As I indicated, Union Carbide, there were in that group a billion 400 million kilowatt hours, and Union Carbide tells me there was something like a billion 200 million of that amount.

1 Bingham - cross 2 And when you take one customer in that class, 3 and he is six times as big as the remaining seven put 4 together. I just don't think you can compare simple 5 rates. 6 Q Rather than comparing rates, we might look at the cost 7 of getting that energy to Union Carbide. 8 Would you accept, subject to check, that the Union 9 Carbide rate of its 5.22 was less than the average 0 fuel cost per kilowatt hour generated in 1973? 1 Well, in your computation of 5.22 did you include L 2 fuel adjustment? L 3 There is no fuel adjustment in 1973 for Union Q L 4 Carbide, is there? L 5 I am sure there was. I would have been fired if there A **L** 6 hadn't been. L 7 Well, let me provide you with a copy of that contract, Q L 8 Mr. Bingham, and you may look at it during the lunch. L 9 And, ladies and THE COURT: 2 0 gentlemen, now it is the lunch hour, so we will 21 take our noonday recess, and please during the 22 recess keep in mind the admonitions that the 23 Court has given you.

24

25

You will return at 1:30. Thank you very much.
{Luncheon recess hada}

1	TUESDAY, AUGUST LL, LBPL, L:	50 D'CLOCK P.M.
2		·
3	THE COURT:	Please be seated.
4	Bring in the jury.	
5	{The following proceedi	ngs were had out of
6	the hearing and presence of	the jury.}
7	MS. COLEMAN:	Your Honor, I have
8	a matter for a bench confere	nce.
9	THE COURT:	All right.
10	{The following proceedi	ngs were had at the
11	bench:}	
12	MS. COLEMAN:	On the question of
13	the proffer made earlier. Mr	• Lansdale has had
14 .	an opportunity now to look o	ver the language
15	and has a suggested change.	
16	Your Honor please, I wo	ould like to have it
17	retyped and incorporate his	change and put it in
18	the record tomorrow.	
19	THE COURT:	No problem.
20	MS. COLEMAN:	Thank you.
21	{End of bench conference	:e•}
22	. <b></b>	
23		

1		WILLIAM N. BINGHAM,
2		resumed the stand and testified further as
3		follows:
4		
5		THE COURT: You may proceed,
6		Ms. Coleman.
7		
8		CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM N. BINGHAM (Resumed
9		
10	BY M	15. COLEMAN:
11	Q	Mr. Bingham, during lunch both of us had a chance to
12		look at the Union Carbide contract, and I was wrong
13		and you were right and kept your job.
14		There is a fuel clause in there, isn't there?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And the fuel clause is stated in the same terms as
17		is set forth in the other schedules in schedules
18		of the company for other rate classifications, is
19		that correct?
20	A	I think it's identical to the one that was in effect
21		for the standard schedules, all of the other
22		schedules, regular schedules.
23	Q	One might be able to estimate then if not having the
24		precise information about CEI's fuel clause at the
25	•	time what the effect of the fuel additive to the

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1
                               Bingham - cross
           Union Carbide contracts is by determining how the
2
           fuel additive of the large industrial concerns is
3
           reported in the FPC Form l; would that be a fair
5
           statement?
           You probably could, although I have the exact number,
6
7
           if you want it.
8
           What is the exact number?
      Q
9
           2.15 mills.
      A
10
           2.15 mills at that time on to the --
      Q
11
            Average 1973.
           -- average 1973 cost for Union Carbide, or for everybody?
12
      Q
13
           For Union Carbide.
       Α
           So did you determine that the 5.22 mills per
14
      Q
            kilowatt hour figure for base charged to Union
15
16
            Carbide was essentially accurate?
17
            No. I think that is wrong, too.
            Based on the assumption of 100 -- pardon me.
18
       Q
                 Based on the assumption of 100,000 kilowatts and
19
            57,600,000 kilowatt hours in a month, what did you
20
21
            come up with as a charge?
            You are talking about now the interruptible part only?
22
       Α
23
            Right.
       Q
24
            And that was 100,000 kilowatts?
25
```

Right.

Q

1		Bingham - cross
. 2		Had you used those assumptions in your
3		calculations?
