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"Do You Have a Conscience?"

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1. "Do you have a conscience?" There was a time when this would have been a question that was immediately intelligible to people, like asking whether a person holding a ball can throw it. For much of the history of philosophy—that ancient Greek invention—the name for what allows one to stay in touch with moral principles in the midst of particular decisions was "conscience" (Langston 2001). To ask whether I have a conscience was tantamount to asking whether I can keep my decisions moral, whether I was capable of being a mature human being. Since morality is the domain of duties of humanity within the larger ethical pursuit of the good life—that is, since the moral is a necessary condition on living an ethical (good) life—to ask whether I have a conscience was tantamount to asking whether I can be ethical at all (Bendik-Keymer 2013). Serious stuff.

2. Do we have a *sense* of what it would be to have a conscience? Centuries before conscience become suspect in twentieth century "Western" culture, the moral framework for conscience had lost much of its metaphysical base, including its moral psychology (Anscombe 1958; MacIntyre 2007).¹ A world of theologically grounded moral principles had come apart as the modern ideas of autonomy and then of the individual arose on secular or cross-religious grounds (Schneewind 1997; Renault 1997; cf. Marx and Engels 2002, 219–233 "Bourgeois and Proletarian"). Although an alternative grounding and psychology for conscience arose almost simultaneously (see §8), its coalescence and

1. "East" and "West" are relative terms generated by the history of colonialist geography. Although not all bad origins are bad results, the inevitability of the categories is worth throwing into question, not only because of the dichotomies created (or rationalized after being produced), but also because of the simplifications that occur. For instance, the "Middle East," equally a product of this geography, includes traditions such as Islam that are both "Western" and regularly excluded from that adjective in contemporary "Western" discourse. Moreover in Arabic, *dhameer*, the word for conscience, maintains an active hold in culture, and one can invoke it easily and readily. The issue of cultural geography may be an issue this journal wants to address as it aspires to "global" ethics.

institutional organization have been slow in the making. In contemporary philosophy, we are still searching for the mental groove that would allow us to see the necessity of conscience without theological underpinnings. This is true even for theists, since conscience claims universal authority, and that authority can be interpretable in theistic terms but cannot be reducible to, or dependent on, them.

Without conscience's moral framework, it was inevitable that suspicion about it would arise, and until conscience's mental groove becomes widely intelligible, that suspicion is unlikely to abate. To see popular, intellectual examples of the suspicion, we can look at Nietzsche (1989) or Freud (1961). Each made conscience less a guide than a repression. Conscience, differently on each of their accounts, keeps down vital human instincts and narrows the breadth of human being. It is also a hindrance to passionate openness, although each understood "passion" and "openness" in different ways. In classical terms (Aristotle 2002), each portrayed conscience as a block to human flourishing—an ethical suspicion.

By contrast, to see where the moral suspicion coalesced in popular and academic culture, we can look at the numerous figures of professionals of "conscience"—from Nazis to bureaucrats of war, to those who manage exploitative endeavors. These people threw conscience into wide moral and philosophical disrepute. They appeared to have consciences, claimed they were conscientious as can be, and yet we saw in them inhumanity. Inhumane, blinkered, unjust, each became a living *reductio ad absurdum* of the moral grounding of conscience.

Consider Adolf Eichmann. According to Hannah Arendt (2006), Eichmann lived by his conscience, a conscience that on her analysis was not properly "thoughtful" (individual and autonomous). His banal evil revealed the modern moral condition of the professional, manager, or bureaucrat—and then of anyone who does his duties submerged in the role he finds in society. The offensive and easily misleading figure of "little Eichmanns" points to a ubiquitous phenomenon: failing a clear, universal moral framework, modern people easily compartmentalize their duties within their jobs and claim to be honoring their consciences by doing their jobs, whatever they might be. Integrity, a potentially amoral concept, becomes more central to people's preoccupations than humanity or social justice.² Recent historians of ethics

2. This focus on (professional) integrity with a de-emphasis on social justice is often found in university discourse surrounding ethics as a mission goal, or as the goal of a professorship or professional ethics program.

have noted that the problem raised by the specter of the inhumane but "conscientious" bureaucrat has become one of the most gripping forms under which the concept of evil is held (Neiman 2002).

Even if Arendt's assumption that Eichmann did have a conscience may not hold up to closer biographical scrutiny of the deeply self-serving man (Cesarani 2007), sociologists of bureaucracy have noted far more subtle, believable, and common ways in which organizations create incentives and disincentives that lead to the avoidance of responsibility, putting on moral blinders, and other forms of essentially inhumane treatment (Jackall 2010). The result has been understandable skepticism about conscience. Do we have a sense of what it means to have a conscience?

3. The obvious response is to insist that people such as Eichmann did not actually have consciences, or had defective ones (cf. Cesarani 2007). But what this assertion raises is the question of how conscience is supposed to be a distinct facet of moral life different from, say, moral principles. Why do we need conscience as a concept for moral life if what we really care about is whether or not a person acts according to moral principles or ethical virtues? Why not just substitute "humanity" or social justice for talk about "conscience"?

One traditional way of understanding conscience was to appeal to conscience to show one what to do. But if that appeal risks evil without the prior appeal to moral principles, it appears that conscience is either redundant or mysterious, or both. This is a more serious matter than the skepticism. It is a theoretically grounded claim to conscience's irrelevance. Once again, we have the problem of lacking a clear sense of the mental groove that would make conscience an obvious and necessary part of moral life.

4. Yet something has been emerging in moral philosophy and in humanist culture over the past three hundred years, and this emerging mental groove, allied often to the word "conscience," makes conscience neither redundant nor (pejoratively) mysterious. Rather, it makes conscience the fulcrum of moral life.

What has been emerging is fragmentary and appears in many shapes. We have to learn to grasp it as through shimmering water. It has been developing for centuries, slowly departing from the traditional understanding of conscience (Bendik-Keymer 2002, ch. 1 and 2). According to that tradition, conscience brought principles and particulars together—it honored God's

commandments in life.³ But “God”—understood as a precritical mythology—is dead because we killed “him” (Nietzsche 2001; Schneewind 1997, Renault 1997; cf. Marx and Engels 2002). And whatever is today divine must emerge within humanity’s sense as the core of that sense, not as its commandment (Nancy 2008). Conscience, then, would have to be basic to our sense, prior even to our principles.

