Abstract

Article III of the Constitution seeks to protect judicial independence, partly through a guarantee of life tenure and partly through a clause that prohibits the diminution of judges' "compensation". The Compensation Clause does not address the subject of taxation, but it has always been understood to affect the federal government's taxing power. This article examines the framing of the Compensation Clause, some nineteenth-century detours that are inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on taxation of judges under the Clause. The article critically analyzes the Court's most recent case on the subject, United States v. Hatter. Finally, the article rejects an alternative justification for the Compensation Clause that the Court has lately advanced, namely the need to make the bench financially attractive to prospective judges. That rationale is unworthy of constitutional status under any interpretive theory.

Keywords

Article III, Compensation Clause, Hatter, judicial independence, taxing power

Publication Date

2006

Document Type

Article

Place of Original Publication

Case Western Reserve Law Review

Publication Information

Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence

Comments

56 Case Western Reserve Law Review 965 (2006)

Included in

Tax Law Commons

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COinS Jonathan L. Entin Faculty Bio