4	A	Not exactly, but you said 57,600,000?
5	Q	Right.
6	A	I get 5.65 mills.
7		I will look again to be certain that I didn't
<b>8</b> .		make a mistake.
9	Q .	We have \$30,000 worth of demand charges.
10	<b>A</b> .	I think I have made a mistake. I think I may have
11		overlooked a factor 5.22 right on the head.
12	Q	And we add to that your estimate of fuel
13 ·		additive which was 2.22?
14	A	I think I said 2.4; and I believe it is 7.36.
15	Q	as compared to the 7.8 mills for the class of
16		contracts?
17	A	Yes. There are some funny things in that class
18		though.
19	Q	Mr. Bingham, would you look at the Union Carbide
20		contract. Did you also find that the contract
21		provided the contract would be canceled if Union
22		Carbide used any other power supplier than CEI?
23	A	I didn't look for that.
24	Q	Do you recall that as a provision in the contract?
25	A	No sir. Specifically can you direct me to a page?

		•
1		Bingham - cross
2	Q	Page 10. Paragraph 2.7.
3	A	That is what it says.
4	Q	And that was intended, wasn't it, to preclude Union
5		Carbide's having its own generation as well as
6		possibly from buying from others; is that right?
7	A	Yes. I think that is probably the reason.
8		We had bought a power plant from them, and we
9		expected to sell them power, and we wanted to be
10		certain that we would.
11	Q	Mr. Bingham, turning more broadly to the question of
12		what is interruptible power, how do you distinguish
13		interruptible power and firm power?
14	A	Let me start with firm power-
15		I believe the common definition of firm power is
16		power which has a general expectation that it will
17		always be available when needed.
1.8		Now, the contrast is that interruptible power,
19		at least in the cases of CEI, is available only when
20	•	CEI believes that it is available.
21		We have the right under our contract to curtail
22		the customer's use of interruptible powers so there

The second distinction -- and it grows directly out

is the first distinction in the reliability of the

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service.

of the first one; is that it generally has a significantly lower rate, which recognizes the fact that it is less reliable, but more directly recognizes the fact that there are major components of a utility's investment or plant that does not have to be installed in order to supply service to an interruptible customer.

They don't have to be installed, but they are used?
Yes. I was going to cover that point.

One of the witnesses. I believe yesterday, was talking about operating reserve. This is capacity which is running but not fully loaded, and every well-run utility has a certain amount on their system in order to take care of contingencies, and under ordinary circumstances that is all it does. It sits there and runs unloaded.

The CEI concept of interruptible power is that we will sell energy out of that operating machinery, the operating capacity, to an interruptible customer.

He agrees that if CEI needs its operating capacity suddenly, it can have it back.

I believe that in every case our load dispatcher at the System Operating Center has a button that he can push to have that load tripped off instantaneously if

2 he needs it.

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Obviously we try to call ahead of time.

I think also in the case of Union Carbide, the controls are probably in the power plant that we bought from them, because that is where they were when we bought them, so it may take a phone call from our dispatcher to somebody in the Ashtabula plant to push the button.

- Now, it is a fact, isn't it, that the experienced interruptions in 1973 were very minimal?
- A To the contrary, they were very high.
- 13 Q They were only 2 percent of the time?
- 14 A My records:show that Union Carbide was interrupted 45
  15 times in 1973.
- Rather than speaking about the number of

  interruptions, if we talk about the minutes of

  interruption for all three of the interruptible

  customers in 1973, they were interrupted for only 2

  percent of the time that they were taking the power

  from CEI?
- 22 A That could well be.

If you don't make the service available that you have they are not going to want it.

Q Well, they got the service 98 percent of the time?

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1		Bingham - cross
2	A	Sure; that is the objective.
3	Q	Mr. Bingham, if some other customers wanted
4		interruptible power, could CEI provide it to that
5		customer?
6	A	If we had it available.
7	Q	Let's turn to another subject, and you can set the
8 .		Union Carbide contract aside, Mr. Bingham.
9		MS. COLEMAN: Your Honor, may I
10		approach the bench?