People have been searching for that sense. In the emerging mental groove that I will discuss tonight, conscience is better thought of as the capacity keeping open our awareness of persons. To fail to have conscience, on this understanding, is to fail to have a moral universe in which persons are qualitatively different than objects and in which, by virtue of being different than objects, persons have claims on us and on each other—claims to worthy treatment. We will see why this shift in the sense of conscience both answers the problem of Eichmann and meets the need for a new framework for conscience. We may even glimpse why affirming life (*pace* Nietzsche 1989) and opening up our nonneurotic relationships with others (*pace* Freud 1961) depend on conscience!

5. Yet there is more to our situation. As the twenty-first century opens, do we have a stable sense of the personal? Over the last half century, just as the background for a new understanding of conscience began to coalesce, problems of scale arose, most of them environmental. These problems of scale pose the following challenge: based on a fictional awareness of persons born of imaginative projection, they honor the personal; but they are truly impersonal. They appear to be both matters that ought to be on our consciences and yet matters that cannot be on our consciences.

Due to our species-level affect on future generations, all of whom are impersonal to us, people of conscience today must not only hold onto their awareness of persons and the morality such an awareness involves but also keep in view the effects of our species as a whole on far future generations and on the world of life that will enable or disable these generations of

3. The most excellent recent treatment of conscience is Dean Moyer’s *Hegel’s Conscience* (2011). However, Hegelian conscience remains theologically framed by the problem of principles and particulars, even while the heteronomous base of that frame in blind obedience to commandments has dropped out. What is interesting in Moyer’s *Hegel* is the emergence of the personal as a category of moral authority. However, Hegel failed to grasp the logic of human relationship. His theory of recognition notwithstanding, Hegel places too much emphasis on cognition, whereas the relational is for the most part pre-cognitive and pre-self-conscious (Levinas 1998).

innocent persons. The result is a complicated dynamic: to be both personal and seemingly impersonal, even before one makes decisions or figures out what moral principles should guide one's behavior. Confusing stuff.

6. The terms of the complex situation surrounding conscience are provided by what I call "relational reason" and by what I call "the problem of aggregate effects." Much of this paper will be focused on explaining each of these concepts and the associated families of concepts that each opens up. Relational reason has been emerging. But the problem of aggregate effects faces us increasingly in the twenty-first century and beyond. It threatens to dislodge our sense of conscience as a personal concept.

Relational reason is the form of reason by which persons try to connect with each other, beginning first with responding to each other as persons. The space and the need for relational reason have been opening up in modern discourse since at least the eighteenth century (especially Hunt 2008 on the intersection with human rights discourse). There have been many forays into this domain. One could look at the eighteenth century's fascinations with moral sentiments, whose most recent form is found in cognitive science work on empathy (Jack 2011) or in Martha Nussbaum's (2007) ethics of compassion. Or one could turn to the twentieth century's focus on intersubjectivity and "relations with the other" in philosophy, sociology, and literary theory, especially in Emmanuel Levinas's unsurpassed final treatise *Otherwise than Being* (1998). Even so-called analytic philosophy has come on strong in the domain of the personal, whether through work on "social ontology," as seen by the likes of John Searle (2003), or through the contemporary discourse of the "second-person standpoint" (Darwall 2006). All of these present an alternative to both theoretical and practical reason, one that often draws on emotional capacity to recognize and connect with others, and one whose fundamental category is that of the person, or the personal.⁴ The key thing here is that people cannot be reduced to either theoretical or practical objects without violence being done to them.

7. The problem of aggregate effects is best indicated by what Stephen Gardiner calls "the pure intergenerational problem" (Gardiner 2011, ch. 5).

4. Perhaps we should align relational reason with the leadership discourse of "emotional intelligence" (Goleman 2006). Relational reason seems central to emotional intelligence, although emotional intelligence is also present in practical reason (e.g., hope) and in theoretical reason (e.g., wonder). Thanks to Drew Poppleton for this connection to leadership discourse.

The aggregate effects of our species' form of power are forecast to deeply affect future generations, not just of humans but also of our planet's species (specifically the valuable phylogenetic lineages that make up the deep branches of the tree of life as it has come to us). The problem of how to understand justice in light of the problem of our aggregate effects on future generations sweeps out to sea most of the existing theories and institutions by which we claim political legitimacy and moral authority (Gardiner 2011, ch. 3–7). It will dissolve the social contract tradition as we know it and the legitimacy of the post-Westphalian political order because of their incapacity to claim moral authority concerning intergenerational and global problems (cf. Nussbaum 2007). The pure intergenerational problem also reveals the potential of economic systems to externalize costs. More than that, it undermines the power of relational reason. The dynamic tendency of the problem of our aggregate effects on future generations is toward being impersonal, not personal.

8. I need to simultaneously familiarize us with the mental groove that will give conscience authority and frame the problem of aggregate effects in such a way that we can at least see the outlines of what could sweep these last centuries of humanist culture out to sea. I'll start with relational reason. Since the eighteenth century, "conscience" has increasingly become the location of interpersonal (face to face) awareness in practical life, foremost through the concept of conscience found in *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and in the twentieth century's major moral discovery—nonviolence as a discrete political (and not simply religious) methodology (Bendik-Keymer 2013). These are very widespread and well-known moral discoveries. Human rights discourse brings us face to face with the claims of others to our—or the state's—humanity. Nonviolence brings us into a visceral, embodied practice of activating elementary, human compassion and respect (cf. Glover 2001). The question for our purposes is, what is the logic of the awareness found in these widespread phenomena?

9. To begin answering this question, we need to raise, briefly, one more basic question: what is a form of reason? We need a basic enough answer to this question to begin articulating the logic of relational reason. We need to understand what a rational process is and the way rational processes are part of human vitality. Admittedly, these are vast and highly complex topics in philosophy that I can only sketch here.

A rational process is a logic expressing a fundamental mode of being human. That is, through rational processes, we make sense as humans and in a variety of ways that goes to showing how to be human is to be dynamic, shifting between different modes of being. There are three such rational processes or fundamental ways of our being—theoretical reason, pursuing truth; practical reason, pursuing the good; and relational reason, pursuing (primarily human) connection. These processes are rational in that they involve reasons.

What, though, are reasons? Again, the answer can only be a placeholder because the topic is so complicated. Briefly, reasons are considerations in favor of some goal, that is, truth, the good, or connection. As considerations, they express the summation of thoughtful attention to what will achieve the goal in question.

For example, suppose that I want to know whether it is going to rain today. My goal is the truth about the weather. Consulting my Internet weather report, I discover that today is supposed to be sunny. Since I believe the report to be largely accurate after living with it for some time and seeing its accuracy, I have reason to believe that it will probably not rain today. If someone asked me, "Why do you think it probably won't rain today?" I can reply, "It probably won't rain, because my trusted weather report says it is unlikely." Here, a theoretical reason—a reason about the truth of some state of affairs—serves me in my process of determining what is true.

