Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S. - U.K. Extradition Treaty
Abstract
The recent ratification of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom (hereinafter Supplementary Treaty) constitutes the most radical departure in extradition law since the U.S. judiciary first recognized the political offense exception to extradition in 1894. Until now, the legal debate surrounding the Supplementary Treaty has focused on those provisions which prohibit judicial application of the political offense exception in cases involving a wide range of enumerated criminal acts. This note, in contrast, suggests that the most extraordinary aspect of the Supplementary Treaty is not its diminution of the judiciary's traditional role in extradition, but rather its unprecedented attempt to expand the judiciary's role by legislatively reversing the "rule of noninquiry."
Keywords
Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty
Publication Date
1988
Document Type
Article
Place of Original Publication
Stanford Journal of International Law
Publication Information
25 Stanford Journal of International Law 257 (1988)
Repository Citation
Scharf, Michael P., "Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S. - U.K. Extradition Treaty" (1988). Faculty Publications. 735.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/735