11		THE COURT: Yes-
12		
13		{The following proceedings were had at the
14		bench:}
15		MS. COLEMAN: Would you read
16		Stipulation 266, and if your Honor please, it
17		might expedite things if I say that I wish to ask
18		you in a few minutes to read Stipulation 267, and
19		if I get authority now, it will save a trip up.
20		MR. LANSDALE: I object to 266 and
21		to 267 on the ground of relevancy. I object on
22		the ground of relevancy. This is an antitrust
23		
24		case, and what they specifically provided,
25		and whether or not we conformed to them. I submit
		is an innelevance, and this is an antitrust case.

1 Bingham - cross 2 It is not a rate case or a complaint about discrimination. Your Honor ruled in MS . COLEMAN: your impact order of May 18 that the question of whether or not the service is provided in 7 connection with the conversion of Muny customers were publicized by the tariff lists still in issue, and that is what these stipulations relate to. 10 The question is not the State law question. 11 but what was provided was what the customer was to 12 pay and what CEI was to pay, whether that was 13 publicly stated. 14 MR. LANSDALE: I am sorry --15 Well, I think that was THE COURT: 16 a pretty good ruling, and I think I will stand by 17 it. 18 They can show -- but certainly there can be no 19 argument that those were contract law. 20 It may go to -- there is a question in my 21 mind -- did I read both of these stipulations? 22 Yes, you did, on MS. COLEMAN: 23 . October the 3rd. 24 I don't see how we can MR. LANSDALE: 25 have testimony that is contrary to the rule and

1	Bingham - cross
2	regulations without suggesting
3	THE COURT: Well, I think the
4	City can argue if it desires that it may have
5	constituted predatory conduct without being in
6	violation of State law-
7	MR. LANSDALE: Oh, sure.
8	THE COURT: Well, it is the
9	import of my ruling.
10	MS. COLEMAN: Thank your your Honor.
11	I request you read Stipulation 266 now, and if I
12	may request to have 267 read from the podium?
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	{End of bench conference-}
15	· 
16	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen
17	of the jury, Stipulation No. 266 reads as follows:
18	"At all times relevant to this case, CEI's
19	rules and regulations on file with and approved
20	by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
21	provided that for overhead service. CEI shall
22	furnísh, install, construct and maintain at its
23	own expense:
24	"A. One standard overhead loop.

"B. Standard transformers for one

		•
1		Bingham - cross
2		transformation of voltage, and
3		"C. Standard metering apparatus."
4	BY M	S- COLEMAN:
5	Q	Mr. Bingham, as to underground service, the Court has
6		just let me preface that, the Court has just read
7		the provisions of service with regard to overhead
8		service.
9		With regard to underground service, if that was
10		all that was available. CEI would also pay for the
11		underground service drop, wouldn't it?
12	A	We had varying rules, I believe.
13		Say, in the downtown area, voltages other than
14		בום volts, we would take the underground cable to
15		the property line I would have to read back on this
16		to be certain and that we would furnish the main
. 17		switch and the meter and whatnot inside the building,
18	•	and transformer if, for example, this were an
19		office building that had what we call a "vault,"
20		it's a small room in the basement where you put the
21		transformer and the switch gear, and whatnot, we
22		furnish the transformer.
23		In case of LL KV, I believe our rule
24	a	Mr. Bingham excuse me I asked you about

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underground lines.

A That is what I'm talking about.

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I think I told you I believe voltages below LL KV, we would carry the dable to the property line of the customer.

In the case of 11 KV, we would carry it to the first vault on the customer's premises and, in addition, a lateral -- I'm sorry -- carry it to the first manhole on the customer's premises and, beyond that, a lateral to the customer's vault or mat.

Again, this is 11 KV underground service. So that we had no uniform rule.

There is a rule on underground service specifically provided in the rules and regulations, isn't there, at PTX-322 on original sheet No. 4, Paragraph 9-B?

{The witness reading silently.}

That's more or less what I testified to with respect

to the less than 11 KV underground.

It says, "We will extend --" where we have existing underground lines, presumably out in the street -- these are general distribution facilities -- "We will extend from such lines to the property line of the consumer --" and I missed this one -- "-- or to such point on the consumer's premises as agreed upon by the company."