The fact that theory, practice, and relating—the three rational processes or ways of our being—have different logics can be seen fairly quickly once we switch our attention to what a practical reason does. It involves a different kind of consideration altogether. With theoretical reasoning, we seek truth and do so by attempting to secure justified true belief, that is, knowledge. Our reasons are explanations. By contrast, with practical reason, we seek the good and do so by attempting to arrive at reliable calculative know-how. Our reasons are casuistry or justification. We want to know what we have to do (not believe) in order to (called the calculative relation) realize, express, or produce what we take to be a facet of the good life. The very concept of the good underscores the difference here. We don't ask whether, say, going down Henry Street as opposed to Mitchell Street is "true." We ask whether it is a good thing to do given that we want to save some time on our way to work. This is a different kind of evaluation, an evaluation of action, not of belief.

Moreover, someone engaged in practical reason is expected to *do* something, not simply *think* something. If I were to seek to figure out what to do, develop a belief about the answer, and then not act, I would have either

switched my intention or not be deliberating at all. Deliberation is action-oriented. You can't stay in your head with it (cf. Vogler 2002 against the "big head" theory of reasons for action). And to know *how* to act is different from having a lot of knowledge. In fact, many people have excellent know-how but can't even express the beliefs that would unpack what they know in their hands, so to speak (Crawford 2009).

10. All this helps us frame the contrast with relational reason. Relational reason is the process of seeking how to be with someone. To use technical vocabulary, relational reason concerns subjects, not objects. That is, it concerns persons.

When I try to know something, I treat it as an object of explanation. When I try to do something, I treat it as an object of action, achieved and to some extent ideally mastered by my know-how and justified in terms of my agenda. But when I try to be with someone, I am not subjecting an object to my knowledge or action. Rather, I am being subject to another who remains herself a subject, and should I take her as an object, or she me, we lose our connection.

Reasons offered here are like advice but also like psychology. They position me to see the other, to be open to her, to hear not so much what she says or what she's doing, but *her* (Kenaan 2005). Relational reasons are locators.

The fundamental logical category of relational reason is that of a person. Along with that category comes an entirely different set of distinctions, a different form of reasoning, and different values. We will explore all these shortly.

11. Someone might object: Don't we know stuff about intimates all the time? Don't we use psychology to know stuff about intimates? Isn't intimacy basically grounded in knowledge, that is, in a theoretical way of being?

Or if it isn't, don't we try to know how to hang out with our friends and family, or at least wish we knew how? Isn't intimacy basically a practice, something we do or enact? In other words, isn't what I consider here a discrete logic, that of connecting with a person, really reducible to theory and/or to practice?

But here's the problem with the objection. When I want to connect with a person, I have to bracket what I know, to be open to her. In fact, whatever I know, in a live connection, must be brought back to her, for her hearing, so to speak. The necessary ways I objectify her are continually subject to her subjectivity, that is, to her not as an object but as a source of agency, belief, and connection.

And so, too, with know-how. Intimacy is anything but a practice of manipulating an object. Undoubtedly, I use all sorts of know-how to figure out how best to be around someone with whom I am familiar. I might know how to phrase advice or chill out when the person is stressed. I might know how to make the person happy. And so on. But all of these essentially—and benignly—calculative relations depend on my staying in touch with her. And that staying in touch, that connection, is a relational matter that I cannot force into actuality, just as love cannot be forced out of the look of another.

The point here, as I will explain shortly, is that theoretical, practical, and relational reason are codependent, cooperative, and co-original in being human, such that the three always go together in a complex balance.⁵ Yet at the same time, insofar as we isolate the logics that conjoin to make being human dynamic, relational reason is discrete—as I've just shown, the logic of connection is. It is reducible neither to theory nor to practice, even if it works with each in a whole human life.

12. There are more distinctions to familiarize us with relational reason. One of the most elementary focuses on the values of each rational process we've been discussing. In a concise form, they are:

The value of theory is the *true*. After all, those who try to know, such as scientists or historians, aim at truth. Whether a process of knowing has gone well or not is in large part decided by whether the process has been guided by what is true. When it has not, the process is taken to be defective in some way and is criticized by what is true, that is, is subjected to the authority of truth.

By contrast, the value of practice is the *good*. As Aristotle (2002) first pointed out, to act is to aim at an apparent good, a goal valued as good. Another way to put this is that our purposes are usually taken as desirable to ourselves. In this way, if an agent starts doing things that aren't good by her lights, she is expected to correct her course. If she doesn't, her practical reason is taken to be defective—e.g., masochistic or neurotic—in some way.

Relational reason ends up having a far different value than either theoretical or practical reason because the value of relating is the beautiful. This may seem odd at first. For much of the past two hundred years in philosophy, beauty has become an aesthetic concept (Harries 1998). But the beauty of

5. Wisdom, on my account, has the logic of coordinating this complex balance, and the virtue of wisdom is to have achieved the right balance. Wisdom is like the charioteer driving the competing horses in the image of the soul from Plato's (1995) *Phaedrus*. I explore the idea in a book project called *φ and our Being: Modes of Discipline in the Beauty of Life*.

relating is not an aesthetic concept. This makes its use, precisely, *post-aesthetic*. I take beauty, repeating a sense found in Plato (1989) and developing a sense found in late twentieth-century phenomenology (Marion 2007) to mean the harmony between two souls. Just as we seek truth when we try to know, and seek what is good when we deliberate, so we seek harmony between souls when we connect. You are with your other, hovering and alight in that connection with the entire universe appearing open around you for the duration (Marion 2007).

13. Another distinction I like between the rational processes is more symbolic than explanatory. Still, it is worth mentioning here because it is memorable. It is this: You might commonly hear that knowledge resides in the head and that know-how lives in the hands. Relating, then, comes from the heart. That there are such shopworn distinctions between the head, the hand, and the heart should be seen only as confirmation that there is nothing unusual about isolating relational reason. We do it all the time—although we may not know we are doing it.

14. Another, this time technical, distinction that allows us to isolate relational reason comes by reference to its end state, that is, the thing that concludes the process under question. Processes, after all, work toward a conclusion. What is remarkable in light of our discussion is that the ontology of the three rational processes is different in each of the processes' conclusions. By "ontology" I mean the kind of thing that concludes the process.

Take knowing. When we know, we try to figure out what we believe. So the process of knowing ends in a belief, one valued for whether it is true. Beliefs are propositional—that is, the way they are structured as the kind of thing that they are.

