Abstract
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for deterrence, should not apply the no-effect rule of illegal contracts uniformly and why they should vary the type of relief according to the factual setting. It posits that a graduated relief structure will maximize efficient deterrence. An efficient deterrence scheme will preserve limited personal, judicial and societal resources without burdening legitimate transactions.
Keywords
Public Policy, Illegality, No Effect, Contracts, No-effect Rule, Illegal Contracts, Graduated Relief Structure, Deterrence
Publication Date
2006
Document Type
Article
Place of Original Publication
Iowa Law Review
Publication Information
74 Iowa Law Review 115 (1988)
Repository Citation
Kostritsky, Juliet P., "Illegal Contacts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory" (2006). Faculty Publications. 466.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/466