1		Bingham - cross
ź	Q	Now, as to any other facilities than those which the
3		Court read in the stipulation and the underground
4		facility we have just discussed, the customer was to
5		pay for those, is that right?
6	A	Not necessarily.
7	Q	Well, the general rules and regulations so provide,
8		don't they?
9	A	That's what they say.
10		But I have always felt that these provide, in
11		essence, the minimum facilities that the company
12		must provide.
13	Q	That's your opinion?
14	A	It carries a lot of weight in the company.
15		MS. COLEMAN: May we approach the
16		bench, your Honor?
17		THE COURT: Yes.
18		MS. COLEMAN: Thank you.
19		<b></b>
20		{The following proceedings were had at the
21		bench:}
22		MS. COLEMAN: It is my intention to
23		request your Honor to read the stipulation we
24		discussed, 267.
25		I would also contend, at this juncture, your

.مر	1	Bingham - cross
,	2	Honor, that where the witness claims that the
	3	tariffs are in minimum, and the law clearly
	4	indicates otherwise, that the stipulations we
	5	discussed this morning ought to be admissible
	6	at this juncture.
	7 .	THE COURT: On what basis?
	8 ,	MS. COLEMAN: On the basis that the
	9	witness claims they are in minimum, and that's not
	10	what the law provides.
	11	The law provides that such services as are
	12	rendered shall be filed in
ገ[3	13	MR. LANSDALE: That's your opinion.
	14	This witness speaks from a good many decades
	15	of experience with the Commission, and
	16	{Document shown to Mr. Lansdale by Mr. Murphy.}
	17	THE COURT: I will overrule the
	18	objection. I am going to permit the answer to
	19	stand; and I will read Stipulation 267, but I will
	20	not read the proffered stipulations.
	21	Let's proceed.
	22	MS. COLEMAN: All right, your Honor.
	23	{End of bench conference.}
∷24	24	
	25	THE COURT: Stipulation No. 267

THE COURT: Stipulation No. 267

1		Bingham - cross
2	BY M	IZ. COLEMAN:
3	Q	Mr. Bingham, in the event that CEI performed such
4		work as was listed by listed in the stipulation,
5		if CEI did it, they would charge the customer what is
6		called a "red card charge", is that right?
7	A	Not necessarily.
8	Q	If they charged the customer for it, it would be
9		considered and is called a "red card charge"?
10	A	Generally speaking, that's correct.
11	Q	And if the red card charge is waived, waiver of the
12		red card charge means that the customer doesn't have
13		to pay for that work for additional facilities, is
14		that right?
15	A	That's correct.
16	Q	Nows for constructions reconstruction or reolocation
17		of electric facilities, CEI would ordinarily charge
18		what is called a "white card charge", isn't that right?
19		THE WITNESS: May I have that
20		read back, please?
21		THE COURT: Read the question back,
22	•	please.
23		{The pending question was read by the
24		reporter.}
25	Α	I don't believe so.

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1		Bingham - cross
2		I'm sorry; whose facilities?
3	Q	The customer's facilities?
4	A	That's different.
5		If we were to do that work and charge for it, it
6		might have been done under a white card.
7		There were a large number of standard kinds of
8		transactions that we don't really get that formal with.
9	Q	Now
LO	A	For example, aluminum siding is sort of popular.
LI <sub>.</sub>		We find a lot of people are putting that on their
12		houses.
13		If you've got a pipe on the outside of the house,
14		obviously somebody has to come along and loosen the
15		pipe so that the new siding can be put under it, and
16		refasten the pipe.
17		As a company practice, if you will, we have
18		determined that we would prefer to do that work.
19	٠	The customer owns that pipe, at least, if he is a
20		residential customer, he owns it. We like to do it
21		because I don't think I'm not trying to brag, but
22		we will get it done right.

We're afraid if somebody else does it, a contractor might try to cut a few corners, and if the pipe falls off the house, we're going to have to go out there to

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### Bingham - cross

repair it.

So we prefer to do it ourselves to see that it's done right. And we do it at a subsidized cost to encourage the customer to use us rather than someone else.

Now, we have a fewer number of these, we don't go through the formality of what you call a "white card charge", but in the final analysis, it's the same thing: It's just that there is no piece of paper signed.