By contrast, when deliberate, I try to figure out how to act. The process of practical reasoning ends properly in a deed, one that should be desirable to me. Actions are intentional, that is, the way they are structured as the kind of things that they are.

However, when I try to connect with someone, well, I try to connect! The process of relating ends in a connection. It is even more precise to emphasize the point this way: we connect. This is an interpersonal event. That is the way connections are structured, the kind of things that they are.

This last set of contrasts underlines the different logic of relational reason, since its end cannot be intended. One can only put oneself in a position

to connect. People often call this “relating”—putting oneself in a position, trying, to be with another. Yet connection depends on a meeting. So the completion of relational reason, which is between subjects, involves two, whereas theoretical and practical reason, each working on objects, can be accomplished by one. And this last point about the nature of meeting as an actual event, will be important later tonight for understanding why conscience is challenged by the problem of future generations.

15. Everything I have pointed to so far is of a logical nature. That is, it sets out the discrete categories and rough form of reason and of reasoning for each rational process. An indirect, nonlogical support to establishing relational reason as a discrete rational process may come from cognitive science. What is interesting is that the underlying brain process of each rational process appears to be different.

Cognitive scientists now know that the human brain has discrete cycles when dealing with experience. One cycle is analytic, and the other is largely empathic (Jack 2011). It would seem that theoretical reason draws primarily on the analytic cycle. Relational reason, by contrast, appears to draw on the empathic cycle. Practical reason, however, is interesting in it would appear to strongly involve both cycles in measure. At the same time, know-how appears to use muscle memory to a great extent (Crawford 2009). Some call this “the intelligence of the hands.”

Does our very physiology mark out the rational processes? If so, the underlying biological difference would indirectly support, while not directly showing, that different logics are in question.

16. Having, I hope, put us in a position to understand the mental groove of relational reason, we can now turn to a more complex point that will solidify our understanding. How do the rational processes interrelate in a dynamic human life? Trying not to belabor the topic but also trying to keep us aware of relational reason, I’ll use three sets of distinctions: codependence, co-originality, and cooperation.

First, each rational process is dependent on the others. I can’t know how to swim here if I don’t know that we have a deep enough river. Practice depends on theory. Similarly, I can’t know that we have a deep enough river here if I don’t know how to confirm the fact (so lab technicians, deeply engaged in the theoretical project of science, must equally be good with their hands). Theory depends upon practice.

But that isn't all. Humans live socially. Accordingly, our propositions are linguistic, which means their form is intersubjective. Another way to mark this is to notice that language is useful for and dependent on connection between people, that is, on speaking (Levinas 1998). Speaking is guided by relational reason, just as addressing is. The life of propositions depends on connection between people.

Something similar can be said of our intentions, too. Part of being a practical reasoner is being able to respond to questions such as, "Why are you bending your knees and pointing your hands?" Answer: "In order to dive into the river" (cf. Vogler 2002). Practical reasoning has intersubjective address and connection as conditions on our life with it. Once again, sociality, dependent on connection, is built into the space of practical reason, just as it is built into the space of theoretical reason. Theory and practice depend on relating.

We have already considered, too, how connecting with others depends on alternating between knowledge, know-how, and connection. To be good at connecting with you, I need to know how to connect with you. Should I be direct or indirect? Should I take my time or get to the point? But to answer these questions, I need to know some things about you.⁶ I need to know whether you are a thick-skinned person or are rather sensitive to confrontation. I need to know whether you are patient or impatient. All the rational processes are thus dependent on each other.

17. So much for codependence. "Co-originality" indicates that no one form of reason can be reduced to another. Due to the different logic of concepts involved, relating can't be reduced to knowing or to know-how. If it could, for instance, then knowing about you could substitute for connecting with you. Or knowing how to manipulate you could substitute for genuinely being with you. Yet by merely stating these conditionals, we can see that they are false. I can know everything in the world *about* you and still not connect with you. And not only does my ability to manipulate you not demand that you connect with you, but it would seem to preclude it! Even if one objected that excellent manipulation sometimes seduces connection,

6. As I will shortly explain (in §17), although relating depends on know-how (practice) and knowledge (theory), it isn't reducible to them. This point is important to keep in mind lest we turn relating into manipulation (know-how) or objectification (knowledge), both of which, of course, are the negation of authentic relating, even if they are partially needed to position oneself for the actual connection and its emotional understanding. You don't relate to someone if what you are basically doing is manipulating or objectifying her.

the fact that it is of a different order can be seen once the seduced person discovers the manipulation. She understandably feels violated, as if her free subjectivity were taken from her. As we said, know-how objectifies through its techniques. But connection is intersubjective.

We can rehearse similar arguments for both knowledge and know-how, showing how each can't be reduced to another. Briefly, if knowledge could be reduced to know-how, then knowing how to drink water would give me knowledge of what water and drinking are, chemically and biologically. True, I might pick up a working sense of some of water's properties and of some of the body's physiology by drinking water, but knowing how to drink water still would be no substitute for the chemical and biological elaboration of H₂O. Likewise, if knowledge could be reduced to relating, then my facility in connecting with you would imply that I know you objectively. But isn't one of the hard truths of relationship that we can be easily deceived about what kind of person another is simply because we can connect with him or her?

Lastly, if know-how could be reduced to knowledge, then a comprehensive knowledge of the physics of engines would be a substitute for knowing how to fix an engine, which it patently is not (Crawford 2009)! Similarly, my deep connection with another would imply that I know how to live with her. Yet another hard truth about relationship is that connection does not imply practicality.

The point here concerning co-originality is subtly different than the one surrounding codependence (§16). Not only do the three forms need each other to function in a human life; the three cannot be built up out of each other. This point lends weight to the idea that what we have here are three basic ways of being human that cannot be streamlined away but demand instead the wisdom to know their balance, know-how to balance them, and be capable of relating that balance well in a life with others.

18. So much for co-originality. The three cooperate in a dynamic human life, too. Their cooperation is a measure of what Aristotle (2002) would think of as a good human life, one that is functioning well (cf. Foot 2003).

We can see the general point about human life when we focus in on a specific context, such as a role in human life. What it takes for the role to function well suggests to us what it takes more generally for a human life to function well. Take as an example a lab technician. Not only must she know how to put an experiment together so as to seek the truth, she must also be able to relate well with her fellow technicians and investigators. If

she cannot do all these things well enough, her ability to function well as a lab technician will be inhibited. The cooperation of theory, practice, and relating is essential to her functioning well. She has to be practical and social enough to effectively seek the truth.

