Abstract
When U.S. corporations cause harm abroad, should foreign plaintiffs be allowed to sue in the United States? Federal courts are increasingly saying no. The courts have expanded the doctrines of forum non convenes and prudential standing to dismiss a growing number of transnational cases. This restriction of court access has sparked considerable tension in international relations, as a number of other nations view such dismissals as an attempt to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. A growing number of countries have responded by enacting retaliatory legislation that may ultimately harm U.S. interests. This article argues that the judiciary’s restriction of access to federal courts ignores important foreign relations, trade, and regulatory considerations. The article applies institutional choice theory to recommend a process by which the three branches of government can work together to establish a more coherent court-access policy for transnational cases.
Keywords
Standing, Transnational Cases, Institutional Choice Theory, National Interest, Foreign Plaintiffs
Publication Date
2010
Document Type
Article
Place of Original Publication
Boston College Law Review
Publication Information
51 Boston College Law Review 1081 (2010)
Repository Citation
Robertson, Cassandra Burke, "Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice" (2010). Faculty Publications. 52.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/52