- Q There is such a thing, I assume, as a white card?
- 13 A Yes, there is.
- And there is a white card charge would be associated

  with certain reconstruction or relocation work that

  the company would do?
- A Actually it's associated with work of the nature where
  the company is acting as a contractor.
- And when there is a waiver of the white card charge,

  that means there will be no charge to the customer for

  that work where the company is acting as the

  contractor, right?
- 23 A If the white card were to be waived, that means there
  24 would be no charge.
- 25 Q Now, Mr. Bingham, from 1971 through 1973, CEI had a

### Bingham - cross 1 practice, did it not, of -- a program -- pardon me --2 of converting Muny Light customers to CEI service? 3 What was that time THE COURT: 5 frame? From 1971 through MS . COLEMAN: 7 1973. Yes; I think in the period we're talking about here is 8 roughly July 1, '71, and I think we quit around the 9 middle of -- we quit signing up new people around the 10 11 middle of '73. I believe. Well, in fact, the program had gone on for some time 12 Q. before July of 1971, right? 13 14 Sure; it started in 1959. And this program involved from time to time CEI paying 15 Q for certain facilities over and above that or perhaps 16 not even the same type that CEI would normally furnish 17 if the customer would convert from Muny Light to CEI? 18 19 That's right. This was available only in the area where Muny Light --20 Q where there were Muny Light customers, those kinds of 21 services were not provided outside that area, right? 22 23 It sort of followed. Now, one means which CEI used to provide these 24 non-standard services to customers was to pay contractors

1		Bingham - cross ·
2		third-party contractors to do the electrical work, right?
3	A	I believe that was almost exclusively the method used.
4		with the possible exception of the house pipe.
5	a	There were also from time to time, weren't there,
6		instances where CEI would do the work and waive the
7		red card charge?
8	A	I think you just switched gears on me: You went from
9		white card type work to red card type work.
10	Q	We defined both red card type and white card type:
11		didn't we?
12	A .	Yes.
13	Q	And in connection with converting Muny Light customers
14		to CEI, CEI would at times waive either the red card
15		charge or the white card charge where CEI did the work
16		to convert that customer from Muny to CEI?
17		{Pause•}
18	Α.	I don't want to split hairs here unnecessarily, but to
19		my it would be my feeling that if it's a problem of
20		converting an existing Muny customer to CEI, in most
21		instances we wouldn't have a red card involved.
22		MS. COLEMAN: Mrs. Richards, would
23		you please get out the following exhibits:
24		Plaintiff's Exhibit 100, Plaintiff's Exhibit
25		114, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 2530.

1 Bingham - cross 2 {After an interval.} 3 BY MS. COLEMAN: Mr. Bingham, while she's getting those exhibits, 4 Q let's go on to some related questions on this same 5 6 subject. One of the charges that CEI may make to a customer 7 is when the customer requests a change of the point 8 . where the line enters his property, is that right? 9 Yes, sometimes we will charge for that kind of a change. 10 And CEI does make this charge when the change is simply 11 Q one for the customer's convenience, isn't that true? 12 Not exactly. Close, but not exactly. 13 {Exhibits handed to the witness by Mrs. 14 15 Richards.} 16 BY MS. COLEMAN: Well, in a situation where if the customer had a 17 Q service attachment at the back of his house and he 18 wanted it moved because he wanted to do a different 19 kind of landscaping, there you would charge the customer 20 21 for that, is that right? 22 Quite likely. A Now, that policy would apply to consumers wherever they 23 Q were located in the CEI service area, right? 24

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Yes.

1	•	Bingham - cross
2	Q	But CEI changed the service entrance location for the
3		customer's convenience sometimes as part of the
4		program of converting Muny customers to CEI, isn't
5		that true?
6	· A	Yes.
7	Q	Now, also, in another part of that program of
8		providing service to induce Muny customers to switch
9		to CEI, was to install a third wire to a two-wire
10		service to increase the capacity of the service
11		switch to permit the handling of what might then be
12		the load, isn't that true?
13	A	We did that system-wise.
14		. We have always been willing to switch from a
15		three- to a two-wire service and to increase the service
16		to any customers.