Take, too, the manager—an apparently practical role, managing a function in the larger collective agent that is a corporation. If she isn't knowledgeable about her domain (isn't an authority), and doesn't know how to work well in her domain (isn't effective), and doesn't manage to effectively connect with others (isn't "good with people"), she will not be much of a manager at all (cf. Jackall 2010). Functioning well as a manager depends heavily on balancing relating with others, moving tasks along, and knowing the facts concerning one's work (and any technicalities of its product or service), corporation, community, legal system, political system and especially economy. Once again, theory, practice, and relating must cooperate for someone to flourish in the workplace.

The general point here holds as well, I believe. In the contemporary Anglo-phone Aristotelian tradition (cf. Aristotle 2002, Foot 2003, Nussbaum 2007, and Thompson 2008), much weight is put upon the possibility of articulating the conditions on living a good life for a member of our kind (i.e., a good human life) simply from attention to the form of human life. I believe that the three rational processes and the balance that appears demanded between them indicate at least some general constraints on what a good—that is, well-functioning—human being is. These constraints are similar to those given by, for example, being able to roam and range, mate and rear for a horse. Without being able to do these kinds of things specific to horse life, a horse isn't a healthy, able horse (cf. especially Foot 2003). The good life for a horse is diminished for it. That our constraints come from kinds of reasoning gives us a more open nature than a horse, as the entire modern tradition has seen since Giovanni Pico dell Mirandola (1996) and is a centerpiece of much current work on being human (Nancy 2008, 2010; Bendik-Keymer 2006).

Are there any exceptions, any people who would not need to be well rounded between theory, practice, and relation in order to flourish? Perhaps only the beautiful soul, as Hegel understood (1979;VI:C:c), could live almost exclusively through empathic resonance with the rest of the world, that is, through relational reasoning.⁷ But as Hegel showed, such a life is not recog-

7. It is interesting that Hegel, following Schiller (2005), identifies beauty with the space that should be explained by relational reason. Perhaps Hegel has a similar sense of beauty as the one I've indicated in this essay.

nizably flourishing because the beautiful soul still has to eat (act) and know the refrigerator from the washing machine (have true beliefs). So much for the exclusively beautiful soul.

The point is that living a whole human life involves dynamically negotiating many ways of being human as these are expressed in different ways as we reach out to consider what we seek. When Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1996) inaugurated Renaissance humanism by underlining how the essence of being human is exercising our judgment, he was scarcely aware that reason is multiple. Yet his point was true—the main part of what makes being human difficult is that we have to find ways to live by the lights of reason.

19. We can now return to conscience as the capacity keeping open our awareness of persons. The point, clearly, is that such a concept of conscience is relational. We are now, I hope, more familiar with that mental groove—are closer to locating it inside ourselves and, more importantly, between ourselves. It is a moral foothold.

Lodged in the midst of practical life—and so in practical reason—conscience has a special function in keeping us aware of relational matters as we act. The voice of conscience is the voice of relational reason within practical life (Bendik-Keymer 2013, cf. Levinas 1998, *pace* Velleman 1999). Some people call conscience “the voice of common humanity” (Bendik-Keymer 2002, ch. 3–5).

At the center of the concept of conscience is the relational logic that invokes the categorical distinction between persons and objects. This category of the person, which gives us our relational landscape once we stand within the mental groove that is relational reason, is central to the dynamics of conscience. As we will see shortly, the possibility of resolving the tension between the personal and the seemingly impersonal problem of justice to future generations depends on the abstract category of the person—and of a set of related concepts that I will discuss later: the person-trace, and the person-projection. For now, though, please notice how the concept of conscience understood relationally avoids the objections to conscience with which I began today. First, Eichmann did not have a conscience, or at least had a defective one. He ignored the people his affections affected. He did so rigorously. Eichmann didn't have momentary lapses of attention. He positively hid behind his professional duty so as to avoid the people his orders caused to be shot and gassed. If conscience is the capacity within us to remain aware of the claims of persons, Eichmann had no conscience.

Second, relational awareness of other people is not a moral principle. It is a basis for the development of any moral principles worthy of the sense of humanity. Accordingly, conscience is not theoretically redundant or mysterious, at least in the sense of having no theoretical role. If conscience is mysterious, it is so in other meaningful ways, which literature explores (cf. Dostoevsky 1996).

Third, to affirm our evaluative powers in the midst of our most open and thriving experience of being human—to affirm our life (Nietzsche 1989)—depends on the open “infinity” (Levinas 1998), that is, being human, our great capacity for connection.⁸ We need conscience to remain open to each other and so to remain open to the fullness of life, *pace* Nietzsche!

Fourth, neurosis is precisely the closure of our capacity to connect with others as persons. In neurosis, both I and others become objects to my unconscious acting mechanically (cf. Guattari 2010). What would psychic health be here if not an open and working conscience—a world where “subjectification” (Guattari 2010), that is, being a person in personally fulfilling relationships with others, were possible again for me?⁹ Accordingly, we need conscience as a foothold to undo harmful patterns in our relations to ourselves and to others, *pace* Freud (1961) and the—thankfully waning—psychoanalytic distrust of conscience that was a feature of much twentieth-century culture in Europe and North America especially.

20. To have a conscience. To not lose a sense of persons. Emmanuel Levinas spoke of being “responsible,” in the sense of always able to respond to others, because aware of them as demanding a hearing, of never being mere objects (Levinas 1998, ch. 2). The thought is actually found in Kant when his explanation of good will implies that every person demands being given reasons that she can find acceptable for any way in which she becomes a means to one’s ends (Kant 1998, sec. II). It is implicit in the development

8. Cf. Nancy 2010, who links our “infinity” with our capacity for “being in common” as mutually reinforcing existential conditions of humans.

9. Both Guattari and his long-time collaborator Deleuze had misgivings about the term “person,” which they saw as a functionally bourgeois term bound up with exploitation, oppression, and repression—most centrally around what they took to be the repressive “machine” of the “self,” a peculiar construct. In other writing, perhaps I will have the space to explain why their view of the personal is problematic due to their own lack of a grasp of relational reason. For Guattari, only theory and practice carve up the world, even in “desire”—a point that partially explains the impersonal and meaningless void, even depression, at the center of their lives and work. See Dosse 2010.

of the currently cutting-edge topic of “the second-person standpoint” as a fundamental to the moral point of view (Darwall 2006).

However, what Kant missed and Levinas understood was the full-bodied nature of relational awareness—how awareness of persons, and so of conscience—is as much a matter of body language, eye contact, and, in a word, “heart” as it is a matter of conscious reason.¹⁰ It is largely precognitive, such that relational reason processes in part through a precognitive intuition (what the phenomenological tradition Levinas was in called “passive synthesis” and, in Levinas’ language, “anarchy”), through what Jonathan Glover (2001) calls the “human responses.” Perhaps that is why conscience is meaningfully mysterious at times, even though it is also very clear and cut and dried at others.

When we are turned around by the presence of someone, claimed by our sense of people near us, what is happening? The idea implicit in relational reason is that we are entering into a certain kind of relationship. In his groundbreaking work on practical logic, Michael Thompson (2008) speaks of the “gear shifts” that thought takes. These “gear shifts” are shifts in logic and lead to entirely different ways of representing the world, for instance, between representing a thing as a self-guided life form as opposed to a simple nexus of physical laws arranging matter.¹¹ Much the same can be said of seeing someone—seeing a person. To be aware of persons is to enter into a kind of relationship where subjects, not objects, are the primary focus, as I have already said. We are called on, diverted, summoned, disturbed, and turned around by people. We have to train ourselves to resist being so. We have to attend people—or drown them out. Or rather, people attend us, in the precise sense of holding onto (in French, “*tenir*,” to hold) us. We can learn to twist away, but we have to achieve a certain kind of discipline to do so—the discipline Eichmann had and the conscienceless bureaucrat has. The mental groove of relational categories comes to us through others, is reinforced through time and attention, and is dislodged only with effort, which is why nonviolence works over time.

10. There does not need to be body language for there to be a genuine connection, but it helps. One can understand, for example, email’s difficulty in this light. People do sometimes connect through bare, electronic words—even without knowing each other. There is a strange poetry to it. At the same, as most people in organizations know, email is often as much a problem as a useful tool, for while it increases efficiency, it also increases point-less misunderstandings due to the absence of tone, body language, and other human cues. Roger Saillant’s piece in this journal may need to consider more closely the lack of relational reason in the Information Age. He infers that the “information” age is the relational age, but there are reasons to be skeptical.

11. See part one, “The Representation of Life” (Thompson 2008, ch 1–4).

If we are turned around by the presence of people, what are the consequences of acknowledging people thoroughly (cf. Cavell 2002)? When a person cannot be reduced to being an object without violence being done to her very nature as a person, many things must change about how decisions are made, how interactions occur, how consequences are conceptualized, even how information is shared as communication. The personal becomes important. We have to hear the "personal" in the "interpersonal." I can't explore these changes in any detail here. But they affect how institutions should conduct their business and how we should conceive of our roles within society. I wish only to leave to your imagination all the work that can be done here as we try to make modern life and modern work more humane (cf. Zeldin 1994).

If we explore the personal as a category, however, we should explore it cross-culturally. I believe that conscience as the location of the mental groove of relational reason allows for a universal moral psychology that can bring closer together deep cultural traditions in the "East" and the "West." This has already begun around the discourse of emotional intelligence, for instance (Goleman and the Dalai Lama, 2004). Things are flowing.

21. But unless we are careful, an undercurrent will sweep them out to sea. The problem, as I've said (§5), is that while we must reside in the personal to be humane, the gravest moral problem—the gravest threat to persons—arises entirely impersonally and seems to demand impersonality of a sort that defies (my) simple conceptualization. There is an undercurrent beneath the stream we've been exploring, and it pulls our moral systems out into the unknown, throwing their authority into question—even our ability to remain comfortably in the mental groove we've sunk into today, together. The only foothold I have in this problem is the concept of our aggregate effect on future generations. Thankfully, as we shall see, perhaps some of the categories of conscience may help sort out the aporia and help us cross the river.

22. What are aggregate effects? Commonly, when ethicists consider collectives, the idea of an intentional collective, a group agent, is in mind. Corporations are group agents. So are states, and teams. In each case, the collective qua collective is bound by a part-whole ordering in which the parts of the collectives (which may be collectives themselves, e.g., a project team, or a city) understand themselves as joined to the collective in terms of the common agenda or constraints on any agenda before them. Usually their agenda is

minimal: to profit, in the case of a corporation; or to subsist or to improve, in the case of a state. Similarly, if one part of the collective is asked what it is doing as a member of the collective, it can explain itself in terms of the collective end, such as when a task force can explain its role within a corporation. If the part can't explain its role, that is taken as a problem.

By contrast, some large-scale problems—especially environmental ones (but also macroeconomic ones)—are not produced by any collective agent. They are produced by an aggregate collective. This is a set of agents joined as agents only by the way their individual actions produce a net sum effect, unintentionally.¹² The collective here is relative to the effect, so to speak, not to the intention. Whatever identity the agents in the collective share, it is not one by which they identify themselves as agents with an agenda in common. Aggregate collectives are just groups of actors doing their own thing.

Aggregate collectives cause a problem due to the unintentional effects they produce. Take the cases of the following large-scale environmental changes: deforestation, overhunting or overfishing, toxic contamination of ecosystem chains on a large scale, massive species loss (with the risk of a cascade to mass extinction), the ozone hole, climate change, and now ocean acidification. All these problems of scale are the result of unintentional actions carried on by agents—individuals, corporations, states, and so on—over time, with the individual effects adding up slowly to produce the problem threatening future generations and sometimes even current ones.

From an ethical standpoint, the challenge of such problems of scale is that they are caused unintentionally. Usually this challenge takes people immediately to the question of institutional design, as in the classic case of tragedies of the commons (Hardin 1968). The idea is that we need to design incentives, disincentives, or regulations better so that myopic actors—that is, actors acting only as individuals without awareness of what others are doing—do not aggregate to produce unintended, bad effects. But for many of the cases facing us, due to the problem of future generations, we have no institutional answers, nor even adequate concepts to approach finding them (Gardiner 2011, ch. 5, 7). Because we cannot cooperate with the future, the problem of future generations is not a tragedy of the commons, and we do not have an understanding of political legitimacy that could allow us to approach it yet.

12. As Drew Poppleton notes, "From an environmental standpoint, all of us [could] be lumped into one collective[,] because together, though acting largely independently, we are [causing massive environmental problems]." Poppleton, commentary on this paper, April 2012, Case Western Reserve University.

23. Nonetheless, when an aggregate collective produces an unintentional, bad effect on a massive scale (and the scales are both spatial and temporal—usually both global or at least regional and extending far into the future), the question of what form our social organization takes is the right one. I call this topic the question of the form of power.