17	Q	This was specifically done as part of the program of
18		converting Muny Light customers, wasn't it?
19	. A	It was specifically done for every customer in our
20		system or specifically available to every customer
21		in our system.
22		MS. COLEMAN: Mrs. Richards, could
23		you give me those same exhibits?
24		THE COURT: I don't have them either

MS. COLEMAN: Please give them to the

1 Bingham - cross Court, too. 3 {Exhibits handed by Mrs. Richards to Ms. Coleman and to the Court.} BY MS. COLEMAN: Mr. Bingham, do you recall testifying concerning some 6 aspects of this program of allowances for the conversion of Muny Light customers to CEI in 1974 in February, in Columbus, Ohio? 10 Is that the OPA case? 11 Yes. 12 Yes, I did. A 13 And do you recall questions being asked about the nature Q 14 of the services provided under what you referred to there 15 as standardization of customer service? 16 Yes: ٠A And you were asked the question: "What sort of activities 17 Q: are necessary to prepare the Muny facilities to receive 18 19 your electricity?" 20 And you answered, did you not: "It conceivably could be the installation of a third wire to a two-wire 21 22 service increasing of service, which would permit the 23 handling of what might then be the load"? 24 I quess I did. 25

Let's turn, now, Mr. Bingham --

Q

1 Bingham - cross 2 Object: if your Honor MZ. COLEMAN: 3 please. Yes. Approach the bench. THE COURT: {The following proceedings were had at the bench:} We have the reading of MR. LANSDALE: 9 former testimony where it says exactly the same thing he did before. I don't understand the 10 11 purpose of this, and I object to the suggestions 12 implicit in doing so. What's the idea? 13 Your Honor, in the MS. COLEMAN: 14 proceeding from which I read, Mr. Bingham's 15 testimony was that that service was specifically 16 to that program, and there was no statement there that they gave it to everyone. The statement in 1.7 this court was, well, they give it to everyone; 18 19 that is why I --20 The statement was THE COURT: 21 certainly not inconsistent with his testimony here. 22 So let's proceed. 23 {End of bench conference.}

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# Bingham - cross 1 Ladies and gentlemen, THE COURT: you will disregard the reference to a previous 3 hearing and the testimony, since it was not inconsistent with anything that was said here. 6. Let's proceed. 7 BY MS. COLEMAN: Mr. Bingham, on the matter of whether white card or 8 red card charges would be waived for Muny conversion, 9 would you look, please, at Plaintiff's Exhibit 100 --10 In the future, when 11 THE COURT: we are going to use transcripts for the purpose of 12 credibility testimony, counsel that intends to use 13 it will direct adversary counsel to the page and 14 permit adversary counsel to review the testimony, 15 and then we can approach the bench instead of 16 having to go through it in the manner that we 17

19 BY MZ. COLEMAN:

18

- 20 Q. Have you had the exhibit to look at PTX-100?
- 21 A I skimmed it quickly.

just did.

- 22 Q That memo mentioned you as a consultant in the
  23 question of converting this customer from Muny Light
  24 service to CEI, doesn't it; in the third paragraph?
- 25 A Yes.

- And the exhibit furthermore shows that a portion fo the cost for the converstion was to be a red card waiver: isn't that right?
- A Yes. I believe that one would have been a red card.
- @ Mr. Bingham, you personally were not involved in administering this program; is that right?
- A I was involved to a degree.
- Q I'm sorry. I should have used the word "involved."
  You certainly were consulted, as this exhibit shows; right?
- A Yes.

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- Q But it was by and large run out of the Marketing Department; is that correct?
- A They would have the primary responsibility.
- And you were aware of certain aspects of it through the consultations that the Marketing Unit might make with your is that right?
- A That, and I was involved rather specifically when the program was set up in 1959.
- And you are familiar then with the amounts that had been spent for these purposes from time to time over the years?
- A Well, that is only from looking it up in the records .

  subsequent to the occurrence.

- You are testifying then that you had no knowledge of how those amounts have changed over time?
- 4 A Not quite to that, but I don't have much.
- 5 Q Well, there was an increase, was there not, in the
- 6 expenditures around 1965?
- ·7 A Oh, sure.