The form of power is the organization any collective has (intentional or aggregate) so as to produce the effects that it does. "Power" here is understood simply as the causal ability to produce specific effects, namely those that affect valuable things, respect-worthy beings, or persons. Through the lens of the form of power, one can approach, say, the collective effects of the "Western" nations over the past two hundred years in contributing to climate change without having to assume intentional coordination. One can ask simply, how was society set up such that individual agents—persons or states, for instance—could produce the amount of greenhouse gas forcing that they did? And the answer would include such things as a system of knowledge (and of ignorance), a system of politics (and of antagonistic national self-interest), a system of economics (that externalized the costs of pollution), and so on. The form of power is the complex architecture of all of these systems insofar as, through their organization, the collective produces the effects it does, unintentionally.

24. The ethical—and precisely moral—dimension of a given form of power hits home once we consider the problem of future generations. Following Gardiner (2011), we can point out that future generations of people do not cause what they inherit and, by virtue of being clearly a future generation (and thus not an extension of our generation), have no reciprocal relationship with the present generation.

Gardiner defines future generations through these two conditions of causal impotence and nonreciprocity so as to avoid the case of reciprocity across families between, say, grandparents and grandchildren. His point is that there will be some set of future people who do not have any reciprocal relations with us. These people are clearly future generations in a morally nonarbitrary sense (Gardiner 2011, ch. 5). To speak of the generation not being arbitrary is to claim that the number of years postdating us does not make people belong to a new generation. Rather, the fact that they stand in morally significant relations with us gives us a principled reason for a division between generations. Which relations? The two given by the two conditions: the future people are passive to our actions and have no basis for reciprocity

with us. This would not be true for our grandchildren. They have some power over us and some ability to be reciprocal with us. But far-future people, as I like to call them, have no interpersonal connections with us. They cannot have them, nor can we.

The problem in a form of power, then, comes from this: future generations are faced with the unintentionally bad consequences of our aggregate collectives. They are faced with having to pay the costs of our actions and to pick up the responsibility for what we do. Moreover, they will suffer the risks of what we have caused and will have to deal with the incapacities a harsher planet might offer.¹³

These are no trivial things when it comes to thinking of affecting adults, who should be one's moral equals. But the matter is much more severe once one considers that, morally speaking, anything bad we externalize onto future generations affects children first. Each person in future generations begins as a dependent and an innocent child.

Insofar as the unintended consequences of our aggregate actions push bad (and in the case of the environmental issues mentioned earlier, sometimes really bad) things onto future generations, our form of power is pushing these things onto innocent children. And there is nothing morally worse, more negligent and reprehensible than that. Nothing at all in the world. There are only equally awful things people can do to each other.

25. Many of the aggregate effects that we are considering are either epochal or species-historical (Bendik-Keymer 2012; and Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, ch. 13). They are epochal insofar as they are the result of an epoch of human history, for instance, the industrial epoch of mass scale production based on fossil fuel in the case of climate change and chemical contamination.¹⁴ They are species-specific insofar as they seem to be the result of the total effects of our species since even before recorded history (that is, since before 8000 BC), as in the case of elevated species extinction risking a cascade into the Earth's sixth mass extinction (Pinet 2009).

Both the epochal and the species-historical are massive scales for the aggregate, let alone for the spatial and temporal effects of that aggregate. Not surprisingly, within these scales, the question of the form of power admits of highly complicated and as yet unarticulated (or not yet fully articulated) analysis (Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, esp. ch. 13). As Gardiner (2011)

13. Cf. Hertsgaard 2011, although he does not focus far enough into the future.

14. This appears to be Roger Saillant's focus in his contribution to this issue of the journal.

and Thompson (in Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, ch. 1) have pointed out so well, what is at stake, really, is the moral responsibility to change the form of our civilization. Anything else ends up being reprehensible.

26. What categories should guide this social reform, and how should conscience figure into it? Changing our civilization is not something individuals can do. As individuals, our actions have no consequence at the scales we are considering. The only thing of consequence is to change the patterns in our civilization that produce injustice. These patterns are what Iris Marion Young (2010) called "structurally unjust." They make it so that individually decent people who don't mean to do anything bad are complicit in large-scale patterns that produce equally large-scale injustice. Here there is a disconnection between individual decency and the overall immorality of one's context (cf. Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012, ch. 13). Responsible people must accordingly change the context.

27. How? Only through what Young calls "civic action." Only by acting in the role of an individual addressing the public sphere and its responsibility for one's society's organization can one discharge one's responsibility to face down structural injustice. It is the nature of structural injustice to persist precisely because one's society allows it. Only civic engagement on behalf of societal transformation can possibly follow through on the moral charge associated with the problem of aggregate effects.

Certainly, then, we can't do without conscience. Precisely by only doing one's job according to one's society, that is, precisely by allowing oneself the same excuse as Eichmann made, we are all today complicit in large-scale structural injustice. People accordingly ought not to simply do their jobs—they should allow their consciences to break through the impersonal roles of unjust institutions. Acting for the sake of justice, they must be active and transformative citizens.

In the case of many environmental problems, however, they must take on both our epochal and species-historical form of life. And this is no small thing. It utterly exceeds anything people of conscience can personally do or imagine. Likewise, it exceeds all their relationships and even their relational abilities. We are losing our foothold again.

28. Far-future oriented citizenship proceeds in light of highly impersonal considerations. The future generations one's collective affects are faceless and

abstract—and so are the distant ancestors (e.g., in 9000 BC) or contemporaries (around the globe in places one has never seen) who produce these problems of usually global scale. Moreover, whereas one might conceivably learn to understand one's way into the place of those in the past or around the world, to project one's own imagination onto the future is fantasy. We have no idea how future people will be. There is no interpersonal connection in sight here, only an abstract fantasy as a placeholder for the moral point of view.

Can I have a conscience, then? These dynamics I've discussed tonight move almost schizophrenically into personal relationship and away from personal relationship toward the most general impersonality imaginable, that of a species perspective. Each direction comes from an awareness of persons, true, but the one is visceral and real, and the other largely imaginary. The personalizing vector moves people of sound conscience toward ever-greater relationships centered around the autonomy and individuality of subjects, that is, around people's voices (and body language), consent (and opening up), and dignity. It searches out oppressive and exploitative circumstances, the stunting of human freedom, and whatever lets people end up as objects. Within appropriate boundaries, it reaches toward the humane, the intimate, the familiar, and the personal. It seeks to connect, to meet, to pay attention to another's subjectivity, that is, to her freedom.

Against this dynamic we find also a different vector that moves toward restraining our form of life from doing anything that it knows to be risky, problematic, or wrong to children coming into this world. We may not know what exactly children of the future will need as persons, but we should not do anything that affects them that we presently think, on reflection, is questionable. So this dynamic abstracts away from the intricacies of personal life to study and to conceptualize our form of life as a whole, its aggregate collective effects, its form of power, and what we need to do to restrain that form of power within the bounds of what we take, to the best of our knowledge, to be entirely responsible and just to children coming into this world. At best, this is a hand stretched out to a connection that could only be received in imagination by the people of the future, themselves recognizing that we acted as if we could connect with them.