- 8 Q Now, with respect to any work which was performed by
- g contractors or by CEI under the red card waiver, when
- 10 CEI paid for those facilities which would have been
- paid for by the customer, whose property did those
- 12 items become?
- 13 A It would have depended on the item that you are
- talking about.
- In the exhibit that you just recently directed to
- my attention, the impression I got here is that these
- facilities would have remained the property of the
- 18 company.
- 19 Q Now, in a situation where CEI paid someone else to do
- the work, that always ended up as the customer's
- 21 property?
- 22 A I think that is universally the case, because it was
- not going to be our property when we paid a contractor.
- 24 Q And the cost of the work, whether performed by a
- contractor or performed by CEI, would become part of

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the cost of CEI's doing business, and it would be spread out through the rates of all customers; is that right?

A There would be an expense of some nature created now.

Now, whether that in fact increased rates or costs to other customers, I can't tell you.

If the new customer provided more revenue than the expenses associated with supplying him, the other customer benefited.

- I asked you wheter the cost as a cost got spread out; as a cost of doing business throughout the service area; isn't that so?
- A I am not sure what you mean by spreading the cost of business throughout the service area.
- Q CEI's costs of providing the service for the customer was spread out through the rates over all of CEI's customers, wasn't it?
- 19 A To the extent that there were expenses, it would have
  20 been shown up some place on the books as a part of the
  21 total expenses in whatever account it was charged to.
- 22 Q It was in fact charged as a promotional expense:
  23 wasn't it?
- Yes, I believe it ended up in what we were then allowed to call "selling expenses."

The inquiry was

### Bingham - cross 1 And that was Account 912 of the uniform account, wasn't 2 Q 3 it? I will accept your word for it. 4 Now, in terms of promotional expenses, there was an 5 Q inquiry into all forms of promotional expenses by the 6 PUCO in 1973 and 1974; wasn't there? 7 Objection. MR. LANSDALE: 8 Approach the bench. THE COURT: 9 O. (The following proceedings were had at the 1 2 bench:} I object to this MR. LANSDALE: . 3 continuing effort to suggest something is wrong . 4 about it with respect to the PUCO regulations. . 5 We keep getting rulings by the Court that it . 6 is forbidden, whether the PUCO approved, but it .7 is irrelevant, and we continue to have these 8 discussions. What difference does it make? L 9 I don't know what 20 THE COURT: comes after this. 21 Was an inquiry conducted, and was there 22 something found that was irregular, and then it 23 24 becomes material.

MZ. COLEMAN:

conducted, and we had this evidence at the last trial, and the report was made to them which called the expenditures for these programs "Standardization of customer service," and it was not candid about the expenses, and that is the point I am coming to.

. THE COURT:

Did you object?

MR. LANSDALE:

To be specific, your

Honor, I have forgotten. I am sure I did. I objected throughout. I objected throughout as to the bringing of the Public Utilities Commission into this at all. I don't think it is a relevant consideration.

THE COURT: Well, in the PUCO, if the PUCO conducted inquiries and they found something that was irregular, then it becomes material, but it is not -- I mean, the mere fact that they conducted an inquiry and came up with some inconclusive decision or no decision, and to attempt to create an inference as to wrongdoing is highly prejudicial.

I don't know where you are going to go with it.

MS. COLEMAN:

As I stated, your

Honor, an investigation was conducted, and CEI

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### Bingham - cross

was asked to prepare a report on all of its promotional expenses, and that is the only general question I have asked now.

In doing so, they called the Muny contractor payments and perhaps other expenses "Standardization of Customer Service." And my point is, they were not being candid in that investigation as to what they were doing.

. THE COURT:

Who?

MS - COLEMAN:

The CEI.

MR. LANSDALE:

Did the Commission say anything about this? Are you contending the

Commission said anything about it?

MS - COLEMAN:

No -

MR. LANSDALE:

Are we going to have

to try it out?

THE COURT:

Just a moment, please,

ladies and gentlemen.

The testimony that the Commission conducted an inquiry, assuming that it is permitted it, and that they came up with some kind of a finding -with what kind of a finding?

I wasn't going into MS. COLEMAN: the finding, but the order was to not have any