29. The personalizing dynamic moves to the here and now, before you. However, the impersonal dynamic moves to the there and then, before an abstract mirror of ourselves as responsible—or not—in the anticipated but also entirely imaginary eyes of those to come.

Moreover, the personalizing dynamic individualizes relationships, which in turn open up the differentiation of each party, each individual. However, the impersonal dynamic moves to lose individual relationships in lieu of an anonymous belonging to our form of life as it lives up, or fails to live up, to its sense of justice.

The one dynamic is intimate and personally, emotionally engaging (Dostoevsky 1996). The other is impersonal, coldly sobering, and emotionally engaging only for those who have internalized the claims of citizenship deeply (Young 2010).

Can we clearly conceptualize this torsion to conscience such that "conscience" has a coherent logic rather than a merely conventional and arbitrary list of causes? Yet it would seem to violate conscience, to, say, simply shear off the problem of aggregate effects. That would really put my conscience at sea.

30. At present, what I can say clearly is that the category of the person allows one to make the relevant abstraction into the far future. The category of the person is a relational category, as we've seen. Yet it is entirely empty because it awaits the subjectivity of the other. Really, the category of the person is a frame for connection with others holding open a different kind of interaction than would be possible under purely practical categories. In fact, we have a name for this different kind of interaction. We call it a relationship.

Although, then, we cannot relate with the far future, we can project relational categories into the future in much the same way as one awaits connection when trying to relate. Trying to relate to the future is, paradoxically, possible in this case where actual relationship is impossible. Moreover, the category anchoring relationship—that of the person—seems to demand that we try to relate even though we cannot actually relate. I call this demand in the abstract a "person-trace" in our consciences.

A person-trace in our consciences allows us the possibility of a person-projection. This is an abstraction belonging to relational reason whereby, due to a person-trace in our heart, we project personhood where we don't actually connect with persons. The possibilities of person-projection deserve to be explored. I have explored them somewhat in our moral concepts relating to other animals (Bendik-Keymer 2006, lecture 4), but they present themselves clearly with respect to far-future people.

Moreover, justice is a practical concept (cf. Aristotle 2002, bk V) that protects relational matters (cf. Thompson 2004). It is one of the prime areas where practical and relational reason cooperate, supporting each other. Justice

protects the possibility of people—and so protects the possibility of people-projections (cf. Nussbaum 2007, including her approach to other animals). The point is important here because what conscience appears to demand (due to the people-traces that the thought of far-future generations invokes in us) is intergenerational justice in the absence of connection. Since justice is a practical condition on connection, striving for justice toward future people appears consistent with keeping open the space for people, that is, with trying to connect through the category of projected persons.

To be fully given, all of oneself, to those with whom one interacts and yet to be nameless and irrelevant except as a function of one's form of life, trying to keep it from failing itself miserably in the (projected) eyes of future people, this is the complex of conscience that makes asking whether you (the one asking yourself) have a conscience no mere rhetorical or judgmental question. It would seem to take art, or excellence, to have a conscience. Certainly, it demands—perhaps a new kind of—maturity and much imaginative projection.¹⁵

If I were to hazard a deduction, it would be that the leaders of tomorrow must be excellent at this dynamic, relational conscience. Despite themselves, they must work tirelessly to salvage our form of life in the eyes of future children, disciplined in projection, clearing mindfulness to listen to the people-traces in their hearts. They must show far-reaching common humanity and deep connections with others as they do it. If they fail to do either thing—fail to work to restrain our civilization, thinking of it at a great level of abstraction and approaching projection with anything less than a geological time scale (Pinet 2009), or if they fail to connect with others now, fail to attend to people here and tonight with a great deal of humanity—they fail to have a conscience. They either become self-absorbed in their own generation or they become impersonal, inhumane.¹⁶

15. The closest I have come to glimpsing this almost geologically timed projection came in reflecting on Alex Shakar's novel *Luminarium* (2011), which explores a roughly (Zen) Buddhist trajectory of losing the self in experiences of the whole continuum of life. What strikes me as promising here is the continuity that exists within Buddhism between relational reason—one of the virtues of Buddhism's emphasis on compassion—and a cosmic perspective that would seem to speak to the pure intergenerational problem, albeit through an ironically worded metaphysics of "reincarnation" (for reasons I cannot go into here, I believe that Buddhist philosophy of language largely makes its publically recognized metaphysical principles ironic). Of course, my use of the category of a person jars substantially with Buddhism, however—as does my differentiation between self and other implicit in relational logic and my understanding of psychic health.

16. Of course, the conditions of leadership sketched here are necessary, not sufficient, for accomplishing what leadership must effect: societal or large-scale organizational change. As

31. As the twenty-first century breaks over us with its increasingly ominous problems of vast spatial and extended temporal scales, our consciences are the site within each of us of a civic responsibility born of our relational sense of humanity. The complexity here is that what civic responsibility demands exceeds how we actually relate, and yet conscience without its relational dimension is inhuman, impersonal. The problem of this essay has been how to conceptualize the demands of conscience when one must be pulled both toward the interpersonal and toward the aggregate effects of our civilization's form of power, that is, toward the impersonal. The challenge that people must meet if we are to keep our footing as moral agents going into the future is how to combine within one conscience the dynamic tension between the personal and the impersonal, between the urgency of face-to-face relations and the silent, remote scale of the entire life of our species.

Even if we cannot actually relate to the far future, our relational capacities allow us to try to relate through the idea of the projected person. Far future people should invoke people-traces in anyone with a conscience. We should feel inside us the pull of future children, pure categorical ideas that demand our greatest moral responsibility. I do not think it is histrionic to say that we should be haunted by "them."

32.

I take *Ignatia* for grief.

Aconite for shock.

Chamomilla for anger which out of nowhere like a slap.

Herbs for retained placenta.

Needles for retained placenta.

Needles for weak pulse, for grief, for shock, for disappointment.

I drink wine, coffee and take pills except

I don't, not yet, just in case.

In case hiding. In case mistaken.¹⁷

I have argued elsewhere (Bendik-Keymer 2012), the nature of structural injustice in the form of power of our aggregate collectives demands civic activism to reorganize crucial aspects of society such that the structural injustice is remedied. Single leaders rarely accomplish such a thing. They need, rather, to be good at leading social movements or complex organizations to take on structural injustice effectively.

17. Zucker 2009, "Welcome to the Blighted Ovum Support Group," 39